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In comparison to security relationships characterised by the centrality of the state and the use of force, 
better explained by the ‘traditional’ security perspective, the U.S.-Mexico security relationship in the 
1990s is defined by non-state actors and trans-border concerns from the U.S. point of view. U.S. security 
concerns regarding Mexico are the result of growing interdependence between the two countries, and the 
paradox of the bilateral security relationship is that these concerns only intensified in the context of 
NAFTA.  
The kind of concerns Mexico indirectly generates for the United States requires for their 
explanation a non-traditional conception of security. This thesis relies thus on the combination of the 
‘Copenhagen School’ and Risk Society theory perspectives to explaining security issues.   
While drug trafficking from Mexico has been seen as detrimental to the social fabric of the United 
States because of its impact on the U.S. society, Mexican undocumented immigration has been perceived 
as a U.S. concern because of the possibility for this flow to weaken the U.S. cultural identity.    
 This thesis also includes the analysis of border environmental challenges, in particular the 
potential for an epidemic from contaminated water in the region, in order to emphasise that not all 
pressing border issues are security concerns, as well as the value of non-traditional perspectives to explain 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
As President Felipe Calderón’s term is coming to an end on the last day of November 2012, 
Mexico is facing a complex and dire security situation as drug trafficking organisations (DTOs)
1
 
continue their violent competition for dominance of the lucrative corridors to the United States. 
According to the most recent National Drug Control Assessment 2011, Mexican DTOs are 
preeminent in the drug trade in the United States because of ‘their control of smuggling routes 
across the U.S. Southwest border and their capacity to produce, transport, and/or distribute 
cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine’.2 In fact, it has been established that 
‘Mexican DTOs represent the greatest organized crime threat to the United States’.3    
Notwithstanding the fact that President Calderón intensified the fight against drug trafficking 
in Mexico since assuming power on 1 December 2006,
4
 the security context in the country began 
to deteriorate long before, as the trend of violent deaths in the country -which at the time already 











                                                 
1
 As most academic analyses on this subject do, this thesis adopts the more accurate term ‘drug trafficking 
organisation’ instead of ‘drug cartel’, recognising that Mexican drug groups do not quite operate either to ‘regulate 
output’ or to ‘fix prices’ for drugs, which are key aspects of the definition of the term ‘cartel’. See ‘cartel’, Oxford 
English Dictionary, [online] available: 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/28279?rskey=sBrhxh&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid (08/06/12). 
2
 U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), National Drug Threat Assessment 2011, National Drug Intelligence Center 
(NDIC), August 2011, [online] available: http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs44/44849/44849p.pdf (08/06/12), p.2. 
3
 U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), National Drug Threat Assessment 2009, National Drug Intelligence Center 
(NDIC), December 2008, [online] available: http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs31/31379/31379p.pdf (11/06/12), p.iii. 
4
 Since the start of his administration, President Calderón deployed 40,000 troops for counter-narcotics operations, 
beginning with ‘Joint Operation Michoacán’ on 11 December 2006 that included 4,200 troops. See Notimex, 









The number of drug-related deaths was 1,080 (2001), 1,230 (2002), 1,290 (2003), 1,304 (2004), 1,776 (2005), 2,120 
(2006), 2,280 (2007), 5,153 (2008), and 6,587 (2009). Source: L. Astorga and D. A. Shirk, Drug Trafficking 
Organizations and Counter-Drug Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context. Mexico and the United States: 
Confronting the Twenty-First Century, USMEX WP 10-0, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, School of International 
Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego (USMEX), El Colegio de la Frontera Norte 
(Tijuana), Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, El Colegio de México, available [online]: 
http://usmex.ucsd.edu/assets/024/11632.pdf (11/06/12), p.41. 
 
An interesting argument locates the origin of current drug violence in Mexico in 2001, as a 
result of the Mexican government’s offensive against the brutal Arellano-Felix organisation 
(AFO/Tijuana DTO), which in turn ended up strengthening the Sinaloa faction, whetting thus its 
appetite for a greater share of the drug market.
5
 Violence in Mexico, however, is a multifaceted 
phenomenon and there are four general factors that help explain the current context. First, 
recurrent economic crises in Mexico between the 1970s and 1990s, and consequent economic 
neo-liberal reforms since the mid-1980s, significantly contributed to erode standards of living in 
the country. Besides increasing unemployment, the situation also contributed to the growth of the 
underground economy, which by some estimates provides income for 28.4 million people or 
64.01% of Mexico’s economically-active population.6 Second, the shift of South American 
cocaine routes from the Caribbean to continental Mexico in the mid-1980s after U.S. authorities 
                                                 
5
 V. Felbab-Brown, The Violent Drug Market in Mexico and Lessons from Colombia, Policy Paper Number 12, 
March 2009, Foreign Policy at Brookings, The Brookings Institution, [online] available: 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/3/mexico%20drug%20market%20felbabbrown/03_m
exico_drug_market_felbabbrown.pdf (08/06/12), p.5. 
6














closed the basin’s aerial and maritime corridors, resulted in a more prominent role for Mexican 
DTOs by eventually increasing both their profits and power, as Colombia’s cartels (i.e Medellín 
and Cali) became also gradually weakened by joint U.S.-Colombia law enforcement action.
7
 It is 
estimated that drug trafficking generates around $30 billion dollars a year for Mexican DTOs -
equivalent to between 3% and 4% of Mexico’s annual gross domestic product (GDP) ($1.5 
trillion)-, in the process providing means of subsistence for close to half a million people.
8
 Third, 
while these law enforcement and economic changes were taking place, political transformation 
in Mexico eroded the traditional social control mechanisms of the single-party political system, 
weakening thus the official containment orientation that allowed drug cartels to grow with the 
connivance and protection of authorities that also prevented violent confrontations among these 
groups. In 1997, for instance, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) lost for the first 
time the majority in the lower house of Congress, and in 2000 it lost the Presidency to the 
Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) candidate, Vicente Fox, and this reallocation of power 
contributed to political fragmentation in the country. Eventually, state and local governments 
found it increasingly difficult to incorporate the federal government’s centrally-designed security 
initiatives because of their different ‘political interests’, and within this vacuum criminal groups 
attained more autonomy from government structures.
9
 The fact that the government’s response to 
drug trafficking in Mexico became fragmented because of the shift described above, -that is, that 
either the level of response to crime or the level of complicity with crime varies for authorities in 
different areas of the country, in part explains why President Calderón’s security efforts have not 
been successful in dealing with both drug flows and violent incidents.
10
 The lesson from this, 
therefore, is that in the long run a comprehensive political agreement in Mexico is required in 
order to effectively contain violence in the country. Fourth, as a result of political change and 
transformations in law enforcement agencies in Mexico, especially the abolition of the political 
police (the DTOs arbitrator), the Federal Directorate of Security (DFS) in response to U.S. 
                                                 
7
 J. S. Beittel, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of Rising Violence, January 7, 2011, 
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress, Congressional Research Service (CRS), [online] available: 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/155587.pdf (08/06/12), p.5. 
8
 D. A. Shirk, The Drug War in Mexico. Confronting a Shared Threat, Center for Preventive Action, Council on 
Foreign Relations, Council Special Report No. 60, March 2011, [online] available: 
www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Mexico_CSR60.pdf (01/06/12), p.7. 
9
 A. Cerda-Ardura, ‘Los Matazetas, apuesta por mayor violencia’, Entrevista a Luis Astorga Almanza/Investigador 






pressure after the assassination in Mexico of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent 
Enrique ‘Kiki’ Camarena Salazár on 19 February 1985 (along with a Mexican pilot, Alfredo 
Zavala Avelar),
11
 the bipolar structure of DTOs in Mexico began to crumble (at that time the two 
main DTOs were Sinaloa and Golfo), leading to the accession of new leaders within the 
fractionalised groups and also to a more intense competition among them. By the 1990s there 
were four major DTOs in Mexico, in comparison to recent years when it has been possible to 
identify at least seven groups.
12
 The country found itself thus with the worst of the two worlds: 
less official control over these criminal groups because of political fragmentation, and less 
respect for the traditional rules of the game on the part of the new leaders of those organisations. 
According to one perspective, the ‘self-destructive’ process that contributes to the breakup of 
these groups, that is, the violent methods used to settle disputes among them, at the same time 
compels them to incorporate new members from marginalised sectors of society whose 
inexperience and, sometimes, greed, in turn lead to more violence,
13
 and this is an argument that 
helps explain why the current organisations are less respectful than the old ones of what used to 
be the ‘non-spoken’ rules of the game (i.e. no dead bodies on the streets). 
 By the 1990s, moreover, Osiel Cárdenas-Guillén, leader of the Gulf DTO, co-opted 
members of the Mexican Army Air/Amphibious Special Forces Unit (GAFES/GANFES) who 
became known as ‘Zetas’, and this development resulted in the introduction, for the first time, of 
paramilitary tactics in the confrontation among DTOs; crime paramilitary tactics implied not 
only the presence but also control of criminal activities within a given territorial demarcation by 
criminal groups, and this eventually led to confrontation with the government after these groups 
were seen as taking over exclusive functions of the state,
14
 such as challenging the official 
monopoly of the use of force. In this context, and in comparison with previous periods of 
violence, DTOs’ behaviour has been characterised by their aggression against the upper echelons 
of security forces; the brazenness of their brutal acts; and the use of high-power weapons (i.e. 
                                                 
11
 Political control mechanisms, through police forces, started to erode since at least the 1980s with the assassination 
of Camarena and the dissolution of the DFS. Political power used to establish the rules of the game and drug 
organisations lacked the capacity to challenge the state. Erosion of those instruments led to an increase of violence 
among drug traffickers. See A. Cerda-Ardura, ‘Inoperante el actual esquema antidrogas’, Entrevista a Luis Astorga 
Almanza/Investigador del Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales de la UNAM, Siempre!,9 de Febrero de 2004. 
12
 These are the Beltran-Leyva, Los Zetas, the Gulf, the Juárez, La Familia, the Sinaloa, and the Tijuana DTOs.  
13
 J. Villalobos, ‘Doce mitos de la guerra contra el narco’, Nexos en línea, (01/01/2010), [online] available: 
http://www.nexos.com.mx/?P=leerarticulo&Article=72941 (08/06/12).  
14
 Cerda-Ardura, ‘Los Matazetas’. 
19 
 




President Calderón responded to this situation escalating the fight against DTOs, by 
increasingly involving the military in regional operations around the country to contain violence 
generated by competition among these organisations; that is, by further militarising the response 
to organised crime activities. This course of action, however, has not been new in Mexico as a 
measure of last resort in response to widespread corruption among its police forces, 
notwithstanding that the military has not proved to be above and beyond drug-related corruption. 
The centrepiece of the Calderón administration’s strategy has focused on the idea of turning a 
‘national security’ problem into a ‘public safety’ challenge by breaking down the big DTOs into 
smaller groups, under the logic that smaller factions are more amenable to be contained.
16
 This 
strategy has put a premium on neutralising high-value targets (HVTs), and this orientation has 
contributed to intra-cartel conflict.
17
 In fact, decapitating DTOs has created more chaos and 
uncertainty in the short-term without necessarily dealing with either drug distribution or internal 
violence. This strategy has also been criticised in terms of an offensive that was launched 
without previously having the required tools to get the job done, evident, for instance, in the fact 
that not only Mexico’s police forces are characterised by their lack of professionalism and 
ingrained corruption,
18
 but also, according to an estimation, by the fact that only 1 or 2 per 100 
crimes actually end up in conviction, which provides the picture of the serious level of impunity 
in the country and the long way Mexico still has to go to achieve an effective judicial reform.
19
 
It is important to note that even though violence in Mexico has so far been localised, it has 
spread internally in the last years. According to a study, 2/3 of drug-related deaths have occurred 
in just 5 of the 32 states, and around 80% of them have occurred in 168 of the country’s 2,456 
municipalities, even though the density of violence in some locations such as Ciudad Juárez has 
                                                 
15
 A. Gereben Schaefer, B. Bahney, K. J. Riley, Security in Mexico. Implications for U.S. Policy Options, RAND, 
Monograph Series, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, c2009), [online] available: 
http://www.insyde.org.mx/images/security_in_mexico.pdf (08/06/12), p.xiv. 
16
 Shirk, The Drug War in Mexico, p.9. 
17
 I. Salmerón, ‘A muerte, la lucha de los capos por dominar el narcotráfico’, Entrevista a Luis Astorga Almanza y 
Jorge Chabat/Investigadores sociales, Siempre!,13 de Febrero de 2006. By mid-2010, more than 35 HVTs had 
already been arrested or killed. See A. Rawlins, Mexico’s Drug War, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), 
December 13, 2011, [online] available: http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexicos-drug-war/p13689 (08/06/12), p.4.  
18
 S. O’Neil, ‘Mexico-U.S. Relations: What’s Next?’, Americas Quarterly, Spring 2010, p.70.  
19





 which is reflected in the 3,096 murders that occurred there just in 2010.
21
 This 
is the reason why Ciudad Juárez became synonymous of drug-related violence in Mexico in 
recent years, and also why the stakes there have been high for the Calderón administration in 
terms of justifying its offensive against drug trafficking.
22
 Regionally, violence has also extended 
as the proportion of the 95% of cocaine entering the United States from Mexico has increasingly 
travelled through Central America (it went from less than 1% in 2007 to 60% in 2010), having an 
impact on the growth of violent deaths in the region.
23
 
The Mexican government may well be correct in believing that the atomisation of DTOs and 
disorder in the drug market indicate that anti-narcotics operations have been effective, but the 
other side of this coin is that authorities are finding it difficult to contain crime.
24
 One reason for 
this unsatisfactory outcome is that unlike Colombia in the 1980s and early 1990s, the greater 
number of DTOs in Mexico makes it difficult for law enforcement agencies to identify with 
accuracy the perpetrators of crime.
25
 It is important to note that, according to a contrasting 
perspective, if it is true that DTOs’ fragmentation brings with it negative consequences (i.e. an 
increase of violence), these effects are temporary and are part of an inevitable step to improve 
security in the long-term. The argument goes that it is less difficult to deal with small, local 
groups, than fighting organisations with a national structure comprising regional influence, 
support from the population, resources, and a large group of enforcers.
26
 Whether atomising 
DTOs is a sensible course of action or not, it is important to note that dealing with common 
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crime in the country requires to deal first with organised crime because of the fact that illegal 
activities such as kidnapping and extortion –apparently unrelated to drugs-, are in fact elements 
of the DTOs’ strategy to maintain management of crime in the plaza. Moreover, the need for 
consolidating regional influence has been a direct consequence of the growth of narco-menudeo 
(retail drug sales on the streets) in the country since the mid-1990s.
27
 
The United States has been part of the problem by its unrelenting demand for drugs and its 
permissive arms market that has fuelled arms trafficking and, consequently, violence in Mexico. 
According to U.S. Bureau of Arms Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) data, 90-95% of guns used in 
drug violence in Mexico enter illegally from the United States; it is estimated that the several 
hundred arms entering Mexico per day add to the estimated 40 million illicit guns already in the 
country.
28
 The persistence of arms trafficking into Mexico is explained not only by the lack of 
political support in the United States for extending the Federal Assault Weapons Ban (AWB) in 
2004 after ten years of observation,
29
 but also by the fact that 10% of U.S. gun dealers are 
located on the Mexican border.
30
 However, the United States has not only contributed to violence 
in Mexico but it has also been affected because of its own vulnerability to criminal activity both 
of Mexican organisations operating within its own territory and south of the border. Even though 
violence has for the most part occurred on the Mexican side of the dividing line, there have been 
isolated incidents related to Mexican organised crime within the United States that have added to 
the perception that violence has spilled-over into the country, and this is the reason that has 
helped to justify, for instance, the $3 billion annually the Border Patrol spends on protecting the 
border.
31
 So far, the effects of border violence on the U.S. side have been manifested in terms of, 
for instance, the movement of people from Mexico. Given the level of violence and extortion by 
DTOs in Ciudad Juárez, people from different occupations with access to economic means have 
increasingly moved to El Paso, Texas, while keeping their everyday activities on the Mexican 
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 It is important to note that while this phenomenon can be seen with concern on the U.S. 
side of the border, it has also had a positive effect in the form of small-business being brought to 
the United States.
33
 More alarming, although still limited, there have been cases of spill-over 
related to, for instance, the number of kidnappings in Phoenix, Arizona, which tripled from 48 in 
2004 to 241 in 2008.
34
 U.S. border cities, however, have been consistently considered some of 
the safest in the United States,
35
 and the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security (DHS), Janet 
Napolitano, has even argued that the border is ‘safest than ever’.36  
In 2008, the United States and Mexico entered into an agreement called the ‘Merida 
Initiative’ that was a three-year $1.4 billion U.S. aid package to provide equipment and training, 
on top of an estimated $4 billion annually devoted by Mexico to the fight against drugs.
37
 This 
agreement was explained not only because of the strategic importance of Mexico in terms of the 
2,000-mile common border and the variety of issues that are part of the complex bilateral 
relationship -such as U.S. foreign direct investment, the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), Mexico being a potential source of asylum seekers-,
38
 but also because of concerns 
emanating from south of the border such as organised crime, drug trafficking, terrorism and 
insurgency.
39
 It is important to note that U.S. counternarcotics aid to Mexico had previously 
amounted to around $55-60 million annually in the 7 years since 2000.
40
 In this context, if 
significant in comparison to previous periods, the Merida Initiative was relevant mainly because 
of its symbolism, in particular because of the U.S. government’s acceptance of the principle of 
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‘co-responsibility’ in reference to Mexico’s challenges, which represented a departure from the 
previous ‘finger-pointing’ practice on the part of each other in the bilateral relationship. As a 
matter of fact, in one of her official visits to Mexico City, U.S. Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, 
conceded the United States was in part responsible for violence in Mexico, and her statement had 
no precedent in the history of bilateral relations.
41
 
The fact that the initial stages of the programme focused on providing coercive instruments,
42
 
and because the increasing involvement of the Mexican military in counter-narcotics operations 
led to human rights abuses,
43
 both governments found themselves under pressure from the U.S. 
Congress and public opinion in both countries to address this issue. Their demand consisted in 
making sure the extension of the programme, called ‘Beyond Merida’, would focus on 
strengthening Mexico’s judicial system and other non-coercive initiatives for dealing with the 
country’s security challenges, more in line with institutional reform. In 2008, for instance, the 
U.S. Congress released the first instalment of $400 million to Mexico, and though U.S. 
legislators initially delayed the second instalment in 2009 due to human rights violations, the 
Obama administration continued its support for the initiative.
44
 One alternative explanation of 
the U.S. emphasis on equipment and training in its support of Mexico refers to Mexican 
resistance to accept foreign intromission in institution-building matters because of sovereignty 
concerns.
45
 An additional problem regarding the Merida Initiative is that it has focused on 
federal to federal collaboration, neglecting thus 95% of the 325,000 police officers at the state 
and local level that are not only the first-responders to crime but also the weakest security link 
and the most vulnerable to corruption.
46
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Mexico’s own efforts at addressing the non-coercive part of its security strategy were 
highlighted by the murder of 15 middle and high school students attending a birthday party in the 
neighbourhood Villas de Salvárcar, Ciudad Juárez, on 30 January 2010, as a result of being 
mistakenly taken by DTO enforcers as members of an opposing gang. At first, President 
Calderón strongly condemned the atrocious act, but also declared the deceased teenagers were 
victims of a ‘fight between gangs’ without validating this information.47 Even though the 
president eventually apologised for his characterisation, this generated uproar in Ciudad Juárez. 
In order to keep the situation under control, twelve days after the massacre President Calderón 
launched the ‘Todos Somos Juárez’ programme that included $282.1 million dollars to finance 
160 different social reconstruction projects, to be disbursed in one year.
48
 Notwithstanding the 
programme faced problems such as insufficient connectivity between officials in charge of  
planning and the needs of local stake-holders,
49
 ‘Todos Somos Juárez’ has often been presented 
as proof of the non-coercive elements of the federal government’s comprehensive security 
strategy. It can be argued, however, that no social project stands a chance to succeed if there is 
not a previous security stabilisation effort to set the conditions for that programme to work out. 
One cannot conceive, for instance, how the building and the materials of a public library 
constructed in the middle of a marginalised neighbourhood can survive if there are no security 
guarantees for that facility to operate.   
Militarisation of anti-narcotics operations has continued to lead to an increase in human 
rights violations, as mentioned above, and it has contributed to corruption, to desertion within the 
rank and file of the Mexican military, and to more violence, in general.
50
 The most ominous sign 
of President Calderón’s strategy, nevertheless, has been the 50,000 deaths51 produced by the 
three-pronged confrontation (i.e. intra-DTO, DTO vs. DTO, and DTOs vs. government) that is 
directly attributed to the federal government’s policy, even though the President has repeatedly 
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argued that far from initiating violence, the government only responded to what already was a 
violent situation, a point which seems to have some merit.
52
 For instance, from the total death 
toll since 2006, 90% of homicides are estimated to be part of intra-criminal conflict, without the 
authority being involved in any manner.
53
 It is important to note that even though violence has 
involved innocent civilians, such as in the case of grenades being thrown into a crowd in Morelia 
on Independence Day in 2008,
54
 criminal activity has not pre-eminently targeted civilians.
55
 
Massacres and homicides are occurring precisely where there are disputes for plazas and 
corridors among criminal organisations, and those conflicts started before the presence of 
authorities was required.
56
 In this context, it can be argued that what produces and explains 
violence has not been the intervention of the federal government per se but the intrinsic dynamic 
of crime as expressed in a high level of ‘criminal density’.57 Violence is evidence of growing 
criminal activities because of the government’s long-time practice of managing, rather than 
solving, the problem in order to avoid conflict,
58
 and it is only in this sense that violence is an 
outcome created by a failed official strategy. 
In previous years, the situation has been so dire in Mexico that both official and private 
estimates have pointed to the country’s supposedly ‘failed state’ status. For instance, the private 
consulting company Stratfor made reference to Mexico’s potential to become a ‘failed state’ due 
to an imbalance between the declining power of the state vis-a-vis the DTOs,
59
 and The Joint 
Operational Environment (JOE) 2008 established that, ‘in terms of worst case scenarios…two 
large and important states bear consideration for a rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and 
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Mexico’.60 A more nuanced and accurate characterisation of Mexico’s predicament, 
nevertheless, makes reference not to a ‘state failure’ but to a ‘security failure’, meaning the 
Mexican government has been ineffective only in the security sphere but not as a state as a 
whole, which is different.
61
 
To these perspectives it is possible to add alarmist statements such as the one by former DHS 
Secretary, Michael Chertoff, who pointed out that his department had devised a contingency plan 
based on a ‘surge’ capability to confront spill-over violence from Mexico;62 the former Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director, Michael Hayden, declared that ‘Mexico could rank 
alongside Iran as a challenge for Obama, perhaps a greater problem than Iraq’;63 and General 
Barry McCaffrey recommended the incoming administration (Obama) to do more to support 
Mexico because  the ‘risk from drug-fueled [sic] crime which is so powerful that it could 
threaten the viability of the state’.64 These statements, nevertheless, have ignored the realities of 
the situation in the country, on the one hand, and have also reflected the complexity of Mexico’s 
predicament, on the other. For instance, the conflict in Mexico has been classified as ‘narco-
insurgency’ and ‘narco-terrorism’65 ignoring that the principal motivation of drug traffickers has 
not been political but economic gain, and also the fact that the problem sprang from the erosion 
of a previous arrangement devised to avoid open conflict, in the first place. Incidents such as the 
2010 car bombing in Ciudad Juárez, nevertheless, have arguably contributed to focus México’s 
challenges from the perspective above.
66
 According to an analyst, ‘strikingly, this is a conflict 
defined as much by what it lacks as by which it includes, and what it lacks is a clear political 
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agenda on the part of almost all combatants’.67 Only La Familia DTO has developed a sort of 
‘narco-administration’ imposing its rules in its home territory.68 Even though the situation in 
Mexico is far from stable, violence elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere is far worse than in the 
country. Whereas there were 45,000 violent deaths in Mexico between 2007 and 2011 (14 per 
100,000), Brazil and Colombia saw more than 80,000 (20 per 100,000) and 50,000 (30 per 
100,000) in the same period, respectively.
69
  
Most analysts agree that the U.S. war on drugs is a failure that requires a new approach,
70
 
evident in the fact that drugs are more accessible, more widely utilised and more potent than ever 
before.
71
 Given that the U.S. demand for drugs will continue and no possible modification of the 
U.S. Constitution Second Amendment
72
 is in sight regarding the easy access to weapons in the 
United States, the option for the Mexican government is to continue fighting drug trafficking, 
perhaps through a more focused strategy targeting not HVTs but the mid-level members of 
DTOs in order to erode their operational capacity.
73
 It can be argued that the state cannot afford 
to have the state institutions challenged, and this is the reason why the offensive will continue 
beyond the 2012 presidential election, and also why advancing on the institution-building 
process is needed. In contrast, the possibility for accommodation between the incoming 
government and DTOs is very narrow because it is not clear who to negotiate with within the 
DTOs, and also because there are no guarantees of stability. Moreover, the idea about the 
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government helping out to consolidate one leading DTO may seem attractive, but the 
establishment of such dominance of the criminal market by one group also has consequences. 
Most obviously, it strengthens the group vis-a-vis both the state and the society.
74
 Such ‘narco-
peace’ is vulnerable to changes in balances of power in the criminal market.75 Power in Mexico 
today is more fractured and devolved to various layers of the government. Equally, the DTOs are 
too fractured and unstable to be able to commit to a bargain.
76
  
Notwithstanding that the Calderón administration is key to understanding Mexico’s current 
security context and therefore its impact on U.S. security, this thesis focuses on an earlier period: 
U.S. security in the 1990s. Given that the research question of this thesis is why Mexico, a 
valuable U.S. trade partner, became a U.S. security concern in the context of a closer economic 
relationship as reflected by the NAFTA agreement, the study of security issues in U.S.-Mexican 
relations during the 1990s is fundamental to explain, first, the increase of undocumented 
immigration to the United States and, second, the strengthening of Mexican DTOs with the 
potential to affect U.S. security. 
On the one hand, from the beginning of the 1990s through approximately 1995, it is 
estimated that around 1.1 million immigrants entered the United States on average every year; 
the peak years were 1999 and 2000 with annual flows 35% higher than average to reach 1.5 
million. Migration from Mexico comprised 1/3 of the overall flow.
77
 On the other hand, it is 
important to note that growing criminality is function not only of the economic crises of the 
1980s and the consequent efforts to restructure the Mexican economy, but also of the fact that it 
was precisely in the 1990s when Mexican DTOs gained sufficient power and influence to 
challenge the structure of the Mexican state through corruption and direct confrontation. During 
the 1990s, Mexican DTOs became stronger and increased their potential to generate risks beyond 
Mexico’s borders. For instance, the Carrillo Fuentes organisation became the most influential 
player in drug trafficking to the United States by controlling the El Paso-Juárez area of 
operations.
78
 By the late 1990s, however, there were four major DTOs fighting for dominance of 
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the drug market, unleashing therefore a wave of violence without precedent at the time.
79
 This 
explains why the 1990s witnessed an increasing deterioration of public safety in Mexico, and this 
is also the background of the U.S. current security concern regarding Mexico.               
At the basis of this thesis, therefore, there is the explanation of the paradox that is related to 
the fact that precisely at a time of a closer economic relationship between the United States and 
Mexico (and Canada) in the context of NAFTA, the United States became more concerned about 
challenges emanating from Mexico, a neighbour that at that time had also become a more 
integrated and thus a more valuable partner. U.S. concerns, nevertheless, contrast with ideas that 
acknowledge, for instance, that ‘only the reciprocal exchange and division of labor’ in the 
international economy promotes peaceful relations among states.
80
 Moreover, from a neo-realist 
perspective, in principle, it does not make sense that the weaker side in the U.S.-Mexico 
relationship represents a significant concern for the United States, given the fact that all 
indicators clearly establish the United States as the superior power in the bilateral equation, as 
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Table 1-1. Differences in Military and Economic Capacity between the United States and Mexico 
(selected years) 
 
                                    1990                                     1995                                       2000                                        2005 
 
                          US                  MEXICO     US                   MEXICO      US                  MEXICO        US                  MEXICO 
 
Total Active     2,117,900      148,500         1,547,300        175,000          1,371,500       178,770           1,433,600       192,770 
Armed                           A               C                       A                   C                        A                 C                        F 
Forces 
 
GDP                  $5.1               $192.38         $6.7                   $243               $8.5                  $400                $10.9               $625 
(US Dollars)      trillion           billion            trillion              billion             trillion              billion             trillion              billion 
                                  B                   B                    D                      D                     E                     E                    G                          G 
 
GDP per            n.a.                n.a.                $25,400             $8,100            $31,100            $7,900            $37,750            $6,115 
Capita                                                                                                                       E                    E                      G                     G 
(US Dollars) 
 
Total                 248,855,000  88,928,000    263,119,000     90,464,000     273,133,000     97,122,000       291,044,000    102,291,000 
Population  
 
Average            n.a.               n.a.                 n.a.                    n.a.               n.a.                   n.a.                   0.80%             1.40% 




A. Excluding the U.S. Coast Guard. 
B. 1989. 
C. 60,000 conscripts. 
D. 1994. 
E. 1998. 
F.  Excluding the U.S. Coast Guard plus 158,156 National Guard and Reserve troops. 
G. 2003. 
H. Projection for the 2002-2015 period. 
 
Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 1990-1991, (Oxford: Published 
by Brassey’s for the IISS, c1990);  The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 
1995-1996, (Oxford: Published by Oxford University Press for the IISS, c1995);  The International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 1999-2000, (Oxford: Published by Oxford University Press for the 
IISS, c1999); The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2004-2005, (London: 
Published by Oxford University Press for the IISS, c2004). Sections on the United States and Mexico.   
 
The selection of the research topic was the product of my personal interest in the field of 
security studies, on the one hand, and, on the other in the United States as a relevant area of 
study because of its impact on the history of Mexican foreign policy.
81
 In this context, this thesis 
is located within the general framework of U.S.-Mexican studies, and it focuses on the security 
aspect of the bilateral relationship. In particular, it explores the security dimension of U.S.-
Mexican relations in the 1990s from the U.S. point of view. 
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The objective of this study is to explain the paradox that is at the centre of the thesis’ 
argument; that is, that precisely at a time of increasing economic integration as expressed in the 
NAFTA agreement -when common sense would indicate that the more economically integrated 
two countries the less the risk they pose to each other-, the United States became increasingly 
concerned about security issues regarding Mexico because of NAFTA’s potential to intensify 
illegal flows across the Southwest border in the form of drugs and undocumented immigration. 
What I am basically asking is why Mexico, a valuable U.S. trade partner, also became a U.S. 
security concern in the context of a closer economic relationship as reflected by the NAFTA 
agreement. 
I am trying to respond to this question utilising a combination of complementary 
perspectives from the non-traditional literature on security. On the one hand, I resorted to the so-
called ‘Copenhagen School’82 which was born at the Conflict and Peace Research Institute 
(COPRI), and it has been identified with efforts at broadening the concept of security. Its best 
known exponents are Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. This research adopted the broader security 
perspective developed by B. Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (Buzan et.al) in Security: A 
New Framework for Analysis
83
 –which is itself a critique of the traditional security perspective- 
because it represents a comprehensive and holistic approach that recognises that security became 
more complex even before the end of the Cold War, to the extent that different actors in the 
international system have become increasingly affected by other issues besides the use of force, 
which is the basis for thinking about both ‘referent objects’ beyond the state, and ‘issue-sectors’ 
beyond the military one.  
On the other hand, I compared the analytical framework above with the insights of the 
Risk Society theory, which is a perspective also from the non-traditional literature on security 
that focuses on the kind of non-military concerns that replaced state-centred threats after the 
Cold War. The justification to combine and to contrast the two approaches above is: (1) both are 
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 According to Steve Smith, the main strands of the ‘non-traditional literature’ are ‘Alternative Defence and 
Common Security’; the ‘Third World Security School’; ‘Buzan and the “Copenhagen School”’; ‘Constructivist 
Security Studies’; ‘Critical Security Studies’; ‘Feminist Security Studies’; and ‘Poststructural Security Studies’. See 
S. Smith, ‘The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: Conceptualizing Security in the Last Twenty Years’, in S. 
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 See B. Buzan, O. Waever and J. de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1998).   
        
32 
 
Western European perspectives that became well-known in the 1990s to explain post-Cold War, 
trans-national, security challenges; (2) both are useful to explain U.S. security concerns 
regarding Mexico such as drug trafficking and undocumented immigration, in particular because 
these are not related to the state or military capabilities but to global forces embodied in an 
integrated illegal market between the two countries; and (3) because, as far as Risk Society 
theory is concerned, ‘risk management’ and ‘preventive action’ have gradually become the 
guiding principle of the U.S. security orientation after the 9/11 events. 
More importantly, the justification to combine them is that the Buzan et.al analytical 
framework has been criticised on the grounds that if it is true it contributes to understanding the 
scope of security, it lacks and in-depth perspective on security,
84
 which is precisely what is 
provided by Risk Society theory by explaining not the consequences but the causes of security 
concerns. Both approaches together, therefore, provide a more comprehensive understanding of 
U.S. security concerns regarding Mexico at a time of a closer economic relationship. Utilising 
both frameworks to explain the U.S.-Mexican security relationship is an exercise nowhere to be 
found in the literature on security in the bilateral relationship. 
The study of U.S. security in the context of NAFTA is relevant because the prospect of 
the agreement made clear to the United States that a trade partnership with Mexico would bring 
with it not only more beneficial economic opportunities, but also a greater exposure to a variety 
of trans-border challenges (i.e. drug trafficking and undocumented immigration) that were 
already present in the bilateral agenda before the formal NAFTA agreement. The basic 
explanation for this was the potential for illegal flows to grow in parallel to increasing legitimate 
exchange opportunities.
85
 The hypothesis developed in this thesis, therefore, establishes that the 
paradox at the basis of this thesis is explained by the increasing U.S. concern about non-military, 
non-state risks on its Southwest border that were related to the intensification of interdependence 
with Mexico, such as drug trafficking and undocumented immigration, which were likely to be 
intensified by NAFTA because the expansion in the flow of goods, services and people in both 
directions presented more opportunities for Mexican criminal organisations to take greater 
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 In criticizing the Buzan et.al analytical framework, for instance, Booth suggests that thinking of security in 
broader terms also requires ‘deepening’ the concept, which means assessing the repercussions of using a more 
complex security idea. M. Sheehan, International Security. An Analytical Survey, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
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advantage of an already integrated illegal drug and labour market between the two countries. 
These problematic flows are not necessarily the outcome of the process of globalisation per se 
but the result of structural demand and supply conditions between the two countries that were 
likely to intensify in the context of NAFTA. An additional issue considered in this study was the 
border physical environment. In contrast to drugs and undocumented immigrants, the analysis of 
bilateral environmental issues demonstrates that potentially disruptive challenges do not need to 
become securitised, and can be actually dealt with through preventive actions.    
The prospect for drugs and undocumented immigration to remain problematic issues in 
the future is explained by the fact that NAFTA is not a political and economic union but only a 
trade agreement between two industrialised countries, the United States and Canada, and a less 
developed country, Mexico, with potential political, social and even military consequences as 
well. In contrast to the comprehensive integration process that has characterised the European 
Union (EU), the narrower NAFTA integration framework, while it deals with regional trade 
matters, is ill equipped to confront political and security issues because of its lack of adequate 
institutions. In contrast to the EU, intra-regional NAFTA borders are not open to the free flow of 
people, and the NAFTA countries lack the high level of foreign and defence policy co-ordination 
and the intensity of police co-operation across national boundaries that characterises the EU.
86
 
My already-mentioned interest in security and U.S. studies eventually led me to the 
analysis of the security dimension in U.S.-Mexican relations, and I became aware of a dearth of 
relevant scholarship both in the United States and in Mexico. According to some specialists, the 
reason that explains this lack of attention to security was in part that Latin America, in general, 
has been basically a low-level foreign policy priority for the United States. In their opinion,  
Up to now, neither the supposedly sophisticated debates about the concept [security]in the 
United States, nor more recent discussions in Mexico, have systematically reviewed the 
importance of each other in the definition and defense of national security. In the case of 
the United States the reason resides in the fact that, as a hegemonic power, it has basically 
taken Mexico (and the rest of Latin America) for granted.
87
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At the time I started studying this topic, I found that while the literature on the bilateral 
relationship between the United States and Mexico contained a wide variety of studies on 
economic, political and social aspects (trade, foreign debt, oil, drugs, immigration, environment), 
there was very little explicit literature on security, certainly not any systematic study on the 
subject, notwithstanding the growing importance of the issue in the bilateral agenda.  
It can be argued that the citation above was basically correct in describing the prevalent 
situation up to the mid-1970s, because in the years that followed the intensification of 
interdependence between the two countries demanded more attention to bilateral issues, 
including those related to security, as more developments in each country had an increasing 
impact on the other. That is, a growing number of domestic issues in each country began to 
affect the other, and for this reason items in the bilateral agenda became known as 
‘intermestic’.88 According to Bayless Manning’s discussion regarding the impingement of 
international on local matters, and vice versa, he pointed out, 
These new issues are thus simultaneously, profoundly and inseparably both domestic 
and international. If I may be permitted a coinage whose very cacophony may help 
provide emphasis –these issues are ‘intermestic’.
89
 
For instance, Mexico’s foreign debt, the effects of the oil crisis on the United States in the 
1970s, and disagreement between the two countries regarding the Central American armed 
conflicts in the 1980s, had the potential to affect each other’s security. That is, increasing 
interdependence between the United States and Mexico since the 1970s led to greater attention to 
security matters as an increasing number of issues in each country had the potential to affect the 
other.
90
 Additionally, growing interdependence between the two countries also set the stage for 
the negotiation of NAFTA at the beginning of the 1990s. This agreement, as a matter of fact, 
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meant that security in Mexico would have eventually to be defined not in national but in 
‘regional’ terms.91      
Reviewing the literature on the security dimension of U.S.-Mexican relations, which is 
what this thesis is strictly about, is in principle a straightforward task because there are only few 
analyses providing a general and explicit perspective on this subject. Nevertheless, since security 
is such a multifaceted concept, it is possible to observe that studies addressing issues such as 
North American integration, the common border, and drug trafficking and undocumented 
immigration, among other aspects, cannot escape reference to the U.S.-Mexico security 
relationship, thus making the review of scholarly works on the subject a more complicated task 
because of the wide array of issues involved and the scope of the bilateral relations literature 
itself. 
This literature review, however, focuses on the most representative sample of analyses on 
the subject in chronological order and from a deductive approach; that is, it addresses first those 
at the general perspective level, and then reviews those at the regional, bilateral and border level, 
to end up addressing works focusing on individual issues and those regarding official views and 
empirical accounts of the subject. 
Within the category of general perspectives on the subject, there is a collective book 
titled Mexico. In Search of Security that was edited in 1990 by a Mexican and a U.S. scholar, 
which represents a conceptual analysis of Mexican security with the United States as the point of 
reference. The opening of the Mexican economy was advanced as the justification for studying 
the United States, in particular its impact on Mexican security. It was a valuable initial effort to 
understand how U.S. national security factors affect Mexico, and how Mexican security issues 
have an impact on the United States.
92
 There is a second book by the title Strategy and Security 
in U.S.-Mexican Relations beyond the Cold War edited in 1996 also written by both a Mexican 
and a U.S. scholar in order to advance mutual understanding of security issues in a post-Cold 
War environment. This project was ‘unique’ not only because it explicitly involved both scholars 
and officials from the two countries, but also because it dealt with more practical issues absent in 
the already mentioned previous work, such as law enforcement and intelligence cooperation 
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between the two countries.
93
 This category also includes a historical analysis of wartime 
cooperation between Mexico and the United States that provides an account of U.S. concerns 
during World War II, in particular those related the possibility of Mexico becoming a platform 
for the Axis powers’ operations in the Western Hemisphere. Even though it discusses U.S.-
Mexican relations in this light, it also represents an analysis of Mexican political evolution 
during this period in terms of the need to maintaining a balance between nationalism and an 
adequate relationship with the United States.
94
 A fourth book, Organized Crime & Democratic 
Governability: Mexico and the U.S.-Mexican Borderlands edited by John Bailey and Roy 
Godson, appeared in 2000 as a collective effort to explain the fact that the increasing complexity 
of criminal activity at the U.S.-Mexico border had already surpassed the ability of local 
governments and the law enforcement approach to deal with those challenges (i.e. not only drug 
trafficking but also smuggling of arms, people and vehicles). By examining Mexico’s political 
system and its security-relevant actors, this book provides a ‘continuum of governability’ to 
guide the analysis of possible solutions to the shared U.S.-Mexico organised crime problem.
95
 A 
more modest effort is National Security in U.S.-Mexican Relations edited by the author of this 
thesis in 2003. This book was the outcome of a bi-national seminar organised in 2000 in order to 
analyse U.S. and Mexican security matters in the context of globalisation and trans-
nationalisation. It reflected the idea that in spite of increased bilateral co-operation at the end of 
the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, the United States and Mexico were still holding 
different conceptions of security. These two countries have usually agreed on what they want to 
prevent, but this has not necessarily translated into compatibility of interests. Therefore, instead 
of becoming ‘allies’ in the foreseeable future, the collective analysis established they were likely 
to remain just ‘partners’ in terms of security concerns.96 
There is a series of books in the 2000s -mainly by Mexican specialists- that offer a 
critical perspective on Mexican security in the context of a closer relationship with the United 
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States as reflected by NAFTA. First, a collective and multidisciplinary work published in 2004 
was devoted to Mexican security from an integrated perspective and going beyond purely 
military factors. For example, it discussed Mexico’s traditionally pacifist posture regarding 
international security, as well as the U.S. war on terror and its effects on Mexico in terms of 
unilateralism and in limiting options for Mexican foreign policy.
97
 Second, an analysis published 
in 2007 by Leonardo Curzio argues that Mexico lacks a clear national project supported by its 
people, and this situation is in turn considered to complicate the design of a meaningful national 
security policy. This lack of a vision for the future originates not only from the erosion of the 
import substitution model in 1982, but also from the imposition of economic integration with the 
United States. There is a contradiction therefore between searching for Mexican security, and at 
the same time maintaining a disadvantageous relationship with the United States.
98
 From a 
different perspective, the history of authoritarian Mexico explains why the country lacks a 
national project and therefore a clear concept of security, in particular in reference to its 
relationship with the United States. It is argued, therefore, that in an increasingly complex 21
st
 
century the country requires to develop its notion of security within a democratic framework, 
because this is an important step to achieve an integral security perspective.
99
 Another analysis 
addresses the concept of Mexico’s ‘security failure’ rather than Mexico’s ‘state failure’, and 
assesses its impact beyond its borders. The key idea of the book -security failure-focuses on an 
intermestic level of analysis (i.e. the country’s institutional weakness vis-à-vis the challenge 
posed by drug trafficking) as opposed to the emphasis on the external, trans-national character of 
threats (i.e. U.S. drug demand), in order to explain Mexico’s current security crisis.100 
The second category of scholarly works refers to analyses dealing with the regional 
perspective. A book titled Drawing lines in sand and snow. Border security and North American 
economic integration addresses the major issues facing the North American region: security, 
economic integration (i.e. globalisation), border management, corruption, and undocumented 
migration. It represents an analysis of the economic, business, and security implications of cross-
border flows of people, goods, and capital in North America, and provides a road map for 
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addressing these concerns recognising the need for a balance between promoting legitimate 
exchanges and the imperative of border control to contain terrorism.
101
 A better known collective 
work, The Rebordering of North America. Integration and Exclusion in a New Security Context, 
deals with the implications for North America of the 9/11 events and the U.S. war on terror in 
terms of both a hardening of border controls and political discourse. For instance, it explains the 
trade-offs between border security and facilitation of legitimate flows across borders, in a context 
where security and economic integration influence policy in opposite directions.
102
 Another 
analysis deals with Mexico’s foreign and security policy after the PRI lost the Presidency in 
2000 and after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It argues that within that context, Mexico started not 
only breaking its isolationist past but also began balancing its bilateral and multilateral agendas 
in order to strengthen its transition to democracy and to position the country within the 
Hemisphere in the post-9/11 security debate.
103
 A trilateral report published in 2005 by the 
Council on Foreign Relations that assessed North America’s security and economic 
vulnerabilities, developed a series of recommendations that at the time went beyond the so-called 
‘Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America’ by proposing an ambitious vision for the 
region by 2010. In the area of security, for instance, it proposed establishing a common security 




There is another collective work that analyses the wide variety of non-state actors (i.e. 
companies, private institutions, social movements and networks that expanded with NAFTA) in 
the region from a multidisciplinary point of view, covering individual issues such as energy, 
security and the environment.
105
 The central argument of the book is that these new regional 
actors interact with governments to generate new dynamics that affect politics in the North 
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American area. Regional analyses also include comparative studies, such as the one on public 
security policy in the Americas focusing not on institutions but on the notion of reform. The 
central argument is that criminal challenges in the region can only be confronted through the 
overhaul of judicial systems and the consolidation of democracy, which means an effective 
government response involves respect for human rights in a context where, as in several parts of 
Latin America, the military has assumed responsibilities that otherwise belong to civilian police 
forces, with implications for the agenda of U.S.-Latin American relations.
106
 
Canadian and Mexican Security in the New North America: Challenges and Prospects 
describes the transformation of regional relations from its focus on trade after NAFTA to 
security as consequence of the 9/11 events. It argues that North American security integration is 
a gradual process that has already started and will continue to be central to the region’s agenda. 
Even though the process has been dominated by the United States, it points out that integration 
offers opportunities for both Mexico and Canada in terms of the former’s consolidation of 
democracy and the opportunity for the latter to become an alternative security model for Mexico 
in contrast to the U.S. option.
107
 In an opposite argument, another book rejects the notion of a 
North American community based on the fact that NAFTA is seen as an instrument of social 
exclusion that was conceived by the elites more than being the product of a bottom-up process, 
making thus both Canada and Mexico more dependent on their common neighbour.
108
 In the area 
of security, it criticises U.S. unilateralism -especially after 9/11- as evidence of the lack of shared 
interests that are characteristic of the idea of ‘community’. A further collective analysis argues 
that the 2008 change of administration in the United States did not bring with it a substantial 
transformation of its strategic policy. In this context, the current North American security 
framework and its focus on international terrorism has not only continued but has also intensified 
regarding border control and intelligence sharing; this situation, nevertheless, has been reflected 
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so far neither in the transformation of U.S. defence relations with Mexico and Central America, 
nor with Canada for that matter.
109
 
 The third category of analyses refers to those devoted to the bilateral context. 
Transnational Crime and Public Security. Challenges to Mexico and the United States was a 
collective volume published 2002 that focused on law enforcement, the judicial system and 
organised crime issues in Mexico, as well as on drug trafficking, military activities and 
intelligence challenges on the U.S. side of the border. It was a study on how local crime, 
violence, corruption, and law enforcement interact with trans-national crime, and how they affect 
domestic politics in particular and U.S.-Mexican relations more in general. The work is a 
relevant contribution because of its emphasis in the possibility for public security matters, 
especially in Mexico, to become national security issues affecting both the United States and 
bilateral relations.
110
 There are two books by the same Mexican author dealing with the subject 
of security in the bilateral context, from a local perspective. The first one addresses the role of 
local border governments in confronting security challenges in the Tijuana-San Diego region. It 
underlines the complexities of promoting cooperation between local governments with different 
capacities and resources, and it emphasises therefore the need to professionalise Mexican border 
administrations as a condition for trans-border strategic management of intricate problems.
111
 
The second book provides a citizen’s perspective in reference to tensions created by the Mexican 
government’s inability to deal with border challenges as a result of an inadequate decision-
making process regarding public policy.
112
 
 Within this category, there are also three analysis published in 2009 that reflect 
increasing attention for the intensification of both, drug violence in Mexico and U.S.-Mexico 
security cooperation. The first volume analyses policy options for the United States in the 
context of both security deterioration in Mexico and the change of administration in the United 
States. It is a RAND Corporation book that explored alternatives for the then incoming Obama 
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administration in reference to U.S. security support for Mexico. From the U.S. point of view, it 
provides arguments for developing a strategic partnership with Mexico, instead of opting for the 
status quo, let alone considering ‘retrenchment’.113 The second volume is a collective effort that 
analyses the Merida Initiative from the point of view of both Mexico and the United States. It 
characterises the programme as a new cooperation paradigm based on the acceptance of co-
responsibility in the challenge posed by drug trafficking to Mexico, notwithstanding Mexican 
corruption and continued U.S. unilateralism as obstacles to the success of the initiative.
114
 In 
contrast to the work cited above, the third volume is a monograph that criticises the Merida 
Initiative as representative of the failed supply-side approach to drugs that has characterised U.S. 
drug control policy. It argues the initiative is unlikely to achieve the desired results in Mexico 
because of marginal attention paid to structural problems in both Mexico and the United States, 
such as official corruption and large-scale drug consumption, respectively.
115
 
 The fourth category of the literature in this area deals with security in the context of the 
common border. The book The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1978-1992. Low-
Intensity Conflict Doctrine Comes Home, argues that during the period of reference, U.S. 
immigration and drug enforcement policies and practices in the U.S.-Mexico border region 
became increasingly militarised based on a ‘low-intensity conflict’ perspective, which entails 
social control over specific civilian populations and human rights violations. In this context, it 
calls for a critical study of official accounts of U.S. policy on the border with Mexico.
116
 A 
widely-known book titled Border Games. Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide, focuses on the 
contradiction created by NAFTA liberalisation, on the one hand, and, on the other, increasing 
U.S. surveillance of the border with Mexico. The author argues that this contradiction reflects the 
fact that bilateral cooperation, far from preventing smuggling, served to provide a stage for both 
United States and Mexico to create the image about their ability to protect borders in an 
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increasingly open world, which is a far cry from actually dealing with the demand for drugs and 
the movement of undocumented immigrants across the common border.
117
 
In a similar line of argument, Operation Gatekeeper. The Rise of the 'Illegal Alien' and 
the Making of the U.S.-Mexico Boundary, explores the U.S. effort to prevent illegal border 
crossings in the context of the mid-1990s U.S. economic boom and the presence of a sizeable 
Mexican immigration presence in the United States. It argues that the aforementioned border 
operation was in fact a political measure by the U.S. federal government to counter California 
efforts (i.e. Proposition 187) in the mid-1990s to prevent undocumented immigration. Instead of 
achieving the supposed goal, it only increased the dangers for immigrants attempting to enter 
illegally the United States and contributed to the further politicisation of the issue.
118
 
An additional analysis addresses U.S.-Mexico security cooperation in the border region 
within the framework of the U.S.-induced security agenda. It analyses bilateral collaboration in 
terms of the new security paradigm introduced by the 9/11 events, and concludes that U.S. 
hegemony over the security discourse, while fostering security agreements, has not been 
adequate to achieve understanding in other pressing issues affecting the border such as 
immigration.
119
 Another volume critical of the U.S. border strategy contends that, 
notwithstanding the optimistic talk of the 1990s regarding bilateral trade, the preeminent role of 
security at the border (embodied in three simultaneous wars, on drugs, on undocumented 
immigration and on terror), has not only restricted the autonomy of local communities but also 
disturbed traditional border practices based on more open economic, social, and cultural 
interactions. This situation leaves at odds the government and the public because of the 
inevitable contradiction between seeking border security and maintaining the flow of legitimate 
cross border exchanges, respectively.
120
 In terms of a wider perspective, the book by the title The 
U.S.-Mexican Border into the Twenty-First Century examines the security context brought about 
by the September 11 terrorist attacks, against the background of the history, politics, economy 
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and society that has characterised the border region. Using globalisation as the framework, this 
study emphasises the continued importance of borders and the conflict this priority creates in a 
context of economic opening.
121
 Another critical volume based on a feminist and human rights 
perspective argues that, notwithstanding the effort to safeguarding the U.S. border with Mexico, 
policies that militarise the region and criminalise immigrants are also responsible for obscuring 
violence against women, immigrant deaths, and poverty prevalent in the region. In this context, a 
link is established between this analysis and proposed solutions to the identified challenges in the 
form of institutional change, policy reform, and protection of human rights as a valuable input to 
transform security perspectives in a more constructive way.
122
 
Focusing on a more specific issue, one of the volumes within this category makes 
reference to the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps as a case study to explore both the emergence 
and proliferation of vigilantism at the U.S.-Mexico border. It argues that groups such as the one 
mentioned above are not only related to the increasing criminalisation and securitisation of 
immigration, but also to a new form of activism brought about by globalisation that is tolerated 
and even encouraged by official structures.
123
 In reference to issues and bureaucracies, the 
collective work United States Border Issues. Defense, Security and Strategies, is an analysis of 
U.S. border security after 9/11 dealing with specific aspects of the U.S.-Mexico border such as 
commercial trucking from Mexico and arms trafficking flowing south. It addresses the expansion 
of border barriers, and the challenge posed by the need to devise methods to measure drug 
violence spilling over from south of the dividing line.
124
 Border Wars is a book that discusses the 
appeal of the Southwest border hard-line rhetoric on immigration-enforcement within 
conservative circles in the rest of the United States, notwithstanding the outcome of this 
discourse so far in terms of lost lives, family disintegration and wasted financial resources. The 
authors argue that the lack of a coherent federal policy regarding border challenges has only 
contributed to politicisation of issues and to justifying significant law enforcement budgets 
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without achieving meaningful solutions. This analysis, however, does not offer alternatives to the 
problem described.
125
 The US Army on the Mexican Border: A Historical Perspective analyses 
the U.S. Army’s traditional role regarding the border with Mexico, and argues there are 
important lessons to be learnt from history that are relevant for the current post-9/11 security 
context, in particular the contribution of the National Guard to border enforcement.
126
 
 The fifth category of relevant literature is composed of analyses on individual trans-
border issues such as drug trafficking and undocumented immigration. Bad Neighbor Policy. 
Washington's Futile War on Drugs in Latin America, for instance, includes chapter 7 titled 
‘Mexico: The Next Colombia?’, which argues that even if Mexico is different to Colombia in 
many political and security aspects, the failed U.S. drug policy could actually push Mexico to 
resemble Colombia at the height of drug violence as in the 1990s. The rest of the book, in 
general, provides an account of the damage the drug war has inflicted on Latin America.
127
 A 
monograph dealing with the ‘Zetas’ argues that the way Mexico can reverse the challenge posed 
by violent non-state actors to the state is the employment of political-psychological measures 
more in tune with the origin of the current Mexican predicament that is related to the 
decomposition of its socio-political system, which in turn explains why law enforcement 
measures, by themselves, will not be able to solve a problem with ramifications beyond 
Mexico’s borders.128 The book Drug War Zone. Frontline Dispatches from the Streets of El Paso 
and Juárez, is an anthropological study of drug trafficking and counter-narcotics efforts in the 
region that resorts to an ethnographic perspective to analyse drug violence in Mexico through the 
eyes of both drug traffickers and law enforcement officials. It underlines corruption as one of the 
issues defining drug trafficking on both sides of the boundary.
129
 A book that also addresses drug 
violence is Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State? It explores both the origin and the 
prospects for containing violence in Mexico, as well as its implications for the relationship with 
the United States. The author concludes that even if it is undisputable that the Mexican state has 
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territorial presence and the resources required for its determined offensive against drugs, the 
country may become a failed state because of its inability so far to gain ascendance on the 
problem in a context where its power is constantly challenged.
130
 A monograph by a Mexican 
and a U.S. specialist analyses the concerns created in the United States by potential spill-over 
violence from south of the border, and considers the consequences of alternative scenarios 
whether Mexico deals with the challenge in the form of complicity, confrontation, or drug use 
regulation, all of which it concludes have inevitable undesirable effects.
131
 A monograph dealing 
with ‘La Familia’ analyses the ideological evolution of the drug organisation, in particular its 
opposition to drug consumption at the same time it continues with production of 
methamphetamines and practises such as extortion of local businesses. Its ideological overtones 
are related to the help the organisation offers to marginalised people in a sort of social service, in 
exchange for their loyalty in the drug trade. The fact that ‘La Familia’ has aligned itself with the 
Gulf and Sinaloa organisations against ‘Los Zetas’ in Tamaulipas, in particular in Nuevo Laredo, 
has relevant implications for U.S. security.
132
 
Another relevant monograph is Mexico's ‘Narco-Refugees’: The Looming Challenge for 
U.S. National Security, which addresses the security concern created by a potential spill-over of 
violence from Mexico into the U.S. side of the border. It analyses the growing number of 
Mexicans moving north escaping insecurity and argues that, if sustained, this phenomenon will 
not only force U.S. policymakers to rethink the strategic environment, but it will also have an 
impact on political debates over immigration, public safety, and border security.
133
 It is important 
to note that the reason for including U.S. Army War College monographs in this category and 
not in that of ‘official analyses’, is because scholars writing these documents enjoy academic 
freedom and therefore they do not convey U.S. government official policy or position. The Drug 
War in Mexico. Confronting a Shared Threat, is a relatively recent analysis of the exaggerated 
‘failed state’ argument regarding Mexico that explores the country’s capacities and limitations, 
and examines factors that have undermined effective state performance. It assesses the 
prospects for U.S. support to strengthen critical state institutions, and offers 
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recommendations for reducing the potential of state failure based on stronger political and 
economic structures, and a more vibrant civil society.
134
 In reference to undocumented 
immigration, an analysis discusses the convenience of turning chaotic Mexican undocumented 
immigration flows into a more ordered process in a context of heightened security. It is 
considered that for such a system to work, nevertheless, Mexico would have to supervise its 
borders and to extend the security perimeter by strengthening the rule of law within its own 
territory. It is suggested this should be a central U.S. policy goal.
135
  
 The sixth category of literature relevant to this thesis refers to the variety of official 
analyses on the subject. At the beginning of 2011, for instance, the U.S. House of 
Representatives published a report that established that, for the first time in 25 years, Mexican 
drug trafficking organisations are targeting U.S. law enforcement agents. This is considered an 
act of terrorism as well as a ‘game-changer’ in terms of the U.S. involvement in Mexico’s drug 
war.
136
 Another official organisation that has regularly devoted attention to Mexico has been the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) through a wide variety of special reports on specific 
issues for Members of Congress. An interesting CRS analysis focuses on the definition of 
‘border violence spill-over’ and distinguishes between two different meanings of this phrase. 
One entails targeting civilians and government officials, while the other restricts the definition 
only to disputes among organisations. This study points out there is no conclusive evidence to 
prove there has actually been a violence spill-over from Mexico into the United States, and this 
argument is in line with U.S. official statements on the issue.
137
 An additional report also deals 
with drug violence in Mexico and points out that, even though the Mexican government’s 
strategy has been fairly successful in hitting the upper echelons of drug organisations, these 
efforts have only led so far to an intensification of violence that has no precedent in terms of its 
scope and brutality, thus leading analysts to debate whether these organisations can be classified 
as terrorists or as criminal groups using terrorist tactics, or even so as insurgents attempting to 
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penetrate the Mexican state.
138
 The report compares current violence in Mexico with Colombia 
in the 1990s, and addresses the prospects for containing violence in the country. 
The seventh category of literature reviewed here is represented by investigative reports 
that even though they provide valuable information, they lack in general the rigorous analysis 
that characterises academic works. The first book is about U.S. options in reference to securing 
the border with Mexico, which involved a series of interviews by the author as well as on-site 
visits to the region.
139
 The author describes the border as one of the most complex issues in the 
context of terrorism and economic uncertainty, and concludes that even though the divide is 
substantial, so are the opportunities for both countries. For all practical purposes, this book 
represents the U.S. side of the story. The second book deals with the recurrent issue about the 
U.S. need to maintaining the balance between building defences and remaining open to the flows 
of people and ideas after the 9/11 events. According to interviews carried out for this work, the 
new U.S. security regulations have not only affected people’s lives but also the U.S. economy by 
discouraging trade, the arrival of tourists into the United States, and the attraction of valuable 
human resources fostered by opportunities offered by both the U.S. economy and the U.S. 
society. It makes a relevant point in terms of the need to distinguish between border enforcement 
and counter-terrorism because of the fact that, to be effective, each needs to be separated from 
the other (it questions the effectiveness of anti-terrorist resources being poured to the border with 
Mexico).
140
 A third book is an account of the migrants' trek across the Arizona border, and 
portrays the dynamic between the Border Patrol and smugglers along the 2,000-mile border with 
Mexico. Although descriptively interesting, this work is uncritical of any position in the border 
or immigration debate, and excessive attention is paid to border police corruption and possible 
links between the border and terrorism.
141
 
A fourth book is the work of an analyst that has followed Mexico's drug trafficking 
organisations, more than that of an on-the-ground observer. It explains their tactics and methods 
to smuggle drugs into the United States and high-powered weapons into Mexico, and argues 
these organisations pose a threat not only to the border but also to areas deep inside the United 
                                                 
138
 Beittel, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations.         
139
 J. Danelo, The Border. Exploring the U.S.-Mexican Divide, (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, c2008).         
140
 E. Alden, The Closing of the American Border. Terrorism, Immigration, and Security since 9/11, (New York, 
NY: HarperCollins Publishers, c2008, published in cooperation with the Council on Foreign Relations).         
141
 T. Gaynor, Midnight on the line. The secret life of the U.S.-Mexico border, (New York, NY: Thomas Dunne 
Books, c2009).         
48 
 
States. It offers alternatives for dealing with the drug trafficking problem in the form of 
reconstructing Mexico’s social fabric and addressing U.S. drug demand through legislation.142 A 
fifth book offers an analysis of the border fence and the variety of forms it assumes at different 
stretches along the U.S.-Mexico border. Through a series of personal interviews with relevant 
actors and on-site visits, the author concludes that, far from achieving its intended purpose -to 
stop undocumented immigration and drugs-, the border ‘fence’ is a waste of resources that is 
counterproductive regarding the issues it is supposed to address, as reflected in the number of 
border deaths and the increasing profits of criminal organisations. A more sensible approach is 




At the time I started my graduate programme at Kings College London back in 1997, the 
security aspect of the U.S-Mexico bilateral relationship was poorly developed, and in this 
context I structured my research question by drawing on the limited security themes that were in 
the literature; these themes were implicit rather than explicit. Even though the literature on the 
security aspect in U.S.-Mexican relations has grown ever since, as shown in the seven categories 
of material reviewed above, security remains an underdeveloped subject as much as was the case 
when I started this thesis, especially if compared to the growing importance of security in the 
bilateral relationship, especially after the 9/11 events and the current security context in Mexico. 
For instance, none of the works above explicitly explains, in the first place, why Mexico can be a 
potential security concern for the United States in the context of a closer economic relationship, 
and certainly not even one has attempted to tackle this type of elemental question by resorting to 
the insights provided by a specific analytical security perspective. Most of these works are 
empirical descriptions of a particular aspect of the subject, and the analysis offered is not based 
on any analytical framework. Therefore, because of the gaps in the literature at the time a started 
studying this subject, which basically remain to this day, I decided to embark on the study of 
U.S. security regarding Mexico in the 1990s to start addressing important aspects of the subject 
that were absent in the body of scholarly work on the subject.  
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During the review of the literature above, I did not find either a fundamental debate or a 
series of debates. However, I identified an implicit discussion about what should or should not be 
considered security issues in the U.S.-Mexican relationship. On the one hand, one perspective 
points out to the inconvenience of identifying drug trafficking as a security matter in the bilateral 
relationship, basically because this is a trans-national issue that as such requires a bilateral (or a 
multi-lateral) approach. In this context, confronting drug trafficking involves a more 
comprehensive response that is in contrast to the narrow military focus provided by the 
traditional concept of security.
144
 On the other hand, the argument in favour of broadening the 
concept of national security, as advanced by one of the first studies on the U.S.-Mexican security 
relationship, México. En Busca de la Seguridad, edited by Bagley and Aguayo, consists in 
creating the possibility of transcending the traditional concept of security in order to be able to 
incorporate Mexico’s security concerns, as a developing country (i.e. democracy, economic 
development, social progress), in the analysis of U.S.-Mexico security issues.
145
 From my 
perspective, transcending the traditional concept of security represents an essential analytical tool 
to understand, and to be able to explain, the kind of non-state, non-military, security concerns 
Mexico poses to the United States. This aspect is nowhere to be found in the seven literature 
categories discussed earlier. 
 The course of action I followed to answer the research question above was to focus 
analysis on the 1990s, in particular on how the Clinton administration saw the security 
relationship with Mexico in the context of a closer economic relationship. At the time, the 
prospect was that with the agreement there would be an intensification of trans-border risks 
given the opportunities created by NAFTA. If it is true the agreement would expand 
opportunities for U.S. investment in Mexico, it would also make legitimate bilateral trade 
channels more vulnerable to exploitation by criminal organisations. For instance, drugs were 
expected to become more difficult to detect within the growing volume of legitimate goods 
entering the United States from Mexico.
146
 
In this context, the current importance of security issues in the bilateral relationship is not 
only explained by the 9/11 events and Mexico’s present security predicament, but also by pre-
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existing illegal flows whose relevance increased in the context of NAFTA. Nevertheless, as 
mentioned above, a closer economic relationship also offered the United States the possibility of 
increasing its influence on Mexican military and strategic matters because Mexican security 
would have eventually to incorporate a regional perspective. 
In order to identify Mexico-related issues that are of a security significance for the United 
States, I started by looking first at U.S. official documents to establish, from the U.S. point of 
view, the issues that were actually defined as threats. In this context, issues were not selected 
randomly but according to what the U.S. government itself established as important. First of all I 
analysed the U.S. defence strategy to determine what kind of threat, if any, Mexico posed at the 
military-strategic level based on the May 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR), which was the first four-year strategic revision that the U.S. Congress instructed the 
Clinton administration to complete.
147
 It was based on the broader May 1997 A New National 
Security Strategy for A New Century.
148
 This latter document was the fundamental reference for 
this thesis because of two reasons: (1) it was the first of the series ‘A New National Security 
Strategy for A New Century’, and therefore the one that set the parameter for the two Clinton 
administrations’ years that is the period covered by this thesis; (2) as such, it became the 
foundation for the first QDR report mentioned above. 
After reviewing the QDR report, I found that Mexico’s military significance for the 
United States was only tangential, and basically related to the support the U.S. military must 
provide to civilian agencies confronting trans-border threats.
149
 The first QDR, nevertheless, was 
criticised by not really affecting the fundamental U.S. Cold War military structure by being 
based on domestic economic and political considerations rather than on the new strategic 
realities of the international system.
150
 Moreover, the QDR retained old Cold War assumptions 
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instead of reflecting the ‘emerging threats of asymmetric warfare’.151 In this context, either 
because of domestic political considerations or because of a disconnection between threats and 
strategy, it is possible to conclude that the QDR did not devote –at least not formally- sufficient 
attention to the kind of non-state, non-military concerns the United States was confronting in 
relation to Mexico.    
When I turned my attention to the broader 1997 A National Security Strategy for a New 
Century, nevertheless, it was possible to better appreciate Mexico’s impact on the security of its 
northern neighbour mainly in terms of trans-border, non-state, threats such as drug trafficking 
and undocumented immigration. In retrospect, the 9/11 events actually validated the focus on 
drugs and undocumented immigrants, given the U.S. border agencies’ concern for the possibility 
of terrorists exploiting the routes and means of organised crime (human smugglers and drug 
traffickers) in order to introduce themselves or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) into U.S. 
territory.
152
      
Besides drug trafficking and undocumented immigration, this thesis also addresses the 
border physical environment not because it is defined as a security issue but precisely because of 
the opposite reason. While drugs and undocumented immigration have involved law enforcement 
and legislative responses in the United States by being recognised as border security concerns, 
environmental degradation along the U.S.-Mexico border, in contrast, has so far not encouraged 
the same kind of emergency-mode measures and instead it has been dealt with through the 
creation of bilateral institutions and within the normal process of political dialogue between the 
two countries. That is, the border environment is addressed within the context of the Buzan et.al 
analytical framework and Risk Society theory to explain an important border issue that has not 
fallen yet within the security realm, to show not only the complexity of security at the border but 
also the utility of both non-traditional perspectives to explain issues that notwithstanding they 
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represent a risk, they are addressed outside the security context, which is an analytically 
interesting point. 
During the course of this study I was often asked why I decided to concentrate on 
addressing only the U.S. perspective, especially when I could have embarked on a more 
comprehensive analysis by including Mexico’s point of view. 
The main reason I opted for emphasising the U.S. perspective, as opposed to the Mexican 
one, was the fact that, in the context of the scarce literature on security in U.S.-Mexican 
relations, I identified a gap in the efforts to understand the impact of NAFTA on U.S. security, in 
contrast to the interest NAFTA created for the analysis of Mexican security. For instance, in 
1997 James Rochlin published a book on how NAFTA would redefine Mexican security,
153
 but 
there was no equivalent analysis regarding the U.S. side of the equation. My research, in this 
context, represents an attempt to fill this gap in the literature in order to contribute to a more 
comprehensive understanding of security in U.S.-Mexican relations, using a combination of 
security perspectives.   
In terms of methodology, I basically relied on two elements. Firstly, after determining 
that U.S. security was affected by non-state, non-military, challenges coming from Mexico, I 
turned to a non-traditional security perspective based on the insights provided by Buzan et.al in 
Security: A New Framework for Analysis, and Risk Society Theory, as mentioned above. Their 
insights were then applied to the analysis of the impact of trans-border concerns to U.S. security 
coming from Mexico. The justification for combining these two perspectives has been discussed 
above. 
I opted for the analytical framework developed by Buzan et.al and Risk Society theory 
because of their potential to explain non-state, non-military, security issues which are central in 
the U.S.-Mexico security relationship. I made this decision, nevertheless, after considering the 
potential of some IR theories within both the ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ literature to 
explain security issues in the U.S.-Mexican relationship. For instance, realism and its focus on 
the state and military threats did not seem to provide a useful framework for a bilateral 
relationship where military factors have not been dominant, in general, except for the 1846-1848 
‘Mexican War’ and a brief period during World War II (WWII) when the two countries became 
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allies to confront the Axis powers’ potential inroads into the Western Hemisphere.154 Regarding 
interdependence, the main reason that led me to initially consider this theory as an adequate 
analytical tool for my study was the fact that this framework has been widely used to explain 
U.S.-Mexican relations.
155
 The use of this theory in the analysis of the bilateral relationship, 
nevertheless, has proven to be useful mainly to explaining economic factors. Moreover, the idea 
that the more density of interaction between societies the less the incentives to resort to military 
means to solve their differences, as advanced by this theoretical framework, was very attractive 
in terms of explaining part of the bilateral security dynamic.
156
 From my perspective, however, 
interdependence did not offer either an adequate explanation of the bilateral security relationship 
because it does not contribute to clarify, for instance, why security –sometimes with military 
connotations such as in the case of sending the National Guard to the border- is in fact currently 
at the top of the U.S.-Mexico security agenda. 
The Buzan et.al analytical framework, in contrast, represents a synthesis of these and 
other theories by explaining not only non-military challenges to security but also how threats in 
one security sector have an impact on the others, which is a phenomenon reflected in the U.S.-
Mexico security relationship. Moreover, after searching for Internet sources, I discovered the 
Buzan et.al framework has been used by a significant number of analysts to explain a wide 
variety of theoretical and empirical security issues. For instance, the aforementioned framework 
has been used to explain the need for a broader security approach to promote stability in 
                                                 
154
  See H. J. Morgenthau, Revised by K. W. Thompson, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and 
Peace, Brief Edition, (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, c1993); and K. N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 
First Edition, (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, Inc., c1979). 
155
 See Report of the Bilateral Commission on the Future of United States-Mexican Relations, The Challenge of 
Interdependence, (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., c1989), p.30; G. F. Erb and C. Thorup, U.S.-
Mexican Relations: The Issues Ahead, Overseas Development Council Paper 35, Prepared for the U.S.-Mexico 
Policy Committee, U.S.-Mexico Project, Overseas Development Council, Nov. 1984, p.2; J. Chabat, ‘Mexico’s 
Foreign Policy After NAFTA: The Tools of Interdependence’, in R. O. de la Garza and J. Velasco (eds.), Bridging 
the Border. Transforming Mexico-U.S. Relations, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., c1997), 
p.35; M. Ojeda, ‘Mexico and United States Relations: Interdependence or Mexico’s Dependence?’, in C. Vasquez 
and M. García y Griego (eds.), Mexican-U.S. Relations: Conflict and Convergence, UCLA Chicano Studies 
Research Center, University of California, Los Angeles, 1983, p.112; C. W. Reynolds, Lessons from the United 
States-Mexico Experience for North-South Relations, Working Paper, U.S.-Mexico Series No. 6, Overseas 
Development Council, July 1982, p.1; C. L. Thorup, ‘Managing Extreme Interdependence: Alternative Institutional 
Arrangements of U.S. Policymaking toward Mexico, 1976-1988’, Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1992, 
quoted by Bailey and Aguayo, ‘Strategy and Security in U.S.-Mexican Relations’, in Bailey and Aguayo (eds.), 
Strategy and Security in U.S.-Mexican Relations Beyond the Cold War, p.2. 
156
 R. O. Keohane and J. S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, Second Edition, Written under the auspices of the 





 or to justify the EU enlargement process.
158
 It has also been used to understand 
the politicisation and securitisation of trans-boundary waters,
 159
 how the concept of human 
security has become embedded in the EU security perspective,
160
 the need to delimit the concept 
of human security in the South Asian context,
161
 the convenience of utilising the securitisation 
process to conceptualise computer security,
162
 and how Japan has securitised itself in non-
traditional ways.
163
 The more theoretical analysis of the framework includes discussions on how 
securitisation transforms practices and discourses,
164
 how to understand security in terms of non-
state actors,
165




Whereas the Buzan et.al analytical framework helps to understand the scope of security, I 
also utilised Risk Society theory to explore the depth (i.e the formation) of the U.S. security 
concerns regarding Mexico in order to complement the Copenhagen School approach. Risk 
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Society theory provides valuable elements to understand the non-military, trans-national, 
concerns that characterise the post-Cold War, post-9/11 period, and in this context it is useful to 
reach a more comprehensive understanding of U.S. security concerns regarding Mexico.     
I do not claim that identifying the trans-border and trans-national nature of the threats 
posed by Mexico to the United States is the original contribution of the thesis because this 
argument has already been presented by other authors.
 167
 What I claim to be the contribution of 
my thesis is the effort to go beyond descriptive explanations of the problem by applying a 
combination of non-traditional security perspectives, and this is something not found in the 
literature of the subject, neither for the threats Mexico perceives from the United States, nor for 
the threats the United States perceives from Mexico, which is the subject of this analysis.          
Secondly, in terms of information, this thesis relies on a blend of secondary and primary 
sources. The former included academic books and book chapters, policy briefs and working 
papers such as those available in Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO) –to which I have 
access by virtue of being alumni from the Center for Hemispheric and Defense Studies (CHDS) 
in Washington, DC- and also academic journal articles as well as articles from newspapers. The 
bibliography of the thesis is organised in two main parts: the first one lists all secondary sources 
and the second one all the official documents used in the course of this research. At the very end 
of the bibliography I provide a list of specialists, mainly officials from the U.S. Government who 
served under one or the two Clinton administrations, who I interviewed during the research for 
this thesis. In terms of the balance between the two types of sources, approximately 40% of this 
research relied on primary sources and 60% on secondary sources. Interviews were particularly 
relevant within the former category as all of them allowed me to confront data found on written 
sources as well as to find new pieces of information not available in published documents. 
Primary sources included government documents ranging from Public Laws and Acts of 
Congress, to reports by Executive Branch agencies such as the U.S. Department of Defense 
(DoD) annual strategic assessments and background notes from the U.S. Department of State 
(DoS), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Factbook, in addition to those ordered by the U.S. 
Congress to be prepared by organisations such as the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and 
the then-General Accounting Office (GAO). I also used statistical data from the Greenbook in 
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order to analyse the evolution of U.S. economic and military assistance to Mexico in the period 
under study, as well as opinion polls on trans-border issues and data on the presence of Mexico 
as a subject in U.S. Congress proceedings in those years. 
Official U.S. documents also consisted of testimony provided by Clinton administration 
officials before members of the U.S. Congress at legislative hearings, as well as reports prepared 
by boards such as the Good Neighbor Policy Board (GNPB), commissions such as the 
International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) and the Commission on Immigration 
Reform (CIR), panels such as the National Defense Panel (NDP), and task forces such as the 
Interagency Task Force on Economic Development for the Southwest Border. 
The White House turned out to be a valuable source of information, as I was able to 
obtain from its website press releases, the yearly National Security Strategy of the United States, 
as well as a variety of assessments and statistics from the Office of National Drug Control 
(ONDCP). I was able to have access to some National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) 
through the National Security Archives at The George Washington University (GWU), whose 
office I actually visited during a short stay in Washington, D.C. 
This study also resorted to sources of information from government academic centres 
such as the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University 
(NDU) in Washington, D.C., and from the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) in Carlisle, 
Pennsylvania. This author visited the USAWC library during the first stage of this research 
project, and frequently followed articles on Mexico and Latin America published in the USAWC 
quarterly Parameters, which is a journal that can be accessed for free through the Internet. It is 
important to note that whenever I had the opportunity to have access to electronic sources of 
information, I extensively used database systems such as ProQuest, and JSTOR (Journal Storage) 
in particular, in order to find articles on the topics of interest of this thesis using key words such 
as ‘U.S. security’, ‘Mexican security’, ‘trans-border issues’, ‘U.S.-Mexico border’, ‘drug 
trafficking’, ‘undocumented immigration’ and ‘NAFTA’, among others. 
Primary sources for this thesis also consisted of reports from international organisations 
such as The World Bank (WB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), and the United 
Nations (UN). UN documents utilised in this research project included papers from the UN 
University and the UN Research Institute for Social Development, and also those from other UN 
bodies covering specific topics such as conflict, climate change, development and drugs. 
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 I also used grey literature from think tanks that included the RAND Corporation, the 
Brookings Institution, the Urban Institute, the Democratic Leadership Council/Progressive 
Policy Institute (DLC/PPI), the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), COPRI, the Commission 
on the Future of United States-Mexican Relations, the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS), the 
Center for Defense Information (CDI), the Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, the 
Project on Defense Alternatives, the Commonwealth Institute, the Inter-American Dialogue, the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the conservative The Heritage Foundation, 
and a variety of papers from academic institutions such as the Association of Borderland Studies 
and Western Social Science Association, the Political Science Association (PSA), the Center for 
Mexican-American Studies (CMAS) at the University of Texas (UT) at Austin, CUSM at UCSD, 
the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (GSIRPS) at UCSD, the 
Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) at UCSD, the Project on Advocacy of U.S. 
Interests Abroad, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Centre for the Study 
of Globalisation at the University of Warwick, and the Mexico City-based Centro de 
Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) and Colegio Nacional de Ciencia Política y 
Administración Pública, A.C. Finally, I obtained information from the Drug Library.org, 
I also carried some quantitative work in the form of searching for and presenting 
statistical data to support specific arguments of this thesis. For instance, the chapters devoted to 
drug trafficking and undocumented immigration included a variety of tables showing amounts of 
drug seizures, U.S. drug assistance and U.S. drug consumption, as well as figures on 
deportations, immigration enforcement and immigrant population in the United States, 
respectively, in order to illustrate and to put into perspective both the trends and the dimension of 
each issue. For this purpose, I utilised statistics from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA), the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DoHHS), in particular from the 
National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA) and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration (SAMHSA), among others. It is important to note that besides the use of non-
traditional security perspectives for the study of the non-military, non-state, threats Mexico poses 
to the United States, interviews with officials who worked in the two Clinton administrations 
were primary sources as well as an additional source of originality for the thesis. Thanks to my 
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frequent participation in academic events in the United States, such as in the Summer Seminar on 
U.S. Studies at the CUSMS at UCSD in 2001, as well as in the variety of events organised by the 
CHDS from 2000 on, I was able to have access to scholars as well as to practitioners who 
worked for the two Clinton administrations who directly dealt with the issues under 
consideration in this thesis. I conducted these interviews according to qualitative methodology; 
that is, they were based on a flexible question-and-answer framework and were carried out 
person to person.
168
 None of them was conducted over the phone, although two of them were 
based on a questionnaire that was sent, and responded to, through e-mail. Except for the latter 
two, all of them were conducted face to face, recorded, and later transcribed. I interviewed Juan 
Pablo Cárdenas, Policy Analyst in charge of Mexico, Central America & Caribbean at The White 
House ONDCP; David Fege, Assistant Director, San Diego Border Liaison Office, EPA; Manuel 
Figueroa, Supervisory Border Patrol Agent at El Centro Sector Headquarters, one of the busiest 
undocumented immigrant corridors in California at the time; Edward Logan, Special Agent in 
Charge at the U.S. Customs Service in San Diego, California; Michael Pérez, Counsel to the 
Deputy Attorney General (former) Office of the Attorney General U.S. Department of Justice 
(DoJ): David Randolph, Coordinator of U.S.-Mexico Border Affairs at the DoS; Ana María 
Salazar, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support 
who later went into journalism in Mexico City; Marico Sayoc when she held the position of 
U.S.-Mexico Program Coordinator at EPA; Mark Spalding, GSIRPS Professor at UCSD, who is 
a re-known specialist on border environmental issues; Thomas Umberg, Attorney at Law, 
Morrison & Foerster LLP, Irvine, California, who was the former Deputy Director for Supply 
Reduction at the ONDCP; and Patrick Whelan, who was in charge of the Office of International 
Activities at the EPA. Two additional interviews I conducted were those with Arturo Valenzuela, 
then-Director of the Center for Latin American Studies at Georgetown University and former 
Assistant Secretary for Hemispheric Affairs at the DoS; and with Errol Chávez, Special Agent in 
Charge of the DEA Division in San Diego, California. The transcription of these two last 
interviews was problematic because of technical problems I unexpectedly experienced with the 
tape recorder, so they are incomplete. As an appendix to this thesis, nevertheless, I have included 
the schedule of interviews, and a transcript of all of them is available for examiners to consult if 
                                                 
168
 J. L. Simon and P. Burnstein, Basic Research Methods in Social Science, Third Edition, (New York, NY: 
McGraw-Hill, Inc.), pp. 255-256. 
59 
 
they wish. In general, information elicited through interviews converged with or did not 
contradict the ideas expressed in official documents, but sometimes disagreed with, or 
complemented, information found in secondary sources.        
This research concludes that the answer to the research question -which consists in 
explaining the paradox as to why Mexico, a valuable U.S. trade partner, became a U.S. security 
concern in the context of NAFTA- is that U.S. security concerns regarding Mexico are the 
product of the intensification of interdependence between the two countries, in particular of the 
existence of an integrated illegal drug and labour market that was likely to expand in the context 
of the trade agreement.  
The NAFTA process began by President George H. W. Bush in 1990 and concluded by 
President Clinton in 1994, created important economic opportunities for both the United States 
and Mexico (and Canada), reflected in the fact that trade among its members increased in the 
first years of operation of the agreement.
169
 Concerns in the United States about the negative 
impacts of the accord with Mexico, nevertheless, have been expressed outside the official U.S. 
rhetoric, and they have been reflected in arguments that point out that NAFTA facilitated the 
movement of drugs across the border
170
 and trade integration, far from deterring undocumented 
immigration, actually increased it,
171
 to the point that the 1990s were characterised by more 
restrictive U.S. immigration policies at the federal level. In this context, drugs and 
undocumented immigrants became more securitised after 9/11 given the potential scenario of 
drug trafficking organisations helping terrorists to illegally enter the United States, possibility 
that contributed to establish a direct link between immigration and terrorism in the United States. 
In contrast, border environmental issues between the United States and Mexico have been for the 
most part not actual but potential security concerns, and they have remained the same way in part 
due to the bilateral institutional infrastructure to deal with these matters. The prospect for drugs 
and undocumented immigration to remain as U.S. security concerns in the bilateral relationship 
depend on whether drugs are eventually legalised, and the United States and Mexico arrive at a 
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more comprehensive integration framework that would allow for the free movement of people -
especially of Mexicans into the United States-, even though it is important to note that this 
scenario is unlikely as long as deep economic differences remain between the two countries. In 
academic terms, this thesis demonstrates the reasons why drugs and undocumented immigration 
are security issues from the U.S. point of view. In policy terms, the conclusion of this study is 
that if both countries had non-coercive institutional structures, such as bilateral mechanisms to 
regulate the flow of Mexican workers to the United States and a bi-national agency to deal with 
the demand of drugs in both countries through the development of a joint strategy and 
programmes to reduce consumption, both issues could be pushed out of the security realm and 
back into the political sphere. The presence of bilateral institutions has proven valuable to solve 
common security concerns.   
After this introduction, chapter 2 is devoted to discussing both the Buzan et.al analytical 
framework and Risk Society Theory. It starts by briefly addressing post-positivist strands in 
order to locate the Buzan et.al and the Risk Society perspectives within this school of thought, 
and compares the Buzan et.al approach with the traditional conception of security to identify the 
latter perspective’s limitations in terms of explaining non-military threats to security. After 
addressing the securitisation process, the chapter goes on to discuss each of Buzan et.al’s five 
security issue-sectors. It assesses the broader security perspective’s advantages and 
disadvantages, and explains the utility of the Buzan et.al analytical framework to study the two 
securitised issues under consideration in this thesis, drugs and undocumented immigration, and 
the non-securitised environmental concern. It addresses Risk Society Theory and compares it to 
the Buzan et.al analytical framework to test its strengths. Chapter 3 begins by establishing the 
nature of the U.S.-Mexico security relationship, and then addresses NAFTA’s security 
implications for the United States establishing the 1990s as the focus of this study. It continues 
with the empirical analysis of Mexico’s importance for the United States within both the U.S. 
defence and the national security strategies. This section adopts an inductive perspective by first 
studying Mexico’s particular military irrelevance within the U.S. defence strategy, and then 
moving on to its broader significance in terms of the more general U.S. national security 
strategy. It is here where Mexico’s security impact on its northern neighbour becomes clearer, 
both in terms of opportunities and risks. Chapter 4 deals with the analysis of drug trafficking as 
the only U.S. security issue directly linked to Mexico within the U.S. national security strategy in 
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its character of a trans-national concern in relation to the Western Hemisphere. It addresses the 
background of the issue, its evolution and explains it from both security perspectives. Chapter 5 
focuses on Mexican undocumented immigration to the United States. Even though Mexico was 
not directly addressed at all within the U.S. security strategy in relation to undocumented 
immigration, the document identified this as one of the issues of a trans-national nature. In this 
context, including undocumented immigration in the analysis of U.S. trans-border threats was 
only logical given both the impact and dimension of Mexican legal and unauthorised 
immigration in the United States. At no point the U.S. security strategy document mentioned the 
erosion of identity either as a security concern in relation to migration, and for this reason it 
became interesting to find out what the U.S. concern is in this regard. This chapter addresses 
undocumented immigration from the two security perspectives. Chapter 6 focuses on the border 
environment, in particular on the issue of water pollution and its potential to create an epidemic 
on both sides of the boundary. In analytical terms, the purpose of addressing the border 
environment consisted in demonstrating that the Buzan et.al analytical framework is equally 
useful to understand potentially threatening issues that are kept outside the security realm –
besides the fact that the existence of a bi-national institutional infrastructure is part of the 
explanation about the non-securitisation of the border environment. This argument was 
complemented with insights from Risk Society theory in order to arrive at a more comprehensive 
explanation about this issue, and the measures that have prevented it from becoming a security 
concern. Therefore, the sequence followed by the analysis consisted in addressing an explicit 
securitised issue, an implicit security issue, and a potential security concern in order to reflect not 
only the complexity of the U.S.-Mexican security relationship but also the utility of both security 














CHAPTER 2. A NON-TRADITIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF SECURITY 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter consists in describing, analysing and comparing the Buzan et.al 
analytical framework and Risk Society theory in order to reach a more comprehensive 
understanding the non-state, non-military, threats Mexico poses to the United States.      
In contrast to security relationships determined by the pre-eminence of the state and the 
threat or the actual use of force (such as the one that characterised bipolar confrontation during 
the Cold War), which are better explained by the realist perspective and its focus on military 
factors, the U.S.-Mexico security relationship is defined, from the U.S. point of view, by non-
state, non-military, trans-border, threats (mainly drug trafficking, undocumented immigration) 
that Mexico indirectly poses to its neighbour to the north. Understanding the U.S.-Mexico 
security relationship, therefore, requires a non-traditional conception of security. 
 It is not the intention of this chapter to make an exhaustive review of the ‘non-traditional’ 
(post-positivist) perspectives on security; instead, the objective is to discuss two interesting post-
positivist strands in security studies such as Critical Security Studies and Feminism in order to 
situate the Buzan et.al analytical framework and Risk Society theory within the ‘non-traditional’ 
literature, and in subsequent sections to compare them in order to test the strengths of the former 
in relation to the analysis of U.S. security and trans-border threats from Mexico. 
First, Critical Security Studies (CSS) derives from critical IR theory, and is an orientation 
that criticises the status quo in international relations based on the idea that the behaviour of 
states and individuals can be transformed. An important book within this school has been 
Critical Security Studies. Concepts and Cases edited in 1996 by Keith Krause and Michael 
Williams, which focuses criticism on the neo-realist’s emphasis on states as the main object of 
security, which for all practical purposes translates a human being’s security into ‘citizenship’; in 
other words, the security of the individual is relevant only to the extent that he/she is a citizen of 
a state; otherwise the individual is not significant as an object of security per se.
172
 In this 
context, CSS proposes an approach based on the security of the individual -or on that of his/her 
society- instead of concentrating on the state. This orientation widens the agenda for security 
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studies, in particular because it opens the possibility of identifying who is accountable for the 
security of the individual in absence of an authority that can provide protection, or whether a 
structure of authority is a threat to its own population.
173
 An important point implicit in this CSS 
argument is that to the extent that the focus of analysis is the individual and/or the community, it 
is important to consider the principles, customs and standards that shape the community, which 
in turn requires the analyst not to be objectively detached from the object under study but to 
interpret the situation according to the object’s perception. In the case of Risk Society theory, 
because of the process of ‘reflexive modernisation’, the individual is a central actor in the 
definition of risk, as discussed below. 
It is important to note that even though CSS criticises the state as the central referent 
object of security by pointing out that security involves more than military aspects, the state itself 
is analysed under a new light because this object, as the community, is also constituted by ideas, 
and this argument is characteristic of the post-positivist theoretical strands. Critical Security 
Studies also refers to a strand developed by Ken Booth based on the ideas of the Frankfurt 
School that links critical security and criticism of Marxist assumptions. Booth distances himself 
from Krause and Williams by being in favour of a unitary rather than a broader critical security 
strand. According to his view, critical theory has to uncover the political forces that shape 
knowledge, as well as to expose the interests behind the apparently ‘neutral’ traditional security 
theory, because this is important to foster social change and thus the possibility of progress; as a 
matter of fact, ‘the test of social theory is emancipation’174 from structures that impede social 
progress such as an authoritarian state, for instance. 
It can be argued that Krause and Williams CSS is a reaction to the Buzan et.al. analytical 
framework more than to the traditional notions of security. Comparing the two perspectives, it is 
important to note that the Buzan et.al analytical framework represents a wider perspective than 
CSS by including security issue-sectors as part of its analysis while CSS focuses primarily on the 
process of securitisation. CSS criticises the Buzan et.al analytical framework in reference to its 
lack of clarity, by failing to adequately address questions such as who can really securitise; under 
what conditions successful securitisation is achieved; and what the consequences of successful 
                                                 
173
 D. Mutimer, ‘Critical Security Studies: A Schismatic History’, Chapter Four, in A. Collins, Contemporary 
Security Studies, Online Resource Centre, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, c2007), p. 57. 
174




securitisation are. While CSS shares with the Buzan et.al analytical framework recognition of 
constructivism as a useful analytical tool, CSS criticises the issue-sector aspect of the Buzan 
et.al’s perspective by considering it part of a different epistemological orientation (positivist) in 
comparison to securitisation which is post-positivist. Booth also criticises the Buzan et.al 
analytical framework for the same reason, in particular because it retains a positivist orientation 
in detriment of a constructivist analysis. Buzan et.al argues that even though their framework 
shares with CSS the value of a constructivist approach, ‘we, in contrast, believe even the socially 
constituted is often sedimented as structure and becomes so relatively stable as practice that one 
must do analysis on the basis that it continues’.175  In their view, therefore, the security field is 
highly constant as not to approach it also from an objective perspective. Finally, CSS shares with 
constructivism the relevance of promoting social change, and both reject the separation of the 
analyst from the social world in contrast to the Buzan et.al analytical framework,
176
 as discussed 
above. Risk Society Theory rejects the centrality of the state and this is a characteristic it shares 
with both the Buzan et.al analytical framework and CSS, even though it has also found it 
difficult to isolate itself from constructivism by recognising that the designation of a risk may be 
function of perception, that is of a social construction as discussed in more detail below.  
Second, Feminism is a theoretical approach originating from the idea that the national 
security discourse, which has emphasised the security of the state, has been influenced by the 
male-dominated world of ‘high politics’ that has resulted in neglecting women and issues that 
also affect the security of the individual. Ann Tickner, for instance, makes reference to this 
exclusion by pointing out to the ‘extent to which international politics is such a thoroughly 
masculinised sphere of activity that women’s voices are considered inauthentic’.177 As in the 
case of other critical theoretical strands, feminism is an orientation interested in finding out who 
has really been favoured by national security policy,
178
 and its main arguments can be grouped 
into four different categories. First, it criticises women’s lack of relevance within international 
security policies. In this context, feminism strives to demonstrate that women and gender are 
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empirically and conceptually relevant aspects of the structure of international relations.
179
 
Women were, for instance, victims in war-ravaged Europe during WW II, while they represented 
a valuable human resource on the home front in the war effort, in places such as in the United 
States. Second, feminism analyses the extent to which women have really been protected in 
times of war, taking into account that security is a multi-factorial concept related to different 
forms of violence that include physical and psychological forms. In this context, feminists 
broaden the security analysis by dealing not only with war as a threat, but also other types of 
issues such as lack of economic opportunities, subjugation to male authority and vulnerability to 
environmental challenges. According to one interesting perspective, ‘feminists not only broaden 
what is meant by security but also who the concept of security applies to’.180 Cynthia Enloe, for 
instance, addresses the issue of global politics by placing women as the central aspect for 
analysis, arguing about women’s positive contribution in areas such as diplomacy, military, 
tourism and agriculture.
181
 Third, feminism establishes that without women, security studies are 
incomplete because it is neither scientifically correct nor ethically acceptable to neglect gender in 
their analysis. Understanding ‘immunity’ in times of war, for instance, required a feminist 
approach to reveal the fact that because of immunity has often been associated with civilian 
populations, meaning women and children, non-combatant male populations were faced with a 
significant vulnerability.
182
 In synthesis, feminism has contributed to reconceptualise ideas such 
as security, violence and war, and has provided new knowledge in areas such as sexual violence, 
the participation of women in the armed forces, militarisation, and the a priori link between 
women and peace, contributing therefore to a more comprehensive understanding of security 
issues. 
The Buzan et.al analytical framework is part of the ‘non-traditional’ literature on security 
that includes the post-positivist strands discussed above, among others. Even though the Buzan 
et.al analytical framework shares with CSS the value of social construction as a key element of 
analysis –which is present in one of its main components, the process of securitisation-, the 
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framework of reference also includes a structural explanation in terms of security issue-sectors 
that allow for a more comprehensive understanding of security than either constructivism or 
CSS. Security: A New Framework for Analysis, therefore, not only explains how issues are 
securitised and by whom, but also the implications of securitisation on different contexts, 
providing thus a ‘holistic’ understanding of security. CSS criticises the Buzan et.al analytical 
framework for retaining a positivist orientation by acknowledging the dominance of the state in 
security analysis. From this author’s view, however, recognising the significance of the state is 
an advantage rather than a disadvantage because of the fact that a more eclectic perspective 
allows the analyst to reach a more comprehensive understanding of security. In this context, it 
can be argued that Security: A New Framework for Analysis represents a sui generis explanation 
by being critical of the traditional notion of security, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, by 
retaining some important positivist elements such as the objective continuation and permanence 
of the state as a key factor in the study of security. 
Feminism provides valuable insights on important international issues such as war, 
diplomacy and economic relations, and this perspective is useful to the analysis of certain 
gender-related aspects of U.S. security in relation to Mexico. For instance, Kathleen Staudt 
points out that the analysis of violence at the U.S.-Mexico border invariably includes ‘gender-
based variables’ such as different sorts of aggression against women.183 She contends, 
nevertheless, that even though the activist community has called the attention of authorities to 
these problems, the paradox is that by doing so the activists have only reinforced the official 
coercive orientation to deal with border challenges that is characterised by the lack of genuine 
concern for women’s issues. To break this cycle, therefore, she argues it is important to 
understand violence against women from the perspective of those who suffer it, and to 
accomplish this objective requires expanding (i.e. focusing the issue from a more general 
Feminist and human rights perspective) the narrower conceptions that characterise the 
government’s response to border challenges.184   
The arguments above do not intend to portray the Buzan et.al analytical framework and 
Risk Society theory as exceptional and ideal models for understanding security in U.S.-Mexican 
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relations; they are just the perspectives that provide more elements to understanding security in 
the context of a very complex bilateral relationship, in comparison to CSS and Feminism. This 
was the justification to adopt both complementary perspectives instead of others within the ‘non-
traditional’ literature on security.       
This chapter has four sections besides this introduction. The first part outlines the main 
characteristics of the notion of security in order to reflect its complexity. The second part focuses 
on describing the traditional conception of security and its emphasis on the state and military 
factors. It deals with the principles of realism and neo-realism and their influence on security, 
and discusses some of the criticisms made to this perspective. It addresses the reasons why the 
realist/neo-realist security notion does not sufficiently explain the U.S.-Mexico security 
relationship. The third part addresses both the Buzan et.al analytical framework and Risk society 
Theory. It examines the framework’s securitisation process and each of the security-issue sectors 
as well as its overall advantages and disadvantages. It discusses the framework’s utility for this 
thesis. The fourth part addresses Risk Society Theory and compares it to the Buzan et.al 
analytical framework to test this latter strength. The fifth part provides the conclusions of the 
chapter. 
 
2.2. The Complexity of the Security Idea 
Even though there are references to the ‘theory of national security’ within academic discussions 
on the subject, the ambiguity and relativity that has characterised the concept of ‘security’ makes 
it difficult to conceive of security in terms of a theory. For this reason, it is easier to think of 
security in terms of doctrines, approaches, notions and analytical frameworks rather than in 
terms of a theory per se.
185
 While most characterisations of security/national security deal with 
basic elements such as goals, obstacles and the state, trying to define a concept is problematic 
precisely because security is contextual and dependent on a wide variety of circumstances.
186
 For 
Colombia, for instance, having U.S. military advisors within its territory as part of ‘Plan 
Colombia’ is not a security concern, in comparison to having U.S. military personnel stationed in 
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Mexico as part of the ‘Merida Initiative’, which Mexico made it clear was out of question, 
because of the historic distrust of U.S. intentions.
187
  
Notwithstanding the argument above, it is important to note that theories have been 
developed in relation to specific aspects of security. For instance, ‘balance of power’ and 
‘deterrence’ are two security-related concepts that have produced theoretical thinking.188 
Moreover, even though scholars, in general, do not make reference to any ‘Buzan theory’, some 
of them have actually theorised about specific aspects of the Buzan et.al analytical framework 
when they mention, for instance, ‘securitization theory’.189 Two of the authors of Security: A 
New Framework for Analysis themselves, Buzan and Waever, have contributed to the 
development of ‘”classical security complex theory”’.190 Yet, they conceive their work of 
reference in terms of a ‘framework for analysis’ rather than in terms of a theory.  
Therefore, although this study underlines the difficulties involved in thinking in terms of 
a ‘security theory’, it does recognise that there is a series of basic elements that underpin the idea 
of security. First, notwithstanding labels such as ‘human’, ‘public’, ‘domestic’, ‘internal’, 
‘national’ or ‘international’, security involves ‘values’ and as such they do require to be 
protected from threats.
191
 In other words, once a goal has been identified, one has to be prepared 
to overcome the obstacles to its achievement. According to Donald Nuechterlein, ‘the national 
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interest is the perceived needs and desires of one sovereign state in relation to the sovereign 
states comprising its external environment’.192 In this context, interests are the concrete 
expression of values and aspirations. Second, security is basically the ‘pursuit of freedom from 
threat’.193 Security is defined mainly by a ‘negative value’ in the sense that it is characterised by 
the absence of a threat. It resembles the debates about ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ freedom in 
political philosophy.
194
 Third, security represents a cost, which means that resources assigned to 
security do so at the expense of satisfying other needs in a context of ‘scarce resources’.195 In 
fact, devoting resources to security implies not only sacrificing other goals but also the 
possibility of producing an undesirable effect: the greater the investment in security, the grater 
the possibility that it could bring about precisely the consequence it seeks to prevent in the first 
place, which is to diminish one’s own security creating a ‘security dilemma’ by making others 
feel less secure because of one’s own actions.196 Fourth, in relation to the previous argument, 
security is relative because more often than not it is necessary to accept a minimum threshold of 
insecurity. Security is relative also because the threat perception is different for different entities 
or actors. According to Arnold Wolfers’ classic 1950s essay, 
Some may find the danger to which they are exposed entirely normal and in line with 




Security, therefore, is an issue related to perception and this fact lays at the foundation of the 
constructivist view on the subject that establishes that the concept is inter-subjective, socially 
constructed.
198
 For instance, walking alone on an empty street late at night can be objectively 
safe because of the absence of any material threat. From a different perspective, this situation is 
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only subjectively safe precisely because of the same reason, because an empty street late at night 
is supposed to increase the vulnerability for an individual walking in the area due to the absence 
of other people who to resort to in case of an emergency.  
 Because of its ambiguity, the purpose of this section has been to introduce some of the 
characteristics that make security a notion difficult to define. This is in line with the argument 
about its complexity and changing character, and with the fact that it cannot be defined in 
absolute terms but only in reference to a specific context.   
 
2.3. ‘Traditional’ Notion of Security 
The traditional notion of security and its focus on the state and military factors has its roots in 
‘classical realism’ and ‘neo-realism’ within IR theory.   
Realism has been a dominant and well established IR perspective whose antecedents can 
be traced back to Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes and Niccolo Machiavelli, which in modern times 
represented a criticism of the ‘utopianism’ that characterised the interwar period.199 For instance, 
in his book The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939 published in 1939, E. H. Carr rejected the idea 
of a ‘natural harmony of interests’ in the international system, and he actually considered it the 
source of ‘so much confusion in international thinking’.200 Hans Morgenthau, the most 
influential proponent of this view after WWII, in his Politics Among Nations criticised ‘the 
“legalistic-moralistic approach” to international politics’.201 He established that the world ‘is the 
result of forces inherent in the human nature’, one of ‘opposing interests and of conflict’ where 
there is no place for morality especially if it is defined in isolation from reality.
202
 
His perspective on international politics is based on six principles: 1) politics mirrors 
human nature; 2) international politics translates into ‘interest defined in terms of power’; 3) the 
meaning of the national interest, as ‘an objective category’, is changeable; 4) the permanence of 
the state is the crucial ‘moral principle’; 5) ‘morality’ is nothing but pursuing the interest of the 
state; 6) ‘moral standards’ must adjust to politics.203 Based on these principles, states are rational 
and unitary actors operating in an anarchic international system, seeking to maximise their power 
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as the means to promote their national interests often through use of the force. This is why 
power, meaning military power, equals security within this perspective. Moreover, in a 
competitive international context of sovereign states, balance of power represents ‘a particular 
manifestation of a general social principle’ that is fundamental to preserve states’ freedom of 
action.
204
   
In contrast to classical realism, for neo-realism or structural realism,
205
 understanding 
international politics requires focusing not on the human nature but on the nature of the 
international system.
206
 According to this perspective, a system is formed by a ‘structure’ and 
‘interactive units’.207 While the structure is defined by the way each unit is related to all others, 
units are states that are differentiated not by the objectives they have to accomplish but by the 
array of instruments at their disposal to achieve those goals.
208
 One relevant aspect of this theory 
is that its most important variables are located at the system level, not at the level of the unit, and 
this is actually a source of criticism made of realism and neo-realism as well.
209
 The criticism 
focuses on the fact that neither of the two theories take into consideration the internal 
characteristics of individual units, which otherwise would provide valuable elements of analysis. 
According to Richard Ashley, for instance, 
The proposition that the state might be essentially problematic or contested is excluded 
from neorealist theory. Indeed, neorealist theory is prepared to acknowledge problems of 
the state only to the extent that the state itself, within the framework of its own 
legitimations, might be prepared to recognize problems and mobilize resources toward 
their solution.
 210  
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In comparison to the hierarchical nature of domestic politics, where there is a vertical line 
of authority that establishes relations of super-ordination and subordination, the defining 
principle of international politics is anarchy, which is created by each unit looking for its own 
self-serving interest.
211
 As a result of this ‘self-help’ principle, the primary goal of states is 
‘survival’.212 As in classical realism, balance of power is a relevant concept, even though within 




One significant criticism of realism comes from pluralism, in particular from the neo-
liberal institutionalist strand and its concept of ‘complex interdependence’. This idea establishes 
that in the international context societies are inter-connected by a wide variety of links; that 
military issues are not necessarily the main concern of all states; and also that military power is 
increasingly difficult to translate into other forms of influence.
214
 Even though this perspective 
does not reject the relevance of the state and military factors, it challenges the claim about them 
being the determining aspects of international politics. One interdependence line of argument 
found in Buzan et.al is, for instance, that ‘in the post-Cold War world, a case can be made that 
military threats are ceasing to matter in relations among the advanced industrial democracies’.215 
Consider, for instance, the Franco-German brigade established in 1987, which is evidence of the 




It is important to mention that realism, neo-realism and neo-liberalism are all positivist 
perspectives, which means they describe phenomena that are observable and measurable, also 
known as practical empiricism.
217
 From the post-positivist side -that rejects the principles of 
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positivism by establishing that observation is fallible and theory susceptible to correction-, 
nevertheless, the realist/neo-realist perspective is also criticised by the ‘English School’ which, 
contrary to realism, holds that states can actually abide by rules that contribute to sustain 
‘common interests’, and by doing so they create a ‘society of states’ meaning that anarchy does 
not necessarily turns into conflict.
218
 Additional theoretical views that are critical of 
positivist/rational choice theory approaches are Feminism, Critical Theory, Post-structuralism 
and Postmodernism that basically share a ‘rejection of a “foundationalist” account of the world, 
in which knowledge can be grounded by the correspondence of theory to a knowable reality’.219 
For post-positivist positions, therefore, knowledge is based on ‘nonfalsified hypotheses that are 
probable facts or laws’.220  Nevertheless, one of the outstanding criticisms of realism/neo-realism 
is its failure to satisfactorily explain the causes of war. According to Robert Jervis, making 
reference to the international context after the end of the Cold War,  
Whatever its explanation, the very existence of a security community among the leading 




States, therefore, are not all and certainly not all the time worried about military threats from 
other states, nor about their survival as realism and neo-realism claim. 
  
2.3.1. The Partial Utility of the ‘Traditional’ Notion to Explain the U.S.-Mexico Security 
Relationship 
Notwithstanding the critique above, it is important to note that the realist and neo-realist 
perspectives are useful if the objective is to analyse power relationships and to compare national 
power factors regarding the United States and Mexico. In terms of neo-realist principles, for 
instance, ‘the distribution of capabilities’ in the system favours the United States in comparison 
to Mexico as shown in Table 1 above. 
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The asymmetry of power between the two countries has been historically evident, and in 
fact the United States expanded in the first half of the 19
th
 century to the detriment of Mexico, 
which explains why the latter has been traditionally wary and cautious of the former. 
Nevertheless, their security relationship has not been determined, at least not since the 1846-
1848 ‘Mexican War’, by military factors. This is the reason why realism and neo-realism 
represent a necessary but not sufficient explanation for the security dynamic between the two 
countries that is determined by the non-state, trans-border, character of challenges in the bilateral 
relationship.  
Even though it is possible to recognise the state as a significant element in the U.S.-
Mexico relationship that is present in the high intensity of inter-governmental interaction -
especially in a context where security has made it to the top of the bilateral agenda-, this situation 
does not necessarily mean the use of force is a preponderant aspect of the relations between the 
two countries. Arguing about the United States and Mexico being part of a ‘pluralist security 
community’, one scholar establishes that after WWII ‘military means of resolving the threats 
posed by each country to the other have been “subrationally unthinkable”’,222 meaning the use of 
force to resolve disputes is out of the mind of political leaders in the two countries. Looking for 
negotiated solutions to disputes in the bilateral relationship is function not only of the high 
intensity of interdependence between the United States and Mexico, but also of the increasing 
institutionalisation of co-operation and dialogue brought about by NAFTA. For all practical 
purposes, military threats are absent in their relationship, and bilateral co-operation in the area of 
security has been defined by the need to confront non-military challenges affecting both 
countries. 
On the one hand, even though Mexico perceives a threat from the United States because 
of its potential to influence Mexican domestic affairs, this perception does not necessarily 
envisage the use of force. On the other hand, in a recent document defining U.S. military 
strategy, only a marginal reference was made in relation to Mexico, and it was in the context of 
disaster relief support the Mexican armed forces provided the United States in the aftermath of 
hurricane Katrina in August of 2005.
223
 The key argument advanced here is that the logic of 
realism and neo-realism does not provide a complete explanation of the security relationship 
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between the two countries, and this is why it is necessary to search for more comprehensive 
orientations in order to understand their security interaction. 
The real militarisation of shared-security issues takes place in the form of a more intense 
participation of the Mexican armed forces in anti-narcotics operations within Mexican territory -
encouraged by the United States-, which could have serious consequences for both countries in 
the long term. This subject will be addressed in more detail below in the chapter devoted to drug 
trafficking. 
Therefore, according to the discussion above, neither realism nor neo-realism offers a 
satisfactory explanation of the U.S.-Mexico security relationship.  
 
2.4. Non-traditional Security Perspectives 
This section addresses the non-traditional security perspectives developed by Buzan et.al and 
Risk society Theory. It deals with the elements Buzan et.al framework and proceeds to 
explaining the securitisation process (i.e. the course followed by a given issue when constructed 
as a security issue), as well as with the criticisms made of this process. The section turns to 
explaining each of the five issue-sectors outlined by the framework, and assesses its overall 
advantages and disadvantages. It deals with the main characteristics of Risk Society Theory. 
Finally, it compares both perspectives and addresses the utility of both for the study of the U.S.-
Mexico security relationship.  
 
2.4.1. The Copenhagen School 
The idea about broadening the concept of security represents a criticism of the so-called 
‘traditionalist’ (realist/neo-realist) view. Whereas the traditional perspective has emphasised the 
state and the pre-eminence of military factors, the broader view of security proposes a re-
definition of both its notion and its agenda in order to provide for a more comprehensive 
understanding of the subject.
224
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As discussed above, Buzan is one of the scholars who have contributed to the 
development of a broader conception of security.
225
 He is associated with the so-called 
‘Copenhagen School’, which ‘has played an important role in broadening the conception of 
security and in providing a framework to analyse how an issue becomes securitized or 
desecuritized’.226 Even though in Buzan’s early writings on security he describes himself as a 
neo-realist, in a further refinement of his ideas he developed a holistic framework for security 
analysis (Buzan et.al) that incorporates the constructivist perspective. This aspect is significant 
because even though Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde are advocates of a broader perspective, none 
of them describes himself as a constructivist.
227
 In fact, they acknowledge that security analysis 
cannot be completely separated from realist principles. In their opinion,  
The main purpose of [Security: A New Framework for Analysis] is to present a framework 
based on the wider agenda that will incorporate the traditionalist position. Our solution 
comes down to the side of the wideners in terms of keeping the security agenda open to 
many different types of threats.
228
 
The Buzan et.al analytical framework broadens the notion of security, first of all, by defining 
five different issue-sectors besides the one related to the military/use of force (i.e. environmental, 
economic, societal/cultural, and political), each one with its own dynamic (meaning the logic of 
securitisation is different in each of them in terms of actors and processes) but interconnected to 
produce a comprehensive understanding of security. These sectors are discussed in more detail 
below. 
 One of the main criticisms of the wider perspective, from the traditionalist point of view, 
is that opening security to issues other than military ones erodes the ‘intellectual coherence’ of 
the field because then everything and nothing could be considered a security concern.
229
 Buzan 
et.al, nevertheless, maintain they ‘want to construct a more radical view of security studies by 
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exploring threats to referent objects [levels of analysis], and the securitization of those threats, 
that are nonmilitary [sic] as well as military’, and they add, 
We take seriously the traditionalists’ complaint about the intellectual incoherence but 
disagree that the retreat into a military core is the only or the best way to deal with such 
incoherence. We seek to find coherence not by confining security to the military sector but 
by exploring the logic of security itself to find out what differentiates security and the 
process of securitization from that which is merely political. This solution offers the 
possibility of breaking free from the existing dispute between the two approaches.
230
 
From Buzan et.al’s perspective, coherence in security studies is not achieved by maintaining a 
military logic. They claim to preserve the field’s congruence by looking at the logic of the 
process of securitisation to identify why and how a certain issue becomes securitised. Describing 
security issues in terms of ‘survival’ and ‘existential threats’ is also a source of intellectual 
coherence within the analytical framework. According to Ralph Emmers, these elements allow 
the broadly defined security framework to maintain ‘the reasoning found within a traditional 
approach to security studies’.231  
In his previous work on the subject, Buzan abstained from defining security because he 
considered the notion to ‘[defy] pursuit of an agreed general definition’.232 His purpose, instead, 
was ‘to map the terrain of the concept, identifying both its general features and its conspicuous 
hazards’.233 This posture, however, came under criticism as well. For instance, in the opinion of 
David Baldwin, dealing with the problem of security requires first of all defining its concept. In 
his opinion,  
[Buzan’s] approach, however, risks conflating conceptual analysis with empirical 
observation. Understanding the concept of security is a fundamentally different kind of 
intellectual exercise from specifying the conditions under which security may be attained. 
Indeed, conceptual clarification logically precedes the search for the necessary conditions 
of security, because the identification of such conditions presupposes a concept of 
security.
234
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Baldwin’s point concurs with Booth’s words with reference to Buzan’s lack of a definition by 
asking: ‘If we cannot name it, can we ever hope to achieve it?’235 The Buzan et.al analytical 
framework, nevertheless, provides a definition of security but does it in terms of a process, a 
logical sequence. According to the analytical framework, in the context of international security, 
Security is about survival. It is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to 
a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating 
government, territory, and society). The special nature of security threats justifies the use 
of extraordinary measures to handle them. The invocation of security has been the key to 
legitimizing the use of force, but more generally it has opened the way for the state to 
mobilize, or to take special powers, to handle existential threats.
236
   
In synthesis, the analytical framework holds that the content of security is determined by how the 
concept is used. Discussion now focuses on the securitisation process and its elements.    
 
2.4.1.1. Securitisation Process 
This aspect of the analytical framework, in particular, reflects a departure from Buzan’s earlier 
neo-realist analysis by incorporating Waever’s constructivist approach, as discussed above.  
The securitisation process emerges from the assumption about a spectrum along three 
different realms, from non-political, to political, to security, where potentially threatening issues 
not adequately addressed within the first two arenas are thus dealt with through extreme 
measures in the third. In this sense, security is seen as ‘the move that takes politics beyond the 
established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above 
politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization’.237 The 
securitisation of a given issue, therefore, reflects the inadequacy of the political arena to 
neutralise problems with potential to escalate. To securitise something is a measure of last resort 
that means shifting into emergency mode in order to justify the use of extreme instruments to 
deal with a challenge. It entails, for instance, the distraction of efforts and scarce resources from 
the satisfaction of other important needs. For this reason, Buzan et.al establish that ‘national 
security should not be idealized’; instead, ‘desecuritization is the optimal range option...’238 
Consider, for instance, a small community facing an upward trend in drug consumption among 
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young people. Without help from any government agency, the first option open for this 
community is to organising itself in order to establish prevention and treatment programmes to 
be managed through non-profit organisations. At this stage, the issue remains non-political. If it 
turns out that anti-drug programmes are ineffective in spite of the community’s efforts, civil 
leaders could resort to the government asking for support to deal with drug demand, effectively 
placing thus the problem within the political agenda. If at this stage the problem persists largely 
because of the corrupting power and the intimidation tactics of a drug trafficking organisation, 
both the community and the government can turn into securitising actors by designating drugs, 
and their multiple manifestations, a security issue. This is the course an issue not dealt with 
within the non-political and political arenas would follow to enter into the security realm.        
 One important aspect of the securitisation process is that it is based on a sequence that 
involves a series of specific steps. Usually, a ‘securitizing actor’ makes a ‘securitizing move’ by 
presenting before an ‘audience’ a development as an ‘existential threat’; if the audience accepts 
this designation the securitising move becomes successful and legitimises thus the ‘breaking of 
rules’ and the adoption of ‘extreme measures’; if it does not, the securitising move results only in 
the politicisation of the issue.
239
 That is, ‘securitization is intersubjective and socially 
constructed’; it is a matter defined by the interaction between the ‘securitizing actor (s)’ and the 
‘audience’ approving the securitising move, as explained above.240 Therefore, in contrast to the 
traditional security perspective that ‘focuses on the material nature of the threat’,241 the Buzan 
et.al securitising process is eminently subjective.  
 There are several relevant criticisms of this particular aspect of the analytical framework, 
but the most important is that it can also be misused to complicate responses to a challenge such 
as drug consumption, which in principle is a health rather than a law enforcement matter, by 
failing to appreciate the relevance of non-security responses to social problems. Securitising an 
issue is often not the best option. Making echo of other scholars, for instance, Michael Sheehan 
points out that, 
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securitizing certain issues such as the environment and migration is likely to be 
counterproductive, because they will end up being colonized by a military mind-set rather 
than being addressed in a holistic and politically progressive manner.
242
               
An additional aspect of the securitisation process is what the authors refer to as the 
‘speech act’, which transfers issues from the realm of normal politics into the security context by 
framing them as something extremely urgent and of the highest priority to be dealt with. In their 
view, ‘[the speech act] is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the 
utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is done (like betting, giving a 
promise, naming a ship)’.243 The most important implication of this aspect of the analytical 
framework is that securitising actors are different in terms of their ability to successfully perform 
the speech act. The most successful ones are those in positions of authority who are therefore the 
‘accepted voices of security’.244 Governments, as representatives of the state, have been usually 
better placed than other securitising actors in terms of identifying threats. Furthermore, they have 
been supposed to promote the general interest of society, and this is a claim that other social 
sectors would find difficult to sustain.    
The analytical framework also expands the range of ‘referent objects of security’ (levels 
of analysis) beyond the state. They are defined as ‘things that are seen to be existentially 
threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival’.245 Even the state is deconstructed to 
consider each one of its components as an object of security. According to Buzan, the three basic 
components of the state are its idea, its physical base and its institutions, and each one of these 
elements is an object of security.
246
 The Buzan et.al analytical framework establishes three 
important conditions regarding the legitimacy of referent objects of security. First, legitimacy is 
established by a community’s sense of identity that justifies its right to continue to exist in 
reference to other community (for this reason, it is difficult for the individual and system level to 
articulate their security needs).
247
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The possibility of securitising a wide variety of referent objects besides the state, such as 
alliances in the military sector, strategic industries in the economic sector, minorities in the 
societal sector, ecosystems in the environmental sector, and international regimes in the political 
sector, depends on the ability of each referent object to legitimise its claim to survival. This is the 
basis for analysing security beyond the parameters established by the traditional military sector. 
In the opinion of Buzan et.al, 
If we place the survival of collective units and principles –the politics of existential 
threat- as the defining core of security studies, we have the basis for applying security 
analysis to a variety of sectors without losing the essential quality of the concept.
248
 
It is important to note, however, that ‘size or scale seems to be one crucial variable in 
determining what constitutes a successful referent object of security’, and this has to do with the 
possibility for entities or actors ‘to establish a wider security legitimacy in their own right’.249 
This explains why the individual cannot be the basis for security analysis. The analytical 
framework, nevertheless, takes the state as the primus inter pares unit without necessarily 
designating it as the only referent object that matters.
250
  
While the process of securitisation can be potentially manipulated to promote a specific 
agenda, de-securitising issues allows for the implementation of collaborative measures to solve 
those issues by removing them from the confrontation-like security arena. For instance, the 
‘Murmansk Initiative’ proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev in October 1987, created not only a ‘zone 
of peace’ in what used to be a military theatre of operations, but also fostered more co-operative 
relations among countries with interests in the Arctic region.
251
 Discussion now turns to the 
description of the five security issue-sectors. 
 
2.4.1.2. Security-issue Sectors 
Sectors represent the essence of thinking about security in terms of a broader perspective beyond 
traditional military concerns. According Buzan et.al, ‘one way of looking at sectors is to see 
them as identifying specific types of interaction’.252 That is, sectors are areas characterised 
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basically by a distinctive security dynamic, which does not necessarily mean they are 
disconnected. In fact, sectors are linked in two important ways. First, even though the analytical 
framework analyses sectors separately, this course of action is followed only for the sake of 
clarity of explanation. They are conceptually linked to each other because of the impact of 
security issues across sectors. According to the authors of the analytical framework,  
Although we maintain that the disaggregated world of sectors makes analytical sense 
because of different agenda, values, discourses, and the like can be reasonably clustered in 
these five sectors, it should be remembered that sectors are lenses focusing on the same 
world. Not surprisingly, the sector chapters are full of cross-references.
253
 
This argument is related to the existence of interconnections among the five security issue-
sectors proposed by Buzan et.al. An environmental health risk, which is a challenge that 
originates in the environmental-security sector, could have serious potential consequences if an 
epidemic leads people to abandon their country of origin and to cross an international border in 
order to get the help they need. For instance, people from the Mexican side could attempt 
crossing into the United States in the context of a health emergency if medical services are more 
available to people on the U.S. side. In such a context, an epidemic could affect the societal 
security of the receiving country if its population perceives immigration as a threat to its identity, 
demanding thus the government to address the flow of unwanted people and placing the 
challenge within the political security sector by testing the government’s commitment regarding 
its country’s people. If the government decides to resort to the use of military means to address 
the trans-border flow, an epidemic as a security challenge would have impacted several issue 
sectors besides the one it originated from.  
 The combination of the logic of securitisation (process) and security issue-sectors 
(structure) represents the foundation for thinking about security from a broader perspective. Far 
from eroding the conceptual coherence of security as a field of study, as one of the criticisms 
establishes, the analytical framework is considered by its authors as ‘the answer to those who 
hold that security studies cannot expand its agenda beyond the traditional military-political one 
without debasing the concept of security itself’.254 
 It is important to note that sectors were at the centre of the development of Security: A 
New Framework of Analysis, which emerged from the question about whether classical security 
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This sector deals with the subject matter of the traditional perspective that is the state and the use 
of force. One important aspect is that notwithstanding that the state remains a central referent 
object within this sector, this area of security is not only about military conflict between states 
because armed forces can also be employed to deal with non-state and non-military issues. 
Buzan et.al argue that, 
the military security agenda revolves largely around the ability of governments to 
maintain themselves against internal and external military threats, but it can also involve 
the use of military power to defend states or governments against non-military threats to 
their existence, such as migrants or rival ideologies.
256
 
Military force, in this context, is used not only to confront other states but also threats to the 
state located at the ‘substate level’ such as criminal, subversive or terrorist organisations.
257
 This 
is also a sector highly organised and rule bound given the importance accorded to the use of 
force, and this is the reason why securitising actors are in general well-identified.
258
 For 
instance, given that the traditional object of security has been the state, official representatives 
have usually been the accepted securitising actors who designate a development as a security 
threat. 
During the Cold War, geopolitical and geo-strategic competition among the superpowers 
helps explain the relevance of the military sector of security in the context of the bipolar 
confrontation. The demise of the former-Soviet Union and the consequent transformation of the 
international system, however, contributed to radically reducing the relevance of global in 
contrast to regional dynamics (by removing the threat of nuclear confrontation as well as 
restrictions that kept inter-state and intrastate rivalries in check),
259
 but also to move competition 
among states from the military sector to other arenas as political and economic factors became 
more salient than those related to the use of force.
260
 In Europe, one of the military issues that 
remained as a concern was the European Union’s common foreign policy’s failure to intervene in 
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s, precisely because of political competition and 
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the contending character of the interests of individual member states,
261
 and also because the EU 
has consistently underplayed military power and investments in it.     
 
b) Environmental 
This sector is about the interaction between two different agendas. The political one that is about 
environmental politics; and the scientific one whose objective is to portray environmental issues 
in terms of threats in order to press the government into action.
262
 This connection is important 
because notwithstanding the activism of certain sectors within the scientific community to 
securitise some issues, most of the interplay between the two agendas results only in the 
politicisation of the issues (by placing them in the public debate).
263
 For instance, in 1949 a 
Scientific Committee was created within the International Whaling Commission (IWC), 
established in 1946, in order to carry out independent assessments of whale populations to revert 
the influence of previously government-funded research programmes. A declining number of 
whales at the beginning of the 1960s, however, consolidated a closer relationship between 
scientists from the committee and activists, which eventually resulted in blurring the lines 
between the interests of the two groups: knowledge became central to the activists’ efforts, and 
activism cemented the influence of scientists.
264
   
Sectors within the scientific community address a wide variety of problems and interpret 
them in terms of an environmental perspective. However, according to the analytical framework, 
‘”disruption of ecosystems” is the most purely environmental issue area’.265 Besides this issue 
that represents an environmental threat in its own right, additional issues in this sector are those 
ecological problems with manifestations in other sectors.
266
 The environmental agenda is 
influential, nevertheless. In Buzan et.al’s view, ‘the extent to which scientific argument 
structures environmental security debates strikes us as exceptional’.267 
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Within this issue-sector, the central challenge is not natural disasters such as earthquakes 
(although it can be argued that other natural disasters such as hurricanes and floods are due to 
global warming that is the product of human activity) for which security refers mainly to the 
implementation of emergency measures to deal with their consequences. The key challenge for 
this sector is related to ‘threats from human activity to the natural systems or structures of the 
planet when the changes made do seem to pose existential threats to (parts of) civilization’.268 
That is, the central concerns of this sector are man-made threats that involve identifying those 
responsible for them and also establishing preventive measures. 
According to the Buzan et.al analytical framework, while the securitising efforts of the 
scientific agenda often results only in the politicisation of environmental issues,
269
 the official 
agenda deals with the consequences of environmental challenges, which lead to securitisation in 
other sectors. In this context, the environmental sector resembles the dynamics of the economic 
sector in terms of generating threats whose effects are experienced in other sectors.  
 Even though securitisation is more successful at the local level, this is a sector dominated 
by a global logic where is difficult to promote a co-ordinated response to environmental issues 
given the disparity of interests in the international context. This results therefore in the 
politicisation of issues at this level.
270
  
 The main criticism of the environmental security sector, as discussed above, is that 
framing environmental issues in security terms could actually end up obstructing more than 
promoting co-operative solutions to common problems. In the opinion of some scholars, ‘critics 
suggest that linking the environment to security runs the risk of militarizing the environment 
instead of greening security’.271 Regarding this last point, it is ironic that the Buzan et.al 
analytical framework represents such a complex and a detailed explanation of security, 
nonetheless useful, only to lead the analyst to conclude at the end that de-securitising an issue is 
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This is a sui generis sector to the extent that vulnerabilities from competition are built-in in the 
post-Cold War neo-liberal economic system.
272
 That is, the triumph of liberalism over 
communism -as expressed by the demise of the former Soviet Union- resulted in the international 
economic system being dominated by market principles. Even though there are examples of 
countries that do not participate efficiently in the dominant capitalist system, or which have not 
adopted entirely its principles, such as Russia and China, respectively, they cannot remain 
isolated from the global economic system and therefore they have to adapt to the liberal rules of 
the game. This set of rules, in turn, fosters an intensified economic competition that rewards 
those units (i.e. states and companies) that are better at adapting themselves to the system, while 
punishing those that are unable to strive within this competitive environment. Under these 
circumstances, it is difficult to securitise economic issues when failure, as a result of poor 
economic performance, is part of the accepted and socialised rules of the game.
273
 Such as in the 
case of environmental issues, attempts to securitise economic matters often results only in their 
politicisation. 
In this sense, it is argued ‘the particular characteristics of the liberal ascendance mean the 
contemporary discourse on economic security centres on concerns about instability and 
inequality’.274 Firstly, inequality is related to the fact that even though advanced and developing 
countries are both exposed to the same international economic forces, the latter are more 
vulnerable to experience the system’s negative effects and less able to exploit its advantages.275 
In the context of the liberal international economy, developing states face structural challenges 
such as foreign debt and institutional weaknesses in areas related to justice, health, finance and 
trade, which are issues for the most part absent in advanced societies.
276
 Secondly, although 
developing countries are less able to exploit the liberal economic system in their favour, they are 
still dependent on it due to the impossibility of operating in complete isolation from the world 
economy, and for this reason they are as interested as developed countries in the stability of the 
system. A global economic crisis has the potential to affect advanced and developing countries 
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alike, even though the impact of economic turbulence is greater on the latter. The Liberal 
International Economic Order (LIEO), therefore, is actually the most important referent object in 
this sector according to the Buzan et.al analytical framework; furthermore, it is suggested that the 
clearest candidate to be considered an economic security issue in this sector is actually a global 
catastrophe.
277
 For instance, a large-scale international financial crisis could affect stock 
exchanges around the world, creating thus a generalised economic breakdown with the potential 
to affect, albeit with different intensity, developing and developed countries alike.    
Besides the issues mentioned above, economic security relates to the ability of the 
economy to provide the means for national defence; abuse of dependency; unequal benefits for 
countries notwithstanding abiding by the rules of the international economic system; ‘the dark 
side of capitalism’ as expressed in the form of illegal flows of drugs, weapons and technology, as 
well as degradation of the environment; and exposure to a worldwide economic disaster.
278
 In 
this context, states and companies do not qualify as referent objects of security because both 
units have no other choice but to operate within the global economic system according to its 
rules with all the consequences this entails. In the economic sector, the only exception for a state 
to become a referent object of security is if its economic system suffers a breakdown to the point 
of risking survival.
279
 Resembling the dynamics within the environmental sector, economic 
issues turn into security concerns mainly because of their impact on other sectors, such as in the 
case of an economic crisis eroding the legitimacy of the state because of insufficient crisis 
management skills and consequent inability to provide for the well-being of the population.
 280
 In 
fact, illegal flows generated by the operation of the market represent the kind of political, 
societal, environmental and military consequences originated in this sector. Similar to the 
environmental security sector, the economic sector is characterised by a globalising dynamic that 
explains why the main concern is the system’s instability. The connection between global and 
regional in the economic sector, nevertheless, consists in the fact that regional frameworks are a 
reaction to global trends, in particular because regional arrangements provide advantages to 
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According to the Buzan et.al analytical framework, ‘the organizing concept in the societal sector 
is identity. Societal insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a development 
or potentiality as a threat to their survival as community’.282 In this context, the identity of 
communities can be at risk by political or economic processes that involve exposure to foreign 
influence. This condition, in turn, threatens to dilute or to transform indigenous values, customs 
and traditions. Consider, for instance, the negative perceptions of the U.S. population on 
immigration brought about by the changing composition of the flows, from European to Hispanic 
and Asian, in both the 1960s and the 1980s.
283
 The most common issues construed as threats to 
societal security are processes that pit one identity against another, and the most conspicuous of 
them is migration.
284
 One useful distinction within the analytical framework is between ‘threats 
in society’ and societal threats. For instance, while drug consumption is an issue that affects life 
in society, if drug use grows out of control it can turn into a societal security issue by threatening 
the survival of the society, by directly threatening its members.
285
  
The referent objects in the societal sector are large groups that are characterised by Buzan 
et.al as ‘tribes, clans, nations (and minorities aspiring to autonomy and nationhood), 
civilizations, religions and race’.286 A paradigmatic case in this sector, for instance, is a nation 
striving for autonomy within a state that does not share its identity. The Kurds, for instance, is a 
‘Sunni’ Muslim people concentrated in an area called ‘Kurdistan’ that straddles the borders of 
Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Armenia. Notwithstanding their long-sought goal of statehood, 
oppression by neighbours and internal dissent has prevented them from becoming an 
autonomous entity.
287




In contrast to the military sector where securitising actors are well-established, in the 
societal sector they are less identifiable because their authority can often be disputed.
289
 Finally, 
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the dynamic in this sector is neither global or regional, nor global versus regional; it is rather 
characterised by the fact that the salience of societal security per se has increased vis-à-vis the 






Security issues are political by definition, and in this sense the political sector is connected to all 
other sectors. According to the analytical framework, ‘political security is about the 
organizational stability of social order(s)’.291 It is about acceptance and recognition of authority. 
In the case of the state, which is the main referent object in this sector, it is about ‘internal 
legitimacy’, on the one hand, and ‘external recognition’, on the other.292 Besides this central 
concern, the political sector is about political threats to non-state referent objects, as well as 
about the protection of global political principles (institutions, regimes, and International Law) 
that contribute to keep the stability of the international system.
293
  
If it is true that the state is a fundamental actor in this sector, additional referent objects 
emerge according to how a political unit is defined. That is, Buzan et.al argue that,  
a political unit is a collectivity that has gained a separate existence distinct from its 
subjects. It can be a firm or a church, not in their basic capacities as economic or religious 




A referent object of security in the political sector, for instance, is a hierarchically-organised 
group such as the Sikh, which is an ethnic minority that has established its own legitimacy and 
right to exist by having an identity that differentiates it from other groups.
295
 This is the ‘middle 
scale’ referent object of security referred to by the Buzan et.al analytical framework, which is 
characterised by operating within a context of competition that reinforces the need to assure its 
continuity.
296
 Minority Rights Group International (MRGI), for instance, is a London-based non-
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governmental organisation (NGO) devoted to promote the rights of minorities around the world 
through education, information and lobbying strategies, guided by the idea that ‘exclusion can 
result in instability, conflict, and in the most extreme cases, genocide’.297 This is an interesting 
illustration of a sub-national group being portrayed by a securitising actor as an object of 
security, establishing its legitimate right to survival. In synthesis, the political sector is about 
collectivities and relationships of authority based on legitimacy. As in the military sector, 
securitising actors here are in general well defined -in contrast to other sectors- because of the 
positions of authority they hold. 
One important distinction within the political sector is that between strong and weak 
states. While securitising actors, typically the government, in weak states are more susceptible to 
securitise challenges from within due to institutional deficiencies and insufficient political 
consensus, securitising actors in strong states are less prone to securitise domestic issues because 
of its higher internal cohesion.
298
 It can be argued that the repressive regime in Iraq in the 1990s, 
and its refusal to comply with the November 1990 UN Resolution 678 to leave Kuwait after its 
August 1990 invasion, is an example of a weak state with vulnerability on both internal and 
external fronts that has represented a significant international security concern in the last 
decades.
299
 Finally, this sector is characterised not by a regional dynamic but by the interplay 




2.4.1.3. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Copenhagen School Perspective 
When reflecting on the advantages and disadvantages of the Buzan et.al analytical framework, its 
main utility lies in the following points. It explains the logic underpinning officials’ confronting 
threats through mobilisation of the resources of the state. In addition, by taking into 
consideration the impact of a variety of issues on the well-being of the individual it expands the 
focus of security to include areas other than the military one. Thirdly, it provides the basis for 
thinking about security from a comprehensive perspective that, in contrast to the traditional 
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approach, includes internal as well as external aspects of security.
301
 The obvious advantage of 
the broader security perspective is its utility to understand the variety of challenges that affect 
modern societies, most of which confront pressing threats other than the use of force.
302
 This re-
conceptualisation of security allows for thinking of security not necessarily in adversarial terms 
between states but in more collaborative forms of dealing with common challenges.
303
 
One of the most important disadvantages of the framework, which mirrors its most salient 
criticisms, is the fact that the analytical framework is criticised for broadening the security issue-
sectors without previously developing the concept of security. Sheehan, for instance warns about 
one of the dangers of broadening security by stating that, 
it can still be done in pursuit of a conservative agenda. Much depends upon whether the 
objective of a particular securitization is to capture the concept for a radical, emancipator 
policy agenda, or whether the purpose is to militarize new areas of governmental action, to 
colonize wider areas of social policy with an essentially militaristic mind-set.
304
 
Sheehan’s argument above is important insofar as it is generally recognised that attaching the 
‘security’ label to issues does not necessarily facilitate the resolution of the problem, and it can 
actually complicate it.  
This thesis is critical of the Buzan et.al analytical framework in terms of its lacunae and 
one of them refers to its lack of explanation about how securitisation occurs in practice. The 
securitisation process describes a very broad inner sequence that moves an issue into the security 
realm without offering more insights on the complications faced by the securitising actor in 
every step of the cycle, and this is the reason why one is left speculating only on the details of 
the process. The Buzan et.al analytical framework clearly establishes that its main focus of 
analysis are successful cases of securitisation, even though it recognises that the use of extreme 
measures to deal with an existential threat is not an automatic consequence of successfully 
moving an issue into the security realm. In this context, there is no way to tell the difference 
between securitisation and extreme forms of politicisation. The argument of this thesis in 
reference to this point in particular, is that establishing that successful securitisation will not lead 
to the adoption of extreme measures makes no sense at all, especially because securitisation of an 
issue is a serious matter that often requires political capital and a significant effort (i.e. working 
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towards UN Resolutions 678 and 1441 in reference to Iraq), just to end up effecting no action at 
all. There is no sense in talking security and not to produce any solution to an identified problem. 
The utility of the Buzan et.al analytical framework for the study of trans-border threats to U.S. 
national security in reference to Mexico, in particular, is discussed in the following section.  
 
2.4.1.4. The Utility of the Copenhagen School Perspective to Explain the U.S.-Mexico Security 
Relationship  
The process of securitisation helps to identify who is the securitising actor, what is the nature of 
the threat, and therefore what the interests and intentions involved in the process are. This aspect 
is useful for this thesis in terms of understanding the reasons why drugs and undocumented 
immigrants became threats to U.S. national security. This point is also relevant because the 
reality is that government officials are not the only ones performing the ‘speech act’ in the 
context of the U.S.-Mexico relationship, given the multiple channels of communication between 
the two countries affecting different sectors of their respective societies. 
Issue-sectors, in particular, contribute to a comprehensive explanation of security in the 
U.S.-Mexico context. As it has been pointed out, ‘the purpose of broadening beyond traditional 
military threats is to be able to address issues without necessarily triggering a traditional 
military-type response’,305 and this is also an important factor in terms of the U.S.-Mexico 
security relationship. This proposition is related to the fact that notwithstanding the United States 
and Mexico hold different security interests regarding undocumented immigration from Mexico, 
for instance, their contrasting views have not led so far the United States to mount a massive-
scale military operation on the border with Mexico in order to stop the unauthorised flow of 
people. Unilaterally, the United States has opted for more restrictive immigration legislation to 
stem the flow of Mexico and to deal with Mexican undocumented nationals already in the 
country, and for the circumscribed use of military assets on the border in order to support its 
LEAs. Accordingly, the U.S. response to undocumented immigration from Mexico has not 
involved a formal military-type of response, even though it is important to underline the fine line 
between the increasing involvement of the military in law enforcement activities, and the 
increasing incorporation of military tactics by LEAs.  
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Drug trafficking has been construed by both governments as a ‘national security’ issue. 
The United States has traditionally adopted a coercive view of the problem by considering drugs 
as a law enforcement matter rather than a health issue. From this perspective, the problem is one 
of supply rather than one of demand, and the solution has been based on interdicting drugs 
abroad more than emphasising treatment programmes at home. Attacking the problem beyond its 
shores also spares de United States the high level of violence present in drug producing and 
transit countries. The United States –mainly its government- has constructed drug trafficking as a 
societal security threat because of its harmful effect on its people (the social costs of addiction), 
as a political security threat because of the impact of corruption on its institutions, and to a lesser 
extent as an economic security matter originating from global illicit market. The policy which 
has been informed by these views, nevertheless, has been inefficient, as shown by the failure of 
the ‘war on drugs’ so far. 
Immigration, in general, is seen by conservative sectors of the U.S. society (such as 
nativist groups, unions concerned about unemployment, right-wing politicians who exploit the 
voter’s fear of immigrants, federal and state legislators, state governments and federal agencies 
such as the Border Patrol), as a matter of concern mainly because of its effect on weakening the 
society’s sense of cohesion and identity (societal security). Even though this issue has for long 
been mostly politicised and not widely discussed in general security terms, undocumented 
immigration has been regarded as a security risk by those who favour more restrictive 
immigration policies and tighter security at the border, such as the Arizona government. It can be 
argued that undocumented immigration has affected sovereignty because of people entering the 
country without having been officially admitted (political security) and because of its perceived 
effect on identity (societal security). In contrast to the past, it is important to note that the 
phenomenon acquired an explicit security connotation in the United States after the 9/11 events. 
Ever since, a direct link was established by the federal and several state governments (i.e. Texas 
and Arizona) between immigration and security because of the terrorist threat, mainly due to the 
possibility of Islamic terrorists entering U.S. territory through the border with Mexico. For 
instance, U.S. security agencies focus their anti-terrorist efforts on people from ‘special-interest 
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countries’ (Afghanistan, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen), and on those based on the DoS 
list of ‘countries sponsors of terrorism’ (Cuba, Iran, Syria and Sudan).306 
This thesis concurs with this argument by establishing that security issues in U.S.-
Mexican relations are located in sectors other than the military one. The analysis of the U.S. 
defence strategy below confirms that Mexico is not a significant concern for the United States in 
military terms. The worst scenario for the U.S. military regarding Mexico would be the need to 
seal the Southwest border in case of deep instability south of the dividing line, and because of the 
potential for massive immigration from Mexico. An additional valuable idea advanced by the 
analytical framework refers to the employment of military assets to confront non-military threats, 
and this is reflected in the support the U.S. military provides LEAs in charge of security at the 
border with Mexico.  
Second, in terms of environmental issues, Buzan et.al establishes that ‘a useful starting 
point for tracing security complexes in the environmental sector is disaster scenarios’.307 In this 
context, this thesis recognises that environmental challenges between the United States and 
Mexico have to do mainly with the common border, in particular with the scenario of a potential 
epidemic deriving from factors such as insufficient infrastructure to deal with water pollution in 
the area. The effects of this potential situation could appear in the political, societal, and to an 
extreme in the military sector. For instance, an epidemic could affect the U.S. societal sector by 
directly threatening the U.S. population in the area, and it could also affect the military sector if 
the U.S. military were called in to prevent a massive influx of people from the Mexican side of 
the border seeking help on the U.S. side. Environmental issues in U.S.-Mexican relations, 
nevertheless, are mostly politicised rather than securitised, and this aspect will be dealt with in 
more detail in the environment chapter as an example of the non-securitisation of a bilateral 
issue.  
Third, in reference to the economic sector, Buzan et.al note that in the particular case of 
North America, the region is ‘lightly institutionalized and reflects liberal values’.308 In contrast to 
the EU, NAFTA does not represent more than a trade pact, albeit one with profound political 
consequences for its three members. NAFTA, nevertheless, has contributed to further 
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institutionalise the U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationship to the extent that increasing trade has 
facilitated co-operation in other areas of the relationship, most notably in the security arena. It 
can also be argued that NAFTA is in fact a response to globalisation from the U.S. and the 
Mexican point of view, in particular because of the need to form a regional trade bloc in order to 
remain competitive in the context of the economic challenge posed by similar arrangements in 
other regions of the world. One of the relevant issues in the economic security sector is that 
liberal economics has facilitated not only beneficial flows but also illegal exchanges, and this 
fact is important to understand the negative implications of the integrated illicit drug and labour 
markets between the United States and Mexico.
309
   
Fourth, the societal security sector is useful to understand both problems originating in 
this sector and the effects of challenges originating in other sectors. Regarding undocumented 
immigration, the Buzan et.al framework underlines that ‘migration operates more intensely as 
intraregional and neighbouring region dynamics, as in the flow of Hispanics into the United 
States…’310 From all the areas addressed by the analytical framework within this sector, North 
America receives the most extensive review among other reasons because the framework 
considers it an interesting, yet little explored, region in societal security terms. In its view, 
‘military security and even political security are rather insignificant in North America, where the 
main agenda is constituted by the global role(s) of the United States’.311 In terms of the regional 
setting, immigration is actually the most important factor. In their view, 
At present, migration is securitized mainly at the state level for these areas -especially 
California- in which the population balance has already shifted the most significantly 
because of the immediate adjacency to the mainland [sic] of origin for immigrants –
Mexico. Two issues (changing self-definition and the physical change in the composition 
of the population) interact in several ways but perhaps most importantly in the reactions 
of white European Americans, who see immigration as a threat –not so much because the 
United States could become Spanish speaking (whites could become a minority) but 
rather because the increasing self-assuredness of different minorities threatens to produce 
a less unified, more multicultural, and thereby less universalistic United States.
312
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The main U.S. security concern regarding immigration from Mexico is precisely its effect on 
U.S. identity. This was the case before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, before the establishment of the 
aforementioned explicit link between immigration and security. More recently, the risks 
associated to immigration are explained because of both the identity issue and the terrorist threat. 
Mexican immigration to the United States, therefore, is a security issue whose explanation can be 
found in the societal security sector. As noted above, this flow is also related to the economic 
security sector because of the existence of an integrated illicit labour market between the two 
countries. 
Fifth, potential threats in the political sector come mainly from the challenge to U.S. 
institutions because of corruption of U.S. officials deriving from drug trafficking and human 
smuggling, as well as from unmet demands for action placed on the federal government by states 
located at the border with Mexico seeking to confront these two threats. That is, political threats 
in the United States arise from challenges originating in other sectors, even though it has already 
been established that all security is political by definition. 
 
2.4.2. Risk Society Theory 
2.5.1. Definition 
‘Risk society’ refers to a theory developed in the mid-1980s by the German sociologist, Ulrich 
Beck, to reflect an increasingly individualised society’s concern about the consequences of 
modernisation and its process of industrialisation, which in turn leads the individual to question 
the foundation of society itself.
313
 The term became popular during the 1990s because of its 
potential to make sense of public environmental concerns during the period, such as the Iraqi’s 
army decision to set ablaze Kuwait’s oil wells in its retreat, in the context of the 1991 Persian 
Gulf War.
314
  Besides Beck, one of its most important exponents has been British sociologist, 
Anthony Giddens. While the latter defined the concept as ‘a society increasingly preoccupied 
with the future (and also with safety), which generates the notion of risk’,315 the former defines it 
as a ‘systematic way of dealing with the hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by 
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modernization itself’.316 At the heart of risk society theory, therefore, is an uneasiness about the 
prospect of a chaotic future that induces the observer to question the wisdom of modern society’s 
progress. In fact, it has been argued that risk ‘is the definitive theme of our age’.317 
There are relevant distinctions to be made, nevertheless, between the concept of risk and 
two of its often related ideas such as ‘uncertainty’ and ‘threat’. On the one hand, while risk is 
related to calculations based on possible outcomes, uncertainty in contrast is characterised by 
lack of information required to make assessments,
318
 which means it is not possible to determine 
with precision whether an event will happen or not, such as the date of the next earthquake in the 
Pacific basin.
319
 On the other hand, whereas risks entail possibilities, as mentioned above, threats 
involve capabilities and intentions.
320
 In other words, while the basis to understand risk is 
possibilities, threat refers to danger that can objectively be measured in terms of goals and means 
to achieve those goals. For instance, this kind of ‘instrumental’ or ‘linear’ rationality was behind 
the formulation of the NSC-68 (National Security Council) directive that represented the U.S. 
master plan for the Cold War.
321
 In this context, ‘threats generate fears; risks fuel anxiety’;322 
while the former are based on objective elements, the latter originate from subjective views.  
 
2.4.2.2. Background 
To a different intensity and extent, human beings have always been exposed to a certain level of 
hazard or peril which traditionally involved the forces of nature. With the development of 
‘modernity’323 and its associated process of industrialisation, however, the main concern for the 
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individual has become not unpredictable natural disasters but man-made issues such as crime, for 
instance, brought about by modernisation itself.
324
 It is in this context that, according to Beck, 
‘society becomes a theme and a problem for itself’.325 Disasters and accidents created by human 
activity represent ‘manufactured risks’326 that are characterised by human agency, which means 
society is responsible for both producing and preventing those challenges. This aspect of risk 
society theory, in particular, resembles the environmental security sector within the Buzan et.al. 
analytical framework in the sense that threats within this sector are defined by ‘human 
manipulation of environment that threatens civilization’,327 more than by natural phenomena. 
Both approaches denote, therefore, an increased sense of human involvement in defining the 
conditions of the current age.    
 Given the fact that manufactured risks are the result of human intervention, the individual 
is in principle able to calculate the risk being produced and therefore to contribute to change 
disruptive behaviour. This implies that risk is a matter of deciding among different alternatives 
based on knowledge about possible outcomes, and this characteristic differentiates risk from 
uncertainty, as discussed above. The increased awareness of risk as a result of industrial 
development is referred to as ‘reflexive modernisation’.328 This is a central feature of risk society 
theory that means the individual questions the wisdom of progress from a self-critical point of 
view. Because of the fateful character of the challenges that define modernity, the individual 
becomes thus more aware of the limitations of official policies and scientific knowledge, and in 
consequence relies instead on ideas such as sustainability
329
 and preventive action
330
 in order to 
minimise and, more specifically, to manage risk. 
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A relevant characteristic of risk society is its built-in avoidance of risk, even though there 
is no clear connection between ‘perceived’ and ‘objective’ risks.331 In this sense, it can be argued 
that risk is a socially-constructed concept that induces society to deal with its self-created 
challenges in the context of an increasingly complex and disordered modern world. In the 
opinion of Christopher Coker, ‘for it is no longer possible to externalize risks; we now 
internalize them as never before. This is what makes our societies so self-critical’.332 Societies, in 
this context, become more aware and self-conscious of the risks they confront. Reflexive 
rationality, however, can be approached either as a reaction to risk society or from both a 
constructivist and a realist perspective.
333
   
A relevant argument of risk society theory is that manufactured risks have an impact on 
social relations as risk, like a concept such as wealth, is not distributed uniformly within 
society.
334
 Nevertheless, risk is also an equaliser in the sense that not even the one 
‘manufacturing’ the risk is safe from its effects.335 Regarding man-made risks, such as in the case 
of the depletion of the ozone layer and its effect on human health and ecosystems,
336
 for instance, 
the distinction between the one polluting the stratosphere and the one suffering its consequences 
becomes blurred, and this represents the ‘democratisation of risk’.337 In theory, it can be argued 
that being wealthy would allow the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a trans-national company 
using chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) in its production process
338
 to purchase the necessary protection 
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from exposition to ultraviolet (UV) radiation. Nevertheless, the distribution of risk is a function 
of knowledge rather than means because, in the example above, Beck would argue that the CEO 
may not know whether, or at what level of intensity, the risk of UV radiation existed in the first 
place.
339
 From Giddens’ perspective, in contrast, class structure plays a more determinant role ‘in 
terms of differential access to forms of self-actualization and empowerment’.340 His view of risk 
society, nevertheless, is more optimistic than Beck’s by establishing that ‘active risk-taking is a 
core element of a dynamic economic and an innovative society’.341 Additionally, a significant 
aspect of risk society theory is that risk entails a ‘boomerang effect’ not in the sense that actors 
producing risks will also be exposed to them but, more properly, in the sense that any effort to 
deal with the original risk will often result in the configuration of an unintended risk, and so on. 
In this context, far from achieving absolute security, the more feasible goal is ‘to manage or pre-
empt a risk’.342 Within risk society there is no perfect and no definitive solution to a given 
problem, and therefore no sense of conclusion. Partial knowledge in reference to probabilistic 
scenarios, nevertheless, does not impede decision-making, and this is what Beck refers to as the 
‘risk trap’.343 Lack of knowledge is no justification not to respond to a risk situation, and this in 
turn strengthens anticipatory action.  
 
2.4.2.3. International Security through the Lenses of Risk Society Theory 
Even though risk society theory was conceived within the discipline of sociology, its principles 
provide considerable potential explanatory power for understanding international relations and, 
more specifically, the post-Cold War globalised security environment. Risk society, as a tool for 
international security analysis has been developed not by internationalist scholars but by 
sociologists who have applied the theory to the study of international affairs, suggesting that ‘the 
international system itself has become a globalised risk society’.344 A particular contribution in 
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this regard are Beck’s two books World Society at Risk (1998) and, one year later, What is 
Globalisation? (1999). Both texts reflect the fact that international security was increasingly 
focusing on probabilistic risks scenarios away from clearly identified threats.
345
 
Risk society theory, as applied to international security analysis, rests on the idea that 
both the end of the Cold War and the process of globalisation have created a new security 
paradigm.
346
 On the one hand, with the end of the Cold War, state-centred concerns were 
replaced by preoccupation with non-military threats, which meant the survival of states at the 
centre of the international system was not threatened anymore by each other, and instead they 
were freed to focus on risk management regarding transnational challenges
347
 such as such as 
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, and drug trafficking, among 
others. As a matter of fact, according to Martin Van Creveld, the future of conflict will not be 
defined by the clear lines that used to distinguish ‘Trinitarian warfare’ (i.e. government, army 
and people), but by confrontation resembling ‘low intensity conflict among different 
organizations’ not necessarily entailing the state and its monopoly on the use of force.348 It is 
argued that, in this context, risk management ‘involves managing disorder at levels of insecurity 
that are more acceptable to the international community’,349 rather than conclusively confronting 
a challenge in order to achieving a sense of security. This is the type of outcome that actually 
defines ‘wicked problems’,350 which are characterised by elusive solutions and by leaving those 
in charge of managing risk in a persistent state of vigilance. Nevertheless, the mere fact of 
looking at current security challenges through the prism of probable scenarios in the context of 
globalisation -as established by Beck’s World Risk Society-, is considered to be ‘a crucial step 
forward’ from the simplistic post-Cold War analysis that was unable to better contextualise and 
explain non-military threats.
351
     
On the other hand, the transformation of security thinking deals with the fact that 
globalisation has had security consequences in the form of trans-`national challenges that do not 
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respect political boundaries. For instance, the 1999 U.S. national security strategy, in its section 
on ‘Opportunities and Challenges’, establishes that, 
Globalization, however, also bring risks. Outlaw states and ethnic conflicts threaten 
regional stability and progress in many important areas of the world. Weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), terrorism, drug trafficking and other international crime are global 
concerns that transcend national borders. Other problems originating overseas –such as 
resource depletion, rapid population growth, environmental damage, new infectious 
diseases, pervasive corruption, and uncontrolled refugee migration- have increasingly 
important implications for American security. Our workers and businesses will suffer if 
the global economy is unstable or foreign markets collapse or lock us out, and the highest 
domestic environmental standards will not protect us adequately if we cannot get others to 
achieve similar standards. In short, our citizens have a direct and increasing stake in the 
prosperity and stability of other nations, in their support for international norms and 
human rights, in their ability to combat international crime, in their open markets, and in 
their efforts to protect the environment.
352
 
It is important to note that risk management is mainly a Western perspective that deals with the 
way advanced countries deal with probabilistic risk scenarios. In other areas of the world, some 
states still face existential threats rather than risks, such as in the case of Somalia which has 
occupied for the fifth straight year the top position of the ‘Failed States Index’, displaying 
aspects such as ‘demographic pressures’, ‘delegitimization of the state’ and ‘external 
intervention’, among other serious challenges.353 In this context, it is suggested that ‘risk is the 
condition that dominates late modernity in the North Atlantic area’.354 However, there are two 
important points to be made in this regard. First, the fact that risk management originated in the 
West does not mean other states do not practice risk management as well. China, for instance, is 
‘just as interested in managing America’s decline as the US is in managing [its] rise’.355 Second, 
the ingrained risk-avoidance trait of the West seems to be paradoxical in the sense that daring 
and audacious actors in other parts of the world (i.e. a rogue state such as North Korea or a 
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terrorist group) may end up forcing the West to discard its proclivity for a protective (defensive) 
stance by being confronted with the need to respond (offensively) to dreadful situations.
356
 
 The central characteristic of risk society, ‘reflexive rationality’, is reflected in the ‘risk’ 
security paradigm in the relevance accorded to avoiding consequences in the context of 
probabilistic scenarios. For instance, whereas the Cold War security environment privileged the 
state’s ‘computable’ rationality’ regarding the assessment of the enemy’s strategic plans and 
order of battle, in the risk age the more subtle character of risks leads the state to focus on 
possible outcomes of events that, even if they do not threaten its survival, they constitute 
challenges that require to be managed.
357
 It is precisely the ambivalence of these issues what is in 
stark contrast with the ‘clarity and decidability’358 of traditional security concerns.359 
Risk assessment is an increasingly individualised activity as survival is seen in more 
personal terms, and this is explained ‘precisely because what we fear most is other people’.360 
Consider, for instance, the case of the 77 lives claimed by Anders Behring Breivik in his 22 July 
2011 Oslo rampage, and the fear instilled in a society by the potential harm that can be inflicted 
not by an organisation or a state but by a single individual.
361
 Therefore, what makes people 
more concerned about risks is a function both of increasing access to information through the 
media and the individual’s own reflexive rationality. This growing role of the individual in 
defining risks may actually explain why sociology was the ground-breaking discipline in relation 
to risk society theory. It is important to note that just as the ‘speech act’ has the potential to 
securitise an issue within the Buzan et.al. analytical framework,
362
 risk discourse represents an 
instrument to either validate or reject the existence of a risk.
363
 That is, risks exist because people 
are made aware of them -paraphrasing the Buzan et.al. framework-, by a ‘securitising actor’. 
Beyond the debate about risk being a rational response or a social construction, an interesting 
argument in reference to risk language points to the need of transcending the traditional 
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conception of risk in terms of calculations, and instead focusing risk from a ‘meditative’ 
perspective that takes into consideration the transformation of technology and the essence of the 
non-apparent danger emanating from it,
364
 such as understanding the danger posed to ‘human 
species’ by developments in biotechnology.365 
In the context of risk management, security strategy is characterised by its proactive 
nature, and this constitutes a significant difference regarding the traditional security orientation 
that was mainly defined by both reactive and defensive postures.
366
 During the Cold War, the 
U.S. strategic posture was intended ‘primarily to deter a nuclear attack, rather than to defeat one 
or otherwise prevail in the event of a conflict’.367 However, given the fact that more often the 
origin of risk, as opposed to threat, is rather diffused, pre-emption is therefore a more amenable 
course of action for managing risk.
368
 The risk age actually rewards the anticipation of possible 
events, notwithstanding that dealing with the consequences of an incident is usually more cost-
effective as long as its effects remain localised.
369
 This is exactly the way risk management has 
influenced thinking about war, which for all practical purposes consists in the use of force to 
prevent probable consequences deriving from a risk situation.
370
 There is a contradiction, 
nevertheless, in the fact that if it is true traditional strategic analysis recognises probabilistic 
scenarios, it has been slow in adapting to the new risk environment, and in this context strategic 
studies have neglected a central Clausewitzean tenet establishing that ‘every age has its own kind 
of war’, because of their continued use of Cold War perspectives to explain new transnational 
challenges.
371
 The logical conclusion is that in the context of risk society theory, risk 
management, and war for that matter, is proactive, and the nature of global risks means they can 
only be managed because of their resistance to un-ambivalent solutions.       
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For instance, risk management has gradually become the guiding principle of the U.S. 
security orientation, with pre-emption as a key element to confront the challenges of the post-
9/11 era. Since the 2001 terrorist attacks, U.S. strategy documents have visibly incorporated risk 
management concepts, notwithstanding that in the Clinton administration years there were 
already some elements related to this line of thinking, such as mitigating conditions abroad that 
could potentially harm the United States. In its 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the 
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) proposed to ‘shaping the international environment’ in order 
to create the conditions to avoid risk. According to the document, 
In addition to other instruments of national power, such as diplomacy and economic 
trade and investment, the Department of Defense has an essential role to play in 
shaping the international security environment in ways that promote and protect U.S. 
national interests. Our defense efforts help to promote regional stability, prevent or 
reduce conflicts and threats, and deter aggression and coercion on a day-to-day basis 
in many key regions of the world. To do so, the Department employs a wide variety of 
means including: forces permanently stationed abroad; forces rotationally deployed 
overseas; forces deployed temporarily for exercises, combined training, or military-to-
military interactions; and programs such as defense cooperation, security assistance, 
International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, and international 
arms cooperation.
 372  
However, while the Clinton administration focused mainly on trans-national issues and on 
managing the end of the Cold War, its successor administration came to power thinking both in 
terms of the need to keep the edge on military power in order to confront potential peer 
competitors, if necessary, and also of ‘[performing] the “constabulary” duties associated with 
shaping the security environment in critical regions’, based on a policy agenda defined by The 
Project for the New American Century.
373
 The 9/11 events, nevertheless, tilted more decisively 
the U.S. security perspective towards adopting a risk approach. First, the 2002 U.S. national 
security strategy incorporated a central risk-management aspect in its policy of pre-emption in 
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reference to an ‘elusive enemy’,374 even though pre-emption had never been used before by the 
‘strong’.375 As a matter of fact, military superiority was considered necessary for ‘[shaping the 
environment’.376 Second, the Bush administration was the first to take the United States to war in 
Afghanistan and Iraq in pursuit of more limited objectives based on a ‘new American Realism’, 
which was in contrast to previous U.S. war rhetoric that had been guided by the idea of achieving 
a ‘New World Order’.377 The more limited scope of U.S. realism recognised that supporting 
democracy and promoting development in weak states were not necessarily mutually excluding 
goals.
378
 Third, the clearest expression about the adoption of a risk management approach by the 
Bush administration was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003 in 
order to streamlining around 100 agencies with homeland security responsibilities -arguably the 
most significant bureaucratic reorganisation since the 1947 National Security Act-, to protect 
U.S. borders and confront trans-national threats such as global terrorism.
379
 It is in this context 
that the logic of ‘risk colonization’ since 9/11 has had a profound impact on the notion of 
security, in particular by leaving society on a continued defensive posture where safety is the 
priority.
380
 For all practical purposes, therefore, risk management became incorporated as 
standard approach in the United States as expressed in official documents such as the QDR 
process and the establishment of specialised organisations such as the DHS. It has been argued, 
nevertheless, that in contrast to the protection of the state that involved an enemy with a territory 
and clearly identified capabilities and intentions, defending the citizen from elusive actors is 




 If it is true within the risk society framework that the individual has become more 
sceptical about the efficiency of bureaucratic structures, it is an irony that governments have at 
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the same time more responsibility as risk managers because of the ominous prospect if risks ever 
materialise. According to DHS Risk Management Doctrine, for instance, 
The United States homeland security environment is complex and filled with 
competing requirements, interests, and incentives that must be balanced and managed 
effectively to ensure the achievement of key national objectives. The safety, security, 
and resilience of the Nation are threatened by an array of hazards, including acts of 
terrorism, malicious activity in cyberspace, pandemics, manmade accidents, 
transnational crime, and natural disasters. At the same time, homeland security 
organizations must manage risks associated with workforce management, acquisitions 
operations, and project costs. Collectively, these external and internal risks have the 
potential to cause loss of life, injuries, negative psychosocial impact, environmental 
degradation, loss of economic activity, reduction of ability to perform mission 
essential functions, and loss of confidence in government capabilities.
382
 
The paradox in this regard consists in the fact that while government resources are limited risks 
are not, and therefore a key feature of risk management is ‘judgement’; that is, the ability of 
accurately establishing probabilistic scenarios to prepare for and to act in consequence.
383
 
Therefore, because ‘instrumental’ rationality in the context of traditional security turns into 
‘reflexive’ rationality under a risk management orientation, the value of anticipation increases. 
The argument goes that if risk refers to consequences of actions yet to be made, then the concept 
of risk, according to Beck, ‘reverses the relationship between past, present and future’.384 This is 
what an observer refers to as ‘colonising the future’.385 In attempting to avoid risks, thus, one is 
defining present problems by their future consequences and this reinforces anticipatory action. 
 
2.5. Comparison between the Copenhagen School Approach and Risk Society Theory 
Risk society is a theoretical approach that became influential in the 1990s by identifying risk as a 
central concern of the increasingly individualised Western societies, which in turn resulted from 
modernisation and its process of industrialisation. The concept of ‘reflexive modernisation’, 
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which is a key aspect of the risk society perspective, refers to the growing awareness of a self-
critical individual that questions man-made challenges brought about by progress itself. 
In the context of international analysis, the risk society perspective establishes that both 
the end of the Cold War and the process of globalisation have created a new security paradigm 
characterised by a ‘risk’ rationality that emphasises probabilistic scenarios and consequences 
from non-state, non-military, challenges, in contrast to previous state-centred threats that 
dominated the traditional security concept based on calculations of intent and capability, 
distinctive of the military-security orientation. A key component of the new perspective is the 
idea of ‘risk management’ that is based on the recognition that risks can only be minimised and 
never eliminated because of their complexity and their ‘boomerang effect’. This means that 
dealing with risks generates other unintended challenges in the process, and this is a situation 
that resembles a ‘security dilemma’ where providing by our own security often fosters insecurity 
on others defeating therefore the original effort at achieving greater security. 
Risk management has important implications such as the need to accept a level of 
insecurity instead of aiming for a reasonable level of security. In this context, war has become 
risk management for all practical purposes, as reflected in the fact that under a risk perspective 
the purpose of the use of force is to keep a diffused and ambivalent challenge under control, 
rather than achieving a definitive settlement and a sense of closure that characterised past 
conflicts. A central aspect that defines both international security and war is the element of pre-
emption that is the imperative to act in anticipation in order to avoid possible adverse 
consequences. This is the best alternative to deal with probabilistic scenarios where inaction is 
considered to be costly, and where access to only partial information is no impediment for 
making necessary decisions. 
Even though risk management is the concept that dominates security thinking in the 
West, this does not mean countries in other areas of the world are oblivious to the concept for 
one reason or another. As a matter of fact, an interesting argument points out that risk can be 
considered ‘only the latest stage of modernity’,386 which means that even if the West can be 
characterised as risk-averse, the fact that there are risk-taking societies and actors in other parts 
of the world may end up forcing the West to abandon its precautionary mentality, giving way 
eventually to a post-risk environment.  
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There are several risk society propositions that are relevant to the analysis of non-state, 
non-military challenges (risks) in U.S.-Mexican relations. First, trans-national issues emanating 
from Mexico such as drugs, undocumented immigration and border environmental degradation 
can be focused from the risk perspective because of its emphasis on complex issues brought 
about by both the end of the Cold War and globalisation. Second, these are complex issues that 
lend themselves to probabilistic scenarios and as such they demand the United States to adopt a 
risk management mode and to accept that a definitive solution to these issues is beyond its 
control. Therefore mitigation, instead of elimination, becomes the more realistic goal. Third, 
each one of these trans-national challenges require the implementation of anticipatory actions at 
the border such as investing in security and environmental infrastructure in the region, in order to 
prevent drug violence from spilling-over the border from Mexico, to avert an uncontrollable flux 
of economic undocumented immigrants or victims of drug violence from south of the dividing 
line, and to avoid serious damage to the border environment because of degradation brought 
about by rapid demographic growth and industrialisation, and lack of proper infrastructure to 
deal with this dual transformation. 
The Buzan et.al analytical framework and Risk Society theory have elements in common. 
First, both are European perspectives influential in the 1990s as efforts to explain post-Cold War 
non-military challenges in the context of globalisation. Second, both recognise a constructivist 
element in the formation of threats and risks, in particular because of the importance of ‘risk 
discourse’ as a legitimising or a de-legitimising aspect element in the case of the latter, and the 
‘speech act’ as the condition to securitising an issue in the case of the former. They differ, 
nevertheless, in the following aspects: (1) the Buzan et.al analytical framework is a complex 
framework full of details, whereas Risk Society theory provides a more straight forward 
explanation of the way society deals with risk, which is through management based on 
anticipatory measures; (2) even though the Buzan et.al analytical framework explains how 
security issues are interconnected across sectors, it is inconclusive in its explanation about how 
an issue actually becomes securitised, which contrasts to Risk Society theory that provides a 
clearer explanation in the sense that ‘reflexive modernisation’ leads the individual to become 
more aware of problems and therefore to opt for preventive action; (3) while the Buzan et.al 
analytical framework provides an explanation of the scope of security through the designation of 
five issue-sectors, Risk Society provides elements to understand the depth of security concerns 
112 
 
by explaining the sources of risks; (4) Risk Society theory offers a better contextualisation of 
security issues beyond the simplistic ‘post-Cold War issues’ by explaining risks independently of 
the Cold War context; and (5) Risk Society, in contrast to the Buzan et.al perspective, represents 
a pro-active orientation as reflected in ‘risk management’ through preventive measures.     
This thesis argues that notwithstanding the limitations of each perspective, both 
complement each other and thus the understanding of complex security issues in the current 
international environment.                     
 
2.6. Conclusions 
The analytical framework proposed by Buzan et.al represents a criticism of the narrow security 
perspective that has been centred on the state and military factors. It is an approach that broadens 
the security agenda by incorporating an explanation about how issues are securitised (process), 
as well as different referent objects of security beyond the state and four security-issue sectors 
(structure), besides the military one, that contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of 
security. 
The utility of the Buzan et.al perspective for the analysis of U.S. security concerns 
regarding Mexico, is evident in the fact that notwithstanding their characterisation as security 
issues from the U.S. point of view, they have not prompted so far a military response from the 
United States, as one would expect under realist principles. 
Besides criticisms about lack of a definition, the idea of expanding the conception of 
security through issue-sectors beyond the military one is seen only as ‘militarizing those other 
sectors’.387 This criticism is important because applying the use of force is not always the best 
solution to long-term, structural problems. This is the case of drug trafficking in U.S. Mexican 
relations whose origin can be traced back to the demand of drugs in the United States, which 
could therefore be more efficiently confronted through treatment programmes. As these 
complexities demonstrate, even though the Buzan et.al analytical framework needs further 
conceptual development as well as refining the explanation of the securitisation process, it is, 
nevertheless, a useful analytical tool that contributes to the understanding of complex security 
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dynamics, such as trans-border threats in the U.S.-Mexico security relationship, as it has been 
discussed in more detail above. 
Risk Society is a theoretical orientation that derives from the criticism, through reflexive 
modernisation, to the consequences of modernisation and its process of industrialisation. It is a 
perspective concerned about the future, in particular about possible scenarios about the effects of 
‘manufactured risks’. Risk management, through preventive measures, is the key to confront 
uncertain developments and the best alternative to deal with challenges whose resolution is 
beyond reach. This perspective was considered to complement the Buzan et.al analytical 
framework in the analysis of U.S. security concerns regarding Mexico because of its utility to 
understand the nature of the non-state, trans-national, challenges that characterise the bilateral 
security relationship. 































CHAPTER 3. MEXICO’S SECURITY RELEVANCE FOR THE UNITED STATES  
 
3.1. Introduction  
The objective of this chapter is to identify, from the U.S. point of view, the variety of threats that 
characterised the security agenda with Mexico in the 1990s. This analysis followed a series of 
specific steps. First, this chapter reviewed the U.S. military strategy, based on the 1997 QDR, in 
order to find out whether Mexico represented a military-type of threat to the United States. 
Second, since the previous question was responded in a negative sense, analysis thus turned to 
the wider 1997 A National Security Strategy for A New Century, where it was actually possible 
to observe that Mexico’s security relevance for the United States was defined in terms of both 
opportunities and threats. Regarding the latter, the common border is fundamental to understand 
the security dynamic between the two countries. 
Mexico’s security significance for the United States was identified first of all in relation 
to drug trafficking, as Mexico was directly mentioned within the U.S. national security strategy 
as a key ‘transit’ country in the efforts to stop the flow of drugs into the United States.
388
 Even 
though there was no explicit reference to Mexico in the same document in terms of 
undocumented immigration as one of the trans-national U.S. concerns, it can be argued that by 
default Mexico is the greatest concern in this regard because of the sheer size of Mexican 
undocumented immigration in the United States, and this is the reason why including its analysis 
as a U.S. security issue was justified within this thesis. Although the U.S. national security 
document addressed environmental issues from a global rather than from a bilateral 
perspective,
389
 this thesis also included the analysis of bilateral environmental matters in order to 
provide a more comprehensive picture of the actual and potential security concerns along the 
U.S.-Mexico border and also because, in terms of the non-traditional security perspectives 
adopted by this thesis, it was interesting to analyse an important border issue that represents a 
potential rather than an actual security concern. 
Therefore, while it can be argued that drug trafficking and undocumented immigration 
were explicit and implicit U.S. security concerns regarding Mexico, respectively, border 
environmental issues have been potential rather than actual security matters. In this context, the 
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Buzan et.al analytical framework and the Risk Society perspective adopted by this thesis are 
useful not only to explain why drugs and undocumented immigrants were security concerns from 
the U.S. point of view, but also why the border environment -a potential security concern- has 
remained within the realm of ‘risk management’ measures on the part of the two countries 
instead of turning into an actual security concern as in the case of the other two issues. In 
synthesis, the 1997 U.S. national security strategy explicitly identified drugs as the main concern 
regarding Mexico; it recognised undocumented immigration as a relevant issue without any 
particular reference to Mexico -notwithstanding the major role of this country in unauthorised 
immigration flows to the United States; and it addressed global environmental matters without 
mentioning Mexico, even though bilateral environmental issues have the potential to turn into 
security concerns.      
If it is true in the 1990s Mexico posed a risk to U.S. security because of the three 
challenges mentioned above, the country has also had the potential to contribute to U.S. efforts to 
limit the effects of those same trans-border security challenges, and this explains why bilateral 
co-operation has been essential in the context of the bilateral relationship. Moreover, Mexico has 
also been a benefit for the United States because of economic opportunities created by NAFTA; 
its role as a reliable oil supplier; and basically because it has so far also provided the United 
States with a stable southern border.       
Even though Mexico has always been implicitly important for the security of the United 
States, its relevance gradually increased since the 1970s in direct proportion to the growing 
interdependence between the two countries. The intensification of interdependence has been 
evident in the variety of issues of a trans-national nature within the bilateral agenda such as drug 
trafficking and undocumented immigration, which have represented the most pressing bilateral 
issues from the U.S. point of view. Furthermore, towards the end of the 20
th
 century the two 
countries formalised their economic integration through a free trade agreement. This created the 
paradox addressed in this thesis, in the sense that NAFTA not only expanded commerce between 
them –and Canada- but also increased U.S. concerns about the need to protect the United States 
from those same trans-national issues that were the outcome of interdependence. The United 
States faced the complex security challenge of facilitating legitimate trade with Mexico, on the 




To accomplish the objective outlined above, the first section of this chapter focuses on 
providing a brief overview of the nature of the bilateral security relationship. The second section 
is devoted to explaining NAFTA’s security implications for the United States in relation to 
Mexico. The third and fourth sections analyse the premises guiding U.S. defence and national 
security strategies in the 1990s, respectively. U.S. defence strategy is examined in order to 
discern what kind of role, if any, Mexico played at the military-strategic level, and then the 
broader political context represented by the U.S. national security strategy is addressed to 




U.S.-Mexican relations were marred by friction and open conflict from approximately the mid-
1800s to the first three decades of the 20
th 
century. This period encompassed the 1847 Mexican-
American War; instability in Mexico due to the protracted internal struggle between 
Conservatives and Liberals; World War I (WWI); and the Mexican Revolution that extended 
from 1910 into the 1930s and included the nationalisation of Mexico’s oil industry in March of 
1938.
390
 Yet, during WWII the United States and Mexico became allies and increased bilateral 
security co-operation to an extent not seen before, or ever since.
391
 This collaboration, however, 
was scaled back after the end of WWII, and for all practical purposes their temporary alliance 
concluded. 
For the next three Cold War decades, Mexico neither explicitly supported U.S. military 
objectives, nor did it become a security concern for the United States. In fact, according to 
Aguayo, the rather benign U.S. view towards Mexico at this time was explained not only by its 
stability-enhancing political and economic conditions, but also by an acceptable interaction with 
its neighbour to the north.
392
 In general terms, during the Cold War Mexico provided a silent 
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advantage to the United States by basically keeping a stable common border. For instance, 
whereas the Soviet Union was confronted with the presence of adversaries on its security 
perimeter, the United States deemed it unnecessary to militarise its borders. Precisely because of 
the benefit provided by Mexico’s stability, the United States was free to project its military 
power beyond the hemisphere and into areas of intense geo-strategic competition. It has been 
argued, in this context, that Mexico’s stability ‘contributed -passively but fundamentally- to the 
final triumph of the [U.S.] policy of containment’.393 In retrospect, consequently, Mexico had an 
indirect yet positive impact on U.S. strategic calculations during the Cold War. 
Mexico’s ‘defensive’ external orientation,394 and the relative domestic stability achieved 
by the one-party system that dominated its politics for 71 years (from 1929 to 2000), helped 
create a non-threatening atmosphere in its relationship with the United States. According to 
Michael Dziedzic, the United States and Mexico have represented a ‘security community’, 
meaning that between them ‘the expectation of war has been abolished, together with the 
preparations for it’.395 This view is shared by David Mares who notes that coercion has been out 
of the question as a means of settling disputes between the two countries; militarily, he 
concludes, the United States and Mexico form a ‘pluralist security community’.396 As already 
mentioned, the fact that the U.S. military’s main mission along the border with Mexico has been 
restricted to assisting LEAs by providing them intelligence and infrastructure assets, supports the 
argument about Mexico not posing a military threat to the United States. 
In the span of the first three decades of the Cold War, nevertheless, interdependence 
intensified between the two countries, thus expanding the bilateral agenda by increasing the 
number of issues that required to be addressed. In the United States, for instance, the 1978 
Presidential Review Memorandum (National Security Council-41) dealing with Mexico, under 
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its subsection ‘The Changing Relationship’, established that ‘developments in Mexico over the 
next generation will influence what Americans do for a living, even who Americans are and how 
they interact with each other’.397 It emphasised that Mexico was increasingly relevant for the 
United States due to issues such as oil, the common border, and the growing impact of each 
country’s domestic politics on the other.398 By the 1970s, interdependence between the two 
countries was characterised by challenges such as drugs, undocumented immigration, Mexico’s 
foreign debt, and the two countries’ clashing perspectives on the nature of Central American 
armed conflicts. Regarding this latter point, it is important to mention that conflicts in Central 
America had created foreign policy differences between the United States and Mexico in the 
1980s. 
In contrast to the period of relative stability in U.S.-Mexican relations from the end of 
WWII to the 1970s, by the 1980s controversies in the bilateral relationship had become 
‘cumulative’399 as a result of a variety of issues such as the 1977 disagreement over the Mexican 
trans-border gas pipeline, and Mexico’s refusal to let the Sha of Iran to re-enter the country after 
receiving medical treatment in the United States, among others; as a matter of fact, ‘by the end of 
the 1980s, the relationship that Carter had hoped to build with Mexico had become a casualty to 
miscalculations, divergent perceptions, and some policy differences’.400 
There was a paradox, nevertheless, in the fact that if it is true U.S.-Mexican economic 
relations in the 1980s were characterised by increasing co-operation due in part to Mexico’s 
1982 crisis and its consequent efforts to reform its economy under free market principles, the 
U.S.-Mexican security relationship during this period was defined by the opposite; that is, by a 
growing level of tension between the two countries over two main factors: Central America and 
drug trafficking.  
 Since 1979, Mexico’s recently-discovered oil reserves became a foreign policy 
instrument for the country to become a more influential actor in Central America among the 
region’s centrist political forces, which in turn would allow it to counter-balance the significant 
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U.S. presence in the area.
401
 The Central American conflicts from the end of the 1970s were of 
interest to Mexico because of the need to prevent conflict from spilling-over its southern border, 
and the course of action to accomplish this objective was to contribute to bring stability to the 
region; otherwise, potential intervention by Cuba and the Soviet Union, and of course by the 
United States, was considered to result in a further erosion of the region’s ‘autonomy’.402 The 
radicalisation of the Sandinista revolutionary regime that ousted Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, 
and increasing opposition from the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional 
(FMLN) insurgency in El Salvador, nevertheless, turned Central America into an area of 
conflicting interests where Mexican and U.S. views were at odds under an assertive Reagan 
administration.
403
 On the one hand, the United States considered the traditionally legalistic 
orientation of Mexican foreign policy as a hindrance to its efforts to contain revolutionary 
movements in the region.
404
 On the other hand, Mexico considered U.S. regional policy, guided 
by an ideological rationale, not only inappropriate but also the main explanation for the 
‘militarisation’ of the conflict and the consequent instability of the region. The elimination of 
this source of tension and the fact that trade integration had become a necessity, nevertheless, 
contributed later on to the Mexican approximation to the United States.
405
 A military escalation 
of the conflict was not convenient for Mexico because it was seen as potentially intensifying the 
challenge it was interested in dealing with in the first place, which was preventing an influx of 
refugees into a problematic part of the country such as the state of Chiapas. In this context, 
Mexico became especially active in the region in 1982, after the November 1981 U.S. decision to 
support the contra paramilitary force in Nicaragua.
406
 
 The way out to reduce U.S. pressure on Mexican diplomacy in Central America, without 
Mexico abandoning its position, consisted in transforming its regional approach from bilateral to 
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multilateral through the creation of the Contadora Group that included Venezuela, Colombia and 
Panama (the initiative was launched in the Panamanian isle of Contadora), to contribute to a 
negotiated solution of the conflict based on principles of international law such as non-
intervention and peaceful resolution of controversies. This mechanism, nevertheless, was 
promoted by Mexico in order to find a compromise with, rather than to oppose, the United 
States.
407
 It was until the Central American Esquipulas process replaced the Contadora Group in 
1987 that tensions between Mexico and the United States gradually began to subdue.
408
     
 Strain in the bilateral relationship was also function of disagreement with respect to drug 
trafficking. In the 1980s, the ‘war’ against drugs was at the centre of the U.S. administration’s 
agenda, and Mexico easily became the target of U.S. policies by being both producer of 
marijuana and heroin and also, from the second half of the decade on, a transit point for South 
American cocaine bound for the United States. Moreover, the assassination in 1985 in Mexico of 
DEA Agent Camarena by drug traffickers with protection from Mexican authorities, contributed 
to create an adverse atmosphere for Mexico in the United States where the country was criticised 
in terms of both its corrupt official structures, and its ill reputed political system, more in 
general.
409
 In this context, the majority of U.S. observers of Mexico agreed that ‘the most 
important source of friction in U.S.-Mexican relations is Mexico itself’.410 
 The United States continued imposing on Mexico a unilateral counter-drug approach 
based on interdiction abroad, and it again compelled Mexico to co-operate. Furthermore, in 1986 
the U.S. Congress passed regulation requiring the White House to carry out an annual exercise 
consisting in verifying anti-drug efforts by other countries, based on the level of co-operation 
with the United States.
411
 In this context, Mexico had to confront the threat posed by both, drug 
trafficking itself and pressure exerted by the United States, and therefore its anti-narcotics 
measures served to ‘reassure and thereby contain the United States’.412 As a matter of fact, in 
1988 President de la Madrid explicitly designated drug trafficking, for the very first time, as a 
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threat to Mexico’s national security, a view that will be confirmed by subsequent Mexican 
presidents.
413
 Efforts by the Mexican Government to reassure the United States after the 
Camarena debacle, such as the 1985 dissolution of the Federal Directorate of Security (DFS) that 
was related to the incident, and the arrest that same year of Rafael Caro Quintero in Costa Rica, 
one of the intellectual authors of the assassination of the DEA agent,
414
 did not satisfy the United 
States and it continued insisting Mexico to restructure its security apparatus in order to deal with 
corruption.
415
 This issue would be resolved by Mexico’s gradual and unwilling steps to allow the 
United States a greater voice in Mexican security affairs, and this would become manifest in the 
following decade.
416
     
 In terms of security co-operation, in general, the period between 1970 and 1995 was 
characterised by scarce participation of the Mexican military in U.S. training and educational 
programmes. For instance, in the 25-period of reference, only 766 Mexican officers attended the 
so-called ‘School of the Americas’ (SOA), which in 1984 was relocated from Panama to Fort 
Benning, Georga, and in 2001 re-named Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation 
(WHISC).
417
 As a matter of fact, military training and exchanges between the two countries 
began to increase in the mid-1990s with the momentum provided by the October 1995 visit of 
U.S. Secretary of Defence William Perry to Mexico, in order to intensify U.S. security assistance 
programmes (as a comparison, only in 1996 WHISC enrolled 153 Mexican students comprising 
16.4% of the student body).
418
 
 It can be argued that in the 1980s there was a fundamental change in U.S. policies toward 
Mexico as explained by uncertainty about its governability and the ability of its political system 
to keep the stability of the country, which had implications for the security of the common 
border.
419
 With the almost simultaneous arrival of new administrations in both countries, in 
Mexico at the end of 1988 and in the United States at beginning of 1989, U.S. views on Mexico 
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changed as evident in the ‘Spirit of Houston’ and willingness to co-operate between Presidents 
George H. W. Bush and Carlos Salinas. To this change contributed the significant challenge the 
left had posed during the past presidential election in Mexico and the U.S. preference for a PRI 
government, especially if supporting democracy in the country would mean a triumph of the left 
over the right and centrist political forces; the arrest of the influential drug trafficker Miguel 
Angel Felix Gallardo by the new Salinas government; and, regionally, the new low profile of 
Mexican foreign policy in Central America and therefore the non-condemnation of the U.S. 
invasion of Panama; all these aspects contributed to set the stage, therefore, for a more 
collaborative stance between the two countries by 1989.
420
                
Even though interdependence-related issues were not new in the bilateral relationship, in 
the United States they had been overshadowed by the more dire threat of a nuclear confrontation 
with the Soviet Union. By the end of the Cold War, however, the United States was able to 
devote more attention to trans-national challenges. Since trans-border issues with Mexico were 
the outcome of interdependence (this has been consistently the Mexican perspective), their very 
nature created therefore the need to confront them in a more collaborative way.
421
 In the long-
term, they were deemed to represent the main threat to U.S. society.
422
 
 In terms of trans-border challenges, however, even before the 9/11 attacks it had been 
suggested that ‘Mexico [had to] be understood by the U.S. military establishment as an area that 
may pose unique asymmetric threats to [U.S.] national security in the not so distant future’.423 It 
was noted, for instance, that the U.S. border with Mexico should be seen as an ‘appealing 
avenue’ not only for illicit flows but also for the possible infiltration of ‘foreign terrorists bent on 
delivering weapons of mass destruction’.424 This line of argument has often been used as a 
disguise to justify a hard-line against undocumented immigration, and it has provided the 
rationale behind proposals pointing out that the best way to secure the U.S. Southwest border is 
through its ‘formal militarization’.425 Fighting terrorism at the border, in fact, is the number one 
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priority established by the U.S. Border Patrol strategy, even though this can also be seen as a 




 The idea of confronting trans-national threats in a unilateral way, however, has been 
considered inefficient and counterproductive by specialists on both sides of the border.
427
 It has 
been suggested, for instance, that the goal of U.S. strategy regarding Mexico should consist of 
turning this country into an asset rather than letting it become a liability.
428
 An additional 
argument pointed out to the risk of conceptualising issues in the bilateral relationship as 
traditional security concerns, mainly because of its counter-productive effect, especially because 
they have not been amenable to coercive solutions.
429
 The bottom line of these ideas has been 
that most of the security challenges in the U.S.-Mexico relationship cannot be dealt with 
effectively, and in the long-term, through military means. They have been challenges that have 
required integral responses. So far, however, both countries officially recognise a security 
dimension in some of the trans-border issues under consideration in this thesis, especially in 
reference to drug trafficking. Furthermore, after the 9/11 attacks undocumented immigration has 
been openly portrayed as a security issue in the United States. Mexico, for its part, has remained 
reticent to consider this issue under this light, categorising it instead as an economic 
development matter. The environment, in turn, has been a potential rather than ac actual security 
concern for both countries. 
It is important to note, nevertheless, that NAFTA brought a new security dynamic to the 
bilateral relationship, with Mexico playing an important role in the creation of a ‘virtuous circle’ 
to deal with common challenges. On the one hand, promoting stability in the country has been 
paramount for addressing trans-border threats affecting U.S. national security. On the other hand, 
dealing with those threats has been considered fundamental to maintaining Mexico’s stability. 
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The security significance of Mexico for the United States has been, therefore, not of a 
traditional military character but related to the trans-border nature of the bilateral challenges 
brought about by interdependence between the two countries. 
 
3.3. The NAFTA Context 
A detailed examination of NAFTA is beyond the scope of this thesis, which covers only the 
1990s. Nevertheless, this section of the study will focus on the trade agreement’s security 
implications for the United States, and its purpose is to set the context for the three trans-border 
issues that will be subsequently analysed. 
 
3.3.1. Background   
The period between 1940 and 1968 in Mexico is known as ‘the Mexican miracle’, and it was a 
phase characterised by both political and economic stability in the country. These were the years 
of the inward-looking development model (import-substitution industrialization strategy [ISI]) 




 The 1970s, in contrast, represented a phase of transition in both the economic and 
political arena after the government tilted internally to the left in order to respond to social 
demands that had been present in the Tlatelolco student movement in 1968,
431
 and this process, 
in turn, created tensions with the domestic business sector.
432
 By the end of this decade, the 
world’s energy crisis, on the one hand, and, on the other, discovery in Mexico of oil reserves at a 
level of up to 200 billion barrels (at a price of $38 dollars in 1979 compared to $4 dollars at the 
beginning of the 1970s),
433
 allowed the country to promote economic growth. It is estimated that 
by the end of the ‘oil boom’ (1978-1981), energy exports were generating more than $15 billion 
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Economic growth in Mexico during this period was explained by the import liberalisation 
policy pursued until 1981, notwithstanding the presence of warnings such as the fact that 
inflation was increasing more than it had been anticipated (27% between 1980 and 1981).
435
 The 
government, however, decided to stay the course because of some positive indicators, such as the 
fact that the job-creation rate was higher than the labour force growth rate.
436
 
Nevertheless, the key to Mexico’s economic imbalance was that the value of oil exports 
did not grow enough to pay for the increasing volume of imports. It is estimated that while the 
value of oil exports grew from $560 million to $14.6 billion between 1976 and 1981, the value of 
imports increased from $9,400 million to $32,000 million in the same period, surpassing thus the 
country’s revenue in absolute terms.437 
Moreover, in mid-1981 the collapse of the world oil market and an increase in interest 
rates created in Mexico a crisis characterised not only by capital flight, but also by the Mexican 
government’s indecision in terms of adjusting both expenditure trends and the exchange rate. In 
this context, by the end of 1982, Mexico had accumulated an $82 billion external debt.
438
 At this 
point, the Mexican government was forced to devaluate the currency by 70% and eventually to 
embark on a transformation of its economic model through the adoption of free market 
policies.
439
 This process started under President Miguel De la Madrid (1982-1988), and it was 
characterised by two important factors: (1) the protectionist model was replaced by a competitive 
framework based of free market principles; and (2) the interventionist state was replaced by a 
state whose function was to stimulate, rather than to direct, the economy.
440
 By 1986, half of the 
total federal government budget was devoted to service the debt, and this situation in turn 
required cuts in social spending as well as in job-creating public investment.
441
 The severity of 




Between 1982 and 1987 Mexico experienced null economic growth, and this occurred at 
a time of a growing flow of people entering the labour market. In this context, the effects of the 
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1982 crisis would be evident in the 1990s, with an accumulated social cost that would exacerbate 
inequality in the country, giving way to unemployment, underemployment and undocumented 
immigration to the United States.
443
        
The economic crises experienced by Mexico in the 1980s basically represented the 
exhaustion of the import substitution industrialisation (ISI) strategy adopted in the post-war 
period. The failure of the ISI programme, furthermore, eventually provided the justification for 
the adoption of a neo-liberal economic model in the country. Economic liberalisation in Mexico 
started with the government’s decision to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) in November 1985, and this process was later intensified under President Salinas’ 
administration (1988-1994). The end of the Cold War offered Mexico almost no opportunities 
for trade diversification -as the preferred strategy to offset the traditional U.S. influence-, as 
powers in both Europe and Asia were more preoccupied with providing economic opportunities 
for their neighbours in order to prevent instability within their respective regions.
444
 Mexico’s 
economic relationship with Latin America, on the other hand, had always been more competitive 
than complementary, and opportunities there remained rather limited as well. In this context, 
Mexico was left with the United States as the most viable partner, especially because bilateral 
trade was already significant. The Mexican government thus decided to formalise an already 
existing trade relationship with the United States.
445
 
 Some analysts argue, nevertheless, that economic reform in Mexico followed in fact a 
political rather than an economic rationale. According to Susan Kaufman Purcell, 
The main reason for economic change was political. The outset of the foreign debt crisis 
in August 1982 seriously threatened the stability of the Mexican political system, and with 
it the continuing rule of the [Institutional Revolutionary Party] PRI.
446
 
According to this argument, the PRI realised that economic reform was a condition to retain the 
reins of power. Both the exhaustion of the ISI model and political imperatives represented the 
stimulus for change.  
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The political effect of the end of the Cold War on the bilateral relationship, moreover, 
also contributed to facilitate a closer co-operation between the two countries to the extent that it 
reduced U.S. pressure on Mexico to support U.S. views.
447
 In the opinion of Jorge Domínguez 
and Rafael Fernández de Castro, Mexico actually opted for ‘bandwagoning’ with the United 
States in the context of the new international environment.
448
 
It is important to note that on the U.S. side of the equation, the idea of a trade agreement 
with Mexico was not new. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, for instance, both the Carter and 
Reagan administrations had proposed energy and free trade agreements, respectively, and 
Mexico had rejected both.
449
 According to Margaret Cummings, nevertheless, the pivotal factor 
in U.S. efforts to get Mexico on board regarding bilateral agreements was that by the mid-to-late 
1980s in the United States there were powerful forces pressing for free trade with Mexico.
450
 
Among the reasons explaining their support were the increasing globalisation of the economy, 
and Mexico’s need to avoid repeating past financial crises related to capital borrowed abroad.451 
Equally significant, however, the agreement represented Mexico’s implicit commitment to keep 
its market open, thus providing certainty to investors.
452
 
The basic U.S. economic argument in favour of the agreement, nevertheless, was that it 
would increase income and employment in the United States. Even though during the campaign 
then-Governor Clinton had expressed reservations about the agreement, by the beginning of his 
administration he became convinced of its benefits. In early 1993 he stated: 
That agreement [NAFTA] holds the potential to create many, many jobs in America over 
the next decade if it is joined with others to ensure the environment, that living standards, 
that working conditions are honored. That we can literally know that we are going to raise 
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the condition of people in America and in Mexico. We have a vested interest in a 
wealthier, stronger Mexico, but we need to do it in terms that are good for our people.
453
    
An additional positive prospect offered by the agreement -taking into account Mexico’s past 
poor economic performance-, was that a healthier Mexican economy would have a positive 
impact on U.S. exports.
454
 
In terms of the predictability the agreement was thought to provide, a further benefit of a 
free trade accord would consist in locking in liberal reform in Mexico. In this context, U.S.-
Mexico free trade had ‘[grown] out of the desire to set a new structure in place that would be 
extremely difficult for future [Mexican] governments to reverse’.455 It can be argued that this 
was not necessarily a positive outcome, at least for Mexico. For instance, according to 
Cummings, free trade agreements are often convenient ‘anti-democratic’ schemes used by 
powerful domestic economic groups to tilt the scale in favour of the private sector and in 
detriment of the government, which in turn finds itself unable to implement social 
programmes.
456
 If it is true NAFTA’s most positive impact has been located at the 
macroeconomic level, it is also true its benefits have been distributed unevenly across society.
457
   
Furthermore, in order to facilitate bargaining, Mexico City agreed not to include 
immigration in the free trade negotiation while Washington refrained from asking its southern 
neighbour to open oil exploration and production to U.S. investment.
458
 The lack of agreement 
on both issues, nevertheless, left each country frustrated with the other. 
Even though both the Bush and Clinton administrations believed that NAFTA’s 
economic benefits would contribute to Mexico’s stability, both avoided the issue of Mexico’s 
democracy.
459
 According to Jacqueline Mazza, although democratisation in Mexico became 
more salient during the NAFTA negotiations, the subject basically did not play a role on the 
agreement’s approval.460 
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During its first five years of operation, NAFTA proved to be a success in terms of 
increasing trade. For instance, in 1998 U.S. exports to Mexico represented 11.5% of the U.S. 
total, up from 8.9% in 1993. In the same period, U.S. imports from Mexico went up from 6.9% 
to 10.4% of the U.S. total. Taking into account both exports and imports, by 1999 Mexico had 




Table 3-1. Top Ten Countries with which the U.S. Trades (for the month of January 2000) 
     Year to date  
     Total in  
     Billions  
Country Name    of U.S. $  
Canada     31.12   
Mexico     17.37   
Japan     15.03   
China     7.78   
Germany    6.43   
United Kingdom   5.99   
Republic of Korea   4.93   
Taiwan     4.83   
France     3.79   
Singapore    2.62 
 
Values given are for Imports and Exports added together. 
These countries represented 70.26% of U.S. imports, and 67.27% of U.S. exports in goods. 
 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, ‘Top Ten Countries with which the U.S. Trades’, [online] available: 
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/top/dst/current/balance.html (23/03/00), p.1. For the month of January 2000 the 
United States had a $1,767.23 million trade deficit with Mexico. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, ‘Top Ten Countries 
with which the U.S. has a Trade Deficit’, [online] available: http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/top/dst/current/deficit.html (23/03/00), p.1.   
 
 As far as Mexico was concerned, by 1998 exports to the United States represented 87.6% 
of the total, up from 82.7% in 1993; imports went up from 69.3% to 74.3% in the same period.
462
 
One important aspect for Mexico, nevertheless, was that it ceased to be an exporter of primary 
products. This change was evident in the structure of bilateral trade characterised by the 
exchange of intermediate goods –explained by the expansion of intra-firm trade-, as shown in 
Table 3-2. 
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Table 3-2. U.S. Trade with Mexico in 1998 (millions of dollars) 
Top U.S. Exports to Mexico   Top U.S. Imports from Mexico 
Total    78,772  Total    94,629 
Electrical machinery and appliances 14,341  Motor vehicles   16,753 
Motor vehicles    7,861  Electrical machinery and appliances 13,540 
General industry machinery   3,762  Telecommunications equipment 10,882 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles  3,423  Apparel and clothing  6,813 
Telecommunications equipment  3,354  Office machines and ADP equipment 5,523 
Office machines and ADP equipment  3,186  Petroleum, petroleum products 5,293 
Manufactures of metals   2,705  Power generating machinery  3,844 
Apparel and clothing   2,647  General industry machinery  3,166 
Power generating machinery   2,544  Professional scientific instruments 2,717 
Machinery, specialised  2,341  Vegetables and fruit  2,647 
Textile yarn, fabrics   1,959  Miscellaneous manufactured articles 2,408 
Plastics in primary form  1,939  Furniture and bedding  2,317 
Professional scientific instruments  1,747  Manufactures of metals  1,811 
Paper, paperboard   1,743  Iron and steel   1,253 
Petroleum, petroleum products  1,481  Textile yarn, fabrics  1,196 
 
Source: Vargas, ‘NAFTA’s First Five Years’, (Part I), p.3. 
 
In reference to U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI), while it averaged $2.2 billion annually 
between 1990 and 1993, it averaged $3.6 billion per year between 1994 and 1998, which 
represented an increase of almost 64%.
463
 As these figures show, in terms of both trade and 
investment Mexico has been highly dependent on the United States, and this is a reflection of the 
asymmetry of power between the two countries. According to estimates at the beginning of the 




Regarding Mexico, an alternative assessment of NAFTA noted that the agreement has 
actually been harmful in a variety of aspects. For instance, it depreciated real wages; it did not 
help to reduce undocumented immigration to the United States; it damaged the environment; it 
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contributed to deforestation (around 630,000 hectares between 1993 and 2003) in the southern 
part of the country; in addition to the fact that the number of new jobs created in the manufacture 
sector (500,000) between 1994 and 2002 did not offset the loss in the agricultural sector (1.3 
million) in the same period.
465
 The conclusion of this assessment established: ‘put simply, 
NAFTA has been neither the disaster its opponents predicted nor the savior hailed by its 
supporters’.466 
If it is true the agreement has had a positive impact on bilateral trade, its benefits have not 
permeated into the Mexican society in general. In 1999, for instance, 40% of Mexico’s 100 
million people still had incomes of less than $2 a day, and in this context it was difficult to see 
how NAFTA could contribute to the country’s stability and democracy in the long term.467 
 
3.3.2. NAFTA’s Security Implications 
In contrast to military and state-centred concerns that characterised competition between the two 
superpowers, the post-Cold War security environment was marked by the prominence of non-
traditional, non-military, threats. Because it is common for these non-state threats to operate 
across national boundaries, the most effective way to confront them is through international co-
operation, and this has been the rationale behind increasing security collaboration between the 
United States and Mexico since the mid-1990s, as shown in Graph 2, which shows an increase in 
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Sources: U.S. Overseas Loan and Grants (Greenbook), U.S. Bureau of Census (BUCEN), International Database. 
Prepared by USAID Economic Analysis Data Services [statsunit@devtechsys.com], [online] available: 




























The specific values for the Graph above are: 
                 FY 
                                  
Economic Military Total 
                 80 0.26 0 0.26 
81 0.3 0 0.31 
82 0.24 0 0.25 
83 0.22 0 0.22 
84 0.21 0 0.21 
85 0.26 0.01 0.27 
86 0.27 0 0.27 
87 0.37 0.01 0.38 
88 0.37 0 0.38 
89 1.34 0 1.34 
90 0.76 0.21 0.97 
91 0.99 0.02 1.01 
92 0.71 0.28 0.99 
93 0.54 0.01 0.55 
94 0.2 0 0.21 
95 0.17 0.01 0.17 
96 0.36 0.03 0.4 
97 0.16 0.64 0.8 
98 0.34 0.32 0.66 
99 0.26 0.28 0.54 
0 0.31 0.24 0.55 
1 0.39 0.28 0.66 
2 0.9 0.23 1.13 
3 0.61 0.17 0.78 
4 0.91 0.12 1.03 
5 0.97 0.11 1.08 
6 1.7 0.15 1.86 
7 0.7 0.15 0.85 
8 0.77 0.12 0.88 
9 3.9 0.62 4.52 
10 5.53 0.85 6.39 
 
The United States has increasingly recognised that its security is connected to that of its 
neighbour to the south. According to Donald Schulz, for instance, this is evident in the fact that 
Mexico’s problems have the potential to ‘[affect] socio-economic conditions in the United 
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States, especially near the Mexican border and in its inner cities’.468 Furthermore, even though 
NAFTA was promoted as nothing more than a trade agreement during the negotiation process, it 
has had important security implications for North America as a whole. According to Dziedzic, 
for instance,  
As the tapestry of the three societies [Canada, the United States and Mexico] becomes 
more intricately interwoven, however, any fraying at the edges of one social order would 
have unavoidable consequences for the others. In this way, NAFTA could unintentionally 
create the necessity for future security cooperation.
469
 
That is, the idea that NAFTA was purely a trade agreement that would not have any significant 
political or security implications was utterly wrong; to the extent that the three societies have 
been bound together more tightly, each has acquired a vested interest in the stability of the 
others. This basically meant an interest in Mexico’s stability, due to the potential for social 
dislocations within the country as a result of the implementation of the accord. This prospect set 
the stage for increased security co-operation, in particular between Mexico and its immediate 
neighbour, the United States. The Zapatista uprising in 1994, in fact, represented only one 
instance of social unrest related to NAFTA’s approval.470 
Rochlin basically agreed with Dziedzic’s point by establishing that NAFTA increased 
U.S. economic stakes in Mexico, and in so doing heightened the urgency of defending U.S. 
interests in the context of potential instability in Mexico. According to this rationale, U.S.-
Mexican economic integration must be followed by military integration, which in turn has to be 
justified in terms of the need to address crime and drug trafficking in Mexico. In Rochlin’s 
opinion, ‘it is precisely in these circumstances that Mexican national security has transformed 
itself into regional security, largely in response to trans-national capital and U.S. strategic 
interests’.471 In this context, one of the problems he identified was that Mexican security became 
susceptible to being defined by the United States.
472
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The argument above, nevertheless, contrasts sharply with others for which NAFTA is 
actually an opportunity to manage trans-national threats more than a mere façade to control 
social unrest in Mexico.
473
 Rochlin’s perspective is also at odds with the view expressed by 
Schulz above for whom trans-border security concerns are serious enough to be relevant by 
themselves, independently of NAFTA. 
In the end, it seems that the U.S.-Mexican security relationship under NAFTA has been 
characterised by the need to protect U.S. interests in Mexico, on the one hand, and the need to 
deal with trans-border threats that affect both societies, on the other hand. If it is true the 
agreement increased U.S. concerns about the need to avoid trans-border risks from Mexico, the 
irony is that these challenges have been in part the side-effects of the U.S.-supported neo-liberal 
reform in Mexico. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that the agreement has not only 
stimulated further co-operation between the two countries, but also contributed to a more 
institutionalised bilateral relationship. 
 
3.4. U.S. Defence Strategy 
This section looks at U.S. defence planning at the end of the Cold War, and describes the main 
elements of a ‘new’ military strategy to confront the challenges of a more complex international 
environment. This is the basis for the subsequent analysis of Mexico’s military significance for 
the United States. 
 
3.4.1. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 
3.4.1.1. Threat Assessment 
In 1997, the first year of publication of the QDR, U.S. military strategy was in the process of 
adapting itself to a new international security environment where the threat of nuclear 
confrontation between the superpowers had been basically replaced by trans-national dangers as 
the main concern. 
 Firstly, the QDR recognised that regional dangers were at the forefront of U.S. security 
concerns, and that ‘failed or failing states’ could potentially generate instability as well as a 
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variety of non-traditional challenges in several areas of the world.
474
 Secondly, the QDR 
underlined the problem of controlling the diffusion of military technology, and therefore the need 
of preventing the dissemination of WMD in strategic areas of the world.
475
 Thirdly, the QDR 
established that U.S. interests were more likely to be affected in the future by a ‘variety of 
transnational dangers’, such as drugs and organised crime.476 And fourthly, even though the 
scenario of a nuclear exchange between superpowers had been left behind, the U.S. territory was 
believed to be exposed to ‘asymmetric threats’ prompted by the superiority of U.S. conventional 
forces. Dealing with these challenges was considered ‘an important element of U.S. defense 
strategy’.477 
 Finally, the threat-scenario section of the document pointed out to the possible emergence 
of a new ‘global peer competitor’ after 2015, and Russia and China were seen as having such 
potential notwithstanding their ‘uncertain’ future.478  
 
3.4.1.2. Elements of Strategy 
According to the principle of ‘engagement’ set forth in the 1997 A National Security Strategy for 
A New Century, the QDR required DoD to pursue three main strategic tasks:  
a) ‘Shaping the International Environment’ 
DoD was assigned the mission of ‘promoting regional stability’ through military collaboration 
with other countries in order to influence the international environment.
479
 The report, however, 
at no point defined allies and friends, or the practical steps to achieve the sated goals. Neither did 
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 A further duty consisted of the application of U.S. military power to ‘preventing or 
reducing conflicts and threats’. In addition to dealing with proliferation and terrorism, the 
document underlined the importance of ‘[reducing] the production of and flow to the United 
States of illegal drugs by means of DoD support to the joint interagency task forces operating 
along U.S. coasts and southern border’, and of the deployment of U.S. forces to maintain 
stability in relevant areas.
481
 Regarding this second objective, however, the QDR did not make 
any explicit reference to Mexico, neither established a connection between terrorism and WMD, 
nor did it define the kind of forces and actions that would be required to confront each potential 
threat. 
 The third assignment consisted in ‘deterring aggression and coercion’ in key areas of the 
world through ‘the peacetime deployment of U.S. forces abroad’; however, the QDR recognised 
that the military relevance of the U.S. nuclear arsenal had lessened, except to ‘deter aggression 
against the United States, its forces abroad, and its allies and friends’.482 
 One of the main criticisms to the series of objectives put forward by the QDR was that it 
created the impression of an overreliance on military means to confront non-military threats, as 
defined by the document itself. According to the National Defense Panel (NDP), for instance, the 
QDR did not properly consider the use of non-military means to advance its goals.
483
 The 
problem, therefore, was that the United States was excessively relying on military means to 
confront the new, post-Cold War security environment, in spite of its own recognition about the 
increasing salience of non-military threats.
484
 In this context, the application of military power 
could be not only costly, but also the cause of a ‘security dilemma’-type of situation.485 That is, 
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the emphasis on military means to confront the new international security environment meant 
basically reproducing the principles U.S. Cold War strategy had been based on.   
b) ‘Responding to the Full Spectrum of Crises’ 
Given that the effectiveness of efforts to influence the international security environment could 
not be taken for granted, the United States had to be prepared therefore to respond to a variety of 
challenges of different magnitude. For instance, the U.S. military had to be ready to operate in 
contexts demanding different kinds of responses, from ‘deterring aggression and coercion in 
crisis’, to ‘conducting smaller-scale contingency operations (SSCO)’, and to ‘fighting and 
winning major theater wars (MTW)’.486 This latter response was considered ‘the most stressing 
requirement for the U.S. military’, and it implied surpassing the military power of other states 
with objectives opposite to those of the United States.
487
 In terms of the post-Cold War 
security environment, one of the relevant criticisms of the QDR was its insistence on the two-war 
scenario as the framework for determining the size of U.S. armed forces. According to the report 
itself, 
As a global power with worldwide interests, it is imperative that the United States now 
and for the foreseeable future be able to deter and defeat large-scale, cross-border 




Such an ability was seen as ‘the sine qua non of a superpower and is essential to the credibility 
of our overall national security strategy’.489 
 By basically confirming the Bottom-Up-Review (BUR) framework,
490
 nevertheless, the 
QDR advocated the retention of Cold War force levels that defence experts considered excessive. 
It was argued, for instance, that ‘in most scenarios, probably less than half the U.S. force that 
was required for a Desert Storm-like conflict would suffice, because there was little chance that 
                                                 
486
 Based on recent experience and intelligence projections, the demand for these smaller-scale contingency 
operations was expected to remain high over the next 15 to 20 years. See Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense 
Review, Section III, pp.6-7. 
487




 Idem.  
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large forces would be needed in two places at once’.491 In a report issued in December 1997 in 
reference to the low probability of a two-war scenario, the NDP stated: 
The Panel views this two-military-theater-of-war construct as, in reality, a force-sizing 
function. We are concerned that, for some, this has become a means of justifying current 
forces. This approach focuses significant resources on a low-probability scenario, which 
consumes funds that could be used to reduce risk to our long-term security.
492
 
The NDP, therefore, pointed out to an implicit contradiction within the QDR: it emphasised the 
importance of platforms for a regular war, on the one hand, and it recognised that ‘asymmetric 
treats’ were an increasing concern, on the other hand.  
c) ‘Preparing Now for an Uncertain Future’ 
As established by the QDR, one important goal for the United States was to ‘maintain its military 
superiority in the face of evolving, as well as discontinuous, threats and challenges’.493 In 
particular, in order to sustain their dominance, U.S. forces were required to carry out both joint 




 There were several criticisms of this section of the document as well. Firstly, by equating 
supremacy with military power, the QDR retained the use of force as the essential factor of 
influence in the international context, which therefore basically reaffirmed the Cold War mind-
set.
495
 Secondly, the QDR report recommended maintaining the U.S. technological advantage 
over potential competitors. However, as shown in Table 3-3, in 1999 U.S. military spending was 
around 6 times more than that of Russia or China, the closest potential future ‘peer 
competitors’.496 
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Table 3-3. 1999 Military Spending (selected countries) 
Selected Countries  Military Budget 
United States   $288.8 billion 
Russia*    $55.0  
Japan    $41.1 
China*    $37.5 
United Kingdom  $34.6 
France    $29.5 
Germany   $24.7 
South Korea   $11.6 
Israel    $6.7 
Iran    $5.7 
Iraq    $1.4 
North Korea   $1.3 
* 1998 Funding.  
Source: Center for Defense Information (CDI), ‘Last Big Time Spenders: U.S. Military Budget Still the World’s 
Largest, and Growing’, [online] available: http://www.cdi.org/issues/wme/spendersFY00b.html (14/12/99), pp.1-2. 
 
In this context, critics considered it ‘foolish to focus concern and resources on preparations to 
meet a peer military competitor unless or until some potential competitor [began] spending 50% 
as much on defence as the United States’.497 It was suggested that a better alternative to protect 
against a future challenger was to maintain ‘a capacity for force reconstitution based on a strong 
training base, a powerful reserve, and a solid research and development establishment’.498 Third, 
an additional NDP criticism, a fundamental one, pointed out: 
…in the report there is insufficient connectivity between strategy on the one hand, and 
force structure, operational concepts, and procurement decisions on the other. This is 
important, since the QDR addresses an even greater array of challenges than we faced in 
the past with even fewer resources than were available four years ago.
499
 
A report issued by the then-General Accounting Office (GAO) also noted that the QDR had 
basically failed to identify a proper post-Cold War military structure, either because force 
requirements were not linked to the threat assessment, or because the latter was wrong.
500
 That 
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is, the QDR paid more attention to budget rather than to strategy matters.
501
 In the opinion of 
James Blaker,  
the Pentagon has opted to keep a slightly thinned out version of today’s force structure, 
replace the equipment that is now wearing out, add some big ticket new tactical aircraft 
buys -and hope that Congress will agree to cut reserve components and the support 
infrastructure enough to pay for it all.
502
  
Basically, the QDR did not reflect in its proposed structure the emerging asymmetric threats it 
itself defined, and instead opted for protecting against an uncertain potential peer competitor. 
The 9/11 events would prove that the threat assessment -if not the force requirements- was at 
least right. 
The review and analysis of the issues above was a necessary step to support the argument 
that in the 1990s the U.S. military strategy was focused on managing the military transition to a 
post-Cold War security environment without really paying much attention to Mexico as an actual 
or potential security concern. That is, Mexico played a negligible role regarding the main 
military issues under discussion (i.e. regional scenarios beyond the Western Hemisphere and 
military technology) in the United States in the 1990s. Furthermore, the three objectives 
described above defined the essence of the U.S. defence strategy. Since these elements derived 
from the broader national security strategy, they represented the link between the defence and the 
national security strategies.
503
 That is, the defence strategy had to fulfil the military requirements 
established by the national security outlook. Analysis will, at a later point, turn to that broader 
national security strategy.   
 
3.4.2. Mexico as a Military Variable  
Shaping, responding and preparing were the three central missions established by the 1997 U.S. 
defence strategy, and this section will analyse Mexico’s significance in relation to each one of 
them.  
In terms of the three goals outlined by the QDR, Mexico was of no relevance within the 
‘responding’ and ‘preparing’ missions. Mexico, therefore, was important only to the extent that 
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‘shaping’ the international environment required addressing the flow of drugs through the U.S. 
southern border, as mentioned above. Firstly, one of the stated purposes of shaping the 
international security environment was ‘to promote regional stability’ where the United States 
had important interests to protect. Regarding this aspect of the strategy, it must be noted that 
while Mexico’s geographic location has been a key factor for U.S. national security planning, the 
country has not been a regional threat because it has not had any outstanding territorial claim, 
nor has it been engaged in any menacing border dispute or resource competition with either the 
United States or, for that matter, with its two neighbours to the south. As a matter of fact, the 
IBWC has proven to be so far a long-standing bi-national institution (it celebrated its 120
th
 
Anniversary in 2009) that has successfully dealt with demarcation and resource issues over the 
years. Yet, Mexico and the United States have shared a concern over access to un-contaminated 
water in several areas along their common border.
504
 
 Furthermore, because of its historical experience, Mexico’s international posture has for 
long been essentially defensive, and it has been focused on protecting the nation’s territorial 
integrity and sovereignty against foreign challenges.
505
 Mexico has promoted its national 
interests by relying on International Law, and in fact its principles have been incorporated in its 
Constitution.
506
 This posture has been the best defence for a weak country, and it has made 
Mexican foreign policy both respectable and predictable in the international arena. For these 
reasons, Mexican foreign policy has been marked by a high degree of continuity in what is best 
described as a ‘state policy’ in contrast to a ‘government policy’, this latter defined by the group 
in power rather than by long-term national objectives.
507
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Mexico has not been party to any hostile alliance to the United States either. With 
exception of the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (ITRA), Mexico has in 
fact avoided participation in military coalitions. Its involvement in the Rio Pact itself was more 
symbolic than real, and the country has consistently opposed participating in any kind of 
multilateral military force, even within the framework of ‘a treaty that [lacked] substance’ such 
as the Rio Pact.
508
 The weakening of this pact became evident after the 1982 Malvinas/Falklands 
War when the United States supported the United Kingdom, a NATO member, instead of 
Argentina in that conflict. The obsolescence of the treaty was actually one of the arguments 
advanced by Mexico to justify its withdrawal from ITRA on 6 September 2002. 
 Secondly, Mexico has not been a concern for the United States in terms of ‘preventing or 
reducing military conflicts and threats’. The reason is that the country has not been engaged in 
any WMD and delivery systems development programme; its government has not been an active 
supporter of terrorism –it has not appeared on the DoS list of countries supporting terrorism or 
on that of countries characterised as ‘safe havens’; nor has it possessed the technological 
platforms to conduct cyber warfare against the United States.
509
 Mexico had a tangential military 
significance for the United States within the 1997 QDR only to the extent that the U.S. military 
was required to help ‘[reducing] the production and flow to the United States of illegal drugs by 
means of DoD support to the joint interagency task forces operating along [U.S.] coasts and 
southern border’, even though Mexico was not directly addressed, as mentioned above.510 
Furthermore, it can be argued that drug trafficking emerged not as a military issue but as a law 
enforcement one from the U.S. point of view. Counter-narcotics operations may involve the 
military -under particular circumstances (such as when drug cartels challenge the authority of the 
state)-, but this is different.  
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 The last element of DoD’s proposed contribution to a stable international context 
consisted in ‘deterring aggression and coercion in key regions of the world’.511 Mexico again has 
not been an issue for the United States in this respect basically because of the overwhelming U.S. 
military power relative to that of its neighbour to the south. Moreover, the United States has had 
a stake in Mexico’s security given the country’s proximity and the damage its instability could 
potentially inflict on U.S. interests. According to Dziedzic, 
Mexico automatically falls within the security umbrella of its northern neighbor since an 
assault on its territory would undoubtedly be treated as a precursor to attack on the United 
States itself. Mexico consequently enjoys the benefits of a de facto alliance without its 
attendant obligations. This, coupled with a dearth of serious external threats, has 




Although the statement above is essentially correct, it is important to note that Mexico’s main 
‘external threat’ has historically been the United States itself. However, Mexico’s singular 
geopolitical situation does explain why its military budget has traditionally been one of the 
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Table 3-4. Military Spending in Latin America shown as % of GDP (selected countries) 
The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (1989-1998) 
Country  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997  
Argentina  1.7 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.2 
Bolivia   1.8 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.9 
Brazil   1.7 1.3 0.7 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.8 
Chile   2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 
Colombia  1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.7 1.8 2.3 --- 
Costa Rica  0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.6 
El Salvador  2.9 2.7 2.4 2.0 1.5 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.9 
Guatemala  1.6 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.0 0.9 0.8 
Honduras  2.4 2.2 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1 0.9 
Mexico   0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Nicaragua  6.5 2.1 2.8 2.3 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.4 
Paraguay  1.2 1.2 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 --- 
Peru   1.9 2.0 1.5 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.3 --- 
Uruguay  2.4 2.4 1.8 2.3 1.8 2.5 1.6 1.5 1.4 
Venezuela  2.2 2.0 1.5 1.3 1.7 1.3 1.4 0.8 1.1 
  
Source: SIPRI, The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, [online] available: 
http://www.sipri.se:8020/IRSIS/owa/milex_retrieve (23/03/00), several pages. According to data from the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, in 1998 and 1999 Mexico’s defence expenditure in terms of its GDP was 
0.9%, which was a figure that departed from the trend showed by SIPRI. In absence of a significant increase in the 
Mexican military budget in 1998, both estimates show a clear disparity between them. See International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2000-2001, (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.300. 
According to SIPRI data, in 2010 Mexico spent $4.86 billion dollars on its armed forces, equivalent to 0.4% of its 
GDP, basically the same proportion as 20 years before. See P. Garibian, ‘Analysis: Mexico needs more defense 
spending to fight cartels’, Reuters, May 26, 2011, [online] available: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/26/us-
mexico-defense-idUSTRE74P7R420110526 (22/06/11).   
 
This low profile of the Mexican armed forces means the country has not considered military 
power a fundamental aspect of its external relations.
513
 As a reflection of its foreign policy, 
Mexico’s military policy has not been oriented towards deterring a specific foreign threat. Yet, 
its armed forces have always had well-defined duties and precepts.
514
 On the one hand, their 
responsibility, established in the Constitution, has been to protect the sovereignty and the 
stability of the country.
515
 On the other hand, their principles have defined three main 
undertakings both of an internal and an external nature, notwithstanding that the latter kind of 
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missions has not been the norm.
516
 Because Mexico has not faced challenges to its territorial 
integrity since the 19
th
 century, the country has not been under pressure to develop a traditional 
defence policy; that is, one oriented towards deterring an external aggressor. In this sense, even 
in terms of the domestic context, Mexico’s armed forces in the 1990s were small in relation to its 
territory, population, and economic output,
517
 and they have remained the same. 
Another U.S. defence objective to influence the international environment was the 
promotion of co-operative and stable military relations in order to advance U.S. interests.
518
  
Regarding this goal, two important points are in order. Firstly, if it is true that in principle 
NAFTA was only a trade pact, it is also true it has entailed political consequences such as the 
imperative of a closer security co-operation between the two countries. That is, to the extent that 
trade interests have brought the United States and Mexico closer together, to that extent it has 
become increasingly difficult for their political interests to differ. In the opinion of John 
Negroponte, for instance, ‘from a foreign policy perspective, an FTA [free trade agreement] 
would institutionalize acceptance of a North American orientation to Mexico’s foreign policy’.519 
According to a similar view, ‘for a document that does not explicitly mention security matters, 
NAFTA is nevertheless replete with implications for regional security cooperation’.520 These 
opinions are related to the idea that the higher the economic stakes in the bilateral relationship, 
the higher the pressure to maintain Mexico’s stability, as noted above.521 Integration within 
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NAFTA, thus, created the context for increasing security co-operation between the United States 
and Mexico from a regional perspective.
522
  
 Secondly, the specific expression of this new atmosphere of ‘co-operation’ has been 
Mexico’s apparent willingness to increase its military collaboration with its neighbour to the 
north. Although military contacts between the United States and Mexico had not been extensive -
due to a history of U.S. interventionism-, they have nonetheless gradually increased, and one of 
the prime areas for bilateral co-operation has been the so-called ‘war on drugs’.523 
Taking into account the political-military context described above, the significance of 
Mexico for the two additional elements of the U.S. defence strategy, responding and preparing, 
was imperceptible. Both aspects were oriented towards confronting threats such as the potential 
use of WMD and the emergence of a ‘peer competitor’. From the range of responses the U.S. 
armed forces could be called in to perform, from ‘deterring aggression and coercion in crises’, to 
‘conducting SSCO (small-scale contingency operations)’, and ‘fighting and winning a major 
regional war’, the second one could be the most likely form of involvement in relation to 
Mexico. This could happen in the context of a deep instability in the country, which could 
require the U.S. army to seal the U.S. Southwest border in order to stop a significant flow of 
immigrants. In reference to this serious prospect, Schulz noted:  
But as important as Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela are to U.S. security interests, they 
pale beside Mexico. Few countries are more vital to the well-being of the United States 
than its neighbor to the south. Not only is Mexico our second largest trading partner, but 
the two countries share a 2,000-mile boundary. Any serious political and economic 
turmoil below the Rio Grande River [sic] is almost certain to spillover the border in the 
form of illegal immigrants, political refugees, narcotrafficking, violence and corruption.
524
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Another potential scenario could be the need to secure access to Mexican oil by force, in the 
context of a simultaneous international oil crisis and deep instability in Mexico. A scenario such 
as this shows why Mexican stability is a high priority for U.S. national security. 
It is interesting to note that in the QDR threat assessment the ‘uncontrolled flows of 
migrants’, with the potential to destabilise regions of the world, was considered to put at risk 
U.S. interests and citizens.
525
 Nevertheless, nowhere in the entire document was there any 
reference to undocumented immigration from Mexico as a specific trans-border concern to the 
United States, notwithstanding DoD’s indirect participation in immigration matters in support of 
LEAs assigned to securing U.S. borders and ports of entry (POEs). 
 In the whole QDR there was not a single direct reference to Mexico, and there was only 
one to the ‘southern border’ in allusion to drug trafficking, as mentioned above. Although 
Mexico’s military importance for the United States has been limited, trans-border security 
concerns emanating from that country have had the potential to affect the well-being of the U.S. 
society. Mexico’s military significance was, therefore, only tangential for the United States, and 
related to the support the U.S. military must provide to civilian agencies confronting trans-border 
security concerns. 
 
3.5. U.S. National Security Strategy 
The objective of this section is to analyse the 1997 A National Security Strategy for A New 
Century that is the basis for this thesis, in order to identify the issues Mexico is of relevance for 
the United States in the context of this more comprehensive strategy, on which the 1997 QDR 
was based on. 
 
3.5.1. ‘Selective Engagement’ 
The 1997 U.S. national security strategy identified a variety of threats to the United States as a 
global power. They were classified into three categories as ‘regional or state-centred’; 
‘transnational’; and those related to ‘weapons of mass destruction’.526 
In order to protect U.S. interests from these threats, the strategy emphasised an outward-
looking orientation recognising the need for the United States to remain engaged abroad:  
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By exerting leadership abroad we can make America safer and more prosperous –by 
deterring aggression, fostering the resolution of conflicts, opening foreign markets, 
strengthening democracies, and tackling global problems. Without our leadership and 
engagement, threats would multiply and our opportunities will narrow. Our strategy 
recognises a simple truth: we must lead abroad if we are to be secure at home, but we 
cannot lead abroad unless we are strong at home.
527
 
According to this view, the process of globalisation had blurred the line between foreign and 
domestic politics, and in this context the strategy of engagement was designed to mitigate the 
negative effects of globalisation.
528
 The 1997 document explained, however, not only why 
engagement was important, but also justified the promotion of both international co-operation 
and a more efficient government response to the prospective challenges.
529
 
 A crucial point of the U.S. national security strategy, nevertheless, was its recognition 
that U.S. resources were limited, which therefore required a ‘selective’ response to the 
challenges by focusing on those most threatening to U.S. interests, 
Our resources are finite, however, so we must be selective in our responses, focusing 




In this context, it has been argued that ‘selective engagement’ was a ‘realist’ strategic outlook 
basically concerned with preventing war among the ‘great powers’.531 Within this framework, for 
instance, one of the most important U.S. objectives was preventing nuclear proliferation in 
‘rogue’ states such as Iran, Iraq and North Korea.532 In fact, the need to maintain stability in key 
regions of the world was the justification for retaining the two-war military capability proposed 
in the QDR report discussed above.
533
 
Selective engagement was therefore a deterrent strategy whose expression in the QDR 
was the need to maintain a forward presence in order to shape the international environment.
534
 
Nevertheless, the strategy also presented several problems, and the most significant was its focus 
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on the ‘great powers’, rather than on the source of various trans-national threats defined by the 





The 1997 A National Security Strategy for A New Century defined three main lines of action to 
promote and defend U.S. interests in the new era: ‘to enhance [U.S.] security; ‘to bolster 
America’s economic prosperity’; and ‘to promote democracy abroad’.536 From the U.S. 
perspective, these goals were closely interrelated to the extent that none of them could be 
achieved in isolation from the others.
537
 
 The first core objective, increasing security, required an efficient combination of the U.S. 
instruments of power in order to advance national security and international stability through 
diplomacy, among other means, as the ‘first line of defense against threats to national and 
international security’.538 The document noted: 
Our response might be diplomatic, economic, law enforcement or military in nature –or, 
more likely, some combination of the above. We must use the most appropriate tool or 
combination of tools –acting in alliance or partnership when our interests are shared by 
others, but unilaterally when compelling national interests so demand.
539
 
From the U.S. point of view, this combination of instruments would facilitate the response to 





 In 1998, for instance, DoS reorganised its structures and methods to address the 
new requirements through better interagency co-ordination, budget reforms, enhancing 
technology and by working closely with the private sector, among other measures.
541
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 The second core objective, strengthening the economy, acknowledged the link between 
U.S. economic and security interests, and also the fact that a healthy economy was a precondition 
for gaining leverage abroad.
542
 In this context, some of the most important steps to promote 
prosperity consisted of increasing access to foreign markets and promoting energy security.
543
 
The strategy, however, did not explain how the only superpower could be expected to 
devote substantial resources to economic development abroad, especially in the absence of the 
competition-oriented motivation provided by the Cold War. An interesting argument pointed out, 
for instance, that ‘as U.S. and former Soviet interest in stabilising political elites in the periphery 
faded [after the Cold War], economic assistance was expected to decline’, mainly because of 
Russia’s economic problems.544  
 The third core objective was to advance political freedom and human rights abroad, 
taking into consideration that democratic transitions in the world were seen as positive 
developments for the United States.
545
 The document failed to specify, however, how this goal 
was supposed to be accomplished without the instability democratic transitions usually bring 
about. It thus ignored the view that countries on the path to democracy ‘usually go through a 
rocky transition, where mass politics mixes with authoritarian elite politics in a volatile way’.546 
What the United States proposed in this section of the strategy was an integrated approach to the 




The document also established the importance of human rights and of sanctions against 
those who did not adopt this international standard.
548
 Finally, this objective also included to 
promote co-operation with other states to ‘curb illegal immigration into the United States’.549 
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3.5.3. Mexico as a Security Variable 
In contrast to the U.S. defence strategy that focused on the military dimension of security, in the 
broader context of the U.S. national security strategy Mexico was directly addressed in several 
occasions. Its relevance derived not only from the impact of trans-border threats emerging from 
its territory, but also from the value of its stability, long-term economic potential and 
significance as a reliable source of energy. Within this broader framework, Mexico’s importance 
for the United States was determined thus not only by challenges but also by opportunities. 
Analysing the U.S. national security strategy was useful in explaining why Mexico, a medium 
range power, was important for the United States in the 1990s. Mexico’s relevance for the 
United States, therefore, will be examined in terms of the three core objectives established by the 
U.S. national security strategy, as mentioned above. 
 
a) Enhancing Security 
According to the 1997 U.S. national security strategy, in the new international environment the 
United States was exposed to three different categories of threats. The one in which Mexico was 
significant was that of ‘transnational’ issues, in particular in reference to drug trafficking. 
Besides this latter issue, this category included terrorism, arms smuggling, international 
organised crime, refugee flows, and environmental damage (at no point was undocumented 
immigration mentioned here).
550
   
In this context, Mexico was directly addressed in the document in relation to drugs, in 
reference to the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy and its objective of reducing the flow of 
drugs through the ‘transit zone’ that included Mexico.551 It is important to point out that this 
reference is thus about Mexico as a ‘transit’ point, not as a producer country. An additional 
reference to Mexico in this regard was found in ‘The Western Hemisphere’ section within 
Chapter III ‘Integrated Regional Approaches’ which established that, 
as part of our comprehensive partnership with Mexico, we continue to increase 
counterdrug and law enforcement cooperation, while in the Caribbean we are 
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The document established that, in order to confront these non-state challenges, 
international co-operation ‘[would] be vital for building security in the next century’; the 
document, however, did not rule out the possibility of acting unilaterally, if necessary.
553
 Despite 
the evident asymmetry of power between the two countries, and the higher margin of manoeuvre 
for the United States, it is important to recognise that the promotion of bilateral co-operation 
with Mexico has been essential for the United States, and this points to the relevance of efforts to 
strengthening its domestic institutions and to dealing with corruption and money laundering.
554 
From the variety of threats listed above, the most relevant to the U.S.-Mexico security 
relationship was drug trafficking where Mexico was explicitly addressed as a ‘transit’ point. 
Even though the document addressed within this section environmental issues from a global 
rather than from a bilateral perspective, this thesis analyses water pollution below as a significant 
potential security challenge on the U.S.-Mexico border in order to explain, from the Buzan et.al 
and Risk Society perspectives, why this item has remained a potential rather than an actual 
security concern within de bilateral agenda, in contrast to the more explicit concern about drugs 
and the implicit concern about undocumented immigration from the U.S. point of view. The 
justification for including border environmental issues in this study, therefore, does not reside in 
the 1997 U.S. national security strategy as in the case of drug trafficking and undocumented 
immigration, but in the importance of explaining why a potential security concern on the 
common border has been kept from becoming an actual security issue, in order to assess the 
contribution of the two complementary non-traditional security perspectives adopted in this 
thesis to understand the U.S.-Mexico security relationship.  
 
Drug Trafficking 
As will be discussed in more detail in a subsequent chapter, according to 2001 data (the closest 
available for the second half of the 1990s), the number of people age 12 years and older in the 
United States who had used an illicit drug during the month immediately prior to an official 
survey interview was 15.9 million, which provided an idea of the magnitude of drug demand in 
                                                 
553
 Ibid., p.13. 
554





 On the supply side of the problem, and also in reference to U.S. official 
figures, Mexico was the origin of 50-70% of cocaine, 80% of marijuana, 20-30% of heroin and 




According to DEA’s reports, the U.S. Southwest border was the major gateway for 
approximately 70% of all illicit drugs entering the United States.
557
 Mexican DTOs, in particular, 
were deemed to pose ‘the greatest challenge to U.S. law enforcement agencies charged with 
enforcing narcotics laws’.558 These organisations have not only undermined the well-being of 
U.S. society by supplying drugs; they have also weakened Mexico’s political stability because of 
their access to financial resources and arms -both of which originate within the United States-, 
and their ability to subvert the authority of the state. Viewing the problem in light of the supply-
demand dynamic, in his May 1997 visit to Mexico President Clinton stated: 
Drugs are not simply a Mexican problem or an American problem –they are our common 
problem. The enormous demand for drugs in America must be stemmed. We have just a 
little less than five percent of the world’s population –yet, we consume one third of the 
world’s cocaine, most of which comes from Mexico. The money we spend on illegal 
drugs fuels narco-traffickers who, in turn, attack your police and prosecutors and prey on 
your institutions. We must face this curse together, because we cannot defeat it alone. My 
friends, the battle against drugs must unite our people, not divide them.
559
    
From the U.S. perspective, therefore, both countries played a part in addressing this challenge, 
especially because of the potential for organised crime to exploit increased exchanges between 
the two countries in the context of NAFTA.
560
 This is why the U.S. National Drug Control 
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 One of the problems of the U.S. ‘comprehensive’ response to drug trafficking, 
nevertheless, has been that it has emphasised coercive measures in detriment of addiction 
treatment.
562
 In 1999, for instance, the U.S. anti-drug policy was supported by a $17.9 billion 
budget proposal that tilted the scale in favour of supply- over demand-reduction measures, as 
shown in Table 3-5. 
 
Table 3-5. U.S. Anti-Drug Budget (1999) 
Spending by Strategy Goal, FY1999 (millions of dollars) 
      Enacted Supp*  Total 
1. Reduce youth drug use  2,080.6  1.7  2,082.3 
2. Reduce drug related crime  7,441.0  12.0  7,453.0 
3. Reduce consequences  3,383.7  0.0  3,383.7  
4. Shield air, land, and sea frontiers 2,159.3  525.9  2,685.2 
5. Reduce sources of supply  1,977.7  304.3  2,282.0 
Total     17,042.3 843.9  17,886.2 
 
* Emergency Supplemental funding provided by P. L. 105-277. These funds were in addition to each department’s 
annual appropriation. Source: The White House, The National Drug Control Strategy: 1999, Office of National 
Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), Washington, DC, p.91. According to the figures above, 69.4% of the budget 
($12,420.2) was assigned to supply-reduction activities, while 30.6% ($5,446.0) was devoted to prevention and 
treatment.  
 
This strategy was complemented by an International Crime Strategy that also underlined the 
supply part of the problem by proposing actions that included border security initiatives; the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law enforcement; increasing international co-operation on 
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intelligence; and protecting international trade from criminal organisations, among other 
measures.
563
            
Even though the U.S. response to drug trafficking emphasised the application of coercive 
measures abroad, it can be argued that in the case of Mexico it included an additional interest in 
the country’s fight against pervasive corruption which, in general, has been considered ‘an 
extreme example of the weakness of the state in many developing countries’.564 From this 
perspective, combating drug trafficking in Mexico represented more than just stopping the flow 
of drugs into the United States; it was also about avoiding a vacuum of power in Mexico to be 




The relevance of drug trafficking for the United States was also assessed in terms of 
opinion polls conducted in the 1990s. For instance, the closest available poll to the 1990s 
conducted between August-September 2000, established that 43% of people in the United States 
considered drugs an ‘extremely serious’ problem and 40% a ‘very serious’ problem; a poll 
carried out in 1997 established that 46% of the population considered the nation had lost much 
ground in coping with illegal drugs, in contrast to 31% who considered the opposite, while in 
August 1995 only 25% of the population supported the legalisation of marijuana against 73% 
who opposed it.
 566
   
 
Environmental Degradation 
The U.S. national security strategy recognised that environmental threats did not respect national 
borders. While conflict was identified as the major threat caused by natural resource scarcities, 
danger to human health was a greater concern when it came to climate change, ozone depletion 
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and the trans-national movement of dangerous chemicals.
567
 In response to these 




 Even though Mexico was not addressed at all in this section of the 1997 document, there 
has been in fact an environmental agenda in U.S.-Mexican relations focusing primarily on the 
effects of increasing economic activity along the common border. Industrial expansion has 
affected air quality and water resources, as well as health conditions and the ecology on both 
sides of the border. It has been common for hazardous waste to be stored in U.S. border cities -
with the potential to affect communities on the other side of the boundary-, and water pollution 
problems have intensified as the demand for infrastructure has exceeded its availability.
569
 This 
happened as border population has constantly grown. As will be discussed below, this thesis will 
focus on water pollution as a potential security concern on the U.S. border with Mexico, which 
on the other hand represents an issue that has remained as a potential rather than an actual 
security concern, as mentioned above. This issue, therefore, is an example of how the Buzan et.al 
analytical framework and Risk Society theory contribute to explain not only issues that are 
security concerns but also those that are dealt with through non-security measures. This is the 
justification for including the environment in the analysis of security issues in U.S.-Mexican 
relations in the 1990s.   
  
b) Bolstering Prosperity 
The second core objective of the U.S. national security strategy was to strengthening the U.S. 
economy. According to the document, exports were important to sustain U.S. economic 
growth.
570
 Moreover, the strategy established that because of the high level of integration of the 
world’s economy, the United States could not detach itself from the external environment and, 
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In 1999, five years after NAFTA entered into force, the agreement had already created a market 
of 400 million consumers, with a combined GDP of $9.5 trillion.
572
 As mentioned above, for the 
United States NAFTA was a response to the creation of economic blocs in other parts of the 
world; in the particular case of Mexico, the agreement represented the opportunity to secure its 
continued access to the U.S. market. According to the U.S. national security strategy, NAFTA 
not only increased U.S. exports to Mexico, but also, and more importantly, ‘it helped stabilise 
Mexico through its worst [1995] financial crisis in modern history’.573 This was the second time 
Mexico was directly addressed in the U.S. national security strategy document, this time not 
necessarily as challenge but as an opportunity. In this sense, the Clinton administration noted: 
NAFTA [would] continue to fulfill the best interests of the U.S. economy and American 
workers. It has kept Mexico on track toward more open markets for U.S. exports, and 
supported Mexican efforts to sustain internal economic reform.
574
 
Similarly, according to its advocates, NAFTA not only had the potential to support U.S. job 
growth by helping to strengthen the U.S. export sector, but also provided the potential for 
Mexico to become more prosperous, thus reducing the need for people there to illegally migrate 
to the United States.
575
 According to President Clinton, 
As the benefits of economic growth are spread in Mexico to working people what will 
happen? They’ll have more disposable income to buy more American products and there 
will be less illegal immigration because more Mexicans will be able to support their 
children by staying home. This is a very important thing.
576
 
It is worth mentioning that NAFTA’s main objective was never to reduce undocumented 
immigration from Mexico per se. However, to the extent that in the long-term the accord was 
seen as having the potential to strengthen the Mexican economy, to that extent it was considered 
it would address this issue. NAFTA was also seen as essential to U.S. leadership in the 
hemisphere after the Cold War, especially because the United States had basically no other 
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coherent policy towards Latin America at that time. Overall, the free trade agreement with 
Mexico was a benefit to U.S. national security rather than a risk.   
 
Energy Security 
According to the 1997 U.S. national security strategy, 40% of U.S. energy demand depended on 
oil; in turn, approximately half of U.S. oil requirements were satisfied with imports from the 
Persian Gulf area.
577
 Nevertheless, the document noted: 
However, we are also undergoing a fundamental shift in our reliance on imported oil 
away from the Middle East. Venezuela is now the number one foreign supplier to the 
United States; Canada, Mexico and Venezuela combined supply more than twice as much 
oil to the United States as the Arab OPEC [Organisation of Petroleum Exporter 




This was the third time the U.S. national security strategy made a direct reference to Mexico, this 
time again in terms of opportunity. The document recognised the increasing importance of future 
access to foreign oil because of a potential decline in domestic production. The United States, 
therefore, would continue to have a vital interest in ensuring access to external sources of 
petroleum, notwithstanding parallel efforts to develop alternative energy projects.
579
 
 In these circumstances, promoting stability in oil-producing areas remained an important 
objective, and therefore the significance of Mexico for the United States resided in its potential 
role as a secure source of oil just across the border, especially in the context of a potential crisis 
in the Middle East. According to 1998 DoE statistics, for instance, differences among Canada, 
Mexico and Venezuela in terms of the value of crude oil imports were not substantial; as a matter 
of fact, as a supplier Mexico was second only to Canada.
580
 That year, in Latin America, Mexico 
was the main non-OPEC oil exporter to the United States with 15.16% (482,252,000 barrels) of 
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total U.S. imports (3,177,584,000 barrels), while Venezuela supplied 15.81% (502,552,000 
barrels) of that total.
581
 That is, the difference between Mexico’s share of U.S. oil imports and 
that of the only Latin American OPEC-member was not a substantial one. In this case, Mexico 
was also an asset for the United States in terms of its national security strategy. 
 
c) Promoting Democracy 
Emerging Democracies 
The document established that promoting democracy, human rights and free markets abroad was 
a priority for the United States. In the Western Hemisphere, in particular, it was important to deal 
with corruption and political discontent through ‘good governance practices’.582 
 Even though in this entire section the document did not mention Mexico at all, it is 
important to underline a couple of points in this regard. First, during the signing ceremony of 
NAFTA’s side agreements, for instance, former President Jimmy Carter stated: 
And Mexico has a long way to go to have a truly honest democratic election. But I think 
the single most important factor that will (bring) [sic] democracy and honest elections to 
our next-door neighbor is to have NAFTA approved and implemented. If this is done, then 
I believe that we will have rich dividends for our own country.
583
 
Notwithstanding President Carter’s statement, it is important to note that democracy in Mexico 
had not been a priority for the United States -especially during the Cold War-, because of the 
more pre-eminent U.S. objective of supporting the Mexican authoritarian regime in order to 
maintain the stability of the country.
584
 The end of the bipolar confrontation, nevertheless, had 
the effect of increasing U.S. pronouncements in favour of democracy in Mexico. However, the 
U.S. rhetoric was not echoed by concrete policies because the Mexican stability factor was still 
important within the new international context. Even though it is possible to argue that 
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democracy contributes to stability in the long-term, a more important U.S. objective in Mexico 
was of an economic nature.
585
 
That is, aside from the crucial stability factor during the post-war period, U.S. policy 
towards Mexico was in fact dominated by economic considerations, before the 9/11 events 
brought security at the top of the bilateral agenda. The U.S. attitude towards Mexico’s 
commitment to democracy and human rights, in general, was conditioned by the more 
preeminent objective of fostering a liberal economic system and stemming its social impact.
586
 
Furthermore, the 2 July 2000 election in Mexico assuaged any concern the United States might 
have had regarding Mexico’s transition to democracy, even though this subject was not central in 
the context of bilateral dialogue. 
The promotion of sound civil-military relations was an additional U.S. objective in order 
to promote democracy around the world.
587
 Regarding this issue, it is important to mention that 
Mexico has had a long-standing tradition of civilian control over the military, which was 
confirmed precisely by the Mexican armed forces’ submission to the opposition party that won 
the presidency for the first time in 71 years in July of 2000.
588
 In this context, U.S. efforts to 
present U.S. civil-military relations as a role model for militaries in emerging democracies has 
not had a significant impact on Mexico. 
 
Undocumented Immigration 
It is remarkable that this issue was not included by the 1997 U.S. national security strategy 
within its list of ‘transnational’ threats. It was addressed, instead, under the ‘Humanitarian 
Assistance’ section of the document, which is part of chapter II ‘Advancing U.S. Interests’.  
Within the section of reference, the document noted that efforts needed to be directed at 
dealing with refugees and displaced people. The section also affirmed the importance of co-
operating with other states to ‘curb illegal immigration’ into the United States.589 This reference 
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to undocumented immigration is one of only two to be found in the entire document; one 
additional reference was found in the section titled ‘The Western Hemisphere’ within chapter III 
‘Integrated Regional Approaches’. In this latter section, the document established that, 
the principal security concerns in the hemisphere are transnational in nature, such as 
drug trafficking, organised crime, and money laundering, illegal immigration and 
instability generated from corruption and political and social conflict.
590
 
Nowhere in the rest of the entire document, however, was there another allusion to this issue, nor 
did it make any explicit reference to Mexico at all. 
It is important to note, however, that Mexico has not only been at the centre of the 
undocumented immigration concern, but also that the issue has been one of the most sensitive 
and outstanding in the context of the U.S.-Mexico bilateral agenda. 
According to 1996 estimates provided by the then-INS, for instance, there were about 5 
million undocumented immigrants in the United States.
591
 Mexico was the leading country of 
origin of undocumented immigrants with 2.7 million or 54% of the total.
592
 Mexico was also 
identified as a transit point for third-country nationals attempting to enter the United States, as 
well as the destination country for other migrants.
593
 
Undocumented immigration from Mexico has been a complex issue that has not lent itself 
to easy solutions. One important explanation, as will be discussed below, has been the operation 
of push and pull factors, as well as the existence of an income gap that NAFTA has not 
addressed so far. In the short- and long-term, therefore, push and pull factors between the two 
countries are likely to continue, and cross-border social networks are also likely to perpetuate 
immigration even if the income gap narrows in the future. 
Because of its dimension and its emotional nature, undocumented immigration from 
Mexico has been both a tacit and an explicit security issue for the United States (especially after 
the 9/11 events), even though its 1997 U.S. national security strategy did not explicitly link 
Mexico to this issue. Immigration in general, nevertheless, was a relevant issue for U.S. public 
opinion in the 1990s as shown in Table 3-6. 
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Table 3-6. Sample of U.S. Opinion Polls on Immigration in the 1990s.  
Poll Opinion on Immigration 
Wall Street Journal/NBC News, December 1998 72% feel ‘immigration should not increase because it will cost 
U.S. jobs and increase unemployment’ 
Horatio Alger Association, August 1996 67% of teens feel illegal immigration to the U.S. should be 
reduced 
NPG/Roper Poll, February 1996 83% of Americans favour a lower level of immigration 
CBS News/NYT, September 1995 63% of Americans think immigration levels were too high 
Time/CNN, September 1993 80% consider it important for the federal government to track 
down illegal aliens living in the United States 
Newsweek, July 1993 60% feel that immigration is a bad thing for this country 
[United States] now  
CNN/USA Today/Gallup, July 1993 89% of Hispanic Americans strongly support an immediate 
moratorium on immigration 
 
Source: Negative Population Growth (NPG), Immigration Polls: Why doesn’t Congress Listen to the American 
People, [online] available: http://www.npg.org/facts/immpolls.htm (25/08/12).  
 
3.6. Conclusions 
After reviewing the U.S. defence strategy, based on the guidelines provided by the 1997 QDR 
report, Mexico did not appear to be a priority for the United States in strict military terms. 
In the military strategy document, the closest indirect reference to Mexico was the 
directive for U.S. armed forces to support LEAs operating along the U.S. Southwest border 
through the provision of intelligence and infrastructure assets to forestall trans-national threats, 
specifically drug trafficking. In this context, even though Mexico was nowhere addressed in a 
direct way in the whole QDR, its relevance in terms of the U.S. defence strategy was only 
tangential and related to the support the U.S. military must provide to civilian agencies dealing 
with security issues at the common border. The United States, nevertheless, has emphasised 
military-type of responses to drug trafficking abroad, even though the U.S. military’s role itself 
in confronting this challenge has been rather circumscribed. 
 When examination turned to the broader 1997 A National Security Strategy for A New 
Century, in particular to the analysis of its strategic objectives, it was then possible to appreciate 
the full extent of Mexico’s relevance for U.S. national security. First, in terms of ‘enhancing 
security’, Mexico represented a concern regarding trans-national threats, especially drug 
trafficking, and the country was even explicitly mentioned twice in this regard. Even though 
Mexico has also been central in terms of undocumented immigration, it is important to note that 
the country was not addressed at all in relation to this concern. Nevertheless, as mentioned 
above, this study analyses this issue because of Mexico, by default, has been at the centre of the 
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U.S. security concern, even though it was not openly recognised by the 1997 U.S. national 
security strategy. 
Among other issues of a trans-national nature identified by the U.S. national security 
strategy, this study also addressed the environment as one of the issues with potential security 
ramifications on the U.S.-Mexico border, even though this region was neither mentioned in this 
regard nor Mexico for that matter. The justification for addressing this issue in this analysis, 
nevertheless, was to explain that not all challenges on the U.S.-Mexico border are necessarily 
actual security concerns because some of them, such as the environment, have been dealt with by 
the two countries through co-operation. The Buzan et.al analytical framework and Risk society 
Theory make a relevant contribution to the explanation of this fact. 
On the subject of ‘bolstering prosperity’, Mexico stood out as an important partner to 
promote free trade in the rest of the hemisphere through NAFTA’s demonstration effect; it was 
also significant as a reliable source of oil just across the border. 
In terms of ‘promoting democracy’, undocumented immigration was addressed within the 
‘Humanitarian Assistance’ section and, later on in the document, within ‘The Western 
Hemisphere’ section that was part of chapter III ‘Integrated Regional Approaches’. There, the 
issue was defined as one of the main security concerns of a trans-national nature, but no details 
were given as to why this is so. Mexico, however, was directly addressed at no point within 
either section as discussed above. This study, nevertheless, included the analysis of 
undocumented immigration to the United States because of Mexico’s evident impact on this 
subject.  
Taking into account the three strategic objectives, in sum, while Mexico represented 
opportunities for the United States in terms of trade, energy, and support for democracy in the 
rest of the hemisphere because of its membership in NAFTA, it represented an explicit concern 
in terms of drug trafficking, and implicitly in terms of undocumented immigration. Within the 
document, Mexico was explicitly mentioned only in relation to drug trafficking: it was neither 
addressed in terms of undocumented immigration, nor in terms of the environment, 
notwithstanding that the latter issue has had potential border security ramifications. Therefore, 
even though references to Mexico were absent from the discussion of relevant items such as 
undocumented immigration and the environment within the 1997 U.S. national security strategy, 
it is important to mention that this country has influenced in a significant way both issues 
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because of its geographical proximity. Nevertheless, the risks the United States identified -
explicit and implicit- in relation to Mexico, in contrast to opportunities offered by this country, 
have originated from non-state actors as they have not been planned or openly encouraged, or 
facilitated, by the Mexican state. 
Each one of the trans-border issues regarding Mexico referred to above are analysed in 
the following chapters. Chapter 4 addresses drug trafficking in order to understand why this issue 
has been an explicitly security concern in the United States. Chapter 5 is devoted to 
undocumented immigration that has been an underlying U.S. security concern related to identity, 
and which became more explicitly linked to U.S. security after the 9/11 events as a result of the 
terrorist threat. Chapter 6 deals with environmental issues along the U.S.-Mexico border, in 
particular with the potential for an epidemic to occur in the region because of water pollution. 
This latter subject, however, has so far not turned into an actual security concern for either the 
United States or Mexico, and part of the explanation is based on the existence of a long standing 
bi-national institutional infrastructure to deal with common border environmental challenges that 



















CHAPTER 4. DRUG TRAFFICKING 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter consists in explaining, based on the Buzan et.al analytical framework 
and Risk Society Theory, why drug trafficking has been a security issue from the U.S. point of 
view, within the U.S.-Mexico bilateral agenda. 
In terms of the analytical framework -and in contrast to the implicit securitisation of 
undocumented immigration and the potential security concern represented by the environment in 
relation to Mexico in the 1990s-, drug trafficking has been explicitly recognised as a security 
concern in the United States, and in this context this issue represents the most interesting subject 
matter for security analysis.  
Even though drug trafficking is a trans-national challenge not restricted to U.S.-Mexican 
relations, it has been an issue with a long history in the bilateral agenda that has been 
characterised by both conflict and co-operation. This has been a predictable situation in a part of 
the globe where an industrialised nation, which happens to be the world’s largest drug market, 
shares a long and permeable border with a developing neighbour that is also a significant drug 
producer and transit country. 
 Drug issues became prominent in the bilateral relationship after WWII when drug 
consumption turned into a significant concern in the United States. After a long period of 
bilateral, albeit often forced, co-operation during the post-war years, tension escalated between 
the two countries at the end of the 1960s. In September 1969 the United States carried out an 
interdiction operation on its Southwest border to force Mexico, by slowing down legitimate 
cross-border traffic in the area, to intensify its efforts against drug trafficking. As a result of this 
unilateral measure, the United States and Mexico strengthened co-operation and drugs became 
more central in the bilateral agenda ever since. In 1985, nevertheless, the murder of a DEA 
Special Agent in Mexico gave way to a new cycle of conflict, with the United States pointing to 
corruption in Mexico as a the key problem in the bilateral efforts to confront this threat. 
If it is true that Mexico has indeed contributed to U.S. counterdrug efforts, it has been 
argued that U.S. drug policy towards its southern neighbour has been ‘cyclical in nature, often 
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unilateral, incident-prone and highly contentious’.594 Regarding drug trafficking, the prevalent 
view in Mexico has been that the origin of the problem has been U.S. demand. The dominant 
U.S. view has been that at the centre of the challenge has been Mexican pervasive corruption. 
The bilateral management of the issue, nevertheless, has been defined mainly in U.S. terms, 
reflecting thus the asymmetry of power between the two countries and the resulting unbalanced 
approach. 
Differences about the impact of the problem in each of the two countries have also 
explained differing approaches. While in Mexico drug use had been low (it has gradually 
increased in the last decades), the major threat from drug trafficking has been the challenge it has 
posed to its institutions.
595
 In the United States, in contrast, drug consumption has been 
considerably higher and it has affected its society (including public health and order) and 
economy. Nevertheless, the corrupting power of drug trafficking has compromised the security 
of producer/transit and consumer countries alike. 
According to one analyst, one additional factor complicating a co-ordinated response to 
the problem has been ‘the overtly political treatment of the drug problem’ in the United States.596 
The negative connotation for politicians to appear ‘soft on drugs’, on the one hand, and aversion 
to the consequences of fighting drugs in terms of violence within its own territory, on the other 
hand, have limited available options to deal with the problem in the United States. As a result of 
these constrains, the United States has basically transferred abroad the costs of fighting drugs, in 
this particular case, into Mexican territory. The U.S. supply-side approach, nevertheless, has 
                                                 
594
 R. B. Craig, ‘U.S. Narcotics Policy toward Mexico: Consequences for the Bilateral Relationship’, in G. González 
and M. Tienda (eds.), The Drug Connection in U.S.-Mexican Relations, Dimensions of U.S.-Mexican Relations, 
Vol. 4, Papers prepared for the Bilateral Commission on the Future of United States-Mexican Relations, (San Diego, 
CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1989), p.78. 
595
 According to Mexico’s National Council Against Addictions (CONADIC), whereas the percentage of people in 
Mexico in 1999 who had ever tried marihuana in their lifetime was 4.7, in the United States that figure was 32.9. See 
México, Secretaría de Salud (SSA), ‘Datos Epidemiológicos’, Consejo Nacional Contra las Adicciones 
(CONADIC), [online] available: http://www.ssa.gob.mx/unidades/conadic/epidem.htm (22/01/03), p.5. For instance, 
whereas in 1976 the percentage of high school and preparatory school students in Mexico City who used marihuana, 
inhalants and cocaine was 1.9, 0.9 and 0.5, respectively, the figures for 2006 increased to 8.8, 6.7 and 3.3 for the 
same types of drugs. México, National Council Against Addictions (CONADIC), Prevención de las Adicciones y 
Promoción de Conductas Saludables para una Nueva Vida. Guía para el Promotor de Nueva Vida, Capítulo III. “El 
Consumo de Drogas en México y sus Consecuencias Sociales”, 13 November 2008, [online] available: 
http://www.conadic.salud.gob.mx/pdfs/nueva_vida/nv1e_prevencion.pdf (06/07/11), p.52.   
596




proved to be ‘ineffective’ so far.597 The explanation for this, in the opinion of a Mexican analyst, 
has resided in ‘failing to view the drug market as an integrated market’.598 This viewpoint has 
not been unique to Mexican scholars. For instance, according to Peter Smith, 
The fundamental source of the drug problem, of narcotrafico in the Americas, is the 
presence of and power of consumer demand. Demand for drugs is most conspicuous in 
advanced industrial countries, in Europe, and –especially important for Latin America- in 
the United States. Demand is what creates the market for drugs. So long as demand 
continues, there will be people engaged in supply.
599
 
Notwithstanding general agreement on the relevance of demand in determining the phenomenon, 
Mexico has for long co-operated with U.S. anti-drug efforts. In fact, in the opinion of Peter 
Reuter and David Ronfeldt, ‘Mexico may represent the “end case”, in terms of what the United 
States can reasonably expect from efforts at drug control within the context of continued U.S. 
demand’.600 It is important to note, nevertheless, that while the ‘dealing with supply’-argument 
has been politically convenient in the United States, it has not contributed to a long-term solution 
of the problem. In the whole research process for this thesis, for instance, it was difficult to come 
across with a report or study explaining why drugs are consumed in the United States, in the first 
place, especially if compared to the amount of analyses on the coercive side of the problem. 
In the specific case of Mexico, this U.S. supply-oriented strategy has resulted in the 
militarisation of anti-drug policies. The Mexican military involvement in drug control has not 
only led to a higher level of violence and human rights abuses in the country, but it has also 
increasingly exposed the armed forces, one important pillar of stability in Mexico, to drug-
related corruption.  
The first section of this chapter analyses the history of conflict and co-operation arising 
from drug trafficking in the bilateral relationship, and describes the way in which U.S. views on 
drug control (i.e. drug use has been considered a law enforcement rather than a health matter) 
were gradually imposed on the Mexican government. That is, to the extent that the United States 
has emphasised the challenge posed by foreign supply, to that same extent it has favoured the 
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militarisation of the response in Mexico. The second section assesses the impact of drug 
trafficking and consumption in the United States, in particular in terms of prevalence of use and 
of the economic drain this problem represents to the U.S. society. It also addresses the domestic 
and bilateral consequences of drug trafficking for Mexico. The third section explains the U.S. 
concerns regarding drug trafficking in terms of the Buzan et.al analytical framework and Risk 
Society theory, and the fourth section provides the conclusions of this chapter. 
 
4.2. Drug Trafficking in U.S.-Mexican Relations 
Historically, the primary U.S. response to domestic drug use has consisted in dealing with the 
supply side of the problem. Besides its proximity, Mexico’s dual role as producer of marijuana 
and heroin, and later on also as a transhipment point for cocaine from South America bound for 
the U.S. market, has explained the country’s location at the centre of U.S. anti-drug policy. 
The U.S. government has consistently ‘encouraged’ Mexico to deal with drug production 
and trafficking, and Mexican authorities have responded not only because of U.S. pressure but 
also because the need to protect the country’s institutions from the corrupting power of drug 
trafficking. Nevertheless, Mexico’s anti-drug activities have failed so far to stem the flow of 
drugs into the United States not only because of the persistence of U.S. demand, but also because 
of the existence of corruption within its security organisations. The relevance of this issue for the 
bilateral relationship, according to a high-ranking Clinton administration official, has been 
explained by: (1) ‘the central position of Mexico in trafficking of cocaine and 
methamphetamine’; and (2) the fact that ‘in Mexico there is a growing realisation that drugs are 
not just a “gringo” problem, that drug trafficking is also dangerous to Mexico because it creates 
corruption and undermines its law enforcement institutions, and also because there is a growing 
demand in the country’.601   
 
4.2.1. Background: Anti-smuggling Measures                                    
Historically, there has been a symbiotic relationship between U.S. domestic and international 
drug control efforts. This has been explained basically because U.S. domestic anti-drug 
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enforcement has relied on the collaboration of producer countries.
602
 Latin America, for instance, 
was from the beginning ‘an early target of U.S. anti-drug diplomacy by being the closest source 
of drugs’,603 even though countries in the region were often reticent to co-operate with the United 
States because of their interest in preserving, such as in the case of Bolivia and Peru, their 
traditional coca leaf production.
604
 Mexico, in contrast, was more amenable to help basically 
because its ultimate objective was to avoid U.S. intrusion in Mexican affairs.
605
   
In response to this problem, in 1916 the Mexican government banned purchases of opium 
from abroad (even though opium had been brought into the states of Sinaloa and Sonora by 
Chinese immigrants between the 1910s and 1920s) in order deprive U.S. authorities of any 
justification to enter Mexico without authorisation.
606
 If it is true that illegal drug flows and the 
use of the border as a refuge for Mexican outlaws had not been new, increasing anti-smuggling 




In the second half of the 1920s Mexico strengthened its anti-smuggling measures and, as 
a matter of fact, they became established as part of its criminal law.
608
 These domestic efforts, 
however, were shored up by Mexico’s accession to the International Drug Control Convention in 
1931.
609
 It is important to note, nevertheless, that one of the defining characteristics of this period 
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was that control emphasised trafficking rather than production, and for this reason Mexico’s 
heroin output, which was between 10% and 15% of the U.S. total supply, basically remained 
unaltered.
610
 Its production actually increased in the context of WWII, when it became more 
difficult to get hold of extra-hemispheric production.
 611
 
It is important to note that from the very beginning, Mexican law enforcement activities 
were affected by corruption. A dispatch sent to DoS on 7 May 1926 by U.S. Consul Henry C. A. 
Damm in Sonora illustrates this situation: 
… The informant states that last year an attempt was made to grow poppy but that the 
plantations were destroyed by order of officials of the Mexican government… This year, 
however, no effort seems to be made to stop the production of the narcotic, although two 
weeks ago an inspector from Nogales visited Oquitoa and Altar. The American informant 
has heard that this inspector collected 15,000 pesos, as tax on the fields…
612
 
Corruption of Mexican officials would eventually become one of the most contentious issues in 
the bilateral relationship in the years to come. However, and even with all their limitations, the 
Mexican programmes were regarded as ‘a drug control system exceeded in the Western 
Hemisphere only by that of the United States’.613                    
 
4.2.2. Post-war Years: Eradication Campaigns 
During the second half of the 1930s, continued U.S. demand and proposals in Mexico for a more 
flexible regulation of its domestic market led Washington to explicitly ‘invite’ Mexico City to 
adopt a restrictive policy similar to that of the United States. 
During this period, the Mexican government adopted a proposal for the creation of a state 
monopoly on the sale of drugs, which eventually entered into effect in 1941. Concerned because 
of the prospect for this measure to increase drug trafficking and consumption in the United 
States, the U.S. government threatened to impose an embargo on all medical drug exports, which 
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in turn led Mexico to abandon its initiative and to follow the parameters established by U.S. 
officials.
614
           
Sending a contradictory signal, however, during WWII the United States ‘encouraged’ 
legal production of Mexican opium and marijuana (i.e. morphine and hemp) for the allied war 
effort, which contributed by 1943 to turn opium into Sinaloa’s main source of agricultural 
income, at a time when the United States wanted to revert this trend.
615
 According to a July 1943 
letter from the U.S. Embassy in Mexico to the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
It is with regret the Bureau of Narcotics must report that along with Iran and Cuba, 
Mexico has now become the principal source of supply of smuggled drugs seized in the 
illicit traffic throughout the United States… There are indications that the acreage planted 
to the opium poppy in Mexico has been increasing each year. Since a large portion of this 
opium is unquestionably intended for entry into the illicit traffic in the United States, the 
situation should be viewed with much concern.
616
   
It is important to note that if growth of marijuana production in Mexico was the result of 
increased U.S. demand after WWII, growth of Mexican heroin production was the outcome of 
interrupted flows from Europe and Asia through Central America.
617
 On the Mexican border, for 
instance, seizures of opium in 1943 were 30 times as large as two years before.
618
     
In this context, it was in 1948 that Mexico implemented its first ‘national eradication 
campaign’, based on two important components: (1) the military started its involvement in the 
destruction of drug plantations; and (2) by the end of the 1950s these efforts were extended 
beyond the usually problematic areas (i.e. Sinaloa, Durango and Chihuahua, referred to as the 
‘Critical Triangle’), to cover both peninsulas and the central region of the country.619 
Notwithstanding the eradication campaign, drug production and trafficking continued 
unabated basically because of three factors: lack of aerial reconnaissance capabilities; shortage of 
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chemicals for eradication; and the violent response from drug producers and traffickers.
620
 It was 
not until late 1961, after Mexico again became the target of U.S. pressure, that it modernised its 
equipment with U.S. help in order to conduct a more effective campaign.
621
 
 On 4 and 5 January 1961 U.S. and Mexican officials met in Washington, DC, to 
informally explore ways to improve anti-drug co-operation. On that occasion, the United States 
and Mexico agreed on the procurement of U.S. training and equipment for Mexico’s efforts, and 
thus both sides issued ‘The United States-Mexico Joint Communiqué on the Control of Illicit 
Narcotics’ that, according to William Walker, not only recognised shared responsibility for the 
drug problem, but also ‘marked the first step toward militarization of the war on drugs in the 
Americas’.622  
Under this agreement, the United States supplied:  
two helicopters, two light planes, ten Jeep trucks (all with radios and spare parts), 
twenty flame-throwers and fifty rifles (with spare parts and ammunition), and 
provided training for three helicopter pilots and three mechanics, plus transportation 
to the United States and factory check-outs for the pilots of the fixed-wing aircraft.
623
 
According to the ‘United States-Mexican Narcotics Control Program’ issued by DoS on 27 
September 1962, the provision of this aid ‘would emphasise continued faith in control at the 
source as the basis of U.S. anti-drug policy’.624 As shown in Table 4-1, the assistance package 








                                                 
620
 R. B. Craig, ‘La Campaña Permanente: Mexico’s Antidrug Campaign’, Journal of  Interamerican Studies and 
World Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 2, May 1978: 107-31, notes omitted. Reprinted by permission of the Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, in Walker, Drugs in the Western Hemisphere, p.176.  
621
 Craig, ‘U.S. Narcotics Policy’, p.73. 
622
 U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Press Release, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene Kansas, 
in Walker, Drugs in the Western Hemisphere, p.169.  
623
 Records of the President’s Advisory Commission on Narcotics and Drug Abuse, Box 1, John F. Kennedy 





Table 4-1. Opium Poppy Plantations Destroyed in Mexico 
Year    Number of Fields  
1958    110,243 
1959    513,000 
1960    521,092 
1961    316,863 
1962    63,890       
 
Source: Records of the President’s Advisory Commission on Narcotics and Drug Abuse, Box 1, John F. Kennedy 
Presidential Library, p.174.  
 
Mexico’s new capability, however, incited a creative response from drug producers and 
traffickers who opted for hiding drug production among legal produce, and for moving 
plantations to secluded areas.
625
 Given the fact that the U.S. demand for drugs did not recede 
during this time, there was a continuous flow of Mexican marijuana and heroin into the United 
States in the 1960s,
626
 and this is part of the reason why, in spite of bilateral co-operation, the 
U.S.-Mexico relationship deteriorated at the end of the 1960s, as will be discussed below. 
Again in response to U.S. pressure, in 1961 the Mexican government signed the UN 
Single Convention, which became law in April 1967.
627
 The convention, however, included 
several provisions that were controversial. Article 33 on ‘Possession of Drugs’ established that 
‘The Parties shall not permit the possession of drugs except under legal authority’.628 According 
to one interpretation, given that the 1961 convention established the parameters for controlling 
drugs, the provision above had therefore an impact on the U.S.-Mexico illegal drug trade by 
virtually suppressing supply while accepting demand.
629
  
It is important to note that in the 1960s, increasing drug trafficking across the U.S.-
Mexico border responded to a growing demand for drugs in the United States. From 1962 to 
1967, for instance, the proportion of people between 19 and 25 years old that had ever tried 
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marijuana went up from 4% to 13%,
630
 and this level of consumption eventually put Mexico 
under the radar of U.S. authorities.
631
 On 14 July 1969, President Richard Nixon recognised drug 
use as a ‘serious national threat’ in a message to the U.S. Congress, and in June 1971 he formally 
declared a ‘war on drugs’.632   
In order to respond to increasing drug consumption in the United States, the Nixon 
administration implemented a series of policies to deal with Mexican marijuana, in particular. On 
21 September 1969 President Nixon ordered ‘Operation Intercept’ on the border with Mexico, 
which was described as ‘the nation’s largest peace-time search and seizure operation by civil 
authorities’.633 This unilateral measure, supposedly designed to stop the northbound flow of 
marijuana into the United States, was in reality intended to take the legitimate cross-border flow 
hostage, in order to compel Mexico to deal with drug trafficking in a more forceful way. This 
was evident in the fact that, 
Although more than 5-million citizens of the United States and Mexico passed through 
this dragnet during the 3-week operation, virtually no heroin or narcotics were intercepted 
from tourists. But… the ultimate objective of Operation Intercept was not to seize 
narcotics but to pressure Mexico to control it at the source by eradicating the production of 
marijuana and opium poppies in Mexico.
634
 
While in the short-term the operation only became a major diplomatic irritant, in the long run it 
succeeded in influencing Mexico to reinforce its anti-drug measures. As an indirect result of the 
U.S. operation, Mexico began to acknowledge the existence of a growing domestic drug problem 
that required to be incorporated within its national campaign. Moreover, after 11 October 1969 
the successor to ‘Operation Intercept’, known as ‘Operation Co-operation’, led to an 
improvement of bilateral efforts.
635
  
Under this bilateral arrangement Mexico increased its eradication and interdiction efforts 
in the ‘Critical Triangle’, but the result was far from satisfactory due to a variety of logistical, 
geographical and technological factors. While the U.S. government was interested in joint law 
enforcement operations along the common border in order to increase effectiveness, the Mexican 
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authorities opted instead for an aerial herbicide programme, a decision that was influenced by the 
need to avoid more violence from drug traffickers in the interior of the country.
636
 As in the 
1930s, in the 1970s Mexican officials were willing to fight the flow of drugs into the United 
States basically because of the need to keep the United States at bay.
637
 
With U.S. assistance, however, in the 1970s Mexico took a step further in its anti-drug 
efforts called ‘Operation Condor’, which was based on the aerial herbicide programme discussed 
above.
638
 The Attorney General’s Office (AGO) managed the campaign, and acquired from the 
United States the aircraft required to launching the ‘largest herbicide program in history’; the 
operation allowed Mexico to improve bilateral and domestic inter-agency co-ordination, as well 
as to strengthen anti-corruption efforts.
639
  
With ‘Operation Condor’, Mexico in fact established a U.S.-style ‘war on drugs’, ‘The 
Permanent Campaign’, which has been basically a supply-side-oriented programme. Under this 
framework, Mexican marijuana decreased from more than 75% of U.S. consumption in 1976 to a 
low level of 4% in 1981 (to rebound to 30% in 1986), which represented a temporarily vacuum 
that was filled by Colombia, Jamaica and the United States itself.
640
 
 As a further example of the problem inherent in supply-oriented strategies, opium 
production in Mexico had recently expanded to fill a gap left by the dislocation of the so-called 
‘French Connection’ (i.e. manufacturers of Turkish heroin based in Marseilles with extensive 
distribution networks in the United States).
641
 From 1972-1975, after opium control was imposed 
on Turkey, opium cultivation in Mexico exploded from 10-15% to 80% of the U.S. market as 
Mexican producers continued to supply the U.S. demand of heroin.
642
 In this sense, Mexico’s 
emergence as a major heroin production and smuggling centre clearly resulted from stricter 
enforcement efforts in other parts of the world, showing that drug production has been extremely 
resilient and adaptable in the face of individual supply-reduction initiatives. Mexico’s intensified 
eradication efforts, in the context of its already mentioned anti-drug campaigns, decreased its 
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output of heroin for the U.S. market from 67% to 25% between 1976 and 1980.
643
 As in the case 
of marijuana, however, reduction of supply in Mexico was compensated by the ‘Golden 




By the early 1970s drug trafficking had become one of the most salient issues in U.S.-
Mexican relations. Toward the end of the decade, and in spite of its efforts, Mexico was the 
focus of U.S. attention as a major exporter of both marijuana and heroin. The Mexican 
government countered that if it not were for the U.S. demand there would be no reason for 
Mexican peasants to cultivate drugs. According to Guadalupe González, the approach to the 
problem favoured by the U.S. (i.e. treating use with relative tolerance while strongly attacking 
production) had only contributed to high drug prices that in turn provided the main incentive for 
the growth of the illegal industry.
645
 This has actually been one of arguments most frequently 
used by Mexican officials to criticise the U.S. drug control perspective.  
The success of Mexico’s anti-drug campaigns in the 1970s did not last long. By 1983-
1984 Mexican production and trafficking were up again, not only in the traditional marijuana and 
heroin markets but also in the cocaine trade as well. The most important explanation for this was 
the one related to the fact that Colombia’s growth as a drug trafficking centre opened lucrative 
opportunities for Mexican drug smugglers, as cocaine transhipment routes shifted to Mexico 
during the early 1980s.
646
 This occurred when the establishment of Joint Task Force No. 4 (JTF-
4) in South Florida closed the Caribbean cocaine trafficking route, opening thus the opportunity 
for Mexican smugglers to assist their Colombian counterparts by taking care of cocaine 
shipments bound for the United States, taking advantage of the established overland corridors 
leading to the U.S. border.
647
 According to DEA officials, JTF-4 operations were ‘highly 
successful’ since a third or more of the cocaine entering the United States was flowing across the 
U.S.-Mexican border, rather than through the traditional routes across the Caribbean.
648
 This was 
hardly an accomplishment, nevertheless, because JTF-4 operations did not disrupt, much less 
halt, cocaine smuggling into the United States; they merely shifted routes and Mexico became 
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the casualty of the U.S. ‘success’.649 One interesting phenomenon that eventually occurred was 
that Mexican smugglers would demand to be paid with part of the cargo, with around ’40 to 50 
percent of each cocaine shipment’, and this condition set the stage for them to become involved 
in marketing operations within the United States.
650
 
The JTF-4 model was eventually extended to the U.S.-Mexican border in March 1983, 
when President Ronald Reagan created the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System 
(NNBIS) to act as ‘interface’ between DoD and LEAs in order to co-ordinate anti-drug 
resources.
651
 In fact, according to Dunn, the ‘war on drugs’ significantly expanded on the U.S.-
Mexican border during the 1986-1992 period in response to increasing drug trafficking in the 
region.
652
        
 
4.2.3. 1980s and Beyond: Escalation of Militarisation 
4.2.3.1. Corruption 
The Mexican government began relying even more on the Mexican military in order to respond 
not only to more powerful drug trafficking organisations, but also to corruption within its LEAs. 
The Mexican military’s participation, however, was not enough to stem the flow of drugs, 
mainly because of corruption among Mexican anti-drug officials.
653
 
In this context, relations between the United States and Mexico began to deteriorate in the 
first half of the 1980s. For instance, in 1984 thousands of tons of marihuana were discovered in a 
location called ‘El Búfalo’ in the state of Chihuahua.654 The initial suspicion that an operation of 
such a magnitude could only be explained by corruption within Mexico’s security apparatus, 
proved to be correct after the assassination of DEA Special Agent Camarena-Salazar in February 
1985, which apparently was carried out by elements of the DFS, in collusion with drug 
traffickers.
655
 It was later discovered that the Camarena case had actually been related to the 
discovery of ‘El Búfalo’ the year before.656 
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The murder of Camarena created a new cycle of conflict in the bilateral relationship, as 
members of the U.S. Congress and drug policy officials began to express negative views about 
Mexico. According to Walker, ‘tensions across the border had not been so great since the oil 
controversy began in 1938’, and reconciliation would have to wait the accession of new 
governments in the two countries.
657
 Meanwhile, in response to the Camarena incident, the DEA 
launched ‘Operation Intercept II’ that partially closed the border for eight days in February 1985, 
and ‘Operation Leyenda’, discussed below, which reminded Mexican officials of their country’s 
vulnerability to U.S. drug policy. Because of intense public criticism from the DEA, police work 
in Mexico led to the arrest of drug trafficker Rafael Caro-Quintero, believed to be behind 
Camarena’s murder.658 
As a response to U.S. pressure, the Mexican government recognised that drug trafficking 
posed a threat to Mexico’s society and institutions, and set out to reform its security apparatus. 
Firstly, while Mexican authorities had traditionally avoided identifying drugs as a national 
security threat in order to prevent the United States from using the concept to justify 
interventionist policies, President Miguel De la Madrid eventually echoed President Reagan by 
declaring that drug trafficking should be considered a threat to national security.
659
 It is 
important to note that in response to raising political pressures in anticipation of the November 
1986 mid-term elections, President Reagan set the stage for a further expansion of the U.S. 
military’s participation in drug control. On 8 April 1986, the president issued National Security 
Decision Directive No. 221 (NSC-NSDD-221) ‘Narcotics and National Security’, which 
established that ‘the expanding scope of global narcotics trafficking has created a situation which 
today adds another significant dimension to the law enforcement and public health aspects of this 
international problem and threatens the national security of the United States’.660 
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Secondly, the DFS was disbanded in 1985 and it was replaced by the General Direction 
for Investigation and National Security (DGISN), which included the National Office for 




4.2.3.2. An Uneasy Transition 
President Carlos Salinas (1988-1994), De la Madrid’s successor, reasserted the previous 
administration’s declaration that drug trafficking represented a national security threat: 
The fight against drugs is a high priority in my government for three fundamental reasons: 
because it constitutes an assault on the health of Mexico’s citizens, because it promises to 
affect Mexican national security, and finally, because the community of nations must 
stand together on this issue.
662
 
In contrast to the United States where the definition of drug trafficking as a national security 
issue helped to justify the military’s support to LEAs in the ‘war on drugs’, in Mexico the 
definition did not have the same purpose because the military was already involved in anti-drug 
missions.
663
 Instead, it allowed the Mexican government to portray the fight against drugs to be 
in the interest of the country, and not only in that of the United States. This declaration had a 
political objective which was ‘[to provide] the base for rallying new political support for an 
increasingly expensive, difficult, and controversial effort’.664 
 Ironically, the shift in cocaine flows from the U.S. Southeast to the U.S. Southwest 
border occurred almost at the same time the United States and Mexico were planning to establish 
a closer economic relationship. Mexico’s growing participation in the cocaine trade, as discussed 
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above, strengthened its criminal organisations such as the so-called ‘Gulf’, ‘Tijuana’ and ‘Juarez’ 
cartels.
665
 In this context, the task for the Salinas administration consisted not only in confronting 
more capable drug organisations within Mexico, but also showing the United States the 
determination of the new government in its fight against drugs.
666
  
 The Salinas government implemented several reforms. It formed a National Security 
Cabinet within the Office of the Co-ordination of the Presidency; late in 1988 it created the 
Office of the Assistant Attorney General for Investigation and Combat of Drug Trafficking as 
well as new units within the FJP; and in early 1989, it established a new intelligence agency, the 
Centre for Investigation and National Security (CISEN), which replaced DISEN.
667
 In general 
terms, in spite of economic austerity, between the late 1980s and the early 1990s anti-drug 
resources assigned to the AGO increased by three times, and some of its restructuring included 
the 1992 creation of an intelligence unit called Centre for Drug Control Planning (CENDRO) 
within the Office of the Assistant Attorney General, and in 1993 the establishment of the 
National Institute to Combat Drugs (INCD) to co-ordinate anti-drug efforts.
668
 
Showing a renewed willingness to work with the United States after the Camarena 
incident, in 1989 Mexico signed a comprehensive agreement on bilateral co-operation and in 
1990 it endorsed the ‘Treaty on Co-operation for Mutual Legal Assistance’; on the multilateral 
front, and in order to strengthen Mexico’s international image, in 1990 the government became 




At the operational level, that same year Mexico created the Northern Border Response 
Force (NBRF) in order to detain drug smugglers and to disrupt their aerial operations leading to 
the U.S. border. Out of the U.S. embassy in Mexico City, a U.S. antinarcotics unit co-operated 
with the NBRF on strategy and exchange of information matters.
670
 From the U.S. point of view, 
this co-operation was seen as key to ultimate counter-drug success because, in the words of one 
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U.S. military officer, ‘without Mexican support the situation closely paralleled a low-intensity 
conflict in which the guerrilla had a perfect sanctuary’.671 
One important aspect of drug control in Mexico during the Salinas administration was the 
increasing participation of the armed forces, which was reflected in the fact that ‘about one-third 
of the military’s budget was devoted to that effort by the end of the 1980s’.672 As a result of this 
growth, the Ministry of Defence (SEDENA) became the predominant official presence in several 
areas of the country.
673
 U.S. anti-drug and military aid to Mexico increased in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, after economic integration was accompanied by security and military co-operation, 
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Table4-2. U.S. Anti-narcotics Assistance to Mexico (1977-2010), 




















1993   1,657,424 
1994   1,305,139 
1995      894,620 
1996   2,934,476 
1997   6,547,147 
1998   6,466,930 
1999 10,211,770 












Source: U.S. Overseas Loan and Grants (Greenbook), Standard Country Report, Mexico, USAID Economic 
Analysis and Data Services (EADS), [online] available: 
http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/query/do?_program=/eads/gbk/countryReport&submit=submit&output=2&unit=R&
cocode=5MEX (25/08/12).  
 
For instance, traditional low levels of U.S. military and security assistance to Mexico began to 
increase during the early 1980s as the country implemented International Monetary Fund- (IMF) 
mandated ‘structural adjustment’ policies in response to its economic crisis. According to a 
report, ‘between 1984 and 1993 Mexico obtained 10 times more U.S. military hardware than it 
184 
 
had received between 1950 and 1983’; it is estimated that Mexico had access to U.S. military 
assets valued in $750 million dollars between 1982 and 1992.
674
 
On the U.S. side, the shift in drug smuggling from the Southeast to the Southwest 
provided the rationale for escalation of militarisation, and in this context in November 1986 Joint 
Task Force No. 6 (JTF-6) was established at Fort Bliss, in El Paso, Texas. Its objective, in 
general, was to co-ordinate active duty and reserve military support for civilian LEAs along the 
Southwest border.
675
 Since the beginning, however, this initiative faced several limitations that 
included not only the Posse Comitatus statute, but also Mexican sensitivity to U.S. military 
presence on the common border.
676
 Although this sensitivity has often been expressed by Mexico 
in terms of the ‘militarisation of the border’, according to one U.S. military officer this has been 
more a concern about the military apprehension of undocumented immigrants and potential 
human rights abuses, an issue that will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
677
 What is 
frequently called the ‘militarisation of the border’, nevertheless, is not the permanent presence of 
U.S. troops along the dividing line, but the intelligence and infrastructure support DoD has 
provided the LEAs in order to deal with illegal flows. This information was confirmed, for 
instance, by the head of the U.S. Customs Service in San Diego, CA. Asked whether his agency 
received support from DoD he replied: 
We do. Is very small in the sense of dozens of National Guards people, and when we say 
‘militarization’ it is not in the common sense; they are not carrying guns, they are not 
making arrests, they are simply helping perhaps… maybe to look at cargo or running x-
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rays, things like that so, at least for Customs we don’t have deployed units with automatic 
weapons and things like that.
678
  
 In 1990 the Southwest border was also formally designated as a High-Intensity Drug 
Trafficking Area (HIDTA), as part of a programme authorised by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1988 to be administered by the ONDCP. According to that office, 
The Southwest border HIDTA was designated as a single HIDTA with the awareness that 
due to the complexity and enormous challenges posed by the Southwest border, more so 
than in any other part of the nation, a high level of coordination among law enforcement 




The HIDTA headquarters were originally located in El Paso, Texas, in order to implement 
border-wide initiatives and co-ordinate regional partnerships in Arizona, California, New 
Mexico, West Texas and South Texas. Its overall mission has been to integrate law enforcement 




 These efforts were complemented in 1994 with the establishment of the Southwest 
Border Initiative (SWBI), which was a regional strategy to dismantle Mexican drug trafficking 
organisations. The SWBI was also a co-operative effort carried out by the LEAs in order to 
combat the threat posed by Mexican-based trafficking groups. Under this initiative, several bi-
national operations were carried out by units in Monterrey, Ciudad Juárez and Tijuana allowing 
for the detention of 156 drug traffickers, and the confiscation of more than 22,000 kilos of 
narcotics and $35 million dollars.
681
 
The significant results of Mexico’s anti-drug efforts during the Salinas years, especially 
those against the top ranks of old drug cartels,
682
 seemed to be proof of unparalleled co-operation 
between Mexico and the United States. On the one hand, both governments were hopeful these 
efforts would contribute to generate a propitious political atmosphere to negotiate the NAFTA 
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agreement; on the other hand, the U.S. administration tried to reassure the public that opening the 




However, all these indicators of effective drug control were misleading because they 
obscured the weaknesses of the enforcement effort. According to Peter Andreas, the seemingly 
positive results of bilateral anti-drug efforts were explained not by the effectiveness of the 
measures; they were simply facilitated by the growth of the drug trade itself.
684
 If it is true this 
image served well its purpose of supporting NAFTA, its most pervasive consequence was to 
increase corruption in Mexico.
685
 
Notwithstanding that the artificial impression of efficient bilateral anti-drug co-operation 
was sufficiently convincing to support the NAFTA negotiation process, the intensification of 
coercive measures, as in the past, only contributed to increase the profits from illegal activities 
and thus the resources available to corrupting authorities, especially on the Mexican side of the 
border.
686
 According to one perspective, part of the corruption problem in Mexico was the fact 
that, far from implementing a comprehensive judicial reform, the Salinas government only 
enlarged security agencies long ago tainted by corruption.
687
 Moreover, contrary to the 
assurances of the U.S. government, drug trafficking organisations took in fact advantage of free 
trade, as reported by a U.S. intelligence analysis pointing out that Mexican drug cartels were 




As already noted, this prospect was not publicly discussed during negotiations over the 
free trade accord in the early 1990s. For instance, U.S. law enforcement agents who worked in 
and on Mexico while President Salinas was negotiating the agreement with the United States 
claimed that political pressure kept them from discussing NAFTA’s potential negative impact in 
terms of drug trafficking from Mexico.
689
 As a matter of fact, the notion that increasing cross-
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border trade was entirely beneficial contrasted sharply with the picture described by the DEA in 
2001: 
Illicit drugs are smuggled in record levels into the United States via the 2,000-mile 
U.S./Mexico border. Over the past few years, Mexican based trafficking organizations 
have succeeded in establishing themselves as the preeminent poly-drug traffickers of the 
world, using our shared border to smuggle illicit drugs into the United States. These 
organizations present an increasing threat to the national security of this country, with 
voluminous amount of drugs, violent crime, and the associated corruption of public 
officials in Mexico. Mexico is the largest transhipment point of South American cocaine 
destined for the United States, and 65% of this cocaine reaches American cities via the 
U.S./Mexico border. Mexico also remains a major source country for heroin and 
marijuana, and many of these Mexican based trafficking organizations are utilized by 
Colombian Cartels to tranship drugs destined for the United States.
690
 
Notwithstanding the threat described above, the U.S.-Mexican border basically remained 
highly porous. In FY2000, for instance, 293 million people, 89 million cars, 4.5 million trucks, 
and 572,583 rail cars entered the United States from Mexico, each one representing opportunities 
for drug trafficking organisations to introduce their illegal substances into the United States.
691
 
This is the reason why the drug threat posed by the Mexican border was compared to the ‘U.S. 
national drug threat’.692 The DEA’s perception of the threat from the Mexican border was shared 
by the then-U.S. Customs Service. In Logan’s view,  
With the Mexican border, of course, it’s a very robust activity you know, certainly drug 
smuggling is number one activity that we see coming out of Mexico, marijuana, cocaine, 
heroin, methamphetamine, pharmaceuticals, and often times because of the increasing 
volume of trade caused by NAFTA, the drug cartels try to mask their smuggling activity 
in legitimate cargo. So it is very difficult, and of course most of the legitimate trade, 
maquiladora factories want to avoid the utilization of their operations for drug smugglers; 
the fact is that their operations get penetrated either in the trucking area or low-level 
employees who certainly can’t stand the pressure of organized crime.
693
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Compelled by the economic imperative of cross-border trade, U.S. border authorities have been 
unable to search every single vehicle entering from Mexico. According to a source quoted by 
Andreas, between 1994 and 1998 the U.S. Customs Service went from inspecting 5 to 25% of 
trucks coming from Mexico.
694
  
A different perspective pointed out that effective drug control was not really sacrificed 
for the sake of NAFTA, but became more problematic with the easing of border controls. In the 
opinion of Logan, trying to reconcile an open border for legitimate trade with the need to protect 
against undesirable flows has been a ‘continuing balancing act’; and he added, ‘there is political 
pressure to make sure on certainly the U.S. side that we have enough controls to make sure that 
the border is not completely wide-open’.695     
It is important to mention that toward the end of the Salinas administration the 
government of Mexico decided to combat drug trafficking activities with reduced U.S. 
assistance. The reason was Mexico’s protest over ‘Operation Leyenda’, mentioned above, after 
the United States encouraged the abduction of Doctor Humberto Álvarez-Machaín from Mexican 
territory on 2 April 1990 in order to face charges in the United States of involvement in 
Camarena’s murder. When the U.S. Supreme Court decided the abduction did not contravene the 
bilateral extradition treaty, Mexico suspended the operation of U.S. agents on its territory, and in 
1993 it ceased the reception of all U.S. counternarcotics assistance for all practical purposes.
696
 
This policy remained in effect until 1995 when the incoming Mexican government again 
accepted U.S. counter-drug assistance.     
 
4.2.3.3. Increasing Bilateral Co-operation  
In general terms, the U.S. and Mexican response to the continued failures of interdiction has 
been the intensification of coercive measures. After taking office in December 1994, President 
Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) declared that drug trafficking was ‘Mexico’s number one security 
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threat’.697 The fact that the situation had not improved in comparison to previous Mexican 
administrations was evident in DoS’s reports covering 1991-1997. They established that Mexico 
was the origin of the majority of drugs entering the U.S. illegal market (between 20 to 30% of 




President Zedillo’s response to continuing corruption in Mexico was to turn once again to 
the military. In late 1995, the armed forces increasingly took over several state police 
departments, and co-ordination for public security increased among the military, state and local 
police.
699
 In December 1996, generals also took over the FJP nationwide, the INCD and 
CENDRO, at the same time military personnel increased its participation in CISEN as well.
700
 In 
this context, by early 1998 it was estimated that around 40% of the Mexican military (out of 
180,000 troops) was engaged in counternarcotics activities.
701
 
The intensified participation of the Mexican military in anti-drug activities, however, did 
not produce a significant change. Comparison between President Salinas’ last 3 years and 
President Zedillo’s first 3 years shows more continuity than change in the pattern of aggressive 
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Table 4-3. Mexican Counter-drug Activities, 1992-1997 
1992 1993 1994  Totals 1995 1996 1997 Totals 
Seizures    
Cocaine (mt)  38.8 46.2 22.1 107.10 22.2 23.6 34.9 80.7  
Opium (mt)  0.17 0.13 0.15 0.45 0.22 0.20 0.34 0.76 
Heroin (mt)  0.09 0.06 0.29 0.456 0.203 0.363 0.115 0.681  
Marihuana (mt)  405 495 528 1,428 780 1,015 1,038 2,833 
Methamphetamine (mt) - - 0.26 - 0.496 0.172 0.039 0.707 
Ephedrine (mt)  - - - - 4.9 6.7 0.608 12.208 
Illicit Drug Labs  4 5 9 18 19 19 8 46 
 
Arrests 
Nationals  27,639 17,551 6,860 51,780 9,728 11,038 10,572 31,338  
Foreigners  208 75 146 429 173 207 170 550 
Total   27,577 17,626 7,006 52,209 9,901 11,245 10,742 31,888 
 
Eradication 
Opium (ha)  6,860 7,820 6,620 21,300 8,450 7,900 8,000 24,350 
*     10,959  15,389 14,671 17,416 47,476  
Marihuana (ha)  12,100 9,970 8,495 30,565 11,750 12,200 10,500 34,450 
*     14,207  21,573 22,769 23,385 67,727 
* Government of Mexico’s figures. 
 
Source: Storrs, ‘Mexico’s Counter-Narcotics Efforts under Zedillo’, p.4. 
 
While arrests and cocaine seizures decreased during this entire period, seizures of marijuana and 
drug laboratories increased by a larger margin. It is important to consider that these figures, 
however, did not provide the total amount of drugs produced, neither reflected the capabilities of 
drug traffickers nor the effectiveness of reporting methods.  
The U.S. encouraged militarisation of drug control in Mexico, consequently, resulted in 
increasing the militarisation of the bilateral relationship. Even though Mexico had traditionally 
rejected U.S. military aid in order to safeguard its independence and sovereignty, military 
contacts between the two countries began to increase, and an important step in this direction was 
the October 1995 visit to Mexico of the then-U.S. Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry (the 
first ever visit by a U.S. Secretary of Defense), which in the following April was reciprocated by 
his Mexican counterpart visiting the United States. In the 1995 meeting, Secretary Perry stated,  
Standing side by side, our two presidents showed the world that the United States and 
Mexico are good neighbors and good friends. My goal, and the goal of my visit, is to help 
our nations forge closer security ties, because when it comes to stability and security, our 
191 
 
destinies are inextricably linked. So let us build a new bilateral security relationship based 
on openness, trust, cooperation and mutual respect.
702
  
In the meeting the following year, both armed forces agreed to establish a bilateral working 
group to explore ways to co-operate in four different areas: a) counter-narcotics, b) natural 
disasters, c) force modernisation, and d) education and training.
703
 While most of these efforts 
concentrated on the fourth area, it is important to note that they emphasised the challenge posed 
by drug trafficking.
704
 According to GAO, during FY1996 and FY1997, DoD provided the 
Mexican military with $76 million worth of equipment and training. The equipment provided is 
shown in Table 4-4. 
 
Table 4-4. DoD Counter-drug assistance provided to, or planned for, the Mexican Military, Fiscal 
Years 1996-97 
Dollars in Millions 
Source of   Value of  Type of 
Assistance   Assistance  Assistance 
Excess defence articles  $5   20 UH-1H helicopters 
 
Section 506 (a)(2)  $37   53 UH-1H helicopters 
drawdown       4 C-26 aircraft 
       2-year UH-1H spare part package 
 
Section 1004   $26   About 70% was planned to be used 
       for training and the remainder for 
       the purchase of equipment 
 
Section 1031   $8   UH-1H spare parts 
 
Source: U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Drug Control. U.S.-Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts Face 
Difficult Challenges, Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO/NSIAD-98-154, National Security and International 
Affairs Division (NISIAD), Washington, DC, June 1998, p.3. 
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Regarding military hardware, all of the helicopters and the C-26 aircraft were delivered to the 
Mexican military during 1996 and 1997, and Mexico also received some logistical and training 
support.
705
 In addition to this assistance, the Mexican military used its own funds to purchase 
two Knox-class frigates from the United States through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
programme, valued at about $7 million, which were delivered to Mexico in August 1997.
706
 
U.S. counter-narcotics assistance was supposed to enhance the ability of the Mexican 
military to conduct counter-drug missions by increasing its air mobility. At that time, however, 
key elements of DoD counter-drug assistance resulted of limited utility. For instance, the 73 UH-
1H helicopters ‘[were] of limited usefulness in meeting some counternarcotics missions, and 
their operational capabilities [were] limited because of the lack of spare parts’.707 Eventually, in 
an episode without precedent at such scale, all the helicopters were returned to the United States 
by the Mexican government (which were intended to enable the U.S.-trained Special Forces 
Airborne Groups [GAFES] to reach clandestine runways to seize aircraft loaded with cocaine). 
According to the account of an insider during the affair, 
The problem was that Mexico was being given old equipment, and the problem with old 
equipment, we are talking about helicopters and ships that were used in Vietnam, is that it 
requires a lot of maintenance, and this is expensive maintenance; and this is not only in 
Mexico but also in other parts of the world; when countries are given this equipment, 
overnight they have a capability which cannot be used because it does not have the right 
maintenance, and besides they [helicopters] are unable to fly at the altitude required by the 
Mexican armed forces. Thus, at some point the helicopters did not fly anymore because of 
problems such as cracks, they have problems because they are old, then you have a 
problem and what to do? What happened was that Mexico, and this had never happened 
before, returned the 73 helicopters to the United States which, never equipment had been 
returned to that level… Dangerously it became a problem in which Mexicans would say, 
‘you are giving us this “junk”’, and the United States would say ‘the problem is that you 
do not know how to keep the helicopters’, and the truth is that both had some reason… 
This was absolutely a problem that could have been diplomatically very complicated and 
could have affected other areas of the relationship.
708
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The increasing involvement of the Mexican military in drug control operations confronted 
not only the problem of inadequate co-ordination but also, and more ominously, the already 
mentioned predicament of greater exposition to corruption. During the Salinas administration 
there were several cases that were evidence of this challenge. In 1991 in Tlalixcoyan, Veracruz, 
for instance, federal police were engaged by soldiers on a clandestine runway when they were 
about to seize drugs and make arrests; some agents died as a result of this incident and no 
traffickers were arrested.
709
 The most serious incident, however, was the February 1997 arrest of 
General Jesús Gutiérrez-Rebollo, the head of INCD, on charges of working for Amado Carrillo 
Fuentes, leader of the Juárez cartel. This occurred only eight days after the then-‘Drug Czar’, 
General Barry McCraffrey, had described him as an ‘honest man and a no non-sense field 
commander’.710 As a result of this incident the INCD was dismantled, and the Mexican 
government created the Special Prosecutor’s Office for Health Crimes (FEADS). The Mexican 
response to such corruption, however, was to reinforce the trend towards militarisation.              
Regarding the U.S. anti-drug certification process, it is important to mention that there 
was no controversy during the Salinas years. During President Zedillo’s term of office, however, 
revelations of deepening corruption put Mexico at the centre of Washington’s certification 
debate.
711
 Because of congressional pressure to encourage Mexico to intensify its anti-narcotics 
activities through the certification process, in 1996 President Clinton found itself confronting a 
dilemma between certifying Mexico in spite of corruption issues, and provoking the outrage of 
the U.S. Congress, or decertifying it and complicating the bilateral relationship in the context of 
the recently approved NAFTA. The solution was to deflect attention from Mexico by 
disapproving Colombia’s anti-drug efforts, but this course of action ended up the ‘integrity’ of 
the whole certification process.
712
 It was in this context that U.S.-Mexico counter-drug co-
operation increased, as already described. 
In a bilateral commitment to confront the drug threat, both governments signed the 
Declaration of the United States-Mexico Alliance Against Drugs, which established the High 
Level Contact Group for Drug Control (HLCG) to provide for cabinet-level co-ordination twice 
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a year, and working groups on money laundering, chemical control, demand-reduction, prisoner 
transfer, extradition and mutual legal assistance met four times a year to co-ordinate policies. 
Acting through these groups, the two countries agreed to develop a joint strategy when President 
Zedillo visited Washington, DC, in mid-November 1997, which was announced in February 
1998. The United States/Mexico Bi-national Drug Strategy defined three main objectives set 
forth in the declaration: 1) to ‘stop the increase in and the illicit consumption, production, and 
traffic of narcotics and psychotropic substances in both countries’; 2) to ‘treat the problems 
generated by drugs in the realms of health and safety in both societies’; and 3) to ‘agree on the 
actions necessary to reduce production, trafficking, distribution and consumption of drugs, as 
well as to eliminate crimes related to drugs such as diversion of precursors and essential 
chemicals, money laundering, and arms trafficking’.713  
Following the mid-February 1997 arrest of General Gutiérrez-Rebollo, some members of 
Congress urged President Clinton to censure Mexico by making a ‘national interest certification’. 
When the president disregarded this advice and fully certified Mexico in late February 1997, 
both houses introduced resolutions of disapproval (H. J. Res. 58 and S. J. Res.19, 20 and 21).
714
 
In order to not openly contradict the administration, on 20 March 1997 the U.S. Senate voted 94 
to 5 to pass an amendment to H.R Res. 58 that instead of disapproving the president’s 
certification, required a report by 1 September 1997 on bilateral anti-narcotics efforts, requiring 
also the strengthening of law enforcement operations and an increase in the number of INS 
agents deployed to the common border.
715
 The Clinton administration complied with the Senate 
version of H.R Res. 58, and reported on the established date.
716
 
President Clinton certified Mexico again on 26 February 1998 emphasising the country’s 
willingness to work with the United States through the HLCG and the bi-national drug control 
strategy; several members of Congress on both Houses found this situation unacceptable and 
each presented initiatives critical of the administration’s decision mentioning, for instance, 
Mexico’s lack of co-operation by resisting requests to allow U.S. agents to be armed within its 
                                                 
713
 The White House, United States/Mexico Bi-National Drug Strategy, February 1998, Office of National Drug 
Control Policy (ONDCP), (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1998), p.2.   
714
 Storrs, ‘Mexico’s Counter-Narcotics Efforts under Zedillo’, p.3.  
715











It is important to note that while the certification process served the interests of those 
U.S. policymakers who wanted to appear ‘tough on drugs’, its punitive approach did little to 
improve bilateral co-operation in drug enforcement. According to Toro, 
the so-called ‘certification process’ has become a source of considerable irritation for 
Latin American governments and societies that do not understand why supposedly 
cooperative endeavors should be judged unilaterally by the country that created the entire 
problem in the first place.
719
 
In fact, the dynamics of this process, and other unilateral actions carried out by the U.S. 
government in the 1990s, complicated efforts to promote co-operation with Mexico. For 
instance, on 18 May 1998, the U.S. Departments of the Treasury and Justice made public the 
conclusion of an undercover initiative called ‘Operation Casablanca’ targeted at drug traffickers 
from Mexico and Colombia, that had resulted in the arrests of representatives of financial 
institutions and in the confiscation of drug proceeds (more than $100 million dollars).
720
 The 
Mexican government, nevertheless, in due course condemned the initiative after it became clear 
that U.S. authorities had operated unilaterally on its territory, and this incident led to a bilateral 
agreement on ‘guidelines for consultation on sensitive law enforcement activities’ in February 
1999.
721
 This episode exposed the fragility of co-operation between the two countries, especially 
because it showed the deep distrust of U.S. officials regarding their Mexican counterparts in the 
context of past corruption scandals.  
 
4.3. Implications for U.S. National Security 
The high-level of demand and consumption of drugs in the United States has been defined 
mainly by its federal government as a national security issue not only because of its obvious 
impact on the health and well being of its citizens, but also because of its detrimental effect on 
economic productivity and the burden it has created for the judicial system.  
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Beyond the pervasive domestic impact drug abuse has had in the United States, the 
tendency of the U.S. government to transfer the costs of drug control to other societies has also 
represented a potential threat to U.S. national security. Nowhere has this prospect been more 
evident than in the case of Mexico, where drug trafficking has constantly threatened to subvert 
internal order, to corrupt government institutions, and to erode the stability of the country, more 
generally. It can be argued that obstacles to a sound bilateral relationship posed by instability and 
corruption in Mexico actually represent a more pernicious threat to U.S. security than drug 
trafficking itself. 
This section will assess the health, economic, and judicial challenges posed by the drug 
trade within the United States, and then it will address the risks that drug trafficking represents 
for U.S. and the bilateral relationship with Mexico. 
 
4.3.1. Domestic Impact 
The use of illegal drugs in the United States has been a problem that has had important social, 
economic, and political consequences for the country. The magnitude of the challenge, from the 
U.S. government’s perspective, is evident from the fact that historically, and formally since 
1986, drug trafficking was characterised by President Reagan as a threat to U.S. national 
security. 
In contrast to the other two issues covered by this thesis for which there has been more 
U.S. ambivalence about their definition as ‘security concerns’, the threat posed by drug 
trafficking has been unequivocal. For instance, Schulz points out that drugs could well be ‘the 
most important U.S. national security interest in this [Western] hemisphere’, and he adds, ‘they 
are poisoning our society, destroying the social fabric, and spreading crime, violence, and 
death’.722 Regarding the health impact, in 2001 the U.S. government reported that more than 
10,000 U.S. citizens died each year from drug-related causes. It estimated that in the first decade 
of the 21
st
 century, without a significant decrease in domestic consumption, around 100,000 
people would die, almost twice the number of U.S. soldiers who died in the Vietnam War.
723
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further concern was the increasing evidence of the corrupting effect of Mexican drug 
organisations operating within the United States on federal, state and local law enforcement 
agencies along the Southwest border.
724
 In a similar opinion, according to the former ONDCP 
Deputy Director for Supply Reduction,  
Yes, I think it is [drugs] a national security issue… national security as broadly defined 
includes protection against all threats, and the preservation of the wealth and welfare of 
the United States and its citizens, and drug trafficking, the one, it degrades the health of 
the nation, that’s one; two, it degrades productivity, so it hurts us economically, because 
of lost productivity and because of increased cost to government because drug addiction 
and those kinds of things; and three, it undermines our institutions, just as it does in other 
countries, so for example drug trafficking begets corruption…
725
   
 
4.3.1.1. Use 
According to previously mentioned 2001 U.S. official drug statistics, the number of drug users in 
the United States (12 years of age and older, who had consumed drugs at any point during the 30 
days previous to the study), was 15.9 million. This figure represented 7.1% of the total U.S. 
population, up from 6.3% in 2000. Consumption had also increased during this period for every 
type of drug (marijuana from 4.8% to 5.4%; cocaine from 0.5% to 0.7%; pain killers from 1.2% 
to 1.6%; and tranquilisers 0.4% to 0.6%).
726
  
In terms of drug users by age, the 2001 study established that consumption increased 
among both the 12 to 17 group (from 9.7% to 10.8% between 2000 and 2001), and the 18 to 25 
group (from 15.9 to 18.8% during the same period), with no statistically significant changes for 
adults 26 years and older.
727
 It was estimated there were 2.4 million first time-marijuana users in 
2000 (compared to 3.2 million between 1976 and 1977), as well as 1.9 million first time-
methamphetamine users in 2000 (from 0.7 million in 1998).
728
 
In order to appreciate the extent of substance use among young people in the United 
States, it is important to consider the following 2000 National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA) 
facts: (a) while nearly four out of ten students (35%) had tried an illicit drug by the end of the 
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eighth grade, 56% of students had already tried drugs by the twelfth grade; (b) while more than 
three-fifths (61%) of people in their late twenties had consumed drugs, 33% had tried an illicit 
substance other than marijuana; (c) in 2001, while more than one out of seven young adults 
(15%) had used cocaine, 8% had done it by 17 or 18 years of age; about 1 out 25 high school 
seniors (3.7%) had tried crack, and the rate for the 29 to 30 group was 3.9%; finally (d) in 2000 1 
out of 16 high school seniors (5.8%) smoked marijuana daily; for the 19 to 28 group the rate was 
5.0%; in 2001, while 1 out of 5 or 6 seniors were daily marijuana smokers (18%), the rate among 




4.3.1.2. Drug Spending 
Spending estimations of both licit and illicit drugs is complicated due to the uncertainty in data 
about amounts used and prices paid. In general, however, we can observe that cocaine 
consumption declined over the course of the 1990s as indicated in Table 4-5. While heroin 
consumption also appeared to decline in the early 1990s, it seems that it had rebounded by the 
end of the decade.  
 
Table 4-5. Total Amount of Cocaine and Heroin Consumed in the United States, 1988-2000 (metric 
tons) 
 
Year   Cocaine   Heroin 
1988   660   14.6 
1989   576   16.6   
1990   447   13.6 
1991   355   12.5 
1992   346   12.5 
1993   331   11.2 
1994   323   10.8 
1995   321   12.0 
1996   301   12.8 
1997   275   11.8 
1998   267   14.5 
1999   271   14.3 
2000   259   13.3 
 
Source: The White House, What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs 1988-2000, Office of Programs, Budget, 
Research and Evaluations, under HHS contract no. 282-98-0006, Prepared by Abt Associates, Inc., December 2001, 
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), p.4. 
    
                                                 
729
 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DoHHS), Monitoring the Future. National Survey Results on 
Drug Use, 1975-2000, Volume I: Secondary School Students, 2001, National Institutes of Health, National Institute 




According to one study commissioned by ONDCP, in 2000 U.S. citizens spent about $64 billion 
dollars on drugs in 2000, as shown in Table 3-6. Overall drug spending, nevertheless, seems to 
have decreased during the decade of the 1990s from a total of $115 billion dollars in 1990 to the 
$64 billion figure in 2000 mentioned above, due basically to a price increase with an average 
spending per year of $79 billion during the whole decade.  
 
Table 4-6. Total U.S. Expenditures on Illicit Drugs, 1988-2000 ($ in billions, 2000 dollar equivalents)  
 
Year Cocaine  Heroin  Meth.  Marihuana Other Total 
 
1988 107.0  26.1  5.8  12.1  3.3 154  
1989 88.4  24.3  5.8  11.0  2.8 132 
1990 69.9  22.5  5.7  15.0  2.2 115 
1991 57.1  20.3  3.7  14.0  2.3 97 
1992 49.9  17.2  4.8  14.6  1.5 88 
1993 45.0  13.8  5.1  12.0  1.5 78 
1994 42.8  13.2  7.6  12.2  2.6 78 
1995 40.0  13.2  9.2  10.2  2.7 75 
1996 39.2  12.8  10.1  9.5  2.7 74 
1997 34.7  11.4  9.3  10.5  2.5 68 
1998 34.9  11.1  8.0  10.8  2.3 67 
1999 35.6  10.1  5.8  10.6  2.6 65 
2000 35.3  10.0  5.4  10.5  2.4 64 
* Estimates for 2000 are projections. 
 
Source: ONDCP, What America’s, p.3. 
 
The price paid by the society as a result of drug consumption in the United States, nevertheless, 
seems to have been more significant than the figures shown above in terms of issues such as 
crime, health, the economy as well as social integration, as will be discussed below.   
 
4.3.1.3. Costs 
According to data on the economic burden drug consumption represents to the U.S. society, 
between 1992 and 1998 the price increased from $102.2 billion dollars to $143.4 billion (5.9% 
per year) even though spending on drugs decreased, as shown above.
730
  
 It is important to note that the price by spending category (health, lost productivity, and 
other effects) was similar during the period of reference. While spending on health care 
diminished (from 10.6% to 9.0%), that associated to productivity losses and other effects 
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increased (from 68.0% to 68.7% and from 21.5% to 22.4% during the period, respectively).
731
 
Moreover, the price tag of drug abuse was estimated to continue growing at 5.8% per year, from 
$143.4 billion to $160.7 billion between 1998 and 2000 (outpacing the annual combined 3.4% 
population and consumer prices increase).
732
 
In total, spending on health services increased 2.9%, from $10.8 billion dollars to $14.9 
billion between 1992 and 1998. It is important to note that spending within this category 
remained almost constant during the period of reference, due to new medicines that allowed for a 
moderate price reduction (from $3.7 billion to $3.4 billion) in the treatment of human 
immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) care, which in 1992 
was the main drug use-related cost. In contrast, by the end of the period community-provided 
care became the most expensive category, as shown in Table 4-7. Another important item was 
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Table 4-7. U.S. Health Care Costs, 1992 and 1998 (millions of dollars) 
 
Cost categories   1992  1998  Annualised % change 





DoD    14  5  -15.9 
Indian Health Services  26  32  3.4 
Bureau of Prisons  17  21  3.4 
Dept. Veteran Affairs  468  416  -2.0 
 
Support 
Federal Prevention  616  725  2.8 
State and Local Prevention 89  85  -0.8 
Training    49  60  3.5 
Prevention Research  158  250  8.0 
Treatment Research  195  328  9.1 
Insurance Administration  223  286  4.2 
 
Medical Consequences 
Hospital/Ambulatory care costs 562  969  9.5 
Special disease costs   
Drug-exposed infants  407  503  3.6 
Tuberculosis   30  24  -3.5 
HIV/AIDS   3,700  3,337  -1.5 
Hepatitis B and C  462  434  -1.0 
Crime victim health care costs 92  127  5.4 
Health Insurance Administration 298  287  -0.6 
 
Total    10,820  12,862  2.9    
 
Source: White House, Economic Costs of Drug Abuse in the United States, p.5.    
 
Drug-emergency cases in hospitals increased from 333,100 in 1978 to a pike of 638,484 in 2001. 
From the 2001 cases, those related to cocaine amounted to 193,034 (30%); those related to 
marijuana were 110,512 (from 15,706 in 1990 or a 604% increase). While in 2000 heroin 
emergency cases reached the 94,804 figure (from 33,884 in 1990 or a 180% increase), by 2001 
this incidence showed a slight reduction to 93,064 cases. For its part, methamphetamine-related 
cases decreased from an all-time high of 17,537 in 1994, to 14,923 cases in 2001.
733
 
 The figure estimated for productivity losses was $69.4 billion in 1992. By 1998, this cost 
was estimated to have risen to $98.5 billion, which represented a 6.0% annual increase. The 
projected figure for 2000 was $110.5 billion. The fastest growing productivity losses were 
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related to health and imprisonment services, with annual rates increasing between 1992 and 1998 
to 8.5% and 9.1%, respectively, as shown in Table 4-8. 
 
Table 4-8. U.S. Productivity Losses, 1992 and 1998 (millions of dollars) 
 
Cost categories    1992 1998  Annualised % change 
 
Premature death    14,575 16,611   2.2 
Drug abuse-related illness   14,205 23,143   8.5 
Institutionalisation/Hospitalisation  1,477 1,786   3.2 
Productivity loss of victims of crime 2,059 2,165   0.8 
Incarceration    17,907 30,133   9.1 
Crime careers    19,198 24,627   4.2 
 
Total     69,421 98,476   6.0 
 
Source: White House, Economic Costs of Drug Abuse in the United States, p.6.    
 
All factors considered, in the 1990s the use of illegal drugs in the United States represented 
around $110 billion in social costs.  
Most of the social costs categorised as ‘other’ involve expenditures on criminal justice. 
Contradicting the argument that most drug users do not commit crimes other than the crime of 
possession itself, survey data demonstrates that between 1986 and 1997 50% to 57% people 
arrested had used drugs within 30 days before their offence. The figure for drug use at the time 
of offense for people at state detention centres was between 31% and 36% in the same period. 
For federal prisoners, drug use within 30 days before their offense increased from 32% to 45% 
between 1991 and 1997, while the commission of crimes while intoxicated increased from 17% 
to 22% between 1991 and 1997. According to the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) 
programme for U.S. selected cities, the number of male prisoners under the influence of drugs at 
the time of their arrest was between 54% and 83%, and that for females was between 44% and 
81% in 1998. One year later, the ranges decreased slightly from 50% to 77% in the former 
category, and from 22% to 81% in the latter.
734
 
 In fact, according to the 1997 Survey of State and Federal Prison Inmates published by 
the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), 51% of the prison population was intoxicated when 
transgressing the law. In terms of specific drug violations, according to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), in 1997 there were 1,583,600 non-federal arrests in the United States. While 
in 1987 arrests related to drugs amounted to 7.4% of the total reported to the FBI, by 1997 the 
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figure increased to 10.4%. Moreover, the proportion of drug delinquents grew from 6% to 23% 
in relation to the total population of both state and federal prisons between 1980 and 1996. Only 
in federal prisons, the proportion of drug criminals increased to 60% in 1997 from 25% in 1980. 
In 1997 the median time served for drug offences was 82 months.
735
 
According to Cárdenas, Policy Analyst at the ONDCP, in past years different states and 
even the U.S. federal government have pursued several laws aimed at stiffly penalising those 
charged with simple possession of drugs.
736
 However, in a statement that helps explain these 
oddly punitive responses to drug possession, a former high-ranking ONDCP official said of 
convicts: 
They are there because of distribution… Well, typically by the amount you… if you get a 
kilogram of cocaine that’s not for your own use; if you get one gram of cocaine that may be for 
your own use, so you distinguish it by the amount in your possession, one; or two, if you are 
caught in the act of selling it and clearly you are in the business of selling drugs, so that’s how 
you distinguish it, but many people are arrested for distribution but they plead guilty to a 
possession, so they may end up going to jail not for the crime that they originally were charged 
with but for a crime that they plead guilty to…
737
 
This explanation, therefore, shows why people have been convicted on the basis of possession 
rather than distribution charges. In some cases, however, such laws have appeared to be 
excessively harsh and for this reason, in order to reduce prison populations, the ONDCP has 




 It is important to note that all of the drug cost categories mentioned above are related in 
one way or another to the cost of crime. In general, the cost of crime in the United States 
increased from $60 billion dollars to $88.9 billion (6% per year) between 1992 and 1998, and 
were estimated to reach $100.1 billion by 2000. Within this cost, the most rapidly increasing 
categories were police protection (i.e. law enforcement activities) and productivity losses (i.e. 
unmet production targets because of unmanned positions) because of people in prison, with 
annual increases of 9.3% and 9.1% respectively, as shown in Table 4.9. 
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Table 4-9. U.S. Crime-Related Costs, 1992 and 1998 (millions of dollars) 
 
Cost categories   1992  1998  Annualised % change 
 
Health care costs 
Crime victim health care costs 92  127   5.4 
 
Productivity losses 
Productivity loss   2,059  2,165   0.8 
of victims of crime 
Incarceration   17,907  30,133   9.1 
Crime careers   19,198  24,627   4.2 
 
Cost of other effects 
Criminal justice system 
and other public costs 
Police protection   5,348  9,096   9.3 
Legal adjudication  2,716  4,489   8.7 
State and Federal corrections 7,495  11,027   6.6 
Local corrections   1,333  1,660   3.7 
Fed. spending to reduce supply 4,126  4,827   2.6 
Private costs 
Private legal defence  365  548   7.0 
Property damage   193  186   -0.5 
for victims of crime 
 
Total     60,832  88,887   6.5 
 
Source: The White House, Economic Costs of Drug Abuse in the United States, p.9. 
 
Drug trafficking has also put U.S. citizens and institutions at risk. Violence, as in other 
parts of the world, has been endemic to the drug trade. In 1997, for instance, 786 U.S. citizens 
were killed in drug-related incidents, the lowest number in over a decade, but still a perceptible 
toll.
739
 This figure, nevertheless, cannot be compared with the mayhem brought about by drug 
trafficking in other countries such as in Colombia and Mexico where U.S. anti-drug policies have 
been exported. 
Neither has the United States been immune to the drug corruption that has affected other 
countries. Drug traffickers have tried to buy protection from U.S. law enforcement and public 
officials, and in some cases they have succeeded. For instance, over the six-year period from 
1992 and 1997, 28 U.S. Customs Service and INS employees on the Southwest border were 
convicted of drug-related crimes, even though this number seemed a low proportion in terms of 
                                                 
739
 White House, ‘Emerging Drug Threats’, p.2.  
205 
 
the 9,600 agents who remained committed to their duty during this period; these cases, 
nevertheless, demonstrate that corruption has in fact existed.
740
  
 What was striking during the course of this research was to find only a limited number of 
analyses concentrating on the causes of drug addiction, as opposed to the number of reports 
focusing on its consequences in the United States. This approach is reflected by the fact that in 
2001 only 1.4% of drug users (3.1 million out of 15 million people 12 years and older) had 
access to rehabilitation in the year before the survey; moreover, almost half of the people who in 
fact received treatment -1.6 million-, obtained it from NGOs.
741
 Efforts to prevent drug 
consumption seem to have been limited at best. For instance, in contrast to the increasing 
proportion of the population who considered smoking to be unhealthy (71% in 2001 from 69.3% 
in 2000), in 2000 only 56.4% perceived the use of marijuana once or twice a week as a great 
health risk, and only 53% maintained this view in 2001.
742
  
The reason for insufficient access to treatment and education programmes may reside in 
the fact that even though supply-side policies have been by far the most expensive kind of 
response to the problem, they have been easier to implement and more politically convenient 
than demand-side measures, and that might well explain the support for them in the United 
States. That is, in terms of the Buzan et.al analytical framework, this could be the explanation 
about why the ‘audience’ has legitimised the coercive U.S. approach to drugs, provided that 
‘extraordinary measures’ to deal with drugs as an ‘existential threat’ are only applied abroad. 
Questioned about the lack of balance in U.S. drug policy, Umberg stated: 
Well, we can always do better. There are sort of broadly defined… there are several 
different areas that we focus on; one is demand reduction, reduction of demand for drugs 
in the United States, and there is a couple of different ways to do that, is by prevention, by 
teaching other people about the dangers of drug abuse and by treatment. We are doing a… 
we could do better specially in those two areas, there is a large treatment gap and there is 
people in the United States who need treatment, don’t have access to it, typically; and 
secondly, in terms of prevention, we are trying to educate America’s young people and 
adults on the dangers of drugs, but we haven’t been 100% successful.
743
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Given the context described above, both a coercive strategy at home and the prospect for the 
legalisation of drugs are completely out of the question for the U.S. government. The primary 
concern about legalisation seems to be its impact in terms of affecting a whole generation of 
young people (given the figures on the age composition of drug users provided above). That is, 
legalisation has been rejected basically because of fear that a growing acceptance of drugs will 
lead to increased levels of drug use, worsening crime, and to consequences such as drug-related 
illness, death and absenteeism. This was especially so at a time when use of marijuana by 8
th
 
graders, as already discussed, was fuelled by a measurable decrease in the number of young 
people who perceived drugs as dangerous substances. In this context, drug legalisation would 
send a conflicting message to the youth of the country by telling children that adults believe that 
drugs can be used without ill consequences. That would in turn eventually lead to the de facto 




4.4. Bilateral Relations 
As discussed above, no issue in U.S.-Mexican relations has generated more controversy than that 
of drugs. Most accounts of U.S.-Mexican diplomacy regarding drug trafficking have stressed the 
pressure on Mexico to ‘do something about drugs’. Interpreting Mexican drug control policy as a 
direct response to U.S. diplomatic pressure, however, disregards Mexico’s own interest in 
fighting an illegal activity that has posed a significant challenge to Mexican institutions.
745
 
Within the wider issue of drug control, one of the most sensitive aspects for the bilateral 
relationship has been the way in which the drug trade has corrupted Mexican authorities. This 
corruption, which has taken many forms and has occurred at different levels, has often 
complicated the process of forging a bilateral response to the drug trafficking threat. Reuter and 
Ronfeldt point out that the United States has been led to more aggressive postures, ‘not so much 
by the extent of drug flows from Mexico as by the perception that the Mexican control efforts are 
corrupt’, and they add, ‘the Mexican drug problem, as it affects bilateral relations with the 
United States, is essentially an issue of integrity’.746  
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The most serious drug corruption-related incident between the two countries was the 
previously mentioned murder of Camarena in 1985. In the opinion of Craig, ‘it was not the 
reality of the drug program’s corruptibility but the extent to which [corruption] had corroded the 
[anti-drug] campaign that came as a surprise’.747 After that incident, the U.S. media and U.S. 
Congressional hearings widely covered the issue of corruption in Mexico. From the Mexican 
perspective, the really irritating aspect of this situation was the ‘public nature’ of U.S. criticisms 
and their potential to produce a Mexican nationalist backlash.
748
 Criticisms also touched on the 
question of commitment, as Mexicans argued that their efforts surpassed by far those of 
Washington, even at a time of economic and political instability.
749
 Following this line of 
argument in Mexico, the question about why Mexicans have not often heard about major U.S. 
anti-drug achievements was posed during the interviews for this thesis. In the opinion of 
Cárdenas, 
Definitely happens [the dismantling of networks in the United States]. But I think it all is a 
problem of perception because the fact that a drug trafficking network has been 
dismantled in New York or Chicago or in Los Angeles does not necessarily is going to be 
a headline news here in the United States, because for one news to be a headline news in 
the United States, it has to compete with many, many other news, so TV channels and 
media in general have to determine that a news is valid for the half an hour on air of their 
programme, so it is very difficult… unless there had been casualties during an operation, 
or there had been a super-multimillion dollar seizure, it is difficult for an operation to 
make it to the news. I’ll give you a specific example: the seizures of the U.S. Coast Guard 
in the Pacific area right now, normally, these seizures which involve really big amounts of 
metric tons of cocaine, normally do not make it to the news programs…
750
    
According to Umberg, the reason that explains the ‘lack-of-U.S. commitment’ perception in 
Mexico has been the different structure of the drug trade in the United States: 
Yes. That’s a custom question. The question is usually posed: ‘How come you don’t arrest 
your kingpins in the United States? There is so much… there are so many drugs being 
distributed that there must be kingpins…’… drug trafficking in the United States is 
organised differently than in Mexico and Colombia. It’s much more diffused; in other 
words, there’re maybe more people involved in drug distribution and typically once we 
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know their name, they’re arrested… there are not too many people, drug dealers, who 
dominate… unless you get to be pretty well-known, after we get enough information to 
indict you, we usually catch you pretty quickly, before you get to be charged of drugs for a 
large area. Now, we did, you know, years ago, there were I think even larger drug 
traffickers that we did arrest them by… and that was a big deal, now it is much more 
spread out. Do we still have drug distribution? Obviously so. Do we… If we had some 
success? We had some success, internationally, production in Peru and Bolivia of cocaine 
is down dramatically, I think there have been successes between the United States and 
Mexico in the last four years that… for example, poppy production in Mexico is down, 
marijuana production in Mexico is down, there are… the cartels that existed in Colombia 
don’t exist the way they used to exist. So, all those things are successes. Do we still have a 
long way to go? Yes, absolutely, we still have a long way to go.
751
    
In the context of the 1985 incident, however, the Mexican government considered the 
accusations and scrutiny of its programmes a violation of its sovereignty. Reflecting public 
outrage, the Mexican press made a case against ‘American police agents’ whose presence in 
Mexico represented a ‘”violation of national sovereignty”, and presented the activities and 
declarations of those agents as unacceptable meddling in Mexico’s internal affairs’.752 
Mexicans have criticised the United States for trying to manipulate one issue in order to 
exert pressure on Mexico in other areas, to raise concerns about the country’s stability, and to 
damage its image for political reasons. In the 1980s, for instance, it was argued that the United 
States was deliberately exaggerating the drug problem to the detriment of Mexican sovereignty 
and security, possibly to compel Mexico to change its policies toward Central America.
753
 
Regarding the question of whether U.S. pressure in the Camarena affair was really motivated by 
Mexico’s policies toward Central America, Craig suggested that it did derive from U.S. 
impatience about issues such as the deterioration of Mexico’s eradication programme in the face 
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Even though ties between the United States and Mexico have been strengthened since 
NAFTA, the problem of Mexican corruption and lack of U.S. trust has still been present. 
According to Cárdenas, the issue of corruption in Mexico has not disappeared in the context of 
the bilateral relationship, but at least it has not been exploited in the way it was in the aftermath 
of the Camarena incident. He also stated that although trust has been complete at the highest 
levels of government, it will take a matter of years for this trust to filter down to the lower 
levels.
755
 Logan agreed with Cardenas’ perspective by pointing out that, ‘at the level of personal 
trust’ is where the best work is done between the United States and Mexico. Nevertheless, 
interpersonal trust ceases to facilitate policy solutions the moment people leave office and the 
new policy-makers are ‘back to square one’.756 According to his experience as Deputy ‘Drug 
Czar’, Umberg pointed out that there was trust between certain people and institutions, but 
accepted that the DEA and the U.S. Customs Service did not trust either their counterparts or any 
other institution in Mexico. He mentioned that notwithstanding that bilateral trust was 
improving, ‘all it takes there is one really bad incident and that trust goes away… you know, 
another Kiki Camarena, another Gutiérrez-Rebollo, something like that and it all is gone’.757     
  
4.5. Drug Trafficking from the Copenhagen School and Risk Society Theory Perspectives  
Drug trafficking in U.S.-Mexican relations, first of all, has been a trans-border issue that has 
originated from an integrated drug market between the two countries, where Mexico has been a 
major supplier and transhipment point, and the United States the world’s biggest consumer 
market. Drug trafficking, therefore, has been a reflection of the negative effects of globalisation. 
According to the evidence analysed in this chapter, drug trafficking in the United States 
has been defined as both a law enforcement matter and a national security issue because of its 
impact on the country’s health and social fabric; because of its negative effect on its economy in 
terms of lost productivity and the burden it has represented for the health and judicial systems; 
and because of its political consequences associated to official –though limited- corruption. This 
coercive U.S. approach to drug trafficking has been based on the idea that drug consumption has 
been is a law enforcement rather than a health matter.     
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In terms of the elements provided by the Buzan et.al analytical framework, in the United 
States the process of securitising drugs has been characterised by the prominent role of the state 
as the main ‘securitising actor’. Drug use was first conceived as a security concern in 1969, two 
years before President Nixon declared the ‘war on drugs’ in 1971. In the mid-1980s, President 
Reagan officially designated drug abuse as ‘national security threat’. That is, at least since the 
end of the 1960s, the U.S. government has been using the language of security (‘speech act’) in 
reference to drugs as a threat to the ‘survival’ of U.S. society. 
The central securitising actor that has traditionally made the ‘securitising move’ in the 
United States in reference to drugs has been the federal government, mainly by framing the issue 
as a ‘national security’ rather than a as ‘health’, matter, as discussed above. Within the U.S. 
federal government, for instance, both the DoS and the DEA have not only defined drugs as a 
security concern, but also Mexican drug trafficking organisations, in particular. This does not 
mean that additional securitising actors such as state or local governments, or those within the 
education and health systems, or religious leaders and the media have not been important; it just 
means that the most salient securitising actors found in the course of this research were federal 
officials.  
The interests and the intentions of those who securitise drugs in the United States have 
been related, first, to the genuine concern over preventing social erosion and the potential impact 
consumption could have in terms of new generations, especially because of the age composition 
of drug consumers in the United States. In this sense, government officials cannot afford to be 
perceived by the population as being ‘soft on drugs’, because this posture is not in line with the 
seriousness and sense of urgency authorities themselves have accorded to the drug threat, as 
reflected on the ‘war on drugs’ rhetoric. 
Second, the U.S. government itself has had an interest in designating drugs as a security 
matter due to the need to justify and maintain the international anti-drug regime of its own 
creation, and in this sense the need to sustain also the international obligations demanded from 
other nations that keep the anti-drug system alive. Maintaining this orientation is important to the 
United States to continue transferring the costs of fighting drugs abroad, which has meant 
concentrating on interdiction efforts beyond its shores instead of emphasising drug prohibition 
domestically, in order to avoid significant political consequences because of the possibility for 
internal violence.  
211 
 
Third, in more practical terms, the U.S. government has had an interest in maintaining 
drugs as a security threat because the public’s acceptance of this designation has been essential 
to justify the significant budgets that have sustained the ‘law enforcement industry’ in the 
country. Just as an example, the Border Patrol, which has been a key factor in dealing with 
illegal flows at the border with Mexico, increased its budget 148% (from $354 million to $877 
million) and more than doubled its personnel on the U.S. Southwest border (from 3,389 to 8,000) 
in just five years, between 1993 and 1998.
758
 More recently, border violence has been a subject 
that has attracted both public and official attention, not only in border communities but also at 
the national level. In this context, the discourse on ‘secure our borders’ in the United States led 
in 2003 to the creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the most 
significant reorganisation of the U.S. security bureaucracy since the 1947 National Security Act. 
‘Protecting the nation’s borders’ (including from the threat posed by drugs), therefore, has been 
not only a phrase that has been related to sovereignty, but also to an ‘existential threat’ and to the 
recognition that security is nothing such as ‘politics as usual’.   
In the case of the United States, the ‘audience’ that has accepted and legitimised the use 
of ‘extraordinary measures’ to confront drugs as an ‘existential threat’ has been the U.S. public, 
in general, an also government officials who at the same time have been the stake-holders that 
have proposed the designation of drugs as a security issue. As part of the audience, fighting 
drugs has represented for government officials the continuity and permanence of their 
institutions. 
It can be argued that the process of securitisation of drugs in the United States has been 
successfully completed because the audience has legitimised the use of ‘extreme measures’ to 
deal with a problem that has been perceived in terms of ‘survival’, which in turn has been 
evident in accepting the existence of a considerable law enforcement infrastructure to confront 
the threat. It can be argued that the acceptance of drugs as a security issue has been facilitated, 
first, by a genuine concern about the need to deal with the high level of addiction in the country, 
Second, the fact that drugs have been considered as something alien to U.S. society, something 
that comes from abroad, has allowed the United States to emphasise interdiction internationally 
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in detriment of treatment at home. That is, even though interdiction has been by far the most 
expensive response to the problem in terms of the U.S. budget, as shown in Table 4-10, it has 
been the most convenient response compared to addressing demand-side measures that might as 
well increase the levels of internal violence in the United States. 
 
Table 4-10. U.S. Anti-drug Budget (1999) 
Spending by Strategy Goal, FY1999 (millions of dollars) 
      Enacted Supp*  Total 
1. Reduce youth drug use  2,080.6  1.7  2,082.3 
2. Reduce drug related crime  7,441.0  12.0  7,453.0 
3. Reduce consequences  3,383.7  0.0  3,383.7  
4. Shield air, land, and sea frontiers 2,159.3  525.9  2,685.2 
5. Reduce sources of supply  1,977.7  304.3  2,282.0 
Total     17,042.3 843.9  17,886.2 
 
* Emergency Supplemental funding provided by P. L. 105-277. These funds were in addition to each department’s 
annual appropriation. Source: White House, National Drug Control Strategy: 1999, p.91. According to the figures 
above, 69.4% of the budget ($12,420.2) was assigned to supply-reduction activities, while 30.6% ($5,446.0) was 
devoted to prevention and treatment.  
 
It is important to mention, nevertheless, that even though the securitisation of drugs have 
been successfully securitised, this does not mean that all sectors of the U.S. society necessarily 
favour a coercive approach to the problem, or accept the law enforcement orientation of U.S. 
drug control policy which has been considered a failure. There have been other perspectives that 
have emphasised different alternatives to the problem, mainly in the form of dealing with the 
demand side of the equation.  
According to the Buzan et.al analytical framework, understanding the securitising process 
of a given issue allows the analyst to determine whether securitisation has been a ‘bad’ or a 
‘good’ decision.759 In the case of the securitisation of drugs in the United States, it can be argued 
that securitising drugs has been a bad idea because emphasising the law enforcement rather than 
the health aspect of the problem has not only been costly for the United States but also 
ineffective, evident in the fact that drug consumption and its social, political and economic 
consequences in the United States have not been adequately addressed so far. If it is true that by 
adopting a coercive approach the United States has also been able to transfer the costs of fighting 
drugs abroad -avoiding thus the domestic consequences in terms of violence as already 
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mentioned, in the specific case of Mexico fighting drugs has not only fostered corruption with 
potential negative consequences in terms of its process of democratic change -because of the 
erosion of its efforts at strengthening its institutions-, but it has also promoted high levels of 
violence with the potential to create instability in the country with consequences that could be 
more costly for the United States than drug trafficking or consumption itself.   
In terms of sectors, in the United States drug trafficking has been related to the military 
sector only to the extent that the U.S. military has provided infrastructure and intelligence in 
support of the LEAs dealing with this problem on the border with Mexico. That is, U.S. military 
forces are only indirectly involved in anti-drug activities. In the political sector, drug trafficking 
has been a threat to the United States because, although to a lesser extent than in Mexico, it has 
undermined its institutions and the legitimacy of the state. Although less prevalent than south of 
the border, drug-related corruption cases have also been present within federal, state and local 
law enforcement agencies and within the private sector.
760
 In the societal sector, in principle, 
drug trafficking and consumption are dangers within society, not threats to society. However, if 
the dimension of these problems becomes considerable enough, which is precisely the point of 
no return that U.S. drug policy has tried to avoid, especially regarding consumption, then it has 
the potential to affect societal security by threatening the U.S. population itself. Drug trafficking 
and consumption in the United States, therefore, have had the potential to affect the U.S. society 
as a whole. Drug trafficking and consumption have also influenced the economic security sector 
because of the existence of an illegal market fuelled by a global phenomenon such as drug 
trafficking, with impact on the well-being of the population. Drugs have not had any apparent 
effect on the environmental sector.  
In terms of Risk Society theory, drug trafficking is a trans-national concern related to the 
existence of an integrated drug market between Mexico and the United States, which is the 
product of a global process and therefore a manufactured risk. In the United States, drug 
trafficking is a security concern that has affected the social fabric of the country, and in the 
context of possible scenarios, it is considered not only to worsen social conditions but also 
negatively affect future generations. In this context, the United States is dealing with an actual 
security concern but it is also minimising, through a risk management perspective, the future 
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consequences of this problem based mainly on law enforcement measures. This course of action, 
nevertheless, has had a boomerang effect in the fact that increasing coercive measures have only 
resulted in more profits for DTOs. Risk management, nevertheless, is seen as the best alternative 




Historically, the United States has defined drug use as a law enforcement -and a national 
security- rather than as a public health, issue, and this view has resulted in a biased and 
unbalanced approach towards the problem. This perspective has not only fostered tougher 
domestic policing that has resulted in a significant burden for the U.S. judicial system, but it has 
also created destabilising effects for those producer and transit countries on which the U.S. 
supply-side orientation has been imposed. After several decades of considerable spending in 
eradication and interdiction campaigns abroad, U.S. drug control policy has been demonstrated 
to be ineffective. Both demand and supply have shown a remarkable resilience, not only in terms 
of the mobility of production as a response to increased control efforts, but also on the demand 
side in the adaptability to new drugs. 
Due to its geographical proximity and dual role as producer of marijuana and heroin, and 
later as a transhipment point for cocaine from South America bound to the U.S. market, Mexico 
guaranteed its place at the centre of U.S. anti-drug policy. Under U.S. pressure, Mexico adopted 
a prohibitionist approach in its drug policy whose clearest expression was the militarisation of its 
eradication efforts early on. This response to the challenge, however, has not been without 
consequences for the country to the extent that increased enforcement has led to the 
strengthening of drug trafficking organisations by making their activities more lucrative, and 
therefore by increasing their availability of resources to corrupt authorities on both sides of the 
border, but mainly on the Mexican side. Continued demand for drugs in the United States, and a 
lack of sufficiently strong law enforcement and judicial institutions in Mexico, are two factors 
eroding the security of the two countries. 
Drug trafficking and consumption have been successfully securitised in the United States 
because the audience, the public and the U.S. government itself, have legitimised the ‘breaking 
of rules’ to use ‘extreme measures’ to deal with an ‘existential threat’ that has been portrayed in 
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terms of ‘survival’, because of its negative social, economic and political consequences in the 
country. The acceptance of drugs as a security issue has been facilitated not only because of a 
genuine concern for its health impact, but also because it has been a convenient justification to 
keep considerable law enforcement structures and budgets, as well as U.S. influence abroad on 
producer and transit countries. This emphasis on coercive rather than on treatment measures, 
however, has demonstrated that the U.S. securitisation of drugs has not been an effective 
measure because of the lack of success evident in U.S. drug policy and in the so-called ‘war on 
drugs’. According to Risk Society theory, drug trafficking is a trans-national security concern 
that has to be addressed through a risk management perspective involving preventive measures 
























CHAPTER 5. UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to analyse undocumented immigration from Mexico as a security 
issue for the United States in the 1990s, in terms of the Buzan et.al analytical framework and 
Risk Society Theory. As in the case of the other two trans-border issues under consideration in 
this thesis, drug trafficking and environmental degradation, both perspectives were used to 
understand why undocumented immigration has been a U.S. security concern. It can be argued 
that immigration, throughout the years, has represented an underlying security issue for the 
United States because of its impact on the country’s identity (which is the subject matter of the 
Buzan et.al societal security-issue sector), even though this concern has been more often 
expressed in terms of apprehension about unemployment rates, low-wage levels and abuse of 
public services by unauthorised immigrants. Notwithstanding that the time-frame of this thesis is 
limited to the 1990s, it is important to note that a more direct link between security and 
immigration was established as a result of 9/11 and the Islamic terrorist threat,
761
 which has had 
significant consequences for Mexican undocumented immigration in terms of increasing human 
smuggling and corruption of authorities on both sides of the boundary as consequence of 
heightened U.S. border security.  
While drug trafficking was explicitly defined as a security concern regarding Mexico 
within the 1997 U.S. national security strategy, undocumented immigration was addressed as a 
concern of a trans-national nature in reference to the Western Hemisphere, without Mexico being 
mentioned at all notwithstanding the fact that this country has historically been one the main 
sources of both legal and unauthorised immigration to the United States.
762
 
For instance, according to a comprehensive bi-national study on Mexican immigration to 
the United States, 
the total size of the Mexican-born population in the United States in 1996 (both 
enumerated and unenumerated, legal and unauthorized) was 7.0 - 7.3 million persons. 
Of this population, legal residents accounted for about 4.7 - 4.9 million persons, 
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about 0.5 million of whom were naturalized United States citizens). Unauthorized 
migrants accounted for 2.3 - 2.4 million persons.
763
 
There are several historical factors that have sustained the movement of Mexicans, legal and 
without authorisation, to the United States. One factor in the decision to migrate has been the 
combination of so-called ‘demand-pull’ factors in the United States and ‘supply-push’ factors in 
Mexico, in addition to the existence of ‘social networks’ across the U.S.-Mexican border that 
have facilitated migration. Even though migration has not been an issue restricted to U.S.-
Mexican relations, it has certainly been one of the most complex, intricate, and sensitive, issues 
in the bilateral agenda. 
The first section of this chapter looks at the history, characteristics, and dynamics of 
Mexican immigration to the United States. Its purpose is to show the dominant economic 
character of this flow in the context of U.S. labour demand and Mexican labour supply, as well 
as to explain the creation of social networks across the border as a result of this historical pattern. 
It charts the attitudes toward Mexican immigration in terms of the changing conditions in the 
United States, as reflected in U.S. immigration legislation. The analysis of the characteristics of 
Mexican immigration, in turn, will demonstrate that notwithstanding the demand-supply 
relationship regarding this flow, Mexicans have also been attracted to the U.S. labour market by 
the facilitating conditions provided by social networks. This point is relevant to understand why 
economic measures per se are unlikely to address this complex problem. 
The second part focuses on Mexican undocumented immigration in the context of the 
bilateral relationship. The prospects for Mexican immigration in terms of the demographic and 
economic transformations in each country, and discusses why, because of -rather than in spite of- 
NAFTA, Mexican undocumented immigration to the United States is likely to continue in the 
foreseeable future. 
The third section addresses U.S. concerns about Mexican undocumented immigration 
from the U.S. point of view, as related to territorial integrity, identity, and economic impact in 
the context of the last two decades of the 20
th
 century, and discusses the U.S. response to this 
challenge in the second half of the 1990s through increased law enforcement both in the interior 
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of the country and at the border. The fourth part focuses on analysing Mexican undocumented 
immigration to the United States in terms of the Buzan et.al analytical framework and Risk 
Society Theory in order to understand its securitisation during the 1990s. The fifth section 
provides the conclusions for this chapter.  
 
5.2. Mexican Immigration to the United States 
Except for a brief period during the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920), when a sizeable number 
of Mexicans moved north escaping from conflict in their country, Mexican immigration to the 
United States has responded to labour demand in the United States. This section will show how 
this immigration flow has historically been determined to a large extent by ‘pull’ factors, and 
how U.S. attitudes toward Mexican immigration have changed according to the U.S. political, 
economic and social context. U.S. barriers to the entry of Mexican workers have generally been 
relaxed when Mexican labour has been considered an advantage, a ‘benefit’, as in the context of 
labour shortages and in times of economic expansion. It has had a negative character when these 
immigrants have been perceived as a disadvantage, as a ‘threat’, as in times of economic 
slowdown or in the context of xenophobic political campaigns, or simply because their number 
and presence has strained the tolerance of the U.S. society. 
If it is true that Mexican immigration to the United States has been dominated by 
demand-side considerations, Mexico’s pace of economic development and the establishment of 
social networks across the border have also significantly contributed to this phenomenon. The 
durability of social linkages between immigrants in the United States and potential immigrants in 
Mexico means that even a closing of the income gap between the two countries would not 
necessarily end Mexican immigration. This is a bilateral issue and one that does not lend itself to 
simplistic or one-sided solutions.   
 
5.2.1. Historical Overview 
Seem from abroad as a country characterised by political freedom and economic opportunity, the 
United States has not only enticed immigrants from all over the world, but also expressly invited 
them into the country in times of labour shortages. During economic slowdowns, however, it has 





Documented and undocumented immigration to the United States are historically the 
predictable consequence of de facto and de jure immigration policies; these policies 
coincide with the perceived need for an immigrant work force.
764
 
As a matter of fact, the 19
th
 century in the United States was characterised by the political 
manipulation of migration in favour of a continued flow, thus recognising its economic 
importance.
765
 Even before the beginning of the 20
th
 century immigration waves, the U.S. 
economy began to attract Mexican workers because they represented a pool of cheap seasonal 
labour that could be returned to its country given Mexico’s adjacent position to the United States. 
The benefit of having access to ‘temporary’ workers, as will be discussed below, turned out to be 
far from reality. Although Mexicans were initially recruited to work in agriculture and some 




The first significant immigration flow across the U.S.-Mexico border occurred during the 
Mexican Revolution. This movement –which accounted for 890,371 individuals according to 
U.S. official records-, was also in part influenced by the U.S. involvement in WWI.
767
 However, 
since refugees and undocumented immigrants were not included, it is estimated that the actual 




Before the Immigration Act of 1917, Mexican immigrants were not a concern for U.S. 
immigration policy.
769
 Enactment of the law, however, ‘imposed a literacy test and a head tax of 
$8.00 on Mexican immigrants and reiterated the prohibition against contract labor’.770 Even 
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though these measures fostered undocumented immigration, flows remained low because 
Mexicans were afraid of conscription into the U.S. armed forces in the context of WWI. U.S. 
manpower transferred to the European theatre of war created a serious labour shortage in the 
United States to the point that in May 1917 (three months after the passage of the act) the U.S. 
government decided to exempt Mexican agricultural workers from its provisions; one year later 
(June 1918), Mexican railway workers were freed from those measures as well.
771
 The U.S. 
Bureau of the Census estimated that in the span of two decades, from 1910 to 1930, the number 
of Mexican immigrants in the United States went from 200,000 to 600,000.
772
   
After the sizeable immigration flows of the early 20
th
 century, pressures for restrictions 
built up and eventually led to passage of the National Origins Act of 1924, which ‘substantially 
curtailed the flow of immigration to the country’, except for Mexican immigrants and for people 
from the Western Hemisphere who were considered more submissive than European 
immigrants.
773
 The Border Patrol was created that same year.
774
 
Although Mexican immigration persisted throughout these years, the effects of the Great 
Depression contributed to stem the flow. In fact, it is estimated that 300,000 Mexican immigrants 
were deported between 1929 and 1932.
775
 Unemployment in the United States fostered hostility 
against foreigners, and ‘prejudice, physical intimidation, and ethnic slurs abounded’.776 In 
response to this situation, in the following years the Mexican government launched a repatriation 
programme to redirect migrants into agricultural production centres back in Mexico.
777
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The decade-and-a-half of low Mexican immigration to the United States, from around the 
middle of the 1920s to 1942, however, turned out to be the exception to the rule. This pattern 
was reversed during WWII when, as a ‘wartime measure’, the U.S. government asked Mexico to 
supply workers to fill positions vacated by conscription as it had been during WWI. In 1942, the 
United States engaged in a series of bilateral agreements with Mexico known as the ‘Bracero 
programme’. Enacted as ‘Public Law 45’ by the U.S. Congress, and revised twice thereafter (in 
1951 and in 1964, the same year it was terminated), the programme established annual quotas for 
temporary Mexican workers in the United States. According to some estimates, after 22 years of 
operation, the programme sent around 5 million Mexican labourers to the United States (as much 
as 400,000 annually in years of highest demand in the 1950s).
778
  
A decade after the beginning of the agreements, the U.S. Congress enacted the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter Act). Among its main provisions, 
the act retained the quota system established by the 1924 act except for the Western Hemisphere, 
and set up a preference system based on the U.S. economy needed skills and family reunification 
criteria.
779
 Regarding Mexican immigration, the act included one of the most controversial 
dispositions ever found in U.S. legislation. The ‘Texas Proviso’ was an amendment promoted by 
Texas legislators designed to tolerate employers who hired undocumented immigrants, while 
criminalising those immigrants who took a job without legal admission in the United States.
780
 In 
the opinion of Jorge Bustamante, this law ‘made the United States the only country in the world 
where immigration laws explicitly allowed employers to hire aliens who had entered the national 
territory in violation of those same laws’.781 
From a different point of view, however, this kind of legal contradiction in the United 
States has obscured an underlying economic logic. The law’s loopholes and lax enforcement 
could be attributed, according to Wayne Cornelius, to ‘the common interest of political and 
economic elites in supplying a steady pool of cheap, pliant, productive and disposable labor to 
agribusiness and certain other sectors of the United States economy’.782 Although this provision 
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was discarded in 1986 when employer sanctions were included in the Simpson-Rodino bill, the 
basic (though less overt) orientation of the law remained: to control entry without endangering 
U.S. businesses that rely on undocumented workers.   
The sizeable dimension of undocumented immigration that had grown parallel to the 
Bracero programme was considered in the United States to depress wages; because of the illegal 
flow, furthermore, in the words of Herbert Brownell Jr., President Dwight Eisenhower’s first 
Attorney General, ‘America was faced with a breakdown in law enforcement on a very large 
scale’.783 In this sense, in 1954 the U.S. government implemented ‘Operation Wetback’, leading 
to the deportation of around 1.1 million Mexican undocumented workers.
784
  
The United States unilaterally terminated the Bracero programme on 31 December 1964, 
in spite of Mexican preferences to the contrary. This decision was influenced by a variety of 
religious, labour and Mexican-American groups that expressed their concern about insufficient 
protection of human and labour rights of Mexican immigrants; the programme was mainly 
resisted by the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) 
which contended that workers from Mexico only contributed to negatively affect labour rights 
and benefits at the local level.
785
 The termination of the programme, however, stimulated even 
more undocumented immigration because a mutually advantageous relationship had already been 
established between workers and employers. In the end, as Carlos Rico pointed out, ‘what 
changed was not the flow but the status of workers’.786 This is attested by the steady upward 
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Table 5-1. Deportable Aliens Located: Fiscal Year 1961-1970 
 
Year   Deportable Aliens Located 
1961   88,823 
1962   92,758 
1963   88,712 
1964   86,597 
1965   110,371 
1966   138,520 
1967   161,608 
1968   212,057 
1969   283,557 
1970   345,353 
Total   1,608,356 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), 1998 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) [online] available: 
http://www.ins.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/ENF98.pdf (14/10/02), p.9. 
 
This phenomenon had occurred because U.S. labour demand became attractive to more 
Mexicans than the programme had anticipated. The Bracero programme, therefore, had two 
important effects on Mexican immigration to the United States: (1) ‘temporary’ migration 
actually turned into long-term immigration because of consolidation of the demand-supply 
relationship;
787
 and (2) the higher level of undocumented immigration was also function of cross-
border social networks established by legal migration, as discussed above, which facilitated the 
northbound flow.  
 Undocumented immigration to the United States has, of course, not been restricted to 
Mexicans. As a matter of fact, there is a difference between ‘Mexican immigration’ and 
‘immigration from Mexico’, because Mexicans have not been the only nationals in the northward 
flow crossing the U.S.-Mexico border.
788
 This fact became evident around the mid-1960s, after 
passage in 1965 of amendments to the 1952 Act. These amendments included important 
measures that eventually had important consequences for the size and composition of 
immigration to the United States, such as family reunification as the central criteria for people 
admitted in the United States; abolition of the quota system; and an increase in the number of 
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visas for Western Hemisphere countries.
789
 The amendments resulted in a shift in the national 
origin composition of immigrants by increasing the Hispanic and Asian components of the 




Table 5-2. Region of Birth of the Foreign Born Population 1960 to 1990 
 
Region   1960  1970  1980  1990 
Europe   7,256,311 5,740,891 5,149,572 4,350,403   
Asia   490,996 824,887 2, 539,777 4,979,037 
Africa   35,355  80,143  199,723 363,819 
Oceania  34,730  41,258  77,577  104,145 
Latin America  908,309 1,803,970 4,372,487 8,407,837 
Total   9,738,091 9,619,302 14,079,906 19,767,316 
 
Source: C. J. Gibson and E. Lennon, Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-born Population of the United 
States: 1850-1990, Population Division Working Paper No. 29, Population Division, U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC), Washington, DC, February 1999, [online] available: 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0029/tab03.html (26/09/02). 
 
For instance, in the 1950s 70% of the immigrant flow came from Europe and Canada; in the 
1970s that proportion decreased to 20%; and in the 1980s to 15%; in contrast, Latin American 
and Caribbean immigration increased 30%, 75% and 80% in those same periods, respectively.
791
 
The end of the 1970s was marked by the outbreak of armed conflicts in Central America, which 
also contributed to refugee flows. Regarding Mexico, the 1965 legislation had an important 
impact because by that time the country was the largest source of legal immigrants to the United 
States. The act resulted in increased incentives to migrate illegally, especially for those Mexicans 
without relatives in the United States.
792
 
The effect of these changes was to create a perception in the United States that the 
country had ‘lost control of its borders’ and that the costs of immigration were greater than its 
benefits, leading by the mid-1970s and early 1980s to efforts to reform U.S. immigration policy. 
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Importantly, these transformations also coincided with Mexico’s economic crisis at the 
beginning of the 1980s, and therefore with greater economic incentives to migrate to the United 
States due to unemployment and the income differential between the two countries. The 
relationship between economic crises in Mexico and emigration to the United States can be 
observed, in particular, in a study that pointed to the positive correlation between peso 
devaluations and immigration flows to the north. For instance, from the 1960s to the 1990s, it 
was estimated that for each 10% variation in the exchange rate favourable to the dollar in 
reference to the peso, there was a spike of about 2% and 5% of detentions at the border, even 
after controlling for the level of wages in Mexico and the United States.
793
   
 After one previous unsuccessful attempt to reform immigration legislation at the 
beginning of the 1980s (i.e. Simpson-Mazzoli bill), on 6 November 1986 President Reagan 
signed into law the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). Also known as the Simpson-
Rodino bill (P.L. 603), this legislation was intended ‘to amend the Immigration and Nationality 
Act to effectively control unauthorized immigration into the United States, and for other 
purposes’.794 The objective of IRCA was to deal with undocumented immigration through 
legalisation by offering amnesty and a Special Agricultural Worker programme (SAW); and 
through enforcement, by establishing for the first time ever employer sanctions as ‘the 
centerpiece of the legislation’, among other measures.795             
The results of the law were divergent. On the one hand, there was a decline in the number 
of unauthorised immigrants in the United States as a total of 3,040,475 people applied for 
immigrant status regularisation (out of between 3 and 5 million), 1,763,434 for temporary 
residence and 1,277,041 for the SAW programme.
796
 On the other hand, after a temporary 
decrease in illegal border crossings in which would-be immigrants adopted a watchful/waiting 
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attitude regarding implementation of the law, the number of annual apprehensions increased 
again as shown in Table 5-3. 
Table 5-3. Immigration Enforcement Statistics 
 
      Mexicans  Mexican 
 Total  Total Border Patrol Apprehended by Undocumented 
Year Apprehensions Apprehensions  Border Patrol  Immigrants (estimated) 
1980 910,361  759,400   734,200   910,361 
1981 975,780  825,300   797,900   975,780 
1982 970,246  819,900   795,400   970,246 
1983 1,251,375 1,105,700  1,076,300  1,251,375 
1984 1,246,981 1,138,600  1,102,600  1,241,489 
1985 1,348,749 1,262,400  1,218,700  n.a. 
1986 1,767,400 1,692,500  1,635,700  n.a. 
1987 1,190,488 1,159,000  1,124,000  n.a. 
1988 1,008,145 971,000   929,800   n.a. 
1989 954,243  893,000   832,200   n.a. 
1990 1,169,939 1,103,400  1,105,400  n.a. 
1995 1,394,554 1,324,202  1,293,500  n.a. 
 
Source: M. R. Rosenblum, U.S. Immigration Policy: Unilateral and Cooperative Responses to Undocumented 
Immigration, Policy Paper 55, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, San Diego, 
[online] available: http://www-igcc.ucsd.edu/publications/policy_paper/pp55.html (29/03/01), p.3.  
 
In this context, the main criticism of IRCA was the absence of a mechanism for effectively 
sanctioning employers of unauthorised immigrants. According to the law, employers had to 
request prospective workers evidence of right to apply for a job; employers, however, were not 
accountable for assessing the validity of identification documents. In principle, therefore, an 
employer was supposed to satisfy the requirements of the law just by arguing that a worker had 
in fact been able to prove being qualified to be employed in the country, even if such event had 
not occurred at all.
797
 Given the government’s inability to enforce such legislation through actual 
checks on employers, the effectiveness of the law depended on voluntary compliance, which was 
considered better than no procedure at all. In the opinion of Manuel García y Griego, IRCA’s 
objective was twofold: to stem illegal immigration flows into the United States, and to shrink the 
volume of unauthorised immigrants already in the country.
798
 Bustamante suggests, nevertheless, 
that the law’s objective was to satisfy various political interests without confronting the 
economic motor of immigration, and that one of its results was, mainly, to promote the 
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proliferation of falsified documents.
799
 Just as in the case of drug trafficking, stricter immigration 
enforcement also turned immigration into a more difficult activity, but not to the point of actually 
becoming an efficient deterrent; it only fostered more extended periods in the United States 
because costs associated to immigration had evidently increased.
800
 
 After IRCA represented a partial solution to the undocumented immigration issue, U.S. 
authorities focused on the legal flow through the Immigration Act of 1990. The context in which 
this law passed was that of a rapid transformation of the U.S. economy away from manufacturing 
and towards service industries, which was also a period characterised by lower U.S. fertility rates 
that in part explains both the contribution of immigration to population numbers and to the figure 
for newly-job seekers, which accounted for 30% and 33%, respectively.
801
 This reform, which 
was intended to satisfy the demand of labour, was implemented against the background of the 
anti-immigrant sentiment that had surrounded the passage of IRCA, and in the context of an 
escalating recession. This kind of political decisions created a tension in the United States 
between those who have seen immigration policy in social and humanitarian terms, and those 
whose main concern has been reversing a perceived labour shortage.
802
 IRCA, nevertheless, 
confirmed the significant influence economic factors have had on U.S. immigration policy.  
As the unauthorised immigrant population increased in the early 1990s, pressure built for 
new law enforcement rules. In 1996 the U.S. Congress passed three laws to deal with this matter. 
The first was the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA) (H.R. 2202) that had as its purpose, 
To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to improve deterrence of illegal 
immigration to the United States by increasing Border Patrol and investigative personnel, 
by increasing penalties for alien smuggling and for document fraud, by reforming 
exclusion and deportation law procedures, by improving the verification system for 
eligibility for employment, and through other measures, to reform the illegal immigration 
system and facilitate legal entries into the United States, and for other purposes.
803
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 U.S. Congress, Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) (P. L. 




Among the relevant dispositions of the law, it authorised an increase in Border Patrol personnel 
through FY2001 (Title I/A); authorised and provided for INS undercover operations (Title 
II/A/Sec. 205); provided for a rapid deportation of undocumented immigrants (Title III/A); 
required to test more secure methods of employment verification (Title IV); and denied public 




The second law was the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) 
(P. L. 104-132), which was created ‘to deter terrorism, provide justice for victims, provide for an 
effective death penalty, and for other purposes’. The law mandated the exclusion of immigrants 
who had not been inspected and admitted (Title IV/Sec.414); facilitated the implementation of 
inspection and exclusion measures by immigrant officers themselves (Title IV/C/Sec.422); and 




The third piece of legislation was the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996, also known as the ‘Welfare Reform Act’ (H.R. 3734), which denied 
unqualified immigrants any federal public benefit except in cases of medical emergency, disaster 
relief and public immunisations (Title IV/Sec.401), and mandated that any ‘qualified alien who 
entered after the enactment of the law’, not to be eligible for any federal public service for a 




The irony was that these measures came only two years after NAFTA had strengthened 
bilateral co-operation between Mexico and the United States. In this anti-immigration 
atmosphere, the Mexican government was forced to adopt an even more active role in migration 
matters because of the potentially negative effect of this series of laws on the labour and human 
rights of Mexican immigrants, both legal and undocumented, in the United States. The 
relationship between NAFTA and Mexican immigration to the United States will be discussed in 
more detail in the NAFTA section below. 
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 U.S. Congress, Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, (Welfare 
Reform Act of 1996) (H.R. 3734) [online] available: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-




The Mexican-born population in the United States does not represent a homogeneous group. 
There are persons with different combinations of legal standing and migratory background. On 
the one hand, the legal standings are (1) ‘legal temporary visitors’; (2) ‘legal permanent 
residents’; (3) ‘naturalized United States citizens’; and (4) ‘unauthorized immigrants’ (people 
who ‘entered without inspection’ [EWIs], and those who exceed the expiration of their visas); on 
the other hand, the two principal backgrounds are ‘sojourners’ (or ‘circular migrants’), who stay 
temporarily in the United States but live mainly in Mexico, and ‘settlers’, who live in the United 
States.
807
 The fact that these categories and distinctions have not always been clearly understood, 
has contributed to false interpretations about Mexican immigration to the United States, in 
particular in reference to the real dimension of undocumented immigration.      
According to data provided by the bi-national study on migration referred to above, the 
characteristics of Mexican immigrants in the United States have changed over time in response 
to the more diverse demand, supply, and social network factors that have historically shaped 
immigration flows. The general characteristics of Mexican immigrants in the United States in the 
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Table 5-4. Characteristics of Mexican Immigration to the United States 
 
(1992)        (1990)  
Mexico  (1992-1994)     U.S. 
Characteristics  Resident Sojourners Settlers  Naturalised       Resident 
Age (avg.)  25 yrs  28-32 yrs 30 yrs  42 yrs  33 yrs  
Males   49%  73-94%  55%  54%  49% 
Married 
Men   83%  56-85%  59%  76%  56% 
Women   72%  43-66%  61%  80%  57% 
Schooling (avg.)  5 yrs  6 yrs  8 yrs  -  - 
Fewer than 5  46%  39%  28%  24%  3% 
Fewer than 12  90%  91-99%  76%  67%  28% 
More than 12  10%  1-9%  24%  33%  72% 
English 
(not speaking well) -  93%  71%  57%  6% 
Labour Force part. 43%  83%  70%  69%  65% 
Male   68%  91%  85%  82%  75% 
Female   20%  58%  50%  53%  59% 
Unemployment  3%  6-11%  11%  9%  6% 
Employment in 
Agriculture  23%  47-53%  13%  10%  3% 
Manufacturing  29%  25-26%  37%  36%  25% 
Services   48%  23-26%  51%  54%  72% 
Annual ind. earnings -  $185-240 (week) $14,138  $16,553  $24,408 
Ann. household income $8,880  -  $27,120  $28,210  $38,940 
Poverty   36%  -  27%  25%  13% 
 
Source: U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, Migration between Mexico & the United States, pp.14-15. 
 
Mexican immigrants to the United States have usually come from the less economically favoured 
social strata, and this characteristic has been in part explained by the non-specialised, rural, 
nature of early U.S. labour demand.
808
 However, over time this pattern has changed. The 
majority of immigrants, both men and women, have been married, and even though they have 
had less years of formal education than the typical U.S. citizen, they have been better prepared 
than the average Mexican population; Mexicans with higher levels of education also migrated to 
the United States as consequence of their country’s recurrent economic predicament in the 
1980s.
809
 Although immigration flows have been dominated traditionally by young males, the 
number of female immigrants has increased. In fact, women became the dominant sex among 
legal immigrants in the last decades leading to the 1990s.
810
 
The category of ‘sojourners’, in general, has been made up of less formally trained young 
men taking up farm jobs, and their short-term employment has explained their low earnings. The 
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‘settler’ group has been more evenly made up of both men and women with higher levels of 
academic preparation, and this category has been characterised by its better command of English 
than sojourners; most of its individuals work in the service sector earning higher salaries.
811
  
 Mexican-origin U.S. citizens have had a better command of English than any of the other 
Mexican migratory groups, and have received higher salaries than non-citizen settlers. According 
to an INS report, between 1977 and 1982 Mexican-born persons who naturalised came from the 
more ‘highly-skilled’ group.812 
A commission for the study of U.S.-Mexican relations documented a general consensus 
that Mexican immigration to the United States has been ‘ultimately driven by economic 
realities’.813 The catalyst for much undocumented immigration has rested on the effect of 
‘demand-pull’ forces in the U.S. economy, although other aspects have also contributed to 
sustain the flow.
814
 This does not mean, however, that Mexicans have not had access to jobs in 
their home country; in fact, most immigrants had some source of income before deciding to 
migrate, notwithstanding the increasing proportion of those unemployed at that particular 
stage.
815
 Rather, wage differentials between the two countries more often underlie the decision to 
emigrate. In general, wages in the United States have been 8 to 10 times higher than in Mexico, 
with variations depending upon fluctuations in the exchange rate. In the 1980s, for instance, 
while the U.S. minimum wage was $3.35 per hour, in Mexico it was 38 cents per hour.
816
 
‘Supply-push’ forces were accorded more importance in the 1980s given Mexico’s 1970s high 
fertility rate, and the 1980s economic downturns; however, both privatisation and agricultural 
reform processes contributed to elevate the unemployment rate.
817
 
Even though Mexican workers have traditionally been employed in the agricultural sector 
of the U.S. economy, since the 1980s the demand for Mexican labour has diversified at the same 
time that Mexico's crises led more people from urban areas to look for jobs in the U.S. service 
sector.
818
 In fact, Mexican immigrants have benefited from the expansion of U.S. low-wage 
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service industries by taking jobs of no interest for U.S. workers. Moreover, according to 
Cornelius: 
The diminishing interest in blue-collar work among young people in the United States 
has produced shortages of skilled workers in industries ranging from shoe manufacturing 
to masonry to ornamental metal work; for such industries, workers trained in Mexico 
provide skills and experience that are in short supply among the U.S.-born population.
819
 
Because Mexican-born immigrants have been employed in more diverse jobs, a lower proportion 
has worked in agriculture. As a matter of fact, it seems undocumented immigrants have been 
increasingly employed in non-agricultural jobs in the United States.
820
 
All the factors described above, nevertheless, provide only a partial picture of the 
phenomenon because other variables need to be taken into account. If profit-maximising 
behaviour were the prime motive for emigration to the United States, poor zones in Mexico 
located just south of the U.S. border would be the main source of immigration (travel costs and 
proximity to the United States are inversely related). Yet, Mexican immigration (legal and 
undocumented) has not typically originated in those areas. According to Table 5-5, traditional 
sending states in central Mexico have dominated as the origin of most emigration, even as flows 
have increasingly come from other regions. 
 
Table 5-5. Source of Mexican Immigration to the United States by Region 
 
Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 Region 5 Region 6  
Guanajuato Baja California Sinaloa  Fed. District Oaxaca  Veracruz 
Michoacán Sonora  Durango  State of Mexico Guerrero Tabasco 
Jalisco  Chihuahua Nayarit  Querétaro Puebla  Chiapas 
Colima  Coahuila Zacatecas Hidalgo  Morelos  Campeche 
  Nuevo León San Luis Potosí Tlaxcala    Yucatán 
  Tamaulipas Aguascalientes     Q. Roo 
38%  21%  22%  9%  8%  2% 
 
Source: U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, Migration between Mexico & the United States, pp.18-19.  
 
Thus, there are areas in Mexico with a deep-seated tradition of immigration to the United States, 
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Due to the imperative of location and a variety of social as well as economic factors, 
Texas was the main area of Mexican immigration before the third decade of the 20
th
 century, 
which was followed later on by other West Coast and Midwest states (such as California and 
Illinois).
 822
 Although Mexican-born immigrants are usually found in specific states and cities, 
they have increasingly moved around the United States. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, it 
seems in 1990 about 85% of the total Mexican born-population was concentrated in the three 
states mentioned above; since the 1920s, California has been the major destination with 50% of 
all Mexican immigrants, and Los Angeles their main point of arrival.
823
  
Given that Mexican immigration to the United States has traditionally originated in 
specific localities within Mexico, social networks across the border have represented a 
significant historical development.
824
 According to Cornelius, 
A century of migration from these places [Mexican source states] has led to the 
development of many thousands of binational kinship-employer networks that directly 
link potential migrants in Mexico to their United States-based relatives and United States 
employers. These networks play a fundamental role in making migration an attractive and 
economically feasible option for many Mexicans.
825
  
The existence of these social networks explains in part why immigration has not been responsive 
to legal controls, and why these measures (i.e. legalisation initiatives) have not only increased 
the likelihood of more permanent residence but actually strengthened cross-border social links. 
    
5.3. Immigration in the Bilateral Relationship 
This section looks at the prospects for future flows based on 1990s demographic and economic 
considerations, as well as on the potential effects of NAFTA. 
  In general terms, the subject of Mexican immigration to the United States has been 
marked by ‘ambivalence and misunderstanding’.826 The simplistic U.S. view has often stressed 
that Mexican immigration is the result of ‘push’ factors deriving from unemployment; the 
narrow Mexican view frequently emphasises the role of ‘pull’ factors created by the U.S. 
demand for migrant labour. The U.S. official position has been that the formulation of 
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immigration policy is a sovereign right and, therefore, a unilateral matter; the Mexican 
government has seen migration more as a bilateral issue that requires a shared response. 
Regarding benefits, while Mexicans have considered the U.S. consumer as the main beneficiary 
of undocumented immigration, the most common opinion in the United States has been that the 
main winner has been the Mexican economy as a whole because of remittances.
827
 One observer 
even noted that keeping the ‘safety valve’ open has only allowed ‘Mexican notables’ to neglect 
the political, economic, and social reforms required by their country.
828
 
Furthermore, the two countries have also had different objectives. Mexico’s favoured 
objective has been the legalisation of its undocumented nationals, which the United States has often 
deplored, although it was actually the course of action adopted under IRCA.
829
  The U.S. objective 
has been ostensibly to reduce immigration, an aim that has not aligned well with Mexico’s national 
interest. Moreover, the Mexican government has avoided deploying law enforcement to restrain 
emigration from its territory, as this would be a violation of Article 11 of the Mexican Constitution. 
The article reads as follows: 
Every individual has the right to enter and exit the Republic, to travel throughout its territory, 
and to change his place of residence without the need of a security card, passport, safe-
conduct or other similar requirements. The exercise of this right will be subordinated to the 
faculties of the judicial authority in cases of criminal and civil responsibility, and to those of 
administrative authorities regarding the limits imposed by emigration and immigration laws, 
public health, or those concerning unauthorised foreigners residing in the country.
830
   
Notwithstanding increased bilateral co-operation under NAFTA, U.S. and Mexican objectives 
seemed to have remained at odds. On the one hand, the United States saw the agreement as an 
opportunity to promote Mexico’s economic development, and thus indirectly to reducing incentives 
for immigration. On the other hand, Mexico expected the free movement of people as the logical 
consequence of free trade, even though NAFTA has not represented a common market. 
Regarding the prospects for the future, low birth rates in the United States and its shift 
towards a service-based economy, coupled with Mexico’s comparatively higher birth rate and its 
inability to generate well-paid jobs in the short term, are both likely to sustain the flows. It can be 
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argued, nevertheless, that not even full employment in Mexico would guarantee the termination of 
the flows, given the existence of the social networks mentioned above, and because of the well 
established patterns of interaction between employers and workers and between communities on 
both sides of the border. 
 
5.3.1. Prospects 
Social networks are likely to contribute to the continuation of Mexican immigration -legal and 
undocumented- to the United States in the future, but other structural factors are also important. 
These include demographic and labour market dynamics in both countries, as well as the impact of 
economic integration under NAFTA. 
 
5.3.1.1. Demographic and Labour Trends  
According to WB statistics, in 2000 the population of the United States was 281.6 million people, 
with an average annual growth rate of 1.1% during 1980-2000; Mexico’s population, in contrast, 
was 98 million people, with an average annual growth rate of 1.9% for the same period.
831
 In terms 
of birth rates, the United States had 15/1,000 people and Mexico 25/1,000 people.
832
 In 2000, 
whereas the median age of the U.S. population was 35.3 years old, that of Mexico was 22 years.
833
 
 In terms of the younger structure of the Mexican population, a study carried out in 1998 
estimated that the key 10- to 19-year old age group in the country, which accounted for 21.85 
million people in that year, would rise to 23.65 million by 2010. It was estimated that if only 80% of 
males in that group became active job seekers, an average of nearly one million new workers would 
enter the Mexican labour force each year over the second decade of the 21
st
 century; consequently, 
while Mexico’s population growth rate has been slowing down in the course of the last decades, the 
number of Mexicans entering the workforce was estimated to be increasing an average of at least 
30% in the first two decades of the new century.
834
 Just to keep pace with this demand for new jobs, 
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without considering existing unemployment and underemployment, the Mexican economy had to 
expand well over the 6.9% GDP growth reached in 2000.
835
 In fact, a U.S. study carried out in the 
early 1990s estimated that Mexico’s economy would have to expand at a rate of more than 10% 
annually to absorb all the new labour force entrants.
836
 These trends, therefore, emphasised the 
potential of the so-called ‘push’ factors to continue in the future. 
 Regarding ‘pull factors’, it was estimated that these could be strengthened by the effects of 
demographic change in the United States over the latter part of the 20
th
 century. The U.S. labour 
force was expected to grow more slowly, to age, and to exhibit increasing diversity.
837
 On the one 
hand, it was projected that with the ageing of the ‘baby boom’ generation (that is, people born 
between 1946 and 1964), the older segments of the population would represent a sizeable 
proportion of the working population in the years to come: in particular, people from 55 years of 
age and older would increase their participation in the workforce from 13% to 20%, from 2000 and 
2020, respectively; on the other hand, jobs would continue to multiply in sectors that had typically 
attracted immigrant workers despite falling rates of population growth.
838
 
 To the extent that the ‘baby boom’ generation retires within the five years from 2010 to 
2015, the pension burden will gradually grow to 37 retirees per 100 people employed, which is 
more than double the 1950 15 per 100 ratio; however, according to U.S. Census Bureau projections, 
in the 30 years between 2020 and 2050 immigrants will increasingly replace retiring workers.
 839
 
 Furthermore, it was expected that the number of jobs that would be created in the United 
States in the first decade of the 21
st
 century would be around 22.2 million, even though the job 
creation rate would be less robust than in the previous ten years (1.6%); the total number of jobs 
was estimated to reach 167.8 million by the end of this period.
840
 Continuing the 1990-2000 trend, 
the service sector was estimated to create jobs at an annual rate of 1.8%; the manufacturing sector 
would also contribute its share but at a less robust rate of 0.5% per year; and the service industry 
and retail trade would represent 73% growth of urban employment between 2000 and 2010.
841
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 These economic trends have been significant for immigration patterns because immigrants 
have tended to cluster in low-paying occupations, especially in the service sector. In 2000, about 
19% of the foreign-born were employed in service occupations, and another 19% worked as 
operators, fabricators and labourers; in contrast, a little less than 13% of the U.S. born was 
employed in each of these occupational categories.
842
 Lower levels of formal preparation and no 
command of English, have been some of the factors that have explained the significant presence of 
non-U.S. citizens in low-wage occupations.
843
  
 The greater availability of jobs within sectors that have historically recruited Mexican 
immigrants would likely portend a spike in Mexican immigration or, at least, more job opportunities 
for immigrants already in the county. In the service sector, the food and drink industry was expected 
to add about 1.5 million jobs between 2000 and 2010. It was estimated that social and economic 
change would contribute to expand jobs within this category of economic activity by 1.5 million 




 In the manufacturing sector, the most 
dynamic source of jobs would be construction, growing at an average rate of 12% by 2010 (7.5 
million openings), retaining its position as one of the most vigorous employment sources.
845
 In the 
agricultural sector, higher production as a result of technological innovation was bound to have a 
positive impact on the overall output. Technology-intensive production, however, was projected to 
decrease total employment by 155,000 jobs within this sector, to reach 1.8 million in 2010.
846
 Thus, 
in the three activities where it has been common to find foreign-born people employed, only 
agriculture would create fewer jobs. Notwithstanding that the Mexican workforce has historically 
been concentrated in traditional sectors such as in agriculture, railroads, and mining, it has become 
increasingly diversified in response to the labour demands created by the shift from manufacturing 
to service-based activities in the U.S. economy, as discussed above. 
 Even though the preceding projections regarding ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors pointed to greater 
immigration in the future, it is important to mention that one bi-national study on migration 
projected the opposite result. On the ‘push’ side, the study established that job growth would 
basically surpass job demand, and under these conditions it was estimated that Mexico could even 
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start dealing with prior labour market challenges in a more comprehensive way.
847
 As for the ‘pull’ 
side of the equation, the U.S. labour markets where Mexican immigrants have usually worked were 
undergoing a rapid change due to technological advances, trade trends, labour force adjustments and 
legislation changes. In terms of demand, in the U.S. labour market employers were adjusting to 
higher minimum wages and to more global competition. In terms of supply, it was considered that 
the United States not only maintained ‘a sizeable low-skill labor force’ but also that the result of 
new social initiatives could be to increase that supply by pushing more U.S. citizens into the labour 





Another important factor to take into account has been U.S.-Mexican economic integration under 
NAFTA. Since the end of WWII, U.S. efforts to establish an open international system for the free 
flow of capital, goods and services, also created the conditions for international migration by 
establishing economic links between the countries. Foreign investment, in particular, had an 
important role in this process. According to Saskia Sassen,  
… significant levels and concentrations of direct foreign investment are one, and only one, 
factor promoting emigration through: (a) the incorporation of new segments of the population 
into wage labor and the associated disruption of traditional work structures both of which 
create a supply of migrant workers; (b) the feminization of the new industrial workforce and 
its impact on the work opportunities of men, both in the new industrial zones and in the 
traditional work structures; and (c) the consolidation of objective and ideological links with 
the highly industrialized countries where most foreign capital originates, links that involve 
both a generalized westernization effect and more specific work situations wherein workers 




In the case of U.S.-Mexican relations, this process began to take place between 1940 and 1970, 
when U.S. capital and technology promoted Mexico’s agricultural development. As noted by 
Bustamante, such linkages made evident that ‘push’ factors were not necessarily endogenous to 
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 Yet, Mexico’s development strategy did cause what Sassen referred to as a 
‘disruption of traditional work structures’. 
 The important point here is that measures assumed to deter emigration, such as foreign 
investment and the creation of an export-oriented economy, often end up creating the opposite 
effect. It is therefore paradoxical that NAFTA was sold in part in the United States precisely with 
the idea of reducing immigration from Mexico (although it was not designed explicitly for that 
purpose). During the signing of the NAFTA side agreements in The White House in September 
1993, speaking in the context of Mexico tying its minimum wage to the growth of its own economy, 
President Clinton stated: 
What does that mean? It means that there will be an even more rapid closing of the gap 
between our two wage rates. And as the benefits of economic growth are spread in Mexico to 
the working people, what will happen? They’ll have more disposable income to buy more 
American products and there will be less illegal immigration because more Mexicans will be 
able to support their children by staying home. This is a very important thing.
851
 
He thus sought to persuade the U.S. public that Mexico’s future growth, as a result of increasing 
foreign investment under NAFTA, would stem emigration to the United States in the long-term. 
This view was consistent with that expressed by the Asencio Commission, which in its July 1990 
report Unauthorized Migration: An Economic Development Response, recommended the 
establishment of a free trade area between the United States and Mexico as the best hope for 
fostering Mexican development and thus for reducing migration pressures.
852
  
 Far from stopping emigration from Mexico, it was estimated that the consolidation of 
NAFTA could in fact promote it. According to Douglas Massey, 
As trade relations expand, a continent wide infrastructure of transportation and 
communication will facilitate the circulation between the two countries, and an expanding 
network of interpersonal ties created trough trade, tourism, education and migration itself 
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will lower the costs and risks of international movement –thus putting a U.S. job within 
easy reach of a growing fraction of the Mexican population.
853
 
In the opinion of Robert Manning, however, the reason why NAFTA could increase Mexican 
immigration to the United States is its effect in decreasing employment and salary levels in 
Mexico due to non-labour intensive manufacturing, and also because of an unbalanced 
concentration of investment in the border maquiladora industry.
854
 Massey concurs with this 
view by pointing out that NAFTA has actually promoted Mexican immigration to the United 
States.
855
 U.S. immigration policy, nevertheless, has been formulated with disregard of these 
processes.      
 In the build up to the NAFTA negotiations, Mexico wanted immigration to be included in 
the agenda but the United States rejected the proposal pointing to the prospect for the issue to be 
rejected by some federal legislators.
856
 In order to avert an impasse, therefore, those involved in the 
discussion about the prospective trade agreement deliberately skipped immigration matters, 
focusing instead only on minor issues such as the more lenient movement of highly skilled 
people among the three countries –Canada, the United States, and Mexico.857 
 The Mexican government, however, made it clear that some kind of arrangement would 
have to be reached in the future. Underlying this conviction was not only evidence pointing to 
the structural nature of the problem, but also the belief that it was only logical to include the free 
movement of people as part of the integration process. In reference to the trade agreement, then-
President Salinas stated:  
This is a negotiation in goods and services. But eventually we will have to sit down and talk 
about labor because the American economy is demanding Mexican workers. I want Mexican 
workers to work in Mexico not out. But nevertheless there is a demand pool coming from the 
U.S. economy, and it is a reality that we will have to look at carefully.
 
[Answering how long 
did he expect it would take to reach an agreement on labor in a free market, he added]: It  [the 
flow] is quite free now. Nevertheless, it is not in accordance with the law, and there are 
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abuses on the Mexican side and on the American side on Mexican workers, and I want to end 
those abuses. Therefore I would say the sooner the better.
858
 
Mexico ultimately did not manage to place migration on the negotiation agenda. For many of the 
same reasons, there was no discussion of Mexico’s state oil monopoly. Both have been sensitive 
domestic political issues, migration for the United States, oil for Mexico.  
  
5.4. U.S. Concerns and Responses to Undocumented Immigration 
Within the debates about undocumented immigration to the United States, it has been common to 
find several lines of argument that have focused exclusively on its negative impact. When 
immigration has been convenient for national economic security, the United States has overlooked 
it, both at times of war and prosperity. Negative attitudes have generally surfaced whenever 
immigrants have been judged to threaten national identity and cohesion, or impose economic 
burdens on the rest of the U.S. society.  
 These views, in turn, have expressed themselves through U.S. immigration policies that 
have concentrated on the law enforcement rather than on the social and economic integration 
aspects of the problem. Even though these policies have served to quiet the political clamour to ‘do 
something about the border’ in the short term, in the long run they have failed to provide for 
effective measures to control or stem the flows. The emphasis on the law enforcement approach has 
not only proved to be a failure on both counts, but it has also contributed to the growth of 
corruption, smuggling organisations, human rights violations and, in the specific case of 
undocumented immigration from Mexico, to an increasing number of deaths along the common 
border.  
 However, the 9/11 events made it more complicated to relax the law enforcement approach. 
To the contrary, security co-operation between the United States and Mexico has expanded, making 
it increasingly difficult, though not impossible, for Mexican undocumented immigrants to respond 
to the demand coming from the U.S. labour market. The arguments about ‘loss of border control’, 
undocumented immigrants as a ‘disruptive force in society’ and as an ‘economic burden’, are 
discussed in turn. 
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5.4.1. ‘Loss of Border Control’ 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the phrase ‘we are losing control of our borders’ became popular 
among those concerned about undocumented immigration to the United States. This argument, as 
already noted, stemmed from reactions to the changes in immigration patterns that took place 
beginning in the mid-1960s, and in particular from the idea that the costs of immigration 
outweighed its benefits, especially in the case of undocumented flows. 
 Anxiety about undocumented immigration has derived from several sources. Firstly, the 
outbreak of the Central American conflicts in the late 1970s and the Mexican economic crises of the 
1980s increased U.S. concerns about the potential of either of these events, or the combination of 
both, to expand immigration flows from this region to the United States. These were the kind of 
perceptions likely to have influenced the passage of IRCA in 1986, which was hailed as the 
legislation that would enable U.S. citizens to ‘regain control of their borders’.859 Secondly, the 
increasing proportion of Hispanics and Asians among legal immigrants over the last decades of the 
20
th
 century also drew more attention to the issue. Because almost all undocumented immigrants 
have been Hispanic or, to a lesser extent, Asian, the increasing number of legal immigrants within 
these groups contributed to create the impression that the volume and impact of undocumented 
immigration has been greater than it has actually been.
860
 The overblown reaction to undocumented 
immigration can be partly explained as an outgrowth of advances in communications and 
transportation, which have facilitated interaction and therefore increased the fear of the ‘outsider’. If 
this fear intensifies, according to Ronald Skeldon, it usually becomes an official concern especially 
when different political views are at play.
861
   
 One criticism of the ‘loss of border control’ argument has been that, to the extent that border 
control has failed, it is primarily because the U.S. Congress has subtly undermined immigration 
laws by confusing them with labour supply laws. From this perspective, Washington’s ‘lack of 
control’ over national borders has been a self-inflicted condition.862 In strict terms of ‘border 
control’, a real Mexican immigration-related threat to U.S. territorial integrity would come not from 
the usual flows, but from the prospect of a deep deterioration of stability in Mexico that could lead 
to a massive northward migration, as happened during the Mexican Revolution. This would 
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represent the materialisation of the loss of control-argument which had been invented for domestic 
political consumption by those who favoured more restrictive immigration policies during the 
debate leading to IRCA. A situation of ‘deep deterioration’ of stability means open civil war in 
Mexico, which could generate a mass exodus from the country. In terms of such a hypothetical 
scenario, according to Thomas Moorer and Georges Fauriol, ‘from the U.S. perspective, few 
developments could be more disastrous than a serious deterioration of Mexico’s prosperity and 
political stability’; they add that ‘U.S. preoccupation with regional socio-economic problems could 
be easily distracted by potentially more troublesome crises such as those in Mexico’, and conclude 
by pointing out that ‘Mexico's problems are our own, we underestimate their ability to damage U.S. 
security...’863 Concern for a potential problem of this magnitude was even reflected in calls made in 
the 1980s for the United States to plan for a ‘Mexican contingency’ and to be ready for the ‘defense 
of the Mexican border’, reminding that,  
the idea of having to entertain a U.S. border defense mission, which goes against the very 
psychology of the nation’s [United States] recent historical experience is unsettling, yet 
defense of the Mexican border has traditionally been an Army mission, forgotten in the age 
of thermonuclear warfare and bipolar worlds.
864
  
Turning the ‘loss of border control’ view up-side down, it is also possible to argue that Mexican 
migration to the United States, given Mexico’s economic problems during the last decades, has in 
fact prevented another major conflict in Mexico. In that sense, Mexican immigration to the United 
States has actually served as a safety valve that has contributed to Mexico’s political stability and, 
therefore, to U.S. security as well.  
  
5.4.2. ‘Inassimilable’ Immigrants 
Another argument which underlined the negative impact of undocumented immigration, and all 
migration for that matter, has been the effect of a sizeable number of foreigners on the identity of 
the country, especially when these individuals are perceived as difficult to ‘assimilate’ and, 
therefore, likely to erode social cohesion.    
 In the book Population Growth in Latin America and U.S. National Security published in 
1986, John Saunders pointed out that it could be expected that North Americans would be 
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outnumbered by 2 to 1 in the Western Hemisphere by 2005. In his view, the main impact of Latin 
America’s population growth on the United States would be increasing immigration from the area. 
In this sense, efforts to deter undocumented immigration along its southern border would lead the 
United States to adopt ‘draconian measures’; Saunders considered that these measures, in contrast to 
U.S. principles, ‘will tend to create within the United States an underclass of less than equal 
residents and citizens, thus sowing the seeds of social discontent’.865 
 This differentiation in U.S. society as consequence of immigration, especially because of the 
concentration of undocumented immigrants among Hispanics, has been believed to have the 
potential to lead to conflicts by creating cultural divisions that could affect the assimilation process 
that has characterised immigration to the United States.
866
 The source of these divisions could be the 
perception within U.S. society that there are too many immigrants who do not share its culture and 
national identity, let alone its standard of living.
867
 This kind of concern could explain the fact that 
U.S. society, in general, has not been supportive of immigration into the country. According to polls 
conducted in different years during the 1990s, there were periods in which a majority of U.S. 
citizens opposed immigration and at no point was there a majority of citizens in favour of increasing 
immigration.
868
 Concerns about immigrant assimilation coalesce around issues such as geographic 
concentration, social interaction (especially inter-marriage), linguistic assimilation and political 
unity.  
 Firstly, the proliferation of Mexican neighbourhoods, in particular, has increased concerns 
among the U.S. population insofar as residential concentration has been seen as evidence that 
Mexican immigrants cannot be integrated into the U.S. society. According to a different view, 
residential segregation has not necessarily indicated resistance to social integration and may have 
actually been a mechanism aiding assimilation. During the period of economic growth in the 1960s, 
Mexican immigrants tended to spread; after the 1970s economic slowdown, they gathered closer 
together once more.
869
 Furthermore, contrary to the general impression, most immigrants have not 
lived in cities because they have been as likely as local populations to live in the suburbs. In fact, the 
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large number of immigrants (13 million) who lived in suburban areas in 2000 showed that 
immigrants were assimilating into mainstream U.S. society, and that they were obtaining a middle 
class standard of living, even though these areas also started experiencing challenges associated to 
population and urbanisation growth.
870
 These problems have been, in turn, usually attributed to the 
foreigners.    
 Secondly, while the continuing arrival of Mexican immigrants has left the impression of no 
assimilation, one notes important changes over time when each generation is viewed separately. 
According to a 1989 report, 13.3% of first-generation Mexican origin men married non-Hispanics; 
in the third generation this rose to 36.2%, and for men with high level wage the figure was 48%; 
intermarriage was around 50% in California, and in northern New York it was over 90%; moreover, 
by the third generation 84% spoke mostly English at home.
871
 After looking at these figures, it 
seems that the question might be not whether Mexican immigrants can be integrated, but rather how 
much the increasing Mexican presence has strained the tolerance for ethnic diversity in the United 
States, particularly in the Southwest. According to one former U.S. Attorney General ‘the level of 
immigration has to remain within the political tolerance of the American people’.872 
 Whatever the role of race in the popular perception of immigrants, it is important to note that 
linguistic divisions have stood out in terms of racial prejudices in discussions of immigration. 
People in the United States have been concerned about their sense of national identity when Spanish 
seems to have been competing against English as the dominant language in some areas. For 
instance, from 1980 to 1990, the Spanish speaking population in the United States increased from 
11 million to 17.3 million people. Its use, however, concentrated in a few metropolitan centres and 
in the Southwest, particularly near the Mexican border. In 1990, the proportion of people living in 
Laredo, McAllen and Brownsville, Texas, who used English within the nuclear family circle was 
8%, 12% and 22%, respectively, notwithstanding the fact that most of them were U.S. citizens.
873
 
This phenomenon has been frequently explained by the replenishment of Mexican population in 
these areas, caused by constant immigration. 
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 Figures such as those above led to a highly politicised debate in the United States about 
bilingual education. While proponents considered this learning method to strengthen students’ 
confidence and therefore their opportunities to succeed, opponents have claimed that ‘political 
forces behind bilingual education are those that promote separatism’.874 Moreover, it has been said 
that ‘maintenance of non-English languages, particularly as a matter of public policy, will slow the 
assimilation of immigrants’,875 which seems to have been a more ideological rather than scientific 
assessment of the issue. 
 In the case of the United States, national identity has been based on values such as the free 
will of the individual. It has been argued that constructing national identity, nevertheless, would 
have been more difficult had it not been for the English language as the common denominator in 
U.S. society.
876
 In reference to national identity, for instance, Anthony Smith makes a distinction 
between that that derives from cultural factors and that which originates from ethnic elements. On 
the one hand, cultural identity is related to the formation of a ‘civic religion’ based on shared 
experiences and sustained through education and language in order to foster ‘cultural homogeneity’; 
on the other hand, ethnic identity derives from a ‘pre-existing ethnie’ that has to be developed into a 
nation by ‘elevating customs into laws’.877 Therefore, in absence of primeval ties, language is more 
important for the construction of civic identity than it is for ethnic identity which has more shared 
original elements of national unity. Nevertheless, in the particular case of the United States, it is 
important not to exaggerate the importance of language in constructing national identity given the 
influence of English and U.S. culture around the world. In this context, it is difficult to think of 
immigrant communities within the United States itself isolating themselves from those two 
powerful forces.
878
             
 Finally, there has been a concern about the potential impact of the Hispanic-origin 
population on politics. Firstly, by its size, this population has been seen as capable of fostering 
trends in favour of its own interests as opposed to those of the rest of the U.S. society.
879
 
Regarding the participation of Mexican-Americans in the U.S. political system, in particular, 
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analyses have shown that they have usually followed a similar pattern to that of other ethnic and 
immigrant groups, by being concerned about the same issues such as income, education and 
political underrepresentation. While these factors may help explain the convergence of Mexican-
American voters around key issues, they have also limited their political clout as a group.
880
     
 Secondly, an issue debated in the United States has been the impact of immigrants and 
ethnic groups on the U.S. foreign policymaking process. According to some views, U.S. foreign 
policy has in part been influenced by domestic foreign-born constituencies.
881
 However, some 
arguments have held that ‘seldom, if ever, have major U.S. foreign policy decisions been 
affected by purely ethnic reasons’.882 In the opinion of Kenneth Franzblau, ethnic lobbies have 
been able to ‘influence’ U.S. foreign policy only under very specific circumstances: (a) where 
the matter has not been related to a vital national interest; (b) where the suggested course of 
action has not been challenged by an equally powerful resistance; or (c) where the course of 
action has been anyway the preferred alternative of the U.S. population at large.
883
 In the case of 
Mexican-Americans, they seem to have had the same narrow set of interests than any other 
foreign-born population group in reference to their countries of origin. Moreover, Mexicans who 
have already lived for long in the United States seem to have been as integrated to the U.S. 
mainstream society as any other foreign-born population.
884
            
 
5.4.3. Economic Burden 
Some of the most common arguments in favour of tighter border controls have pointed out that 
immigrants, especially those illegally in the country, have had a significant impact on a wide 
variety of economic woes, from unemployment, low wage levels and inadequate working 
conditions, to the federal government’s fiscal deficit. 
 Firstly, it has been argued that the presence of insufficiently trained immigrants has 
usually depressed wage levels. According to labour market estimates that compare income for 
U.S. citizens residing in locations with elevated and minor levels of immigration, it turned out 
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that the average local wage was slightly lower in immigrant cities, but the difference was 
relatively small, of about 0.2% for a city with 10% more immigrants in comparison to others.
885
 
This correlation became stronger by sector, which was evident in a 2% wage decrease in 
activities experiencing the presence of 10% more immigrants in comparison to others.
886
 
Although these impacts were not significant, it is important to point out that these estimates did 
not distinguish between legal and illegal workers. This is a relevant consideration, because it has 
been demonstrated that undocumented immigrants, by accepting lower wages because of their 
undocumented standing, often end up depressing wages within specific occupations, or 
eliminating job competition from non-immigrant individuals for particular activities.
887
 The fact 
is that salaries in the U.S. economy have been affected to a greater extent by wage differentials 
in the international context, particularly in the less-skilled enterprises because of the high 
mobility of capital and technology.
888
   
 A second issue related to immigration has been its impact on expenditures in welfare 
programmes. After reviewing data on cash benefits, (Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
[AFDC] and Supplementary Security Income [SSI]), and from the Survey of Income Program 
Participation, George Borjas found that in 1970 non-Mexican immigrants were less likely, on 
average, to receive cash benefits than the U.S. population, whereas Mexican immigrants were 
substantially more likely to receive them than the U.S. population. In 1990, these percentages 
were 8.6 for non-Mexican immigrants, 7.4 for the U.S. population, and 11.3 for Mexican 
immigrants. Once welfare programmes were included in the calculations (Medicaid/Food 
Stamps/Housing Assistance), it turned out that the proportions increased to 16.7%, 14.1% and 
36% respectively.
889
 One comment regarding these estimates is that they reported welfare usage 
rates by households rather than by individuals. And since Mexican immigrants have been more 
likely than the U.S. population as a whole to live in extended family households, their higher 
proportion of welfare usage might have been attributable to welfare receipt by household 
members other than members of the nuclear family. There have been geographical differences as 
well. For instance, California has had substantially higher welfare usage rates than other states 
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and, as noted earlier, it has had a higher concentration of Mexican immigrants than other states. 
According to Jeffrey Passel, welfare usage rates for Mexican immigrants in the Midwest have 




 A third issue has dealt with estimates of the undocumented immigration fiscal burden 
(which is the deficit in taxes paid measured against welfare services used by immigrants). 
According to Borjas’ 1997 analysis, while some estimates pointed out that the net contribution of 
undocumented immigrants in the United States was in the vicinity of $27 billion dollars in taxes, 
other reports set their welfare tag at $40 billion to be paid by U.S. citizens.
891
 At the federal 
level, however, revenues exceed costs. The largest source of revenue from immigrants came 
from federal income taxes and Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) or Social 




 Nevertheless, and despite the ambiguity in these calculations, it seemed that most studies 
concluded that the undocumented population in California (which has been predominantly 
Mexican) created a fiscal burden for that state’s taxpayers. According to GAO, in 1994 
undocumented immigrants imposed a fiscal burden on California’s taxpayers of around $1 
billion annually.
893
 Therefore, even though the evidence was inconclusive as to whether Mexican 
immigration created a fiscal burden at the national level, ‘Mexican immigrants may well be 
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responsible for fiscal dislocations in the most affected localities’.894 Part of California’s fiscal 
burden originated because a large fraction of the taxes paid by undocumented immigrants were 
federal taxes used for federal programmes. In contrast, a large number of the social benefits 
provided to them came from state programmes paid for with state revenues. According to Passel, 
nevertheless, the largest cost for the state has been education for the children of immigrants, 
which in strict sense has been used on the payroll of U.S. teachers; in this context, spending in 
education could be understood as an ‘investment’ rather than as a ‘cost’.895 In his opinion, this 
‘somewhat diffuse character of the benefits, plus the more apparent governmental costs, account 
for much of the political reaction against immigration (particularly undocumented immigration) 
in some of the major receiving areas’.896  
 Given the high concentration of Mexicans in California, it is evident that this population 
has had an impact on the state. Without denying this impact, however, it is important to note that 
much of the reaction against immigration in the state has been based on the erroneous 
assumption that all or most Mexican immigrants are undocumented. This perception has had a 
significant impact on California politics, which in turn has permeated the national debate. 
Outside of California, the fiscal burden of Mexican immigration has been either minimal or 
inexistent.
897
    
 According to some 1995 estimates of the benefits for the United States from Mexican 
immigration, the economic gains seemed to have been marginal. On the one hand, it was 
estimated that the presence of around 20 million immigrants in the United States was responsible 
for a wage decrease of about $133 billion dollars (1.9% of GDP) for the U.S. work force; on the 
other hand, the main beneficiaries of this presence were U.S. employers who made $140 billion 
(2% GDP) in profits by paying cheap salaries. The total benefit from immigration for the U.S. 
economy, therefore, was around $7 billion (0.1% of GDP). Moreover, the presence of a low-
skilled immigrant work force in the United States was supposed to be the main factor explaining 
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In 1996 the INS released its most recent estimates at the time about undocumented immigration in 
the United States. According to Table 5-6, in October 1996 there were about 5 million 
undocumented immigrants in the country (with a margin of error of 0.8 million), with a population 




Table 5-6. Estimated Illegal Immigrant Population for Top Twenty Countries of Origin and Top 
Twenty States of Residence: October 1996  
 
Country of Origin Population  State of Residence  Population 
All Countries  5,000,000  All States   5,000,000 
1. Mexico  2,700,000  1. California   2,000,000 
2. El Salvador  335,000   2. Texas    700,000 
3. Guatemala  165,000   3. New York   540,000 
4. Canada  120,000   4. Florida   350,000 
5. Haiti   105,000   5. Illinois   290,000 
6. Philippines  95,000   6. New Jersey   135,000 
7. Honduras  90,000   7. Arizona   115,000 
8. Dominican Republic 75,000   8. Massachussets   85,000 
9. Nicaragua  70,000   9. Virginia   55,000 
10. Poland  70,000   10. Washington   52,000 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), ‘Estimates, Fiscal Year 1999’, in 1999 Statistical Yearbook of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), [online] available: 
http://www.ins.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/Est99pdf (04/09/02), pp.3-4. 
 
The 5 million undocumented immigrants represented 1.9% of the total U.S. population, with the 
highest concentrations in California (2 million or 40% of the total), followed by Texas and New 
York; Mexico was the main source of undocumented immigration (2.7 million or 54% of the total) 
growing annually to about 150,000 from 1988 onwards.
900
 It is important to note that in the past, 
apprehensions of undocumented immigrants were frequently used as the basis for estimating their 
number in the United States. Nevertheless, what such statistics represented was not the actual 
number of persons but the number of times one particular individual would try to illegally crossing 
the border. Therefore, numbers based on such a flawed interpretation of data only misled the public 
and created animosity towards these immigrants.
901
 
 Before considering responses to popular concerns over immigration in the 1990s, it is 
useful to situate them within the wider panorama of U.S.-Mexico integration as implemented 
under NAFTA. Distinctions and tensions between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ still exist within the 
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free trade region. In this sense, the purpose of U.S. law enforcement along the common border 
has been to maintain the relative economic advantage of the U.S. population in reference to the 
Mexican population –by definition this U.S. posture has failed to recognise the existence of an 
integrated labour market-, at the same time that the U.S. population has benefited from access to 




In 1994 the INS created a new record system, IDENT, which became operational three years 
later. The system consists of biometric data of people arrested by the then-INS and ever since, 
including any police report as background information.
903
 The system not only allowed for a more 
accurate assessment of the flows, but for the first time it provided the INS with critical information 
on criminal immigrants. Its database contained over 400,000 hits on people with previous 
immigration violations, and it helped the INS to determine whether an immigrant with a record 
of illegal border crossings should be detained for prosecution.
904
  
In dealing with immigration, in general, the U.S. government has had a variety of tools at 
its disposal, including political, economic, and military measures.
905
 Regarding undocumented 
immigration from Mexico, the U.S. government has frequently placed emphasis on law 
enforcement, which over the decades has been increasingly supported by military intelligence 
and technology. Beginning in 1993, the INS enhanced its programmes as part of the reform of 
the immigration system, which included the expansion of its budget and an increase of the 
Border Patrol force. The allocation of resources to the INS went from $1.5 billion to $4.2 billion 
dollars between FY1993 and FY1999, with the Border Patrol receiving the greater share of the 
funding to reach a total annual budget of $887 million in 1998 from $354 million dollars at the 
beginning of the period; during those years, the number of Border Patrol agents on the Southwest 
border went up from 3,389 to 8,000.
906
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 With more resources and personnel, the Border Patrol put into practice a new strategy to 
deal with undocumented immigration along the border with Mexico: 
The INS ‘prevention through deterrence’ strategy calls for deploying Border Patrol agents 
along the border to prevent and deter illegal entry, rather than apprehending undocumented 
immigrants after they have entered the United States.
907
  
This strategy (1) intensified law enforcement at key points of unauthorised entry along the border, 
and (2) required inspections along major transportation routes leading to the interior. Regarding the 
second component, Figueroa, a Border Patrol Supervisor, explained that these ‘back up’ inspections 
were intended to create a series of echelons as one moved north from the international line. The first 
echelon was formed by agents right at the international limit; the second was composed of those 
who patrolled the surrounding areas; and the third was made up of the interior roadway checkpoints 
themselves, established to stop undocumented immigrants in case they avoided detention at the first 
two echelons.
908
 The tacit purpose of this strategy was to push unauthorised immigration to non-
urban areas where the assets of the Border Patrol translate into greater operational control. In 
particular, the idea has been to channel undocumented immigrants into zones far from major U.S. 
population centres and through inhospitable settings, hoping that faced with this scenario they 
would be deterred from adventuring themselves into dangerous areas. 
The first of such initiatives, ‘Operation Hold the Line’ (first designated with the less 
diplomatic name of ‘Operation Blockade’), was launched in El Paso, Texas, in September 1993. 
This operation was reported to produce a 50% decline in apprehensions from FY1993 to FY1996.
909
 
The second was ‘Operation Gatekeeper’ which started in October 1994 and covered a 66-mile 
stretch along the Mexican border in the San Diego sector; as a result of its implementation, 
apprehensions were reported to have reached an 18-year low in 1998 in this area, which accounted 
for 45% of all apprehensions nation-wide before Gatekeeper, but only 16% in FY1998.
910
 
Additionally, ‘Operation Safeguard’ was launched in Arizona in FY1995 in order to divert illegal 
border crossings away from urban areas near Nogales.
911
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It is important to point out that the most immediate effect of operations Hold the Line and 
Gatekeeper was mainly to redirect the flows. For instance, from FY1994 (after Operation 
Gatekeeper) to FY2000, the number of apprehensions increased more than eight-fold in El Centro, 
California (the sector east of San Diego) and in Tucson, Arizona, apprehensions more than 
quadrupled to 616,346. McAllen, Texas, surpassed El Paso in apprehensions after implementation 
of Hold the Line, with 124,251 in FY1994 to 133,243 in FY2000.
912
 Whether part of a staged plan 
or a response to unexpected increases, ‘Operation Rio Grande’ started in August 1997 to expand 
coverage to all of Texas and New Mexico. By FY1998, apprehensions had decreased by 35% in 
Brownsville and 27% in Laredo, while immigration shifted to other corridors.
913
  
 Far from deterring immigration, therefore, these operations merely led people to attempt 
crossings at different locations along the border, frequently at remote and rugged areas where 
immigrants have been at a greater risk of injury and death. According to an analysis of immigrant 
deaths at the border covering the period from 1993 to 1997, during the span of the study there were 
more than 1,600 possible such events.
914
 According to the INS, by 2000, deaths were reaching more 
than one a day.
915
 
 As a result of the redirection of undocumented immigration towards more dangerous 
terrain, there was an increase in the number of deaths at the border. The leading causes of death 
during the 1993-1997 period were: drowning (29%) in the Rio Bravo/Grande segment; 
hypothermia, hyperthermia, and dehydration (14%); highway incidents (13%); violent death 
(14%); run over fatalities (9%); train-related (5%); and some others attributed to previous 
medical or physical conditions; about 12% of deaths were related to non-specified reasons.
916
 It 
is interesting to note that the characteristics of the victims (85% were males in their 20s) 
provided relevant information about the flows, as women were found to be less likely to risk 
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 In the opinion of Timothy Dunn, this approach to undocumented immigration represented 
the application of a LIC strategy to a non-military issue.
918
 He noted that the increasing 
militarisation of immigration after 1986 was connected with the simultaneous emergence of a 
more militarised approach to drug control and its redefinition as a problem of border security. In 
his opinion, ‘this outcome [was] not surprising, given that undocumented immigration and drug 
trafficking have been portrayed as security issues by policymakers.
919
 Although immigration law 
enforcement has increased in the last decades, interdiction against drug trafficking has been the 
largest U.S. governmental operation on the Mexican border, as already discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
 According to INS statistics, during FY2000 the Border Patrol carried out 12,174 narcotics 
seizures (9,941 of marijuana, 225 of heroin, 1,024 of cocaine, 470 of dangerous pills and 514 of 
other kind of drugs).
920
 These statistics, however, did not provide information about whether 
these drugs were seized at the U.S. Southwest border, or whether they were related in any way to 
immigrants. According to the interview with Figueroa, there have been several arrests of 
Mexicans used as ‘mules’ by drug trafficking organisations to smuggle drugs, mostly marijuana, 
into the United States. Another tactic has consisted in sending in a group of immigrants with the 
drugs, which after detection by the Border Patrol splits into one bigger and one smaller party, 
under the logic that Border Patrol agents will chase the bigger group giving the smaller party 
carrying the drugs the opportunity to escape. But such cases are not typical of the ‘big’ drug 
smuggling operations carried out by international DTOs that deal not only with marijuana but 
also with heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamines.
 921
  
 Nevertheless, one of the consequences of the overlapping of the relatively ‘non-violent’ 
undocumented immigration flow, and the drug trade that has been violent in terms of the 
responses of both smugglers and the government, has been increased physical danger to 
immigrants and Border Patrol agents alike. For instance, during the deployment of a Marine unit 
to carry out surveillance operations close to the border at Redford, Texas, one Marine 
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accidentally killed a Mexican-American goat herder named Ezequiel Hernández.
922
 Officials 
from both the Border Patrol and the DoS, made it clear during interviews that the only function 
of the military at the border has been to support federal agencies in terms of equipment, 
infrastructure, surveillance, and cargo checks. They expressed the view that the U.S. armed 
forces have not had any law enforcement role whatsoever, neither in terms of immigration nor of 
drug trafficking.
923
 According to an interesting account, however, within the U.S. government 
there have been efforts to strengthen immigration control using funds and programmes that were 
intended to combat drug trafficking. According to Salazar, a DoD official during the Clinton 
administration, 
… at the time I was at the Pentagon there was a lot of pressure on my office at different 
moments, from different legislators, who wanted to use the National Guard for 
immigration control purposes. Therefore, there were often proposals to completely 
militarise the border, and these proposals usually came from legislators who wanted to use 
my office’s drug-control budget to militarise the border under the ‘drug-control’ title, 
when in reality what they were concerned about was immigration. Therefore, there was a 
very interesting struggle from the ideological and political point of view, because they 
knew that if they tried to get funding for using the armed forces for immigration control, 
they were not going to succeed. Then the pressure was on me to justify an increasing 
amount of programmes under the ‘drug-control’ title. However, my office’s attorneys 




It is important to note that efforts such as those described above, and the presence of the U.S. 
military along the border with Mexico -even for drug control purposes-, created serious concerns 
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in Mexico about the human rights of immigrants. Incidents like the killing of Hernández seemed 
to confirm these fears.                          
 In general terms, escalation of law enforcement at the U.S.-Mexico border has failed to deter 
undocumented immigration, and instead it generated counterproductive consequences that in turn 
justified calls for further escalation. Firstly, more law enforcement led to a burgeoning smuggling 
business, as it was estimated that around 75% of all Mexican illegal border crossings involved the 
help of a smuggler; secondly, as security at the border became increasingly tight, smugglers became 
more prone to exploit the use of lost or stolen documents or to corrupt U.S. authorities.
 925
 Finally, 
the growing price to be paid by attempting an illegal entry into the United States, as discussed 
above, also prevented undocumented immigrants already in the country from even considering the 




 As in the case of drugs, the law enforcement approach to deter undocumented immigration 
between ports of entry was not effective in dealing with the challenge. On the one hand, it is 
estimated that a sizeable proportion of all undocumented individuals in the United States (40% to 
50%) entered using legal documents through the POEs, and then became ‘illegal’ immigrants by 
exceeding the authorised time of stay in country.
927
 On the other hand, very little attention was paid 
to the issue of employer sanctions, as it represented only 2% of the INS enforcement budget.
928
 This 
situation and the series of restrictive laws passed in 1996 seemed to confirm the U.S. preference for 
the law enforcement approach to undocumented immigration, in spite of its lack of effectiveness 
and the potential of other measures to deal more effectively with the problem. 
 Although in the United States, in general, concern about undocumented immigration 
served to justify a hard-line approach, there are arguments that establish that this orientation 
itself, more than a relaxed immigration policy, may undermine national security. Firstly, in the 
opinion of Mark Miller, violence and discrimination against immigrants often results in a 
backlash from the immigrant community. The consequences of restrictive immigration policies, 
nevertheless, are hardly ever part of the discussion about immigration and security, which often 
neglects the fact that coercion instead of opportunities for integration, frequently leads to social 
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 Secondly, according to Skeldon, policies that incorporate an inclusive view of 
immigration are more likely to succeed in the face of a continued flow, especially if the state in 
developed countries is able to accommodate immigrants within a context of social diversity, 
capable of transforming societies at both ends of the immigrant’s journey.930 These are two 
interesting arguments that point to the convenience of moving immigration out of the security realm 
by having a more balanced approach to the issue that takes into consideration a more 
comprehensive rather than a narrow, coercive, response to the problem.  
  As already discussed, in the United States there has been a debate about undocumented 
immigration that has frequently emphasised its negative political, social and economic 
consequences. Although most of these arguments have not been well supported by the facts, they 
have served to legitimise a law enforcement approach to the issue. This approach has not only 
been highly ineffective, but has also intensified a variety of problems such as corruption, human 
smuggling and immigrant deaths at the U.S.-Mexico border, which in turn have provided the 
rationale for further law enforcement escalation.   
 
5.5. Undocumented Immigration from the Copenhagen School and Risk Society Theory 
Perspectives 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the most relevant aspects of undocumented immigration 
as a U.S. security concern, which include infringement of the country’s sovereignty, the threat to 
democratic institutions deriving from the presence of a second-class group of people, and erosion 
of U.S. identity. Based on the Buzan et.al analytical framework and Risk Society Theory, the 
specific objective is to find out why this issue is seen as a security concern in the United States.  
 First of all, from the Buzan et.al analytical framework perspective, it can be argued that 
Mexican undocumented immigration has been a security concern for the United States because 
any illegal entry into the country is a violation of its territorial integrity and, therefore, of U.S. 
sovereignty. According to Buzan, the state has three main components: its idea, its territory, and 
its institutions, and they are ‘objects of security in their own right’.931 In this context, it does not 
matter whether an undocumented immigrant entered the U.S. territory looking for a job or with 
                                                 
929
 M. J. Miller, ‘International Migration and Global Security’, in Poku and Graham (eds.), Redefining Security, 
p.26. 
930
 Skeldon, ‘Migration Policies and National Security’, p.46. 
931
 Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, p.65. 
259 
 
the intention of doing harm; this action represents a threat because it erodes the sovereignty of 
the country, even though this is empirically difficult to demonstrate. 
 An argument has been made that border crime is a factual example of the danger of 
having people illegally crossing the international boundary. Even though crime has been in fact a 
problem along the U.S.-Mexican border, both for the undocumented immigrants themselves and 
for the communities in the area, it is important to note that arguments linking immigration and 
crime have usually been marred by methodological deficiencies. For instance, neither figures 
from studies carried out in the 1960s nor analyses by specific location have been able to 
conclusively establish a direct relationship between these two factors, except some evidence of 
non-aggressive felonies committed in the area.
932
 According to the logic, undocumented 
immigrants, in principle, maintain a low-profile in order to avoid detention by U.S. immigration 
authorities, and this is the reason why they usually keep away from trouble. 
 Secondly, according to one interpretation, undocumented immigration has not only 
represented a transgression of the law, but has also denied the receiving society the right to 
decide who can be admitted into a given community, which in turn is a factor that determines the 
level of acceptance of an individual in that same community.
933
 In reference to Mexican 
undocumented immigration in the 1980s, for instance, John DeWitt, former director of the 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research at DoS stated, 
For a country based on the rule of law and dedicated to the proposition that all men are 
created equal, it is a serious problem for the maintenance of our most basic traditions and 
beliefs to have such a large and growing proportion of the population relegated to a 
clearly, second class status, subjected to exploitation and abuse, and denied full access to 
due process of law, one of the most cherished possessions of the citizens and legal 
residents of this country. I strongly believe that our inability to reach even a partial 
legislated solution to this problem [the defeat of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill] saps our inner 
strength and is indeed a national security problem.
934
    
Having ‘second-class citizens’ (i.e. undocumented immigrants), in fact, is considered to be 
incompatible with democratic values,
935
 basically because the presence of an unincorporated 
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group within society represents a challenge to political order. In this context, according to 
Zolberg, this is the reason why democracies have developed a variety of devices to make sure the 
stay of temporary workers or refugees is ‘extremely temporary’.936    
 Thirdly, besides the state-related risks discussed above, other kinds of concerns are those 
connected to social and economic issues. Regarding social threats, it is important first to 
remember that according to the Buzan et.al analytical framework, societal security is about 
‘identity’; in this context, ‘societal insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a 
development or potentiality as a threat to their survival as a community’.937 In the particular case 
of Mexico, Samuel Huntington articulated this concern about identity in concrete terms by 
distinguishing Mexican immigration from other immigrant flows, and thus converting it into the 
‘Mexican problem.’ In his opinion, the ‘problem’ originates from Mexico’s contiguity to the 
United States, and from the dimension, continuity and accumulation of Mexican immigrants in 
some areas of the United States. In his view,  
If over one million Mexican soldiers crossed the border Americans would treat it as a 
major threat to their national security and react accordingly. The invasion of over one 
million Mexican civilians, as [President Vicente] Fox seems to recommend [after calls to 
eliminate restrictions on the movement of people], would be a comparable threat to 
American societal security, and Americans should react against it with comparable 
vigor… Mexican immigration is a unique, disturbing, and looming challenge to our 
cultural integrity, our national identity, and potentially to our future as a country.
938
   
It was revealing that Huntington identified the main problem regarding Mexican immigration not 
in political or economic terms but with regard to U.S. national identity. He believed that the self-
contained Mexican subculture in the United States has been inconsistent with the ‘melting-pot’ 
ideology that has characterised the process of assimilation in the country. The Buzan et. al. 
analytical framework’s diagnosis about societal security in North America, actually concurs with 
the concerns expressed by Huntington by establishing that, 
                                                 
936
 Zolberg, ‘Immigration and Multiculturalism’, p.57. 
937
 Buzan et.al, Security, p.119. 
938
 S. P. Huntington, ‘Reconsidering Immigration. Is Mexico a Special Case?’, Backgrounder, Center for 
Immigration Studies, November 2000, p.5. 
261 
 
At present, migration is securitized mainly at the state level for those areas –especially 
California- in which the population balance has already shifted the most significantly 
because of immediate adjacency to the mainland of origin for migrants –Mexico.
939
    
From this perspective, Mexican immigration in the United States is securitised because of the 
double challenge it poses to U.S. identity: Mexico is not only culturally very different but 
geographically very close. Both Mexico’s distinctiveness and its proximity have contributed to 
the U.S. perception that Mexican immigration is a threat to the U.S. identity, and therefore, to its 
security. 
 When society’s identity is perceived as being threatened by immigration, the population 
may call upon the state to confront this challenge through legislative or law enforcement 
measures, or both. In the case of undocumented immigration to the United States, these types of 
U.S. responses have been common, and they have often represented a cycle that has involved 
first, placing the responsibility for economic problems on undocumented immigrants; second, the 
implementation of coercive measures; and third, a return to ‘business as usual’ regarding 
undocumented immigrants after the economic situation has stabilised.
940
 Something similar has 
happened in the context of political campaigns when fear of undocumented immigrants among 
U.S. voters has been exploited by politicians and commentators for political purposes. In both 
cases, however, it is interesting to note that the measures to deal with undocumented immigration 
have been detached from the so-called ‘pull factors’ in the United States. According to 
Bustamante,  
In fact, the activation of the political apparatus towards restricting immigration has never 
succeeded in closing the door to migration from Mexico… Despite massive deportations 
during various periods of unemployment crisis, these measures have translated into 




Lack of recognition about the impact of U.S. demand on unauthorised immigration to the United 
States, therefore, seems to indicate that behind social and political campaigns against 
undocumented flows there has been in fact a deeper concern about their ‘deleterious’ effect on 
the U.S. ‘melting pot’ ideology, in the context of the imperatives imposed by the U.S. economy. 
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 According to Desmond King, nevertheless, the ‘melting pot’ ideology in the United 
States has been oblivious to the reality about how the U.S. identity was actually constructed. 
Firstly, the traditional ‘melting pot’ idea has not recognised the difference between ‘voluntary’ 
and ‘involuntary’ (i.e. slaves) migration, and this has allowed the U.S. historical account to 
emphasise the former in disregard of the latter; secondly, the same narrative has obscured the 
fact that containing diversity was actually a requirement to give way to U.S. identity; and thirdly, 
for all practical purposes, ‘assimilation’ has basically meant for people to be adapted to the 
‘white’ U.S. identity.942 This explains why Mexicans, who have been able to keep some of their 
customs by replenishing their numbers in the United States due to proximity to their country, 
have been seen as posing a threat to U.S. identity.    
The main securitising actors regarding undocumented immigration have been, in general, 
conservative groups that have been mainly concerned about the erosion of identity, and they 
have included politicians, unions, state officials and legislators, radio and TV commentators and 
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Table 5-7. Active Anti-immigrant Groups in the United States 
Arizona 
Mesa US Border Guard & Border Rangers 
Phoenix United for a Sovereign America (USA) 
Sierra Vista American Border Patrol 
 
California 
Huntington Beach California Coalition for Immigration Reform 
San Bernardino Save Our State 
Sherman Oaks American Patrol/Voice of Citizens Together 
 
District of Columbia 
Washington Federation for American Immigration Reform 
 
Massachusetts 
Framingham Concerned Citizens and Friends of Illegal Immigration Law Enforcement 
 
Michigan 
Petoskey Social Contract Press 
 
Mississippi 
Jackson Press 2 For English 
 
Nevada 
Henderson Emigration Party of Nevada 
 
Texas 
Livingston  Border Guardians 
 
Virginia 
Monterey American Immigration Control Foundation/Americans for Immigration Control 
 
Source: Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), ‘Anti-immigrant Groups’, Intelligence Files, [online] available: 
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-files/ideology/anti-immigrant/active_hate_groups (29/07/11). 
 
They have been more ideological than practical, to the extent that issues such as the immigrants’ 
impact on the economy have usually occupied a secondary place in their concerns. As in the case 
of the 1964 termination of the Bracero programme mentioned above, there have also been 
unions and Hispanic groups that have opposed immigration basically because they have 
perceived competition from newcomers. These sectors have often been supported by individual 
politicians during political campaigns, and by each of the political parties, for different reasons. 
While Republicans have been responsive to conservatives that see immigration mainly as a 
societal threat -often linking the issue to drugs and crime-, Democrats have been sympathetic to 
unions and minorities that are concerned about immigration’s economic (i.e. the argument 
discussed above about undocumented immigrants being responsible for depressing wages) and 
social impact. Some of the most important securitising actors in this area, nevertheless, have 
been state governments with a sizeable presence of undocumented immigrants. They have 
usually bore the brunt of the social and economic costs associated with this presence (this was 
actually one of the central concerns that supported the promotion of Proposition 187 in 
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California in 1994) and have been those more active in pressing the federal government to 
assume its constitutional responsibility in dealing with this challenge.   
Governmental actors such as the Border Patrol, for instance, have also securitised 
undocumented immigration because of reasons other than protecting the integrity of the country. 
That is, one of its motivations has been the need to maintain the vitality of the ‘law enforcement 
industry’ referred to above, which has been evident in the rapid growth of the force during the 
1990s. As discussed above, just in the Southwest border, the most demanding area of operations 
for the Border Patrol, the number of agents expanded from 4,000 to 8,000 in the span of four 
years, from 1994 to 1998.
943
 
The designation of immigration as a security matter has been accepted by a 
heterogeneous audience –comprising conservative politicians at every level of government, 
right-wing organisations, nativists and unions- that has approved of its security designation for 
different reasons such as identity, the discourse on ‘secure our borders’, state sovereignty and 
economic reasons. This audience has also included those who have securitised immigration, such 
as state governments that have had the obligation to respond to public demands to put in place 
measures to stop what has been seen as an ‘invasion’. This helps explain why the National Guard 
has often been called upon at the border, and also the erection of the border fence at the dividing 
line in the 2000s that has satisfied voters but has not necessarily either stopped undocumented 
immigration or addressed the root of the problem.
 944
 The federal government has also been an 
important part of the audience that has accepted immigration as a security issue, and the evidence 
was the creation of the DHS on 1 March 2003, which has ‘[represented] the largest 
reorganization of the Federal Government since World War II’.945  
It is possible to argue that securitising undocumented immigration became increasingly 
politically acceptable in the United States especially after the 9/11 events, even though the 
Executive Branch has been less resounding than the U.S. Congress about framing undocumented 
immigration as a security issue, let alone portraying it as threat to identity in a country that is 
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supposed to be multicultural. As in the case of drugs, the mass media has also contributed to 
construing immigration as a security issue, especially because of right-wing radio and TV 
stations, and conservative commentators, such as Lou Dobbs, for instance, at CNN, who 
characterised himself for his hard-line comments regarding undocumented immigration from 
Mexico.
946
   
The interest and intentions in defining and accepting immigration as security matter have 
been primarily related to xenophobic impulses and concern about the erosion of identity within 
conservative sectors of the U.S. society, as discussed above, and also to preoccupation about 
preserving economic advantages for the legitimate (citizens) members of the society. According 
to Zolberg, 
at every level of skill, an individual is better off working and living in a developed rather 
than in a developing country. Given the rational desire of the less favoured individual to 
improve his standard of living by relocating, the restrictive regulation of immigration 




Immigration controls, therefore, are not only a matter of security but also an instrument for 
maintaining the division of power and wealth in the international system. This is why 
international immigration, in general, has been an ‘inherently security sensitive’ issue.948 
In this context, it can be argued that the Border Patrol has been devoted to protecting the 
identity and the economic advantages of the U.S. society. To detain undocumented immigrants 
has become thus a societal as well as an economic security matter, hidden behind the veil of the 
‘border security’ discourse which has been a more palatable ‘speech act’, to use the language of 
the Buzan et.al analytical framework. 
An important concern that cannot be overlooked regarding undocumented immigration 
has been the need to incorporate newcomers into the mainstream of the U.S. society, not only 
because of the importance of providing them economic opportunities but also because isolating 
them is incompatible with the principles of democracy in terms of having equal political 
rights.
949
 This is a significant point of consensus within the U.S. society, independently of the 
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individual opinion about either Mexico or undocumented immigration. This posture has been 
very pragmatic, and has been in line with the shared sense of identity of the U.S. society, even 
though the treatment of undocumented immigrants in the country represents a contradiction. 
 The threat-perception associated with undocumented immigration, in general, has led the 
United States to adopt a law enforcement approach to the problem in detriment of alternatives to 
integrate immigrants in more constructive economic and social terms in the face of a continued 
illegal flow in the foreseeable future. If it is true this coercive approach has served to assuage the 
concerns of sectors that have demanded the government to ‘do something about the border’, U.S. 
immigration policy has basically failed to provide for long lasting solutions to the problem, and has 
created additional challenges such as corruption, the use of fake documents to cross the border, 
human rights violations and the strengthening of human smuggling organisations, as well as 
undocumented immigrant deaths along the inhospitable corridors to the north. The process of 
securitisation of undocumented immigration in the United States has been successful because the 
audience has basically approved the use of ‘extraordinary measures’ to deal with the problem by 
strengthening both the legal and the law enforcement capacities to deal with problem. Securitisation, 
however, has not resulted in adequately addressing the problem. It cannot be argued that it has been 
the best course of action to confront this challenge.    
 In terms of issue sectors, it can be argued, first of all, that undocumented immigration 
from Mexico originates, similar to drug trafficking, as an issue in the economic sector in the 
form of the existence of an integrated illegal labour market. It is also a highly politicised matter 
in the United States because of the efforts of conservative sectors of its society, and some 
politicians during electoral campaigns, whose intention is to exploit for political purposes the 
fears of U.S. voters regarding the threat to U.S. identity posed by undocumented immigration. 
An additional reason why undocumented immigration has been more explicitly securitised, is 
because of the link that has been established between immigration and terrorism after the 9/11 
events, in particular because of the U.S. concern about the possibility of undocumented flows 
being exploited by terrorists to introduce themselves into the United States. In this context, the 
main securitising actor has been the federal government through its statements about the need to 
reinforce border security in order to prevent terrorist attacks.  
 Mexican undocumented immigration has not been a military threat to the United States in 
the strict sense. It can be argued that any entry into the country without authorisation, 
267 
 
technically, is a violation of its territorial integrity and thus of its sovereignty. However, Mexican 
undocumented immigration has been marginally related to the military sector to the extent that 
the U.S. military, as in the case of drug trafficking, has provided infrastructure and intelligence 
support to the LAEs operating at the Southwest border. A more controversial issue from the 
Mexican point of view, has been the presence of U.S. troops on the common border, supposedly 
to discourage the flow of drugs but equally useful to prevent undocumented immigration, which 
therefore creates the potential for human rights violations in the region. 
 In the political sector, while technically Mexican undocumented immigration has been a 
violation of U.S. sovereignty, it is difficult to assess empirically how much sovereignty the 
United States has lost with every Mexican entering without inspection into its territory. In the 
aftermath of the 9/11 events, the perceived vulnerability of the border to penetration by terrorists 
heightened anxiety about their potential infiltration through the porous U.S.-Mexico border, 
which in turn produced tougher security policies. Even though these measures have increased the 
costs and dangers for Mexican undocumented immigrants, so far they have not completely 
deterred illegal flows. Were the U.S. government to ignore the demand for increased border 
security, it would face a different political security threat to its legitimacy. This prospect could 
emerge not from immigrants transgressing national sovereignty but from a citizenry concerned 
by the unresponsiveness of its political representatives. There has also been a concern that the 
presence of undocumented immigrants in the country could lead to create a fragmented society 
that, by definition, is incompatible with a democratic system, and for that reason it could 
potentially undermine U.S. institutions.  
 In the United States it has been easier to define immigration as a security issue in the 
societal sector. There has been a long-standing U.S. concern that Mexican immigration, whether 
legal or undocumented, could weaken or erode the cultural identity of the country, even though 
this has not been conclusively demonstrated. Preoccupation with cultural homogeneity has been 
pervasive and influential though it has rarely been explicitly mentioned as a justification for 
more restrictive immigration policies that have more often been articulated in terms of border 
security. The threat undocumented immigration has posed to U.S. identity is key to 
understanding the securitisation of this issue, from the U.S. perspective, regarding Mexico.   
 In the economic sector, the existence of an integrated illegal labour market has been 
considered to adversely affect the well being of the U.S. population by the burden undocumented 
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immigration places on U.S. taxpayers. According to the evidence, the economic effects of 
Mexican undocumented immigration to the United States have been mostly felt at the local level 
and have been marginal, at best, at the national level. As a matter of fact, easy access to cheap 
labour from Mexico can be argued to support, more than undermine, U.S. economic security by 
increasing the competitiveness of certain sectors of the U.S. economy such as services and 
construction. 
 In the environmental sector, even though it can be argued that the flow of undocumented 
immigrants has represented an environmental challenge in the corridors to the north, such as in 
the Arizona desert, no reliable neutral study or analysis has pointed out to a significant impact on 
environmental degradation on the U.S. side of the border as consequence of undocumented 
immigration. Most of the reports on the issue come from anti-immigrant organisations which 
make reference to ‘the devastating environmental impacts of illegal immigration’, such as 
‘Numbers USA for Lower Immigration Levels’.950 Moreover, Mexican immigrants tend to 
diffuse throughout the country once they cross the dividing line, and this is the reason why they 
have not concentrated in the border region. Most of the people living in unincorporated 
settlements on the U.S. side of the border, the so-called ‘colonias’, have been more often U.S. 
citizens of Mexican origin than Mexican undocumented immigrants. 
 From the Risk society perspective, undocumented immigration is a trans-national security 
concern that is the product of an integrated illegal labour market between the United States and 
Mexico and as such an effect of global economic forces. Undocumented immigration from 
Mexico is an actual security concern for the United States because of its perceived negative 
effect on the identity of the country and because, in the context of possible future scenarios, the 
intensification of the flow might further erode the ‘Melting pot’ narrative in the country. In this 
context, the United States has adopted a risk management approach regarding this concern, 
which consists on a variety of legislative and law enforcement measures to minimise the flow 
and therefore to prevent societal challenges. As in the case of drug trafficking, the risk 
management approach does not have the purpose of dealing definitively with the problem but 
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only to prevent this risk from growing, even though this course of action has a boomerang effect 
in the form of longer periods of stay for Mexican immigrants in the United States, as well as an 
increase in both profits for human smuggling organisations and in deaths at the common border.     
 
5.6. Conclusions 
Undocumented immigration in the United States in the 1990s was the outcome of a historic 
process influenced by economic factors, in particular by demand for labour in the country. Over 
the course of several generations, a structural relationship developed through the interaction of 
‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors in the United States and Mexico, respectively, which in turn contributed 
to the creation and perpetuation of trans-border social networks. This characteristic helps 
explain, for instance, why immigration has not only been driven by economic forces, even 
though they have been of paramount importance. 
 Historically, Mexican immigrant labour in the United States used to be concentrated in 
certain economic sectors such as agriculture, railways, and mining in the Midwest and 
Southwest. The shift in the U.S. economy from manufacturing to service-based activities in the 
last decades, however, has diversified the demand for immigrant labour just as recurrent 
economic crises in Mexico have increased the skill- and education-levels of immigrant labour 
supply. In the last decades, Mexican workers have been found in more regions and in a wider 
variety of occupations in the United States. 
 The two countries have usually held different perspectives about immigration. For the 
United States, the preferred option has been to have immigrant workers perform the required 
activities, and then facilitate their return to their places of origin. The United States has not 
openly acknowledged the existence of an integrated labour market with Mexico, and has usually 
blamed the problem of undocumented immigration on the inability of the Mexican economy to 
generate the required level of employment in the country (as if immigration responded only to 
this variable). Its answer to the problem has been instead based on unilateral and limited 
legalisation schemes, as well as law enforcement measures. Policies grounded in ignorance of 
the unrelenting demand for immigrant labour, and trust in border security solutions, have failed 
to curb undocumented immigration and even encouraged more permanent stays.  
 Although immigration matters were not addressed during NAFTA negotiations between 
1990 and 1993, the U.S. government considered that as a consequence of the agreement, 
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investment in Mexico would result in more jobs being created and more incentives for Mexicans 
to stay home. The effects of NAFTA, and the economic reforms implemented by Mexico since 
the mid-1980s and until the end of the 1990s, this latter period covered by this thesis, however, 
have resulted in more rather than less immigration. To these factors it is important to add the 
effect of demographic and labour market trends in both countries, which have reinforced the 
supply-demand relationship. 
 Undocumented immigration has been considered a security concern in the United States 
because of its perceived negative impact on the fiscal and employment stability of the country, 
but more importantly, because of its deleterious effect on U.S. identity. The societal threat posed 
by undocumented immigration has often been hidden behind arguments about the economic 
burden unauthorised immigrants have represented for the country. Although these arguments 
have been emphasised for political purposes during electoral campaigns and at times of 
economic slowdown, an unequivocal link was established between undocumented immigration 
and security in the aftermath of the 9/11 events, due to U.S. official concerns about the 
susceptibility of illegal flows to be exploited by terrorists bent on attacking the country. 
 In the United States, the securitisation process of undocumented immigration has been 
successful to the extent that the audience has legitimised the ‘breaking of rules’ and the use of 
‘extraordinary measures’ to confront the challenge, which has been evident not only in the series 
of restrictive immigration legislation approved by the U.S. Congress and local legislatures, but 
also in the sizeable budgets appropriated for LEAs dealing with border security.  
 The U.S. law enforcement approach to the issue, however, has not been up to the task of 
effectively dealing with problem, which has been evident in its negative effects reflected in the 
strengthening of smuggling business, the use of false documents at U.S. POEs, increasing 
corruption and undocumented immigrant deaths at the common border. These coercive measures 
have not prevented the continuation of the illegal flows, basically because they have not addressed 
the root causes of the problem, which have been related to the U.S. economy continued demand for 
foreign labour due to structural factors that have been beyond the control of both the U.S. and the 
Mexican governments. Undocumented immigration might be a self inflicted predicament created by 
the United States resulting from the process of globalisation U.S. foreign policy has vigorously 
pursued around the world.        
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 Since the end of the 1990s, a more direct link was established between security and 
immigration, in general, in the United States especially as a result of 9/11. Due to the fact that 
‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors have not been eliminated from the de facto U.S.-Mexico integrated 
labour market, Mexican undocumented immigration flows have continued, albeit at a slower 
peace, because of the U.S. economic contraction brought about by the ‘housing bubble’ (second 
half of the 2000s) and heightened security at the common border. In this context, undocumented 
immigrants have continued attempting more dangerous crossings in rough areas such as in the 
Sonoran desert in Arizona, while others have resorted to human smuggling that has increasingly 
been controlled by Mexican DTOs, especially in the Gulf of Mexico area, turning undocumented 
immigration into a more dangerous and violent alternative for people looking for better 
economic opportunities in the United States.
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According to Risk Society theory, undocumented immigration is a trans-national security 
concern that has to be addressed through a risk management perspective involving preventive 
measures to stop the flow of people as the best alternative for an issue that is far for a definitive 
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CHAPTER 6. ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION 
 
6.1. Introduction 
As discussed in the introduction of this thesis, the main objective of this research consists in 
analysing the non-state, trans-border, threats Mexico indirectly posed to the United States in the 
1990s. This, in turn, is an exercise that requires a non-traditional conception of security in order 
to understand the dynamics of non-military threats. 
In this context, the analytical value of this chapter -which addresses environmental issues 
in U.S.-Mexican relations-, consists in explaining why environmental degradation along the U.S. 
border with Mexico, in particular water pollution, has been an issue that has so far remained only 
as a potential security concern.  
As already mentioned, analysing border environmental issues from the Buzan et.al 
analytical framework and Risk Society theory perspectives contributes to provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of trans-border bilateral concerns, in particular the fact that not all 
of them translate into security challenges, especially compared to drug trafficking that is an 
unambiguous security issue from the U.S. point of view. 
This chapter argues that an epidemic at the U.S.-Mexico border, derived from water 
pollution, represents the most serious potential concern in the context of the variety of challenges 
that have characterised the region. This issue, nevertheless, has not turned so far into a U.S. 
security issue, or a Mexican security concern, for that matter. This has to do with both an 
analytical and with an empirical explanation. 
First, according to the Buzan et.al analytical framework, the key ‘to study securitization 
is to study discourse and political constellations’; that is, it is fundamental to understand the 
process by which ‘securitizing actors’ manage to ‘legitimize’ the adoption of ‘emergency 
measures’ to deal with ‘existential threats’ to the ‘survival’ of a ‘referent object’ of security.952 
As will be discussed in more detail below, water pollution has not successfully been portrayed as 
an existential threat to the object of security, which is the U.S. border population, basically 
because the securitising actors (i.e. government officials, scholars, environmental organisations) 
have not been able to legitimise the adoption of extreme measures to deal with the potential 
threat. In other words, they have not been able to complete the securitisation process in a 
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successful way. Second, as far as Risk Society theory is concerned, a risk management approach 
to the issue, as expressed in the existence of a bi-national institutional structure that constantly 
addresses issues through initiatives and programmes –albeit insufficient- has been able so far to 
keep border environmental matters from the security realm. This bilateral institutional 
infrastructure is addressed at length below. 
Moreover, the fact that bilateral environmental issues are not securitised, helps to 
illustrate that the U.S.-Mexico security relationship is in fact more complex than what is 
reflected in the scarce literature on the subject, and therefore that this field of study deserves a 
more detailed analysis. 
After five decades of intense economic activity across the U.S.-Mexico border, which 
started in the mid-1960s, the region has undergone a rapid demographic and environmental 
transformation. On the Mexican side, establishment of the maquiladora industry created 
employment in the area, attracting people not only from the interior of the country but also 
nationals returning from the United States after the end of the Bracero programme (1942-1964). 
On the U.S. side, communities providing services and materials for assembly plants across the 
border also shared some of this growth. 
Increasing industrialisation and population growth eventually resulted in degradation of 
the border environment, as both processes surpassed the capacity of local infrastructure to meet 
growing demands. While these conditions represented a threat to the region’s ecosystem in the 
long-term, degradation of air and water quality standards, as well as pollution generated by 
hazardous waste, posed a health risk to residents on both sides of the boundary in the medium- to 
short-term. 
The U.S.-Mexico border is one of the longest and busiest international boundaries in the 
world, which is characterised by the presence of 14-pairs of ‘sister cities’ along the dividing line. 
The intense trans-boundary movement of people, goods and resources, as well as the fact that 
communities on both sides of the border basically share the same natural resources, has 
represented the potential for the spread of environmental health risks across the international 
frontier. From an epidemiological point of view, the region’s population is highly integrated, and 
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for this reason health challenges do not stop at the border.
953
 Environmental degradation, and its 
effect on public health, therefore, does not respect political boundaries.  
Although the need to broaden the traditional military focus of the concept of ‘national 
security’ -to explain increasingly complex international issues- has been debated since at least 
the 1970s, it was only since the beginning of the 1990s that environmental aspects gradually 
became part of the U.S. national security outlook.
954
 This issue has been incorporated as part of 
the U.S. foreign policy rhetoric that recognises the potentially negative effects, as well as the 
benefits, of globalisation. There is a particular concern about the combined effect of population 
growth and resource scarcity on issues such as poverty, disease, and ultimately on international 
stability, because of the potential for conflict over resources and massive movement of displaced 
people.
955
  In the 2002 National Security Strategy announced by the then-Bush administration, 
for instance, the most important statement on the subject was the need to reconcile protection of 
the environment and economic growth.
956
 The difficulty of reconciling these two objectives, 
more precisely, the tendency to pursue economic growth in detriment of environmental quality, 
is actually the key to understanding the most pressing ecological problems affecting the U.S.-
Mexican border, and is an issue that has attracted a wider debate not only in the context of U.S.-
Mexican relations.
957
 This study argues that unless this imbalance is redressed in favour of 
environmentally sound, national and bilateral, economic and social policies, the U.S. population 
residing in the area, like Mexican border-dwellers, will continue to be potentially exposed to the 
trans-border degradation of the environment.          
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As discussed above, this chapter holds that although air quality degradation and 
inadequate disposal of hazardous waste have had an impact on environmental conditions along 
the border, during the 1990s -the time frame of this study- water issues had the greatest potential 
to become the main environmental security issue for U.S. residents in the area. Water issues can 
be divided into two different challenges: those that derive from scarcity and those from pollution. 
Firstly, addressing the scarcity aspect of the challenge is beyond the scope of this thesis. Suffice 
to say that this problem, in principle, can be dealt with through better management and 
conservation initiatives, and that there is no evidence of the possibility for a conflict between the 
United States and Mexico over water. Scarcity most often comes as the result of atmospheric 
conditions, and therefore it is likely that the issue will be addressed through negotiation and co-
operation. At least this has been the course of action followed in past experiences regarding 
access to water from the Grande/Bravo River.
958
 
In this context, the possibility of a ‘water conflict’ in the form of an armed confrontation 
between the United States and Mexico is very limited, to say the least. On the one hand, the 
United States is not only the superior power in the relationship with Mexico, but also the 
upstream state in the two river basins along the common border (i.e. Colorado and 
Grande/Bravo). These two conditions leave Mexico with no option but to look for a negotiated 
solution with the United States. On the other hand, the United States might be willing to co-
operate with Mexico in order to avoid a crisis of water scarcity in that country as this could hurt 
U.S. interests by causing instability and accelerating the pace of immigration. Problems deriving 
from scarcity, therefore, could create tensions in the relationship but also incentives to co-
operate, and the latter outcome is actually more likely because of the existence of a 
comprehensive bi-national institutional infrastructure to deal with environmental issues. 
Secondly, besides scarcity, the other relevant water-related issue is pollution. Of all 
security concers, it is possible to argue that none of them is more serious than a threat to the 
health of the individual or the society. Problems related to water pollution represent the most 
serious environmental challenge to U.S. national security in the border region. This is because of 
the potential for waterborne diseases to spread on both sides of the border, not only because of 
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the common access to water sources but also because of the intense two-way flow of people 
across the boundary. Throughout history, migration has been an important element in the 
propagation of infections, even though it is complicated to establish the precise link between 
both factors.
959
 In any event, the consequences of a waterborne epidemic along the border would 
be greater than the health problems caused either by air pollution or hazardous waste. This is 
because of its mode of transmission and the higher risk of contagion in the case of diseases such 
as amebiasis, hepatitis, shigellosis or typhoid fever.  
The prospect of an epidemic from contaminated water could be even more worrisome 
than the risk of a chemical accident or a toxic terrorist attack, because it could affect even more 
people. Although water infrastructure in the region has gradually improved since NAFTA 
entered into force, there are important needs yet to be met that represent potential gaps in the 
barrier against the outbreak of disease. Such a scenario constitutes a challenge to the U.S. 
national interest concerning the well being of the population, as stated in the U.S. national 
security strategy.
960
 If an epidemic were to occur, nevertheless, the United States and Mexico 
would likely strengthen bilateral co-operation in order to contain the spread of disease. 
Therefore, because of the complexity of border environmental issues, and the existence of a 
bilateral institutional infrastructure to deal with environmental challenges at the border, these 
issues are potential rather than actual security concerns in the U.S.-Mexican relationship. 
The first part of this chapter describes the demographic characteristics and the 
environmental infrastructure conditions of the U.S.-Mexico border area, to show how the 
combination of these two factors has created environmental challenges in the context of the 
economic transformation of the region. The second part focuses on water problems generated by 
industrial and demographic growth in order to understand the nature and magnitude of the 
challenge, in particular water poluution. The third part provides an overview of the institutional 
infrastructure created by the United States and Mexico, especially in the context of NAFTA, to 
deal with environmental problems. It includes the obstacles these institutions have confronted so 
far in their operation, as well as the issues that have yet to be addressed. The final part deals with 
water pollution along the U.S.-Mexico border in terms of the Buzan et.al analytical framework 
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and the Risk Society Theory perspectives, and explains why this issue has remained as a 
potential rather than as an actual security concern, in contrast to drug trafficking which has been 
considered an unequivocal security issue from the U.S. perspective.              
 
6.2. Setting 
As noted above, this chapter focuses on environmental issues in U.S.-Mexican relations in the 
1990s. Its objective is to analyse bilateral challenges in order to understand, in terms of the 
Buzan et.al. analytical framework and the Risk Society Theory perspectives, why border 
environmental issues, in general, have remained potential rather than actual security concerns.  
The combination of expanding economic activity, and related population growth, has 
overburdened the existing infrastructure capacity along the U.S.-Mexico border. As discussed 
below, this situation led to a gradual deterioration of environmental conditions in the region, in 
spite of bilateral efforts since the 1980s to deal with this challenge in a more systematic way. In 
this context, in the 1990s –the period of study of this thesis- many environmental hazards 
persisted, and they represented a potential risk not only to the ecological equilibrium but also to 
the health of people living in the region.   
Despite sporadic claims of both federal governments to the contrary, for decades 
conditions in border communities were adequately addressed by neither Washington, DC, nor by 
Mexico City. Although inattention to the borderlands has not been unique to the U.S.-Mexico 
border,
961
 lack of proper attention from both federal authorities to the plight of this region has 
been highly peculiar in light of its significance as an item on the bilateral agenda. Moreover, the 
importance of the region would eventually become more evident in the context of negotiations 
leading to NAFTA.   
As already noted, environmental issues in U.S.-Mexican relations have related mainly to 
industrial and demographic growth along the common border. This region has been defined by 
NADB as the area covering 100 kilometres (62 miles) each way to the north and south of the 
international boundary.
962
 As shown in Table 6-1 below, according to 1995 estimates, the 
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population living within 100 kilometres of the border was about 10.6 million people with 5.8 
million living on the U.S. side and 4.8 million on the Mexican side. The largest population 
concentrations on either side of the border were located in California and Baja California on the 
Pacific Coast. Whereas the total population of the 24 U.S. border counties was 6,899,904 in 
2006, which represented a 9.5% increase in relation to 2000, population on the Mexican side of 
the border was estimated at 6.4 million, representing a 16% increase in reference to 1999.
963
   
 
Table 6-1. Population Adjacent to the Border 1980-1995 
 
Area    1980   1990   1995 
Border Total    6,976,622  9,103,319  10,585,265 
U.S. Subtotal   4,009,079  5,213,774  5,827,439 
California   1,953,956  2,607,319  2,767,796 
Arizona    728,142   914,919   1,038,156 
New Mexico   117,974   159,578   188,841 
Texas    1,209,079  1,531,958  1,832,646 
Mexico Subtotal   2,967,543  3.889,545  4,757,826 
Baja California   1,002,459  1,400,873  1,750,172 
Sonora    312,079   394,712   469,804 
Chihuahua   635,490   869,951   1,086,559 
Coahuila   151,623   191,135   238,288 
Nuevo León   16,475   17,312   18,276 
Tamaulipas   849,417   1,015,562  1,194,727 
 
Source: J. Peach and J. Williams, U.S.-Mexico Border Region Population Projections to 2020, Paper presented at 
the Association of Borderlands Studies and Western Social Science Association Annual Conference, Ft. Worth, 
Texas, April 22, 1999 (Unpublished manuscript, April 1999), in A. Canales, ‘Industrialization, Urbanization, and 
Population Growth on the Border’, Borderlines, Vol. 7, No.7, August 1999, p.4. 
 
Based on growth rates from the end of the 1990s, it was estimated that by 2020 the region could 
more than double its population, reaching around 24 million people.
964
 
In the opinion of NADB, the projected population increase, based on 1990s data, had the 
potential not only to stress the insufficient infrastructure capacity to deal with wastewater and 
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solid waste treatment but also the drinking water supply, especially because of the prospect for 
increased agricultural activity under NAFTA and the fact that crops have been the main 
consumer of water in the region. This situation was complicated by the fact that 90% of border 
settlements have been characterised by their limited size and non-urban condition, and therefore 
have been unable to address their own infrastructure needs.
965
 In this context, in the 1990s the 
absence of infrastructure at the border was considered the main factor affecting the ability to deal 
with environmental challenges. For instance, according to a 1996 GAO report, 
Although the United States and Mexico have expanded efforts in recent years to address 
environmental problems in the border region, many environmental infrastructure needs 
remain unmet and continue to pose serious threats to human health and the environment 
on both sides of the border. These unmet needs are particularly acute on the Mexican side 
of the border, where the basic infrastructure is generally insufficient and sometimes non-
existent for connecting the outlying communities to services for municipal sewage 
collection, wastewater treatment, and solid and hazardous waste disposal. The colonias 
[sic] however, have many unmet environmental infrastructure needs, and some other 
communities need to expand or upgrade the capacity of their existing infrastructure to 
meet the ever-increasing demand from population and industrial growth.
966
 
Notwithstanding that the two countries have increasingly co-operated to address 
environmental issues along the common border since the 1980s with the establishment of La Paz 
Agreement that will be addressed below, the reasons behind the awkward development of the 
region have also been related to the fact that each one has had a different view about the border 
itself.  
In the 1990s, the United States regarded the border with Mexico as an area confronting 
environmental and standard of living-related problems, evidencing thus deficiencies in almost 
every social indicator (similar to those of its ‘inner cities’).967 Although most U.S. Southwest 
border communities have shown these conditions, there have been differences among some 
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states and counties as there are zones of prosperity, such as San Diego County, inserted in 
broader areas of poverty. In general terms, however, these communities have shared similar 
characteristics with their neighbours south of the border and have had lower standards of living 
and levels of economic development than the rest of the United States. 
With the prospect of the eventual implementation of NAFTA in 1994, cross-border trade 
was expected to become a benefit for all in the United States. Nevertheless, U.S. border 
communities have been experiencing most of the trade’s negative impact both in terms of 
continued unbalanced development and demographic growth.
968
 In order to cope with this 
situation, in May 1999 President Clinton signed Executive Order 13122 creating the ‘Interagency 
Task Force on the Economic Development of the Southwest Border’, to improve social and 
economic conditions in the region.
969
 Notwithstanding that in principle its objectives included 
the environment, the initiative was intended to deal mainly with economic problems. In the 
opinion of one of its members, 
The Interagency Task Force on the Economic Development of the Southwest Border was 
a positive thing in bringing together all the federal agencies that work on the U.S.-Mexico 
border. We met weekly and shared with one another our agency’s activities on the border. 
However, very little substantive results and discussion came out of the task force with 
regard to the environment. Nothing new emerged that can be said was the cause of the 
taskforce. Coordination and information sharing was its strength. Unfortunately, the 
change of administration ended the task force and its activities.
970
 
Besides its neglect of environmental problems, lack of decision-making capacity, absence of co-
ordination among federal authorities, and its focus on economics, together these factors 
contributed to the inability of the task force to support federal efforts to deal with environmental 
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problems on the border.
971
 That is, in spite of initiatives to deal with the needs of U.S. border 
communities, lack of adequate development policies remained a recurrent problem.  
 The Mexican view of the border in the 1990s contrasted sharply with that of the United 
States. While U.S. border communities have fared less well in terms of standards of living than 
the rest of the country, they have been better off than Mexican border communities, which in 
turn have been better off than those of the rest of Mexico because of employment opportunities 
in the region. For Mexico, its northern border has represented an ‘economic engine’ 
characterised by lower unemployment and relatively high wages (despite infrastructure similar to 
that found in the rest of the country). Although the expansion of urban concentrations in the area 
has not been a new phenomenon, it is important to note that this growth has been different than 
that of other Mexican cities due to the combination of economic activity and migration. In 
particular, the maquiladora industry has taken advantage of an increasingly diversified economy 
and proximity to the United States to generate jobs, which in turn has attracted migrants from 
other parts of Mexico.  
The growth of Mexican border cities, as discussed above, can be traced back to the 
establishment of the maquiladora industry in the region in the 1960s.
972
 Even though the 
government’s first major economic development programme along the U.S. border began in 
1961, the end of the Bracero programme in 1964 led to a new initiative aimed at promoting 
industry to absorb the expected influx of ex-braceros. The government created the ‘Border 
Industrialisation Programme’ (BIP) that provided for the establishment of maquiladora plants in 
the region. Access to cheap labour from Mexico, and application of U.S. tariffs only to the value 
added during the production process, became the incentives that led some U.S. firms to move 
part of their production to Mexico. Initially, maquiladora plants manufactured clothing and 
electronic products, and after two decades they assembled a wide variety of goods.
973
 The 
expansion of economic activity in the border area, therefore, can be attributed to Mexico’s 
maquiladora programme. 
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According to an EPA document, between 1990 and 1998 the number of plants went from 
2,100 to 4,000, and by 2000 it was estimated they were employing around 800,000 people in the 
border region.
974
 However, the 4,000 figure might have been an overstatement because, 
according to 1997 Mexican official figures, the number of such plants in the country was around 
2,000 (see Table 5.2 below). The most recent number of maquiladoras on the Mexican side of 
the border is 4,760, 700 of them located in Tijuana providing 115,000 jobs.
975
 Nevertheless, the 
key point here is that while these plants have been successful in generating jobs, they have also 
contributed to environmental stress. Maquiladora plants basically represent a production rather 
than a development model. Therefore, the combination of industrial and population growth has 
brought with it unplanned urbanisation, air and water pollution and erosion of natural resources. 
This has occurred because development of basic infrastructure did not keep pace with economic 
and demographic growth, as already mentioned, and because natural resource depletion has 
occurred independently of whether there has been proper infrastructure or not. 
In 1992, during the NAFTA debate, the cost of providing the border with basic 
environmental infrastructure was estimated at between $2 and $8 billion.
976
 To put this in 
perspective, the total amount of NADB’s resources available to the region through September 
1996, two and a half years after NAFTA had entered into force, was $3 billion.
977
 This figure fell 
far short of the $8 billion upper estimate, and therefore it could be considered insufficient to 
respond to economic growth and population pressures. According to Cyrus Reed, part of the 
problem can be explained by the fact that earnings generated by maquiladoras have been in the 
form of taxes appropriated by the Mexican federal government, and they have not been 
necessarily re-invested at the border.
978
 Wealth generated by this industry, therefore, has not 
translated into infrastructure benefits for the cities where the plants have been located. 
There have been additional problems associated with the presence of assembly plants at 
the border. Besides proximity to the market and the consequent reduction of transportation costs, 
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maquiladora profits have come mainly from access to cheap labour. Even though salaries paid 
by these plants are higher than those for equivalent jobs in other areas of Mexico, it is important 
to note that a city such as Tijuana, despite its high number of plants compared to other Mexican 
border cities as shown in Table 6-2 for the year of 1997, had relatively high rates of poverty and 
low standards of living. According to some estimates, more than half of families in that city 
qualified as poor, even though 42% of people had a job in the manufacturing sector.
979
 Whereas 
in 1998 there were 681 plants in Tijuana (40% of the total in the country in 2000),
980
 18.4% of its 
population was still considered to be poor (those earning equivalent to two minimum wage or 
less) by 2000.
981
    
 
Table 6-2. Number of Maquiladoras in Mexico’s Northern Border in 1997 (Total 1,910) 
 
Baja California  901 Coahuila  152  Chihuahua  372 Sonora  222 Tamaulipas  263 
Mexicali  182  Ciudad Acuña  35 Cd. Juárez  372 Agua Prieta  30 Matamoros  149 
Tijuana  719  Piedras Negras  117   Nogales  168 N. Laredo  64 
        San Luis  24 Reynosa   50 
 
Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), United States-Mexico Border Environmental Indicators 
1997, U.S.-Mexico Border XXI Program, EPA909-R-98-001, [online] available: 
http://www.epa.gov/usmexicoborder/indica97/1997report.pdf (19/10/02), p.27.     
 
Moreover, because of the priority given in Mexico to attracting and promoting a favourable 
climate for investment, a recurrent problem has been the lack of enforcement of environmental 
regulations, which has meant the region’s economic growth has been attained at the cost of 
environmental damage and inadequate health conditions for the population. Thus, the negative 
side of the assembly plant production process, often erroneously described as a ‘development 
model’, has not only been the perpetuation of low wages but also the generation of 
environmental problems. 
Although for different reasons, both the United States and Mexico have neglected 
environmental conditions around the common border and overexploited its natural resources. As 
noted above, for the former the border has been an underdeveloped area of marginal economic 
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importance, and policies to control drug trafficking and undocumented immigration have taken 
precedence over efforts to deal with environmental issues. For the latter, the border region has 
been an economic powerhouse where production has traditionally overshadowed other social or 
environmental considerations. The long-standing tolerance of pollution along Mexico’s northern 
border and indifference to such problems in the United States have contributed to the 
deterioration of the environment in both U.S. communities and in the region as a whole. In the 
last two decades, and partly as a result of the pressures generated by free trade, the two 
governments resumed efforts to address the border’s environmental issues. However, as these 
problems have persisted even in the presence of NAFTA’s environmental institutions, it is likely 
that their resolution will require dealing with accumulated infrastructure needs, which means 
environmental problems are expected to continue posing a threat to people living in the region.       
 
6.3. Water Challenges 
The human impact on water and air resources as well as hazardous waste management, were 
significant challenges to the border region’s environmental health in the 1990s. In this context, 
analysis focuses on the situation regarding water resources at the border in the 1990s. Water-
related health issues are dealt with in depth towards the end of the chapter. 
Water has been the most important resource at the border and, at the same time, one of 
the most scarce and fragile. In addition to environmental pressures deriving from industrial 
activity and population growth, access to an adequate water supply has been affected by 
agriculture. Communities in several areas have also had to deal with water scarcity as the result 
of recurrent droughts, and several cases serve to illustrate water’s dual pollution/scarcity 
problem. 
The common challenge shared by the Texas/Mexico border region has been pollution 
affecting its limited water supply. For example, a bi-national study carried out in 1994 found that 
at several locations along the Rio Grande/Bravo there was a ‘high potential for toxic chemical 
impacts’, including segments close to the sister cities of El Paso/Ciudad Juárez and 
Laredo/Nuevo Laredo.
982
 It is important to note that cases of river water pollution have been 
basically related to inadequate wastewater infrastructure, and they frequently have involved the 
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The combination of high fertility rates and intense maquiladora and agricultural activity 
(both in the Imperial and Mexicali valleys), are all factors that have affected the San Diego-
Tijuana water supply. Firstly, because of its own demographic explosion, the San Diego-Tijuana 
region has lacked the proper wastewater treatment infrastructure to deal with the area’s output. 
For instance, wastewater has frequently surpassed the capacity of the San Diego’s Point Loma 
treatment plant, and overflows have often contaminated coastal waters because of wastewater 
running from pluvial outlets.
984
   
Tijuana, for its part, has been even less able than its neighbouring city to deal with its 
industrial and urban outputs. The problem with its wastewater management plant, besides poor 
equipment’s maintenance, consisted of receiving more wastewater than it could actually treat, 
which basically meant that not all wastewater reaching the plant was completely recycled or that 
some wastewater did not even make it to the plant. This wastewater, because of the area’s 
topography, flowed to the ocean affecting beaches on the U.S. side of the border.
985
 It also 
affected one of the few estuaries in California which has been characterised by the presence of 
both endangered and rare species.
986
 There have been several efforts to deal with these problems. 
For example, in 1991 the San Diego’s Point Loma treatment plant was treating up to 13 mgd. of 
Tijuana’s overflows.987 An international wastewater treatment plant located on the U.S. side of 
the border was also carrying out basic recycling to reduce sewage flows into the Tijuana River 
and the Pacific Ocean, and in 1999 a $20 million project was implemented to increase the 
efficiency of the Tijuana sewage system.
988
  
In areas characterised both by a shortage of water and a limited coverage of public water 
services, low-income people has usually procured water by digging their own wells without their 
quality ever being assessed. For instance, according to a 2000 report, the testing of 86 private 
wells by the New Mexico’s Border Health Office (BHO) found significant concentration of both 
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In the Arizona-Sonora border, water quality issues have involved contamination from 
maquiladora waste discharge and untreated municipal effluent, but most critically from 
traditional mining operations in the area. In Bisbee, Arizona, for example, in 2000 it was found 
that a bi-national aquifer that supplied Bisbee itself and the two Nacos (Arizona and Sonora) was 
contaminated by the presence of minerals accumulated on the surface, which in turn penetrated 




This section has discussed water challenges in U.S.-Mexican relations in the 1990s 
underlining those deriving from pollution. It described the nature of pollution challenges and 
their relationship to lack of adequate infrastructure to deal with growing needs.                            
 
6.4. Bilateral Co-operation 
This section analyses the bilateral efforts of the United States and Mexico to confront the 
challenges posed by environmental degradation along the common border, focusing on the 1990s 
and in particular on the environmental institutions created by NAFTA. This analysis provides 
some data from 2000 and 2001 only to the extent it contributes to explanations, but it does not 
cover more recent years because they are beyond the scope of this study.  
Although co-operation has not been new in this area of the bilateral relationship, it is 
important to mention that efforts to deal with the environment had not been systematic. In the 
context of NAFTA, both countries took a further step in environmental co-operation by adding to 
the institutional infrastructure to deal with these problems. However valuable these efforts were 
in the 1990s, the reality is that problems persisted in the second half of the 1990s because these 
measures were insufficient to rectify the long-standing neglect of environmental infrastructure on 
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Even though U.S.-Mexican relations have always been complex, the history of bilateral 
environmental affairs has been characterised by willingness to deal with common problems. The 
beginning of co-operation along the common border started with the Treaty of 2 February 1848 
that established the international boundary, which was later modified by the Treaty of 30 
December 1853. A commission created by the Convention of 29 July 1882 was charged with the 
establishment of markers along the land boundary from El Paso-Ciudad Juárez to San Diego-
Tijuana. Regarding shared river systems, the Convention of 12 November 1884 defined the 
procedures for the rectification of the boundary if altered by changing river flows. Almost five 
years later, the Convention of 1 March 1889 created the International Boundary Commission 
(IBC) to enforce the guidelines of the 1884 Convention. The Convention of 21 May 1906, 
provided for the allocation of Rio Grande/Bravo river water.
991
 
The 1944 ‘Water Treaty’, in its Article 2, created the IBWC as successor to the IBC.992 
Under this treaty and subsequent agreements, the IBWC has been responsible for resolving 
boundary problems, maintaining the border between the United States and Mexico, and 
managing issues involving the waters of the Grande/Bravo and Colorado Rivers. Over time, the 
IBWC’s agenda has changed itself to deal with water pollution, in particular with all matters 
related to wastewater management as a result of the transformation of the border.
993
 
 Although the era of increased stress on the border environment began in the mid-1960s 
after the establishment of the maquiladora industry on the Mexican side of the border, its 
consequences did not draw the attention of Washington, DC, and Mexico City until decades 
later. By 1983, deteriorating border conditions -such as increasing pressure over water resources, 
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air and water pollution and growing production of hazardous waste- had finally attracted the 
attention of both federal governments, and in August of that year the two countries signed the 
‘Agreement between the United States and the United Mexican States on Cooperation for 
Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area’. Better known as the ‘La 
Paz Agreement’, the accord set as its main objective to ‘establish a cooperative mechanism to 
preserve and foster the environment along the common border, based on the principles of 
equality, reciprocity and mutual benefit’.994 This agreement launched a broad range of 
environmental co-operation initiatives between the United States and Mexico, and by 1989 five 
technical working groups had been established for each of its annexes.
995
 This accord resulted in 
the institutionalisation of regular consultations among senior federal officials, and in the creation 
of a framework for assessing and dealing with outstanding issues. La Paz Agreement ‘was a new 
and more extensive mechanism for facilitating trust and openness among officials of the two 
countries in the 1980s’.996 
 
6.4.2. NAFTA Context 
After the La Paz Agreement, political and governmental attention did not return to the border 
again until 1990, when Presidents Bush and Salinas began to discuss the prospects for a U.S.-
Mexico free trade agreement. Advocates often presented a trade agreement as the key to 
Mexico’s prosperity and, thus, to the possibility of investing on the border’s sustainable 
development. However, it became clear that without a formal side agreement for addressing 
                                                 
994
 J. C. Belausteguigoitia and L. F. Guadarrama, ‘United States –Mexico Relations: Environmental Issues’, in 
Bosworth, Collins and Lustig (eds.), Coming Together?, p.108. 
995
 Annex I. Signed in July 1985. Deals with the construction and operation of water treatment plants in the 
San Diego-Tijuana area. 
 Annex II. Signed in July 1985. Subsequently complemented by an emergency plan on hazardous waste 
spills in the border area in 1988, this annex deals with the establishment of a joint response team to handle any 
emergencies in the border region. 
 Annex III. Signed in November 1986. The intent of this annex was to establish procedures and regulations 
for the transportation and trade of trans-boundary hazardous wastes between Mexico and the United States. In 
general, these restrictions require prior notification and approval before waste can be transported from one country 
to the other. 
 Annex IV. Signed in January 1987. This section was devised to deal with trans-boundary air pollution 
caused by copper smelters located on the border, mainly in the area of southern Arizona and northern Sonora. 
 Annex V. Signed in October 1989. With the aim of analysing and determining possible solutions to the 
problem of urban air pollution, this annex targets pairs of border cities designated as ‘study areas’. The first one was 
the metropolitan area of El Paso-Ciudad Juarez. 
See Ibid., pp.108-111.     
996
 Hecht, Whelan and Sowell, Sustainable Development, p.6.  
289 
 
border environmental concerns, the trade accord would not obtain public and congressional 
approval.
997
 Opponents of a formal environmental side agreement, in turn, countered that its 
provisions could only increase the regulatory burden on enterprises.
998
 
Nevertheless, both governments acknowledged that an environmental initiative would put 
the United States and Mexico in a better position to address issues that could arise in the context 
of NAFTA negotiations. In particular, most U.S. environmental groups feared that the outcome 
of a trade agreement with Mexico would be the erosion of environmental controls in the United 
States or that international business would consider establishing themselves in Mexican territory 
as an opening to avoid strict environmental regulations.
999
 Yet, other groups, such as the 
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), argued that economic and social factors already present in 
1994 would intensify interaction between the two countries either with or without NAFTA, and 




In this context, the ‘Integrated Border Environmental Plan’ (IBEP) released in February 
1992 in the midst of NAFTA negotiations, was implemented beginning in that same year and 
completed its first stage in 1994. It was designed by the EPA and Mexico’s Secretariat of Social 
Development (SEDESOL), and its specific objectives included compliance of environmental 
legislation, adoption of environmental-friendly technology, extension of collaboration to fields 
with impact on the environment (urban planning, education), and promoting a more accurate 
assessment of environmental needs at the border.
1001
 Although several projects were developed 
and concluded under this programme, its objectives were not fully achieved. According to one 
assessment, the plan was insufficient because it did not adequately deal with water problems as a 
central issue, and because planning depended on federal initiatives more than on the preferences 
of individual communities.
1002
 Moreover, the programme was criticised for being a political 
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justification for NAFTA negotiations, which was evident in its limited operational and financial 
structure.
1003
 Suggestions to improve co-operation in the future included streamlining bilateral 
co-ordination, developing indicators to measure implementation and strengthening 
institutions.
1004
    
 As trade negotiations reached a basic accord by August 1992, then President-elect 
Clinton became the one in charge of pushing the agreement through Capitol Hill, 
notwithstanding that during his campaign he had advocated NAFTA provided that there were 
two parallel negotiations on measures to deal with pollution, and to guarantee a minimum of 
acceptable working conditions. Once in office, the Clinton administration adopted President 
Bush’s dual approach to border environmental matters. That is, while some of them were dealt 
with within the NAFTA side agreement that would be negotiated, the majority of issues were 
addressed in the ‘parallel track’ of the normal bilateral relationship. Both processes are described 
below.  
 
6.4.2.1. Border Institutions 
As it was clear that the success or failure of NAFTA in Congress would depend to a large extent 
on the side agreements mentioned above, public and governmental concerns in the United States 
about lack of environmental enforcement in Mexico were addressed trough a trilateral side 
agreement, the ‘North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation’ (NAAEC). This 
side agreement created the ‘Commission on Environmental Cooperation’ (CEC), which 
encouraged parties to the agreement to effectively enforce their environmental laws and 
regulations.
1005
 Regarding the U.S.-Mexico border, infrastructure needs were addressed through 
the November 1993 ‘Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of the United Mexican States Concerning the Establishment of a Border 
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Environment Cooperation Commission and a North American Development Bank’ (the 
BECC/NADB Agreement). The idea guiding both institutions was that environmental 
sustainability had to be the objective of projects approved by the bank, to ensure self-sufficiency 
in the border region, and that these projects had to operate under the principles of ‘public 
participation’, ‘ecology’, and ‘economic viability’.1006  
BECC’s functions have been to provide technical assistance to communities for 
developing environmental infrastructure projects in the border area, and to certify those projects 
for financing consideration by the NADB.
1007
 It is important to note that the latter has been a 
lending institution that was formed using paid-in capital from the U.S. and Mexican 
governments. The infrastructure projects have been limited to three categories: water supply and 
treatment; wastewater treatment; and disposal of solid municipal waste. However, after both U.S. 
and Mexican authorities recognised the limited ability of small border locations to afford their 
infrastructure needs, they decided to provide construction grants in addition to contributions for 
BECC operations and NADB capitalisation. The resources needed specifically for construction 
projects were estimated at $1.4 billion over a ten-year period, with half coming from each 
country. EPA became the U.S. agency responsible for managing financial resources by means of 
both BECC and NADB.
1008
 This has been an important reason why communities in both 
countries have sought project certification by BECC.
1009
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 One of the criticisms of NADB and BECC has been that political pragmatism has in 
general limited their scope to water treatment and supply. After almost seven years of operation, 
in September 2000, for instance, out of a total of 81 projects financed by NADB (44 on the U.S. 
side and 37 on the Mexican side of the border), 60% of them were related to water 
(approximately 38 in the United States and 11 in Mexico).
1010
 One of the recommendations made 
to both institutions was that they should consider viable projects not necessarily related to their 
core areas, and to make sure the public, especially on the Mexican side of the border, 
participated in the decisions affecting their communities.
1011
 Months before, NADB had actually 
prepared a white paper that was released in June 2000, which proposed a mandate expansion to 
allow the bank to finance additional environmental projects.
1012
 This is how the issue was 
resolved: 
In November 2000 the [NADB] Board approved a resolution allowing the Bank to 
finance new types of BECC-certified environmental infrastructure projects within the 
current charter. While water, wastewater and solid waste will continue to be priorities, 
this new flexibility to consider additional sectors and financing mechanisms will greatly 
enhance the Bank’s positive impact along the border. The Bank and the Border 
Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) are working together to identify which 
new environmental infrastructure sectors to pursue in the near term.
1013
  
In this context, in early 2001 BECC and NADB agreed to open for certification and financing 




Another important issue was the recognition that NADB's loan portfolio was modest, and 
that its lending capacity was under-utilised. To illustrate, between the start of the bank operation 
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and 1997, out of the $265 million in loans and grants approved by the bank, more than $253 
million were grants and only $11 million were loans.
1015
 This problem resulted from the fact that 
NADB’s interest rates were established at the same level as market rates, and therefore applying 
for a loan had been costly for poor border communities. The application of market rates can be 
explained by the fact that while NADB has lent to anyone whose project has been certified by 
BECC, the bank has not been a tax-exempt institution and therefore its funding has come only 
from the market (i.e. no subsidised loans). This is the reason why the bank has been unable to 
loan at a level lower than the market rate.
1016
 According to Fege, EPA Assistant Director at the 
San Diego Office, this situation led communities on the U.S. side of the border either to use 
grants in order to pay interests on NADB loans, or to ‘finance tax exempt bonds’ also as a way of 
keeping the interest rate lower (because ‘the bond holder does not pay tax on earnings’).1017 To 
address this problem, in 2001 NADB formally established a ‘Value Lending Program’ to lend 




Although both organisations have also been the target of criticisms about institutional 
weakness, it seems that insufficient public participation in their decision-making mechanisms has 
not been at issue, at least not regarding BECC.
1019
 According to Sayoc, the BECC has been an 
outstanding example of an institution supported by both governments that has fostered local 
participation in the solution of environmental problems. This has been evident in the fact that ‘all 
projects that are working towards BECC certification must show local support before it [sic] 
moves forward’.1020 
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Finally, within the U.S. government structure, the GNEB, created by the Enterprise of the 
Americas Initiative Act (EAI) in 1992, has worked as an independent federal advisory 
committee. GNEB has not carried out any specific programme. Its mission has been to advise 
both the U.S. Executive and Legislative branches of government on the well-being and 
sustainability of communities along the common border. After focusing on issues such as 
institutional and infrastructure development, information needs, and participating in the design of 
a Border XXI Plan, in its fourth annual report issued in 2000, for instance, it recommended the 
adoption of a watershed approach to better managing outstanding water issues at the common 
border, and to present solutions incorporating the views of all levels of government.
1021
 
It is important to note that by 2000 there were a number of border projects already 
completed or in the engineering stage as never seen before, which was significant given the 
region’s deficit in infrastructure investment. As will be discussed below, however, these efforts 
were not sufficient to satisfy existing needs, and it was uncertain whether the level of investment 
at the time was going to be able to keep pace with future economic and demographic growth in 
the area. In general, expectations about the ability of BECC and NADB to address the border’s 
long-standing environmental problems in a short period of time were exaggerated. According to 
Spalding, some of the blame for such expectations must be attributed to NAFTA’s advocates, 
‘because in the politics surrounding NAFTA’s passage, unrealistic promises made by its 
supporters placed an unreasonable burden upon the shoulders of the two young 
organizations’.1022      
 
6.4.2.2. ‘Border XXI Program’ 
While the new Clinton administration that was inaugurated in January 1993 supported the 
concept of a border plan as well as the previous request of resources made by President Bush to 
implement that plan, the incoming administration was critical of IBEP’s narrow scope and its 
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‘top-down’ approach.1023 Therefore, U.S. officials wanted to draft a new plan as soon as the 1994 
elections in Mexico were concluded. In this context, EPA announced a new initiative as a 
follow-up to IBEP, the ‘Border XXI Program’ (B21). Signed by the United States and Mexico on 
7 October 1996, B21 was an ‘umbrella program’ for the co-ordination of environmental activities 
of federal, state, local and tribal governments on both sides of the border. In particular, it 
expanded the scope of bilateral co-operation through the establishment of nine border-wide 
groups that covered issues related to natural resources, environmental health and data 
management.
1024
 It is important to mention that B21 was not a treaty but a 5-year non-binding 
agreement that built on mechanisms already in place, such as the La Paz Agreement. In this 
sense, the programme was only a framework for co-operation and as such it did not receive 
appropriated funds nor had a funded staff. B21, however, represented a step forward in contrast 
to earlier efforts by satisfying demands for decentralisation and public participation, and also by 
promoting co-operation with the private sector. 
Working through its nine groups, B21 yielded some concrete results on the border in 
terms of strengthening institutional and bi-national capabilities to deal with long-term 
environmental and development issues.
1025
 One of the key objectives of its ‘Framework 
Document’ was that each of the workgroups would develop indicators to evaluate the 
effectiveness of border environmental policy. Descriptions of each environmental indicator were 
published in 1997 but these were not accompanied by concrete data showing the impact of 
B21.
1026
 According to EPA sources, while the proportion of localities on the Mexican side of the 
border with access to water for human consumption grew between 1995 and 2000 from 88% to 
93%, those with access to drainage and residual water services grew from 34% to 75% and from 
60% to 75% in the same period, respectively, although other indicators appear to have 
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 As will be discussed below, these figures seem to exaggerate the pace of 
improvement because other sources from EPA itself recognise that a variety of water-related 
needs in the border region have not yet been met. 
Nevertheless, in terms of other achievements, from the point of view of Whelan, an EPA 
official in Washington, DC, one very important workgroup that had not received enough 
attention from the public was the workgroup on ‘Contingency Planning and Emergency 
Response’. Its relevance resided in the need to be prepared to handle emergencies such as 
chemical spills that could occur as a result of accidents along high-traffic corridors. Such 
accidents could have a serious impact on border communities’ health.1028 This workgroup has 
been concerned with creating the necessary infrastructure to deal with dangerous spill-over 
contingencies at the community-level, as well as with creating a bi-national pool of assets to 
confront such type of situations. A relevant concern voiced in public forums, however, was that 
sizeable geographic areas had been left out of the project despite the fact that these locations 
were important in terms of potential trans-border risks.
1029
            
B21 was also criticised for being dominated by federal agencies and yet unable to address 
the limited local capacity to deal with environmental problems. Detractors of B21 further pointed 
to the unreliable access to financial resources and the absence of a clear vision for the future on 
the part of the two governments.
1030
 The workgroups, which were the core of the programme, 
were criticised for implementing projects in a unilateral way in the absence of a framework for 
bilateral solutions. Co-ordination and planning among federal agencies also seemed to have been 
complicated by the fact that budget cycles are different in the United States and Mexico. In the 




 As already discussed, the U.S. and Mexican governments have established a 
comprehensive set of institutional arrangements to deal with environmental problems along the 
common border. These institutions and collaboration mechanisms have demonstrated a 
willingness on the part of the two countries to co-operate on environmental matters, even though 
                                                 
1027
 EPA, Protecting the Environment, p.11. 
1028
 Interview with Patrick Whelan, U.S.-Mexico Program, Office of International Activities, U.S. EPA, carried out 
in Washington, DC, on 22 May 2001. 
1029
 EPA, ‘Executive Summary’, pp.7-8. 
1030
 Mumme, ‘NAFTA’s Environmental Side Agreement’, p.4. 
1031
 Kourous, ‘Border XXI’, p.2. 
297 
 
they have faced a variety of operational problems which have prevented them from achieving 
optimal results. In spite of institutional shortcomings and the variety of issues that remain 
unsolved, it is important to note that the bilateral environmental institutional infrastructure has 
allowed the two federal governments the possibility of addressing environmental challenges 
without them turning into security issues. The existence of these institutions, and continuous 
bilateral dialogue on these issues, explains in part the reason why the potential for risk has not 
materialised, and also why those issues have remained in the political rather than moving into the 
security arena.    
 
6.5. Threat Assessment 
Population growth in the border area has been a feature of particular concern for its long-term 
prospects. Past demographic trends have not only placed stress on scarce natural resources, but 
have also generated environmental degradation in the context of insufficient infrastructure, in 
particular that related to water. As mentioned above, this section focuses on potential public 
health problems such as the spread of waterborne disease. This issue is addressed below. 
 
6.5.1. Environmental Health 
This section argues that, from the variety of environmental challenges at the U.S.-Mexico border, 
the most serious concern is the potential for an epidemic deriving from water pollution. This 
possibility, however, has not translated into water becoming an actual security concern because 
the two federal governments have addressed this issue through dialogue and co-operation, and 
because of the use of the bilateral institutional infrastructure already in place. Moreover, the 
potential for an epidemic at the common border seems to fit the pattern explained by the Buzan 
et.al. analytical framework that establishes that governments are more likely to securitise the 
consequences rather than the causes of environmental problems, notwithstanding the efforts of 
securitising actors to place urgent issues within the security arena. 
Rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, without the parallel development of required 
infrastructure, have had the potential to create serious public health risks on both sides of the 
boundary. Among the factors that have upset the integrated region’s health conditions stand out 
the variety of contamination challenges involving both air and water resources, inadequate 
treatment of hazardous waste, and mismanagement of pesticides. 
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On both sides of the border, agricultural production has relied on significant quantities of 
chemicals in the cultivation of crops, and exposure to pesticides has become a relevant problem 
in the area. For instance, according to a 2000 report of the Texas Department of Health (TDH), 
‘50% of colonia households [were] located within 1/4 of a mile from an agricultural field’; ‘66% 
of these households reported that pesticides were used on these fields’; and ‘75% said the 
pesticides were applied using aerial application’.1032 People with history of contact with 
chemicals for agricultural production have often developed brain and skin disease, as well as 
potential prenatal and fecundity problems. According to activists, toxins are clearly linked to an 
increased risk of different types of cancer in the region.
1033
 Nevertheless, scientists have been 
unable to determine conclusively whether there is a link given the complex cause-effect dynamic 
between chemicals and specific illnesses.
1034
 
To illustrate this point, beginning in 1992 there was a series of efforts to find out whether 
copper smelting in Douglas, Arizona, contributed to the high incidence of systemic lupus 
erythematosus (SLE) in the community. These efforts, however, failed among other reasons 
because there was not a reliable record of diseases in the area; because of insufficient research on 
‘the genetic predisposition’ of Mexican-Americans to such an illness; and because of inadequate 
medical treatment in the region.
1035
 According to some analyses, people with occupations 
involving contact with toxic substances have been prone to have offspring with pre-birth 
afflictions.
1036
 The main environmental health challenge, however, has not come from potential 
chemical exposure. 
 
6.5.1.1. Public Health Risks 
Without dismissing the seriousness of the health problems described above, the most pressing 
public health challenges along the U.S.-Mexican border have been those related to waterborne 
diseases and their potential to turn into an epidemic affecting a large proportion of the region’s 
population. Environmental conditions and public health in the U.S.-Mexico border area have 
been influenced by the quality of available water resources. There are two important factors that 
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have connected water and public health across the border. Firstly, all the communities on both 
sides of the boundary have been equally affected by the quality of water they share. Secondly, 
public health problems along the border could be exacerbated by the impact of intense cross-
border travel and commerce. In FY1996, for instance, there were some 280 million land 
crossings from Mexico through the U.S. Southwest border, which accounted for approximately 
70% of all land crossings in the United States that year. At the San Ysidro point of entry alone 
(between San Diego and Tijuana), there were 40 million crossings in the same period.
1037
 For a 
long time, it has been recognised that the movement of people and the exchange of goods are 
factors that increase the potential for health risks.
1038
 According to David Graham and Nana 
Poku, 
Population movement is one of these globalizing processes, and one that has increased as 
the power and influence of the nation-state has weakened. The increased movement of 
goods and capital can, and does, threaten the security of state economies. The increased 




Even though the environmental health situation at the U.S.-Mexico border has been far from 
representing a global health risk, there are nevertheless several challenges that could affect U.S. 
security (and Mexican security by implication) in the foreseeable future. 
Although on the U.S. side of the border there has been more water supply and wastewater 
infrastructure than on the Mexican side, there have been some U.S. communities, especially 
colonias, which have not had access to sanitary services. For instance, according to a 2000 TDH 
survey, 41% of households on the Texas border obtained water for human consumption from 
sources other than the faucet, in spite of the fact they had access to water services at home; in 
this context, a survey of 64% of households that accumulated water in containers, found an 
acceptable level of ‘chlorine residual’ only in 10% of the cases; it also found that only 54% of 
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the colonia inhabitants had access to the drainage system.
1040
 These figures were significant if it 
is considered that colonia residents represented 20% of the total border population in 2000.
1041
 In 
comparison, as shown in Table 6-3, while, in general, people on the northern side of the U.S.-
Mexico border has been better poised to obtain water for human consumption, more pressing 
infrastructure conditions in Mexico have made even more difficult for people there to procure 




Table 6-3. Water Services for Selected Mexican Border Cities (1997) 
 
  Drinking Water      %Wastewater  % Water  
per capita   % Population/ % Population/ Collected and  Disinfected   
City   Lts./Day Drinking Water Sewer Service Treated  before Delivery 
Mexicali 500*  93  80  72  100 
Nogales  183*  64  81**  100***  100*** 
Ciudad Acuña 372  89  39  0  100 
Piedras Negras 419  95  80  0  100 
Matamoros 262  72  47  0  100 
Reynosa  294  92  57  100  100 
 
* 1995, **1992, ***1997. 
 
Source, EPA, United States-Mexico, pp.34-36. 
 
One comprehensive study on water and wastewater infrastructure on the U.S.-Mexico 
border published by the EPA afterwards in 2001, established a link between water quality and 
public health conditions. This study gathered and analysed data on surface water quality for each 
of the seven boundary area water bodies (i.e. Pacific Coastal Basin, New River Basin, Gulf of 
California Coastal Basin, Colorado River Basin, Northwest Chihuahua Basin, Rio Grande Basin, 
and the Gulf of Mexico Coastal Basin). Firstly, the sample data indicated that in the majority of 
the sampling locations water did not meet the minimum purity required, frequently as 
consequence of inefficient water recycling processes.
1043
 Secondly, the study found that along 
the border, the rate of incidence of waterborne diseases was higher than the median in the United 
States, as shown in Table 6-4. 
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Table 6-4. Comparison between U.S.-Mexico Border and U.S.-Nationwide Waterborne Disease 
Rates (1998). Incidents per 100,000 people 
    
U.S. Border Mexican Border  U.S. Nationwide 
Disease   Rates  Rates   Rates 
Amebiasis  1.4  798.8   1.4 
Hepatitis A  37.1  50.1   12.6 
Shigellosis  35.3  n.a.   10.9 
Typhoid Fever  0.4  36.1   0.2 
 
Source: EPA, Status Report, p.9. 
 
Unsanitary conditions and a paucity of treatment facilities have contributed to the diffusion of 
these diseases. In general terms, the rate of incidence has been usually higher on the Mexican 
side of the border.
1044
 One extreme case was that of the New River, considered the most polluted 
watercourse in the United States. It contained an average of almost 461,665 colonies/100 ml. of 
faecal coli form, when the minimum accepted for human contact is 200 colonies/100 ml.
1045
 
Thirdly, according to the survey, only some of the U.S. cities and very few of the Mexican cities 
have had adequate water and wastewater treatment facilities. A significant number of cities on 
both sides of the border have obtained water from wells and most Mexican communities have 
treated water through unsophisticated filtration methods or have had no water treatment capacity 
at all.
1046
 The fact that most of the border communities have obtained drinking water from 
aquifers does not mean their water supply has been safer for consumption, because of the 
possibility that contaminated surface water could have been filtering into these underground 
water sources as in the case of Bisbee, Arizona, discussed above.   
In this context, one of the most significant requirements to confront the challenge of 
public health along the border has been to address water and wastewater infrastructure needs. 
Infrastructure in the border area, as already mentioned, has varied from community to 
community, and although investment and construction have been underway under NADB and 
BECC, it seems that much still needs to be done. In the opinion of Pamela Doughman, ‘the 
BECC and NADBank were created to respond to the view that there is a health-threatening 
wastewater infrastructure deficit in the border region’.1047 While some areas required upgrading 
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or rehabilitation, others need new construction. According to an official 2001 U.S. report, 9% of 
the border population lacked access to water services, and 23% and 40% required sewers and 
wastewater treatment capacity, respectively.
1048
 Across all the seven water basins, as shown in 
Table 6-5, the estimated capital needs for water supply and wastewater treatment infrastructure 
through the year 2020 amounted to $1.3 billion for the U.S. side of the border, and $2.4 billion 
for the Mexican side. 
 
Table 6-5. Water Infrastructure Needs in the U.S.-Mexico Border Area for the Year 2020 
  
Population Near-term needs ($ millions) Long-term needs ($ millions)  
Basin   00 20 U.S. Mexico  Total U.S. Mexico  Total 
Pacific  4.3 6.6 95 26  121 232 593  825 
New River 1.0 1.6 37 4  41 123 85  208 
Gulf of Cal. 0.2 0.3 0 26  26 0 162  162 
Colorado 1.5 2.2 133 51  184 216 222  438 
N. Chihuahua 0.2 0.3 1 4  5 19 122  141 
Rio Grande 4.6 8.7 42 222  264 517 1065  1644 
Gulf of Mex. 0.8 1.4 34 16  50 229 219  386 
Total  10.4 21.1 342 349  691 1336 2468  3804 
 
Source: EPA, Status Report, pp.11 and 74. 
 
It is important to note that another factor contributing to the border’s poor health record 
has been poverty. As was established at the beginning of this chapter, U.S. border communities 
have had the lowest economic indicators in the country. In 2000 in Texas, for instance, 40% of 
four-member border families qualified as poor, in contrast to 17% of families with the same 
number of members for the entire state.
1049
 Because healthcare in the United States has been very 
costly, it has been unavailable to many residents of that country’s low-income border region. 
Each day a sizeable number of U.S. border residents travel to the southern side of the border 
looking for less expensive medicine and treatment, given the fact that the cost of health goods 
and services in the United States is sometimes threefold than in Mexico.
1050
 In the 2000 TDH 
study, 40% of people interviewed reported that someone in their family unit bought medications 
in Mexico in the past year.
1051
 Nevertheless, there have been several problems with U.S. 
residents seeking treatment and medications in Mexico. Firstly, Mexican physicians have not 
been utilised for long-term treatment but only for medical contingencies. Secondly, all efforts to 
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create an epidemiological picture of the border region have been impaired by the fact that the 
exchange of information on these matters between the two sides has been insufficient. Thirdly, 
the majority of economically disadvantaged people has resorted to inexpensive, traditional, 
cures. Because they have usually not completed or abided by a treatment programme, this 




  Despite employment generated by the maquiladora industry and the existence of poverty 
rates lower than the national average, the Mexican border region has lacked access to basic 
services, more so even than its U.S. counterpart. Furthermore, the economic disparity between 
the United States and Mexico has made trans-boundary co-operation difficult. In particular, 
differences between the two health systems along the border have represented an obstacle to a 
common diagnosis and response to health challenges.
1053
 However, diseases or pandemics do not 
stop at the border. For this reason, it is important for Mexico and the United States to strengthen 
bi-national mechanisms in order to avoid an epidemic that could endanger the well being of U.S. 
and all border residents. 
 
6.6. Environmental Degradation from the Copenhagen School and Risk Society Theory 
Perspectives 
In general terms, in the United States the environment has been a politicised issue -as in other 
countries-, notwithstanding the fact that the U.S. security rhetoric has increasingly reflected 
concern for environmental matters. For instance, even though the U.S. government supports the 
development of clean technologies and renewable energy,
1054
 there are several cases in point 
where the United States has not shown a firm political commitment with the protection of the 
environment, as evident in its reluctance to ratify the Kyoto Protocol of the UN Framework 
Convention on Climatic Change.
1055
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 United Nations Convention on Climate Change, ‘Convention Parties and Observers’, [online] available: 
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U.S. environmental policy was not different in the 1990s in reference to the U.S. 
Southwest border. As discussed above, the U.S. side of the border with Mexico has consistently 
recorded a lower standard of living compared to other areas in the interior of the country, even 
though they have been higher than in communities south of the border. The dynamic between 
population growth and economic activity in the border region, as a whole, has contributed to 
create environmental challenges that have not been properly addressed so far because of lack of 
adequate and sufficient infrastructure, as discussed in the sections above. 
Among the variety of environmental challenges confronting the U.S.-Mexico border in 
the 1990s, this thesis found that the possibility of an epidemic deriving from water pollution was 
a significant U.S. issue (with consequences for Mexico as well), based on the analysis of 
demographic, geographical, and infrastructure factors at the time. 
The Buzan et.al analytical framework establishes that it is not the task of the security 
analyst to take the place of the securitising actor by pointing to something as a security issue.
1056
 
In this context, it is important to emphasise that the ultimate purpose of this chapter has not been 
to identify a threat, but to ‘problematize’ the ‘absence of securitization’ for an issue such as 
water pollution at the U.S.-Mexico border, based on the fact that the literature on the subject has 
recognised it as a pressing concern.
1057
 
Water pollution and its potential impact on the border population (i.e. object of security) 
has not been securitised in the United States because its securitisation process has not been 
successfully completed, notwithstanding the efforts of the securitising actors to present it as an 
extremely urgent matter. That is, it has not been recognised as a matter of survival. 
The analytical framework establishes a securitisation process that basically describes a 
sequence through which a ‘securitising actor’ identifies an ‘existential threat’ to a ‘referent 
object of security’, in order to propose the securitisation of the issue (‘securitising move’) before 
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an ‘audience’, with the purpose of obtaining its approval to ‘legitimize’ the use of ‘extraordinary 
measures’ to deal with the threat before is too late. 
Typically, within the environmental sector, securitising actors are those for whom 
environmental matters represent a priority and, therefore, are interested in taking the issue to the 
top of the governmental agenda. The sense of urgency attached to these issues can be interpreted 
as an effort to securitise them, even though presenting them in this fashion is often the only way 
to elevate them (i.e. to politicise them) within the agenda. This does not mean those interested in 
securitising the environment are not satisfied with its politicisation, especially if politicisation is 
in fact their most realistic target.  
Based on the evidence provided above, it can be argued that the main securitising actors 
in relation to water pollution along the U.S.-Mexican border were, first, government agencies 
such as EPA presenting reports on the pressing needs and lack of adequate infrastructure to deal 
with the challenge; and second, concerned scholars and NGOs trying to call attention to border 
environmental problems. These two groups include the variety of U.S. federal and state agencies 
dealing with border environmental and health matters, and those scholars and NGOs whose 
reports were quoted in this thesis. In general terms, environmental NGOs have been better 
organised north of the border, and they have included, among other groups, the Sierra Club, 
National Wildlife Federation (NWF), Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the 
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), in addition to ‘community-based NGOs’, such as 
‘Arizona’s Border Ecology Project, California’s Environmental Health Coalition, New Mexico’s 
Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC), and the Texas Center for Policy Studies’, among 
others.
1058
 The IRC, for instance, was in charge of publishing Borderlines -the series of reports 
on environmental matters used in this research-, which was IRC’s main ‘information 
dissemination’ tool.1059        
It is important to note, according to the Buzan et.al analytical framework, that those 
actors attempting the securitisation of certain issues ‘do not necessarily say “security”, nor does 
their use of the term security necessarily always constitute a security act’.1060 This point is 
important because, as matter of fact, none of the actors calling attention to water pollution 
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explicitly portrayed the challenge in terms of security. By arguing about the urgency of dealing 
with water pollution, nevertheless, it is possible to argue they were contributing to the process of 
securitisation of the issue, even though they only managed to increase its level of politicisation, 
which is a more common outcome when attempting to securitise environmental concerns. 
In terms of the analytical framework, successful securitisation requires the ‘audience’ to 
approve and legitimise the use of extraordinary measures to deal with the existential threat, and 
nowhere there is evidence of the U.S. or local governments dealing with water pollution in a 
matter of ‘survival’ mode. The audience for securitising moves regarding the environment 
includes the government and the public, in general. Nevertheless, the level of acceptance is 
different for each of them. Regarding environmental matters, for instance, for the government it 
is often more difficult to accept the securitising move because bureaucracies are better prepared 
to securitise the consequences rather than the causes of environmental concerns, as discussed 
above. In reference to the general public, if it is true that it is more open to be concerned about 
these matters, it is important to consider that only a small fraction of the population is in fact 
receptive to environmental problems and for this reason its influence is marginal at best. 
Additional difficulties in reference to the securitisation of environmental issues, according to the 
analytical framework, is the fact that notwithstanding that environmental challenges have 
gradually become part of the political debate, these matters are very complex and not easy to 
understand. There is no evidence, in the case of U.S.-border environmental issues, that either 
government agencies or the public accepted (sanctioned) the urgency to deal with this matter. 
One relevant characteristic of the Buzan et.al analytical framework in this context, 
nevertheless, is the fact that not all securitisation processes must be approved by the government 
in its role of audience, because if this were the case, then the analytical framework would be only 
reaffirming the traditional centrality of the state.
1061
 In the case of environmental issues along the 
U.S.-Mexico border, in particular in reference to water pollution and its potential to generate an 
epidemic in the region, it is possible to argue that the process of securitisation of this issue has 
been incomplete because the audience (i.e. the U.S. and local governments and the public, in 
general) have not been convinced so far that an epidemic represents a threat to the survival of the 
U.S. border population –the object of security-, because of the reasons discussed above. 
Moreover, in the specific case of U.S.-Mexico environmental affairs, it is important to take into 
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consideration that both countries have had a long tradition of collaboration on these matters (they 
have shown the highest level of co-operation not seen in reference to other issues within the 
bilateral agenda), which is reflected in the existence of both bilateral mechanisms and institutions 
that albeit insufficient, have represented a forum for continued dialogue on issues of mutual 
interest. This is a fundamental empirical factor contributing to keep water pollution along the 
common border away from the security realm, maintaining thus the issue within the risk 
management context. 
 The United States and Mexico have gradually worked together through bilateral co-
operation mechanisms (i.e. IBEP and B21) and environmental institutions (i.e. NADB and 
BECC) –discussed at length in the sections above- to address the lack of water infrastructure at 
the common border, keeping therefore the risk posed by water pollution to the population at the 
border within the political rather than within the security realm. This is a remarkable case 
because it shows that not all challenges at the U.S.-Mexico border become security concerns, 
especially considering that the common border is the key security aspect in U.S.-Mexican 
relations, as demonstrated by prominent issues such as drug trafficking. To sum up, in the period 
of study covered by this thesis, the United States securitised neither scarcity nor pollution 
problems related to water at the border with Mexico, basically because they were not considered 
a matter of survival and because of the existence of a bilateral institutional infrastructure to deal 
with these matters.  
In terms of issue-sectors contained in the Buzan et.al analytical framework, 
environmental issues are more politicised by the scientific agenda than actually securitised, as 
discussed above. It can be argued that environmental degradation along the U.S.-Mexico border 
has been related to the economic security sector to the extent that degradation of the border 
environment has derived from global economic forces, as expressed in industrial activity in the 
area in the context of intense intra-firm trade between both sides of the boundary. This is what 
the analytical framework refers to as ‘the dark side of capitalism’.1062 In this sector, the depletion 
and contamination of vital resources could ultimately undermine efforts to promote growth and 
prosperity in the region. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that this has happened yet or that it 
will happen soon. However, an argument can be made that pollution entails costs not only in 
terms of resources rendered unusable, but also in terms of financial resources devoted by the 
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government to environmental infrastructure, even though this latter aspect could also be 
considered an investment in a strict sense.     
 The United States has not been threatened in the military sector by environmental 
problems on the border with Mexico. The sole exception could be an environmental catastrophe 
on the Mexican side of the border that could spur a northward exodus of emigrants, and in this 
context require the presence of the U.S. military on the border to stop that exodus. As noted in 
the previous chapter, massive immigration could also have ramifications in the political sector if 
the U.S. government were seen by the U.S. population as incapable of containing that influx. 
Likewise, in the societal sector this phenomenon could stir fears over the erosion of national 
identity precisely because of that ‘invasion’.  
In the environmental sector, pollution and depletion of natural resources provoked by 
human activity has the potential to affect human lives to the point of threatening their survival, 
even though this has not occurred yet. Northern Mexico has shared the same environment and 
the same challenges. The consequences of the operation of the liberal economy along the U.S.-
Mexico border (e.g. the activities of maquiladora plants), has resulted in environmental 
degradation, just as it has also fuelled the trade in illegal narcotics.
1063
 This research found that 
the most pressing environmental concern with potential implications for U.S. security was 
related to water even though this issue has not become an actual security concern. Regarding this 
resource, the risk was not the possibility of a ‘water conflict’ between the United States and 
Mexico because of scarcity. Rather, the central issue was the lack of adequate water 
infrastructure on both sides of the border, which increased the probability that water supplies 
would be contaminated. This was a concern of paramount importance because exposure to 
polluted or improperly treated water could lead to the spread of disease in epidemic proportions 
due to the border’s own dynamic. The United States and Mexico, nevertheless, have created a 
comprehensive bilateral legal and institutional framework to deal with water-related 
controversies. Moreover, within the bilateral framework, the United States and Mexico 
established a workgroup to deal with health problems (i.e. Workgroup 9 under B21) should they 
ever occur, even though it is important to mention that the deficit in water infrastructure has 
lingered as an issue for the well being of U.S. communities without becoming securitised. 
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An epidemic on the border could also have consequences beyond the realm of 
environmental health and into the societal security sector, if an exodus from Mexico creates 
concerns about identity in the United States. Nevertheless, environmental concerns in the U.S.-
Mexican border have been so far mainly politicised and both countries collaborate to resolve 
common problems. The threat most likely to be securitised in this sector could be water 
pollution, and in fact it would fit precisely the definition of environmental threat advanced by the 
framework. That is, a challenge that is the product of human activity –not nature- which allows 
therefore for the identification of those responsible for it. This matter has not become securitised, 
as discussed above, in part because of the high level of bilateral collaboration between the two 
countries, which has taken the ‘urgency’ and ‘survival’ factor out of the issue. 
According to the Risk Society perspective, border environmental degradation, in general, 
represents a manufactured risk that is function of global processes manifested in demographic 
change and industrialisation. Border environmental concerns have been approached in U.S.-
Mexican relations from a risk management perspective, which is evident in the existence of a 
long-standing bilateral institutional framework to deal with possible environmental scenarios 
along the common border, which has prevented potential issues from becoming actual security 
concerns. This is the fundamental difference when comparing environmental issues with drug 
trafficking and undocumented immigration that are both located within the security realm. In 
contrast to these two actual security concerns, risk management in the environmental context 
deals with causes more than with both causes/consequences as in the case of the two issues 
above. The boomerang effect in this case is related to the fact that addressing potential 
environmental security issues in the present, only fosters more economic activity in the future 
creating thus the possibility for preventive measures to be insufficient at one point to deal with 
environmental challenges. Nevertheless, the focus of Risk Society on the future provides a more 
complete understanding of environmental concerns than the Buzan et.al perspective that is 
unable to conclusively distinguish between issues that are extremely politicised and those that 
are actually securitised   
 
6.7. Conclusions  
Since the decade of the 1960s and up to the 1990s -this latter decade the focus of this research-, 
intense industrialisation and population growth, occurring mainly on the Mexican side, has 
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affected the environment of the U.S.-Mexico border. These two processes by themselves, 
however, do not fully explain the degradation of environmental conditions. Neglect of the 
border’s environmental infrastructure by both the U.S. and Mexican governments has 
compounded the region’s environmental woes. 
For the United States, the area has been of marginal economic importance compared to 
the rest of the country and, therefore, the focus has been mainly in containing ‘undesirable flows’ 
from the south such as drugs and undocumented immigrants, although there have also been 
sporadic efforts to promote economic development. For Mexico, in contrast, the border has been 
an important platform for economic growth, and this has meant that growth has been promoted 
even at the expense of social and environmental considerations. 
It was the trans-boundary character of environmental problems that led the governments 
of the United States and Mexico to take the first steps to address these matters in the 1980s, even 
before NAFTA’s entry into force and the creation of its bilateral environmental institutions. 
This chapter found that environmental degradation along the U.S.-Mexican border has 
had the potential to affect the well being and, therefore, the security of the U.S. population (as 
well as of the Mexican population) in the area. This analysis has demonstrated that even though 
Mexico has not represented a security threat to the United States in the classical, military, sense, 
trans-boundary environmental challenges related to Mexico, especially water pollution, have had 
the potential to affect the U.S. border population. Insufficient capacity to deal with industrial and 
demographic growth, especially on the Mexican side of the border, has been an outstanding 
aspect of the problem. 
This chapter argued that notwithstanding other environmental concerns such as air 
pollution and contamination produced by solid and hazardous waste, water pollution has been the 
most important environmental risk along the U.S.-Mexico border, based on the evidence found 
during the course of this research. In terms of the Buzan et.al analytical framework, U.S.-Mexico 
border environmental challenges, however, have been basically politicised rather than 
securitised, not only because of the analytical reasons discussed above, but because of the 
presence of a long-standing bilateral institutional framework to deal with environmental matters 
in a mutually convenient way. The potential for an epidemic deriving from water pollution along 
the common border has been an issue that has not been securitised so far by the United States, 
basically because securitising actors have not been successful in presenting this challenge in 
311 
 
terms of survival. The environment, in general, has remained an issue to be addressed within the 
bilateral political arena, and up to now it cannot be identified as a U.S. security issue, 
notwithstanding that U.S. security rhetoric has been increasingly incorporating the environment 
as a matter to be considered under the security logic.  
In terms of the Risk Society theory, environmental degradation at the U.S.-Mexico border 
is a transnational issue that is the expression global economic forces. This concern has been 
focused by both countries from a risk management perspective that is evident in the existence of 
an institutional framework to deal with environmental issues along the common border, which 
has prevented these issues from becoming actual security concerns. In contrast to drug 
trafficking and undocumented immigration, risk management regarding the environment deals 
with causes rather than with consequences, notwithstanding the fact that addressing potential 
environmental issues in the present only delays the emergence of contingencies if the dual 
process of demographic change and industrialisation is not accompanied by investment in 
sufficient environmental infrastructure. Even though both the Buzan et.al and the Risk Society 
perspectives provide useful elements to understand why the environment has not become a 
security concern, the latter provides a more useful explanation than the former because of its 
focus on preventive measures, vis-à-vis the confusion of the former in terms of distinguishing 
















CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Since the end of the ‘Mexican War’ in the first half of the 1800s, and except for a brief period 
during WWII when co-operation between the armed forces of the two countries increased, it can 
be argued that military factors have not played a central role in the U.S.-Mexico security 
relationship.  
From the U.S. point of view, the Mexican state itself has not represented a traditional (i.e. 
military) threat. Not only are military issues a low priority in the bilateral relationship, but 
Mexico actually contributed to U.S. security during the Cold War, for instance, by remaining a 
stable neighbour. In so far as Mexico presents a security threat to the United States, from the 
U.S. point of view, this threat emanates from non-state actors operating along the common 
border, taking advantage of a de facto existence of an integrated illegal drug and labour market. 
The paradox of U.S.-Mexican relations, nevertheless, is that at the same time that NAFTA 
intensified the linkages between the two countries, it also increased U.S. concerns about the need 
to protect its Southwest border from ‘undesirable flows’ from Mexico. In this context, the 
imperative of facilitating legitimate, and guarding against illegitimate, exchanges has 
characterised the U.S. security perspective in reference to Mexico in the context of NAFTA. 
Understanding why Mexico represents a threat to the United States in the context of intensified 
economic integration explains the focus of this thesis on the 1990s.  
A broader conception of security from the ‘non-traditional’ literature of security resulted 
useful to analyse the threat Mexico indirectly poses to the United States. From the several strands 
of the post-positivist literature on security, this thesis opted for the Buzan et.al analytical 
framework because it is the one that offers a more comprehensive explanation of the issues under 
consideration in terms of the scope of security, in contrast to other perspectives that only 
emphasise the constructivist aspect of security. For instance, the Buzan et.al perspective includes 
both a process (securitisation) that explains why an issue becomes securitised, by who, and under 
what circumstances, as well as a structure (security issue-sectors) that explain the impact of 
security challenges in one area on others, providing thus a more comprehensive understanding of 
the dynamics characterising a security issue in a context where the state remains a dominant 
rather than a central actor. This perspective, nevertheless, was complemented with insights from 
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Risk Society theory that provide an in-depth perspective of security by explaining the logic 
behind the designation of security concerns. 
The identification of the issues under consideration in this thesis was based on a 
methodology that included reviewing first the U.S. military strategy in order to identify Mexico’s 
military relevance for the United States from the own U.S. perspective. Since the Mexican state 
itself did not pose a military threat to the United States in the 1990s, very little was found by 
looking at U.S. defence strategy. Based on the guidelines established by the 1997 QDR, Mexico 
did not appear to be a priority for the United States in strict military terms. The most important 
finding in this regard was that the U.S. armed forces were directed to support the activities of 
LEAs along the common border by providing them infrastructure and intelligence to forestall 
trans-border security concerns, mainly drug trafficking. Mexico was nowhere addressed in a 
direct way in the whole QDR. 
 When examination turned to the broader 1997 A National Security Strategy for A New 
Century, however, it was then possible to appreciate the full dimension of Mexico’s relevance 
for U.S. national security not only in terms of challenges but also in relation to opportunities in 
the areas of trade, energy and promotion of democracy. Regarding drug trafficking, Mexico was 
an explicit U.S. concern because of the need to stem the flow of drugs through the Western 
Hemisphere transit zone of which Mexico is part. No mention was made, nevertheless, of 
Mexico as a producer country. Even though undocumented immigration was singled out as a 
major trans-national issue within the hemisphere, Mexico was not explicitly addressed in relation 
of this issue, notwithstanding the fact that the country is a major source of both legal and 
undocumented immigration to the United States, and this is the reason why, from the point of 
view of this thesis, it was relevant to analyse it as a security issue by default. It is important to 
note that Mexico was not mentioned at all in terms of environmental degradation. This thesis 
analysed U.S.-Mexico border environmental issues, nevertheless, because of two important 
reasons: first, in order to get a more comprehensive understanding of security at the border by 
analysing issues that are both actual and potential security concerns; and second, to demonstrate 
that non-traditional security perspectives are equally useful to analyse the two types of issues. 
Firstly, regarding the illicit trade in drugs -which is not a new phenomenon-, it is 
important to mention that drug issues became prominent in the bilateral relationship after WWII 
when drug use increased in the United States. Drugs have remained one of the most important 
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items of the bilateral relationship, and it actually was a major source of tension during the 1980s 
and the 1990s. Yet, while Mexico has been a key country for U.S. anti-drug efforts, the bilateral 
management of the issue has been asymmetrical by being defined mainly in U.S. terms (i.e. by 
stressing the supply-side of the problem). While attacking the supply side of the problem has 
been the least politically costly alternative for Washington, it has failed to address the problem 
and thus has not contributed to further U.S. security. Not only has U.S. drug policy failed to 
make progress towards its stated goal of protecting the well being of U.S. citizens; it has also put 
Mexico’s stability at risk by externalising the costs of fighting drugs. The consequence for 
Mexico has been the need to confront stronger drug organisations and greater corruption within 
its security agencies.  
The combination of persistent demand in the United States and failed Mexican control 
efforts has had serious security implications for both countries. In the United States, drug use not 
only impairs the health and well being of U.S. citizens but also saps its economic strength, 
burdens its criminal justice system, and degrades its social values. In Mexico, drug trafficking 
has generated violence and induced the concentration of law enforcement resources in anti-drug 
activities in a society whose main demand, in the last decades, has been for more public safety. 
One of the most serious threats to Mexico, however, has been increasing corruption among its 
law and order institutions and, in recent years, the high level of drug-related violence in the 
country. Moreover, the use of the military for anti-drug operations has exposed it to drug money, 
thus jeopardising its prestige, its cohesion, and its historic role as one of the guarantors of the 
country’s stability. 
Drug trafficking and consumption have been successfully securitised in the United States 
because the audience, the public and the U.S. government itself, have legitimised the ‘breaking 
of rules’ to use ‘extreme measures’ to deal with an ‘existential threat’ conceived in terms of 
‘survival’, because of its negative social, economic and political consequences in the country. 
The acceptance of drugs as a security issue has been facilitated not only because of a genuine 
concern for its impact on the society’s health, but also because it has been a convenient 
justification to keep considerable law enforcement structures and budgets, as well as U.S. 
influence abroad on producer and transit countries. This emphasis on coercive rather than on 
treatment measures, however, has demonstrated that the U.S. securitisation of drugs has not been 
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an effective measure because of the evident failure of the U.S. sponsored so-called ‘war on 
drugs’.     
The central securitising actor that has traditionally used the ‘speech act’ to securitise 
drugs in the United States has been the federal government, mainly by framing the issue as a law 
enforcement/national security rather than as a health matter. This perspective has justified the 
coercive approach to the problem, in particular the supply- in detriment of the demand-side of 
the issue. The U.S. response to drugs has not only been forceful, but it has also been oriented 
towards transferring the cost of combating drugs abroad. This one-sided and asymmetric 
perspective, in turn, has been endorsed by state and local governments that have defined drugs 
also as a security issue and, therefore, as a law enforcement matter more in general. The 
securitisation has been successful to the extent that this perception has easily translated into 
accepting and legitimising the government discourse on drugs as a security matter, which is 
reflected in considerable law enforcement budgets and coercive anti-drug aid abroad. In this 
context, the discourse about ‘secure our borders’ has justified not only the need to protect against 
terrorist threats (especially after 9/11 which is a period beyond the scope of this thesis), but also 
the continuation of the coercive approach to drugs and undocumented immigration from Mexico.  
The audience that accepts and legitimises the designation of drugs as a security issue in 
the United States is made up of the same stake-holders that propose it, especially the government 
through the law enforcement agencies for whom combating drugs represents the continuity, 
growth and permanence of their institutions. The interests and the intentions of those who 
securitise drugs are related, first, to the genuine concern over preventing social erosion and the 
impact consumption has on new generations. Moreover, the politicisation of the issue is reflected 
in the fact that governments at every level cannot afford to be perceived by the population as 
being ‘soft on drugs’, because this posture is not in accordance with the generally accepted, and 
politically convenient, ‘war on drugs’ rhetoric. In more specific and practical terms, there is an 
interest in maintaining drugs as a security matter because the acceptance of this threat is essential 
for justifying the significant budgets that keep the ‘law enforcement industry’ working, because 
drugs not only imply substance trafficking and consumption, but also a variety of associated 
crimes such as robberies, rapes, extortion, street violence, gang activity and public corruption, 
that in turn require responses in terms of police personnel, equipment, courts, and prisons.   
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It could be argued that drug trafficking is, in principle, an economic challenge emerging 
from the forces of demand and supply in the context of an integrated market for drugs. In the 
United States, drug trafficking originates from the economic security sector because of the 
existence of an integrated illegal drug market with Mexico, but it is also related to the societal 
security sector inasmuch as it threatens the population itself. Additionally, it affects the political 
security sector because of the potential for corruption within institutions, and because it 
contributes to increase crime rates. Potential large-scale violence resulting from drug control in 
Mexico also raises the possibility for Mexicans to migrate to the United States in search of a 
safer environment. In this context, the United States could face a challenge in the societal 
security sector as a result of a potential significant inflow of people from the south. To sum up, a 
challenge of an economic nature has important effects on the societal and political sectors in the 
United States. 
In terms of Risk Society theory, drug trafficking is a trans-national concern related to the 
existence of an integrated drug market between Mexico and the United States, which is the 
product of an illicit global process and therefore a manufactured risk. In the United States, drug 
trafficking has been designated an actual security concern that has affected the social fabric of 
the country, and in the context of possible scenarios, it is considered not only to worsen social 
conditions but also negatively affect future generations. The United States has responded to this 
challenge through a risk management perspective that deals through law enforcement measures 
with both its actual and potential manifestation. So far, the coercive approach has only resulted 
in more incentives for DTOs to carry on with their lucrative activities, and this is a situation that 
will continue in the foreseeable future as long as drug demand remains unadressed. 
Secondly, in addition to drugs, undocumented immigration is one of the most complex 
and sensitive items in the bilateral agenda. There are several factors that explain the sustained 
movement of Mexicans, legal and undocumented, to the United States. They are the so-called 
‘demand-pull’ factors in the United States and ‘supply-push’ factors in Mexico, as well as the 
existence of ‘social networks’ across the U.S.-Mexican border. Even though immigration matters 
were not addressed within NAFTA negotiations, it was argued that the agreement would 
stimulate investment in Mexico and that it would generate more jobs that would prevent the need 
to emigrate in search of work. While Mexico expected that the agreement would facilitate 
dialogue on reducing barriers to immigration, the United States only intensified its efforts to 
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stem undesirable flows, including unauthorised migrants across the border, through enhanced 
law enforcement and border infrastructure. As a matter of fact, in the United States a clear link 
was established between immigration and terrorism after the 9/11 events.  
In the debates about undocumented immigration in the United States, emphasis has often 
been placed on its negative effects and the country has responded accordingly by increasing its 
law enforcement measures. Changes in U.S. immigration policy have responded to the 
perception of immigration either as an asset or a liability, which often depends on the economic 
and political context of the nation. There is considerable debate over whether undocumented 
immigration tends to suppress the wages of native-born workers or whether it imposes a net 
burden on the public treasury. Regarding the last question, it can be argued that while 
undocumented immigrants do impose a fiscal burden in some individual states, they actually 
contribute more to the federal government in taxes than they receive in services.  
What causes Mexican immigration to be perceived as a security concern, more than its 
economic or political impact, is the perception in the United States that Mexican immigration, 
especially undocumented, could undermine the identity of the country. A U.S. concern is the fear 
that an influx of Mexican immigrants could weaken the cultural identity of the country should 
they take advantage of their large numbers and geographical concentration to collectively resist 
pressure to assimilate. Though the evidence pointing to such a scenario is weak, it is difficult to 
dispel anxieties over immigrant assimilation, perhaps due to latent and unstated concerns over 
the dilution of dominant racial and ethnic, rather than merely cultural, identities. 
The main securitising actors in the field of immigration are the anti-immigrant groups 
that include nativists, right-wing radicals and conservative organisations, more in general, who 
are worried first and foremost about the erosion of identity. There are some unions and Hispanic 
groups as well that perceive competition from newcomers. These sectors are supported by 
individual politicians and by each of the political parties, for different economic or ideological 
reasons. Some of the important actors securitising immigration, nevertheless, are state 
governments with a sizeable presence of undocumented immigrants. They bear the brunt of the 
social and economic costs associated with this presence, on the one hand, and are those which 
also press the federal government to deal with the problem as its own responsibility, on the other 
hand. Official actors such as the Border Patrol, for instance, also securitise the subject because of 
the need to maintain the vitality of the ‘law enforcement industry’ referred to above.  
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The designation of immigration as a security issue has been successful to the extent that it 
has been accepted by the audience, including those who promote it as such. In this context, 
governments have the obligation to respond to public demands to put in place measures to stop 
what is seen as an ‘invasion’. The government is an important part of the audience accepting 
immigration as a security issue, and the evidence has been the creation of a DHS not only at the 
federal level but also within the bureaucratic structures of states on the Northern and the 
Southwest borders.  
In Buzan et.al’s terms, undocumented immigration is first of all a threat to identity within 
the societal sector. It is a threat because the presence of a large racially and linguistically distinct 
population in the United States is presumed to weaken the assimilation process. Undocumented 
immigration from Mexico could become a threat to U.S. security in the military sector if a 
serious deterioration of Mexican stability resulted in a mass movement of people to the United 
States, which might, in turn, compel the U.S. armed forces to seal the Southwest border. Even 
though this challenge emerges in the societal sector, it is of an economic nature due to the 
existence of a de facto integrated labour market between Mexico and the United States. This is 
another example of the challenges created by the growing interdependence between the two 
countries.       
 In the United States, the securitisation process of undocumented immigration has been 
successful, as mentioned above, to the extent that the audience has legitimised the ‘breaking of 
rules’ and the use of ‘extraordinary measures’ to confront the challenge, which has been evident 
not only in the series of restrictive immigration legislation approved by the U.S. Congress and 
local legislatures, but also in the sizeable budgets appropriated for LEAs dealing with border 
security.  
 The U.S. law enforcement approach to the issue, however, was not up to the task of 
effectively dealing with problem, which has been evident in its negative effects reflected in the 
strengthening of the human smuggling business, the use of false documents at U.S. POEs, 
increasing corruption and undocumented immigrant deaths at the common border. These coercive 
measures have not prevented the continuation of the illegal flows, basically because they have not 
addressed the root of the problem, which has been the U.S. economy’s continued demand for 
foreign labour due to structural factors that have been beyond the control of both the U.S. and the 
Mexican governments, this latter because of its inability to stabilise its labour market. 
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Undocumented immigration might be a self inflicted predicament created by the United States 
resulting from the process of globalisation U.S. foreign policy has vigorously pursued around the 
world. 
 From the Risk society perspective, undocumented immigration is a trans-national security 
concern that is the product of an integrated illegal labour market between the United States and 
Mexico, and as such an effect of global economic forces. It is an actual security concern for the 
United States because of its perceived negative effect on the identity of the country and because, 
in a possible future scenario, the intensification of the flow might negatively affect social 
integration in the country. The United States has adopted a risk management approach regarding 
this concern that includes legislative and law enforcement measures to contain the flow. As in 
the case of drug trafficking, this approach does not have the purpose of dealing definitively with 
the problem but only to prevent this risk from growing, even though this course of action has had 
the unintended effect not only of blocking ‘circular migration’ but also increasing both the 
profits of criminal organisations and deaths at the common border.       
 Thirdly, decades of intense economic activity and a rapidly increasing population have 
transformed the U.S.-Mexico border region’s environment. Growth has outpaced the capacity of 
the local resource base and exceeded the ability of border area governments, especially on the 
Mexican side, to establish new infrastructure to keep up with greater demands. Degradation of 
air and water quality standards, as well as pollution generated by hazardous waste, pose health 
risks to residents on both sides of the boundary. 
The U.S.-Mexico border is one of the longest and busiest international boundaries in the 
world. Because communities on both sides of the boundary share the same natural resources, 
scarcity, but especially contamination, could become a problematic issue. The sizeable flow of 
people moving back and forth across the dividing line reminds that an outbreak of contagious 
disease on one side of the border would also require the attention of both nations. This study 
establishes that, although air quality degradation and inadequate disposal of hazardous waste do 
have an impact on environmental conditions along the border, water issues represent the greatest 
potential for directly affecting the U.S. population in the area.  
Problems related to water pollution represent the most serious environmental challenge to 
U.S. security in the region, because of the potential for waterborne diseases to spread on both 
sides of the boundary. Because of common access to water sources and the intense two-way flow 
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of people across the border, the boundary line would pose no barrier to the transmission of 
disease. Such an epidemic would have broader consequences than the health problems caused 
either by air pollution or hazardous waste due to its mode of transmission and the higher risk of 
contagion. Moreover, even though water infrastructure in the region has improved in recent 
years, there are important needs yet to be met that represent potential vulnerabilities to the 
outbreak of disease. Such a scenario constitutes a hazard to the U.S. population and, as such, a 
potential challenge to U.S. security. There are, of course, other potential consequences of 
pollution besides epidemic diseases. Collectively, however, an epidemic is the most important 
concern. 
In general terms, in the United States the environment is a subject more politicised than 
securitised, even though there is a concern for the environmental matters that is present in the 
discussion about security. Notwithstanding that the U.S. government reflects preoccupation 
regarding the development of clean technologies and renewable energy, there are several 
international instances where the United States has not shown a decided commitment in 
reference to the protection of the environment. 
The main securitising actors that attempt the securitising move regarding the environment 
are the NGOs and the segments of the scientific community, for whom environmental matters 
represent a priority and, therefore, are interested in placing the issue at the top of the 
governmental agenda. In fact, trying to securitise the subject (portraying it as an extreme 
concern) is often the only way to elevate it (i.e. to politicise it) within the agenda. 
The audience in relation to this matter includes the government and the public in general. 
Nevertheless, the level of acceptance is different for each of them. For the government, for 
instance, it is more difficult to accept the securitising move because of bureaucracies, in general, 
are better placed to securitise the effects rather than the causes of environmental degradation. In 
reference to the general public, if it is true that it is more open to be concerned about the 
environment, it is important to consider that only a small fraction is in fact receptive of 
environmental problems, and for this reason its influence is limited, at best. In the case of water 
pollution along the U.S.-Mexican border, the pattern of the issue is similar to what the Buzan 
et.al perspective describes in its analytical framework; that is, in the majority of cases, the 
securitising move in relation to environmental issues results in politicisation rather than in 
securitisation. At the end, the issues with the greatest potential to become securitised are the 
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consequences of man-made disasters. It is possible to argue, therefore, that because 
environmental issues are not readily accepted as urgent matters by the audience, they often do 
not become security issues. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the fact that they are not 
accepted as such, does not necessarily mean they do not have the potential to become an actual 
security challenge. This study argues that water pollution along the border can be a security 
matter independently of the actors and the interests. The consequence of accepting this reality, 
nevertheless, would be the need for both governments to aggressively invest in water 
infrastructure in the region. It will take more to construct water pollution along the border as a 
security matter. In the 1990s, both governments were satisfied with doing what they could, and 
were ready to securitise the environment had they ever needed to respond to a major border 
contingency. 
This study found that environmental degradation along the U.S.-Mexican border has had 
the potential to affect the well being and, therefore, the security of the U.S. population (as well as 
of the Mexican population) in the area. This analysis has demonstrated that even though Mexico 
has not represented a security concern to the United States in the classical, military, sense, trans-
boundary environmental challenges related to Mexico, especially water pollution, have had the 
potential to affect the U.S. border population. Insufficient capacity to deal with industrial and 
demographic growth, especially on the Mexican side of the border, has been an outstanding 
aspect of the problem. 
It was argued that notwithstanding other environmental concerns such as air pollution and 
contamination produced by solid and hazardous waste, water pollution was the most important 
environmental risk along the U.S.-Mexico border in the period of study. Environmental issues in 
the region were politicised rather than securitised, not only because of the analytical reasons 
discussed above, but because of the presence of a long-standing bilateral institutional 
infrastructure to deal with environmental matters in a mutually convenient way. The potential for 
an epidemic deriving from water pollution along the common border was not securitised by the 
United States, because securitising actors were not successful in presenting this challenge in 
terms of survival. The environment, in general, has remained an issue to be addressed within the 
bilateral political arena, and it cannot be identified as a U.S. security issue, notwithstanding that 
U.S. official rhetoric has been increasingly incorporating the environment as a matter to be 
considered under the security logic. 
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According to Risk Society theory, environmental degradation at the U.S.-Mexico border 
is a transnational issue that is the result of global economic forces. Potential environmental 
concerns have given way to a risk management perspective that is based on a bilateral 
institutional framework to deal with the causes rather than with the consequences of 
environmental issues along the common border. Addressing potential environmental issues in the 
present, nevertheless, only delays the emergence of contingencies if the dual process of 
demographic change and industrialisation in the region is not accompanied by investment in 
environmental infrastructure. By focusing on prevention, Risk Society theory provides a useful 
explanation as to why the environment has not so far become a border security concern either for 
the United States or Mexico.   
This thesis concludes, therefore, that the paradox at the basis of this study is explained by 
the intensification of trans-border challenges as a result of a higher level of interdependence 
between the United States and Mexico in the 1990s in the context of NAFTA. 
In terms of the non-traditional security perspectives, drug trafficking is an explicit U.S. 
security concern because it has been successfully securitised by the U.S. government by 
affecting the societal and political issue sectors. From a Risk Society approach, it is an issue 
focused from a risk management perspective that requires to be contained in the absence of 
meaningful demand-reduction policies. 
 Undocumented immigration is an implicit U.S. security concern successfully securitised 
by state governments and public opinion because of its impact on the societal security sector, in 
particular its deleterious effect on U.S. identity. It is also an issue addressed through a risk 
management orientation because of the existence of structural factors both in Mexico and in the 
United States that are likely to encourage the continuation of the flow in the foreseeable future. 
Environmental degradation, in particular water pollution, represents a potential U.S. 
security concern that has remained outside the security realm because of efforts at securitisation 
have only produced its politicisation, and because of the existence of an institutional framework 
that, albeit insufficient, has so far prevented it from becoming a security issue. The emphasis on 
preventive measures to deal with potential environmental contingencies, nevertheless, explains 
why this issue has remained outside the security realm, notwithstanding that managing efforts at 
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